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This  thesis  is  concerned  with  the  meaning  of  metaphors.  In  particular,  it  examines  a 
contemporary  dispute  in  the  philosophy  of  language,  primarily  comprising  critical 
responses  to  Donald  Davidson's  seminal  work  in  the  area,  which  focuses  on  the  question 
of  whether  metaphorical  utterances,  qua  metaphors,  ought  to  receive  distinctive  semantic 
evaluations.  I  treat  this  debate  as  an  instance  of  a  more  general  form  of  philosophical 
dispute,  which  has  been  explored  in  some  detail  in  recent  work  on  the  nature  of  realism 
and  anti-realism. 
The  thesis  has  five  chapters.  In  the  first  chapter,  I  outline,  motivate  and  evaluate  two 
contrasting  approaches  to  realism,  proposed  by  Michael  Devitt  and  Crispin  Wright.  I 
argue  that  neither  is  wholly  satisfactory,  but  that  a  modified  version  of  Wright's 
approach  is  likely  to  be  most  fruitful  in  the  philosophy  of  metaphor.  In  the  second 
chapter,  I  examine  the  character  of  Davidson's  anti-realism,  concluding  that  he  is best 
thought  of  as  an  error-Theorist  about  metaphorical  meaning.  I  go  on  to  set  out  a  unified 
Davidsonian  argument  for  semantic  and  pragmatic  anti-realism  about  metaphor,  and 
offer  a  sustained  discussion  and  partial  defence  of  the  six  premises  that  such  an 
argument  proceeds  from. 
My  third  chapter  outlines  a  series  of  common  objections  to  Davidson's  views,  and 
argues  that  error-theorists  have  the  resources  to  address  many  of  these  criticisms  in  a 
fairly  plausible  manner.  In  the  fourth  chapter,  I  go  on  to  investigate  the  realist  standing 
of  metaphorical  meaning  in  more  detail.  I  examine  the  open-endedness  of  metaphor  in 
the  light  of  Wright's  response-dependent  theory  of  intention,  and  argue  that  this 
approach  offers  a  novel  response  to  certain  anti-realist  concerns. 
The  fifth  chapter  concerns  the  relationship  between  metaphor  and  non-conceptual 
content.  I  argue  that  thinking  of  metaphorical  meanings  as  non-conceptual  entails  that 
the  non-propositional  and  limitless  character  of  metaphor  does  not  pose  a  fatal  objection 
to  a  pragmatic  realist  account,  contra  Davidson.  I  apply  my  suggested  account  to  two 
test  cases:  metaphors  that  describe  one's  emotional  state,  and  religious  metaphors,  and 
2 argue  that  in  each  case,  thinking  of  the  metaphors  as  expressing  non-conceptual  contents 
is  potentially  suggestive  and  helpful.  In  that  chapter,  I  also  examine  the  possibility  of  an 
robustly  realist  approach  to  metaphorical  meaning,  modelled  on  the  epistemicist 
approach  to  vagueness  set  out  in  recent  work  by  Timothy  Williamson.  I  demonstrate 
how  the  dominant  objection  to  this  account  can  be  partially  defused,  and  go  on  to 
examine  the  final  standing  of  the  dispute  between  realist  and  anti-realist. 
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6 Preface 
In  this  essay,  I  examine  some  of  the  ways  in  which  a  particular  debate  in  the  philosophy 
of  metaphor  -a  debate  which  concerns,  to  put  it  crudely,  the  question  of  whether 
metaphors  have  meaning  -  can  inform,  and  be  informed  by,  contemporary  reflections  on 
realism  and  anti-realism.  This  choice  of  subject  matter  has  the  distinct  disadvantage  that 
neither  topic  is  particularly  pre-theoretically  gripping.  On  the  one  hand,  reflection  on 
the  core  elements  shared  by,  say,  moral  realism,  scientific  realism  and  mathematical 
Platonism  is  an  especially  abstruse  variety  of  philosophical  activity,  one  where  obtaining 
the  requisite  alpine  clarity  of  overview  requires  getting  accustomed  to  thinner  air  than 
that  which  surrounds  the  more  pressing,  felt,  substantive,  first-order  philosophical 
problems.  The  interest  of  undergraduates  or  non-philosophers  is  more  easily  sparked 
when  considering  the  nature  of  scientific  success,  or  the  problems  of  reconciling  the 
claims  of  justice  and  welfare,.  than  when  identifying  the  best  formulation  of  cognitivism, 
or  the  relationship  between  metaphysical  and  semantic  accounts  of  realism. 
Metaphor  might  seem  a  juicier  topic  of  discussion  than  realism,  but  the  particular 
question  of  metaphorical  meaning  is  rarely  felt  to  be  worthy  of  serious  consideration. 
Blank  stares  from  the  folk  are  hardly  unsurprising  in  this  area.  If  by  `meaning'  we  mean 
the  property  that  ordinary  speakers  of  English  tend  to  attribute  in  their  talk  about 
meaning  and  meaningfulness,  it  can  scarcely  be  denied  that  metaphors  are  meaningful. 
The  debate  I  am  concerned  with,  unsurprisingly,  appeals  to  a  more  technical  notion  of 
metaphorical  meaning;  otherwise  this  would  be  a  very  short  book.  Once  again,  however, 
the  price  of  precision  and  theoretical  interest  is  a  certain  dislocation  from  first  order 
issues.  It  is  easy  to  feel,  when  reading  even  the  best  work  by  analytic  philosophers  on 
the  topic  of  metaphor  that  something  has  been  lost;  that  the  original  motivation  for 
engaging  in  talk  of  metaphorical  meaning  involved  some  quite  separate  impulse,  perhaps 
misplaced  or  ill-conceived,  but  in  any  case  somewhat  orthogonal  to  the  debates  that  we 
find  ourselves  engaging  in. 
7 I  do  not  in  any  way  intend  these  remarks  to  signal  a  lack  of  engagement  with,  or 
enthusiasm  for,  the  question  of  realism,  or  the  methodology  of  analytic  philosophy  of 
language.  My  sympathies  lie  wholly  with  that  tradition.  The  point  is  rather  simply  to 
signal  explicitly  that  this  book,  like  those  of  many  analytic  philosophers,  may  deliver 
results  that  are  less  well  integrated  with  efforts  in  other  arts  and  humanities  subjects,  and 
with  the  wider  practical  concerns  of  those  whose  work  or  life  involves  grappling  with 
language,  than  might  have  been  hoped.  I  would  have  liked  to  have  written  a  book  that 
had  some  consequences  for  the  way  real  metaphors  are  actually  thought  about  and 
interpreted.  I  might  yet,  but  I  rather  fear  this  is  not  it. 
8 1.  Truth,  Realism  and  Balance 
1.1  Introduction 
The  aim  of  this  book  is  to  examine  the  way  in  which  recent  work  on  realism  might  help 
advance  attempts  to  give  a  satisfactory  answer  the  following  question:  do  metaphors, 
qua  metaphors,  express  distinctive  linguistic  meanings?  In  this  chapter,  I  begin  to  set 
out  what  I  take  to  be  the  most  constructive  way  of  characterizing  the  nature  of  the  debate 
between  realists  and  anti-realists  in  general,  considered  in  abstraction  from  any  given 
subject  matter.  My  hope  is  that  regarding  the  disagreement  between  those  theorists  who 
think  that  metaphors  are  typically  associated  with  characteristic  meanings,  and  those 
who  do  not,  as  a  special  instance  of  such  a  general  form  of  debate  about  realism,  will 
cast  some  welcome  light  on  some  difficult  issues  in  the  philosophy  of  metaphor.  I  begin 
this  more  challenging  work  in  later  chapters.  For  the  present,  my  concern  is  primarily 
elucidatory. 
I  introduce  the  topic,  in  Sections  1.2-1.5,  by  elaborating  two  influential  contemporary 
conceptions  of  that  debate,  presented  in  recent  work  by  Michael  Devitt  and  Crispin 
Wright.  '  I  argue  that  the  generality  and  topic-neutrality  of  Wright's  conception  offers  a 
more  attractive  approach  for  our  purposes,  and  that  there  are  in  any  case  some  reasons  to 
remain  suspicious  of  Devitt's  presentation  of  the  issues.  Since  much  of  the  interest  of 
Wright's  approach  relates  to  the  `cruces',  or  tests  for  the  realist  standing  of  a  given  type 
of  fact,  that  he  outlines,  I  go  on  to  examine  and  discuss  a  selection  of  such  criteria  in 
some  detail  in  the  next  four  sections. 
However,  I  do  not  embrace  Wright's  approach  uncritically.  In  the  final  section,  I  raise 
some  worries  which  relate  to  the  putatively  unassuming  character  of  a  minimalist 
approach  to  truth,  and,  relatedly,  to  the  suggestion  that  an  anti-realist  construal  of  a 
given  area  of  thought  ought  to  be  the  default  dialectical  position.  I  conclude  by  briefly 
1  See  Devitt  (1997)  and  Wright  (1992) 
9 outlining  a  conception  of  the  realist/anti-realist  debate  that  seems  to  me  to  respect  many 
of  Wright's  key  insights,  but  which  seems  to  avoid  some  of  the  more  unwelcome 
implications  of  his  position. 
1.2  Realism,  Existence  and  Independence 
Michael  Devitt  has  argued  that  we  ought  to  characterise  realism  about  the  external  world 
in  the  following  terms: 
Devitt's  Realism  Tokens  of  most  current  common-sense  and  scientific  physical 
types  objectively  exist  independently  of  the  mental.  2 
The  various  elements  of  this  definition  require  some  elucidation.  Devitt  tells  us  that  for 
a  token  of  some  common-sense  type  (chairs,  tables,  mountains)  or  scientific  type 
(electrons,  quarks)  to  exist  objectively  is  to  for  the  object  not  to  be 
constituted  by  our  knowledge,  by  our  epistemic  values,  by  our  capacity  to  refer  to  it,  by 
the  synthesizing  power  of  the  mind,  by  our  imposition  of  concepts,  theories,  or 
languages.  3 
It  is  not  wholly  clear  what  Devitt  means  by  an  object  being  `constituted  by  our 
knowledge',  or  by  our  epistemic  values,  but  the  thrust  of  the  thought  about  objective 
existence  is,  I  hope,  clear.  His  common-sense  realist  thinks  of  the  world  as  being  as  it  is 
regardless  of  our  epistemic  and  semantic  access  to  it. 
Such  a  conception  of  objectivity  might  seem  to  make  the  qualification  regarding 
independence  from  the  mental  redundant.  Devitt,  recognises  this  possibility,  but  argues 
that  it  is  worth  including  it  to  forestall  the  possibility  that  a  sophisticated  anti-realist 
might  posit  unknowable  or  unconceptualized  entities,  that  were  nevertheless  somehow 
dependent  on  minds  for  their  existence.  Perhaps  certain  past,  non-actualised  `permanent 
possibilities  of  sensation'  might  have  this  status,  for  example.  Such  an  anti-realist  might 
2  See  Devitt  (1997)  Ch.  2,  passim. 
3  Ibid,  p.  15 
10 argue  that  she  too  could  provide  an  account  of  our  common-sense  intuitions  regarding 
the  objective  existence,  in  the  above  sense,  of  the  external  world. 
In  any  case,  Devitt  is  surely  right  to  endorse  the  idea  that  realism  about  an  external 
world  commits  one  to  this  kind  of  modesty  -  to  use  Wright's  terminology  -  in 
characterising  the  degree  to  which  the  existence  and  nature  of  the  external  world 
depends  on  human  minds  and  cognitive  abilities.  It  is  also  common  ground  that  such 
realism  involves  a  certain  epistemic  presumption,  marked  in  the  case  at  hand  by  Devitt's 
inclusion  of  ontological  commitment  to  many  of  the  entities  postulated  by  contemporary 
scientific  theory.  Let  us  grant,  finally,  that  anti-realism  about  the  external  world  can  be 
characterised  in  general  terms  as  the  rejection  of  either  such  modesty  or  presumption.  4 
I  have  deliberately  laid  stress  upon  the  sense  in  which  Devitt  and  Wright  agree  on  a  core 
general  characterisation  of  realism,  and,  ipso  facto,  anti-realism.  The  key  elements  - 
independence  and  existence,  modesty  and  presumption  -  comprise  a  shared  and  plausible 
background  theory,  even  if  differences  of  emphasis  remain.  Issues  become  more 
contentious,  and  more  immediately  pertinent  to  the  project  at  hand,  with  the  following 
questions 
1.  Is  it  unproblematic  to  extend  this  kind  of  general  picture  of  realism  to  debates 
between  realists  and  anti-realists.  in  other  areas  of  discourse? 
2.  How  might  actual  debates  between  realists  and  anti-realists  be  profitably 
prosecuted? 
3.  Given  the  above  intuitive  characterisations  give  a  satisfactory  account  of  realism 
and  anti-realism  in  general,  which  particular  species  of  each  genus  are  tenable, 
and  which  most  plausible,  in  particular  disputes? 
Much  of  this  book  will  examine  potential  answers  to  the  third  question  with  reference  to 
the  special  case  of  realism  about  metaphorical  meaning.  I  will  concentrate  for  the 
4  See  Wright  (1992)  pp.  1-3 
11 moment,  therefore,  on  briefly  examining  the  divergent  answers  that  Devitt  and  Wright 
offer  to  the  first  two  questions. 
1.3  Extending  Devitt's  Account? 
Devitt  is  explicitly  concerned  with  realism  about  the  external  world,  committed  to  the 
existence  and  mind-independence  of  both  common-sense  and  scientific  entities.  He 
does,  however,  extend  his  account  beyond  this  domain.  For  example,  he  argues  for  a 
certain  realist  attitudes  towards  semantics,  which  he  call  `the  factual  perspective'.  5  He  is 
also  defends  a  certain  kind  of  value  realism,  with  respect  to  epistemic  value.  6  These 
further  realisms  are  defended,  in  part,  by  appeal  to  external  world  realism,  but  it  should 
be  clear  that  they  are  logically  independent  from  it.  (For  example,  Davidsonians  reject 
the  factual  perspective  on  semantics,  and  many  philosophers  would  feel  suspicious  of 
the  claim  that  empirical  procedures  can  establish  normative  claims.  )  Each  of  these 
further  realist  theories,  however,  fits  more  or  less  into  the  model  Devitt  has  set  out  as 
constitutive  of  external  world  realism.  In  each  case,  instances  of  semantic  and  epistemic 
properties  are  thought  of  as  existing  objectively,  and  doing  so  in  a  manner  which  is  not 
constitutively  dependent  on  human  cognitive  responses.  7 
Moreover,  each  of  the  realist  accounts  that  Devitt  offers  are  in  accord  with  a  certain  set 
of  methodological  `maxims'  that  he  offers: 
Maxim  1  In  considering  realism,  distinguish  the  constitutive  and  evidential  issues. 
5  See  e.  g.  Devitt  (1997)  p.  190:  "From  [the  factual]  perspective  the  semantic  properties  of  symbols  are 
explanatory  in  theories  of  mind  and  language.  Thus,  on  the  one  hand,  their  existence  is  supported  by  a 
wide  spectrum  of  evidence,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  their  nature  is  not  determined  by  that  evidence". 
6  Ibid  p.  78  "I  see  no  reason  to  doubt  that  most  questions  of  the  goodness  of  [epistemic]  procedures  are 
concerned  with  objective  matters  of  fact.  Though  this  normative  task  is  outside  psychology,  it  is  not 
outside  science...  It  is  an  empirical,  question  which  procedures  are  good". 
Except  perhaps  per  accidens,  as  when  all  the  instantiated  semantic  properties  are  properties  of  creatures 
with  minds.  It  is  not  clear  what  Devitt  should  say  about  this  kind  of  case. 
12 Maxim  2  Distinguish  the  metaphysical  (ontological)  issues  of  realism  from  any 
semantic  issue. 
Maxim  3  Settle  the  realism  issue  before  any  epistemic  or  semantic  issue. 
Maxim  4  In  considering  the  semantic  issue,  don't  take  truth  for  granted. 
Maxim  5  Distinguish  the  issue  of  correspondence  truth  from  any  epistemic  issue. 
It  is  not  wholly  clear  what  the  status  of  such  maxims  are.  There  is  clearly  something 
right  about  the  idea  that  e.  g.  epistemological,  metaphysical  and  semantic  issues  can  often 
be  profitably  distinguished  from  one  another.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  something 
uncomfortable  -  at  least  it  feels  so  to  me  -  about  taking  such  maxims  to  be  simply  an 
expression  of  methodological  inclination.  I  shall  try  and  give  more  substance  to  this 
intuition  in  my  discussion  of  the  self-reflective  worries  for  Wright's  minimalism  in 
Section  1.10  below. 
For  the  moment,  I  simply  want  to  note  that,  even  if  we  follow  such  maxims,  there  is 
some  reason  to  wonder  whether  Devitt's  model  of  external  world  realism  can  be 
extended  straightforwardly  to  cover  other  realist/anti-realist  disputes.  Bernhard  Weiss, 
for  example,  claims  that  if 
we  thought  of  realism  as  a  view  about  a  certain  range  of  entities  then  we  would  miss  the 
potential  similarities  between  realism  about,  say,  other  minds  and  realism  about  the  past 
(where  norange  of  entities  seems  to  be  under  discussion).  8 
Weiss's  latter  example  is,  perhaps,  poorly  chosen.  At  least  one  realist/anti-realist  debate 
about  the  past  -  that  conducted  between  eternalists  and  presentists  -  precisely  turns  on 
the  existence  or  non-existence  of  a  range  of  entities,  with  the  eternalist  holding,  and  the 
presentists  denying,  that  past  and  future  objects  and  events  exist  in  just  the  same  sense  as 
present  ones  do.  I  think  his  general  point  is  well  taken,  though.  There  are  cases  where  it 
is  difficult  to  think  of  realism  as  consisting  in  the  combination  of  existence  and 
8  Weiss  (2002)  p.  51 
13 independence  that  Devitt  appeals  to  in  the  case  of  common-sense  objects.  One  example 
might  be  the  debate  about  the  existence  of  qualia.  Neither  friends  nor  foes  of  qualia 
need  think  of  them  as  existing  wholly  independently  of  human  subjective  responses; 
quite  the  opposite.  Both  realists  about  qualia  and  their  opponents  can  accept  that  the 
existence  of  qualia  depends  on  their  being  perceived.  This  seems  straightforwardly 
inconsistent  with  Devitt's  characterisation  of  independence.  9  Perhaps  some  adjustment 
could  be  made  to  that  theory,  to  allow  us  to  state  the  similarities  and  differences  between 
external  world  realism  and  qualia  realism  perspicuously.  Surely,  however,  it  is 
methodologically  desirable,  when  engaging  in  reflection  on  philosophical  debates  and 
positions,  to  be  able  to  operate  at  a  level  of  abstraction  that  enables  us  to  draw  analogies 
directly  with  similar  debates  in  other  areas.  It  seems  that  Devitt's  account  of  external 
world  realism  does  not  generalise  straightforwardly  to  other  debates  in  this  way. 
Another  example  might  be  the  debate  between  genuine  modal  realists  and  actualist 
realists.  10  Both  groups  of  theorists  can  hold  that  possible  worlds  exist,  and  that  such 
possible  worlds  are  mind-independent.  There  is  a  real  sense,  however,  in  which  the 
actualist  defends  a  less  realist  position  than  the  genuine  modal  realist.  (That  is  why 
actualist  realism  has  proved  to  be  a  more  attractive  option  in  the  debates  about 
modality).  A  useful  overview  of  the  realism  issue  should  allow  us  to  draw  finer  grained 
distinctions  than  Devitt's  account,  as  it  stands,  allows  us  to  do. 
Again,  it  might  be  the  case  that  Devitt's  account  could  be  extended  or  modified  so  as  to 
include  the  kind  of  generality  and  topic-neutrality  that  it  currently  seems  to  lack.  "  The 
maxims  that  I  outlined  earlier  might  seem  to  offer  a  natural  starting  point  for  such  a 
expanded  project.  For  the  moment,  I  merely-want  to  insist  that  Devitt's  treatment  of 
external  world  realism  is  not  straightforwardly  extensible  to  other,  seemingly  directly 
analogous  areas  of  thought,  and  that  therefore,  as  it  stands,  gives  us  only  limited  insight 
into  how  actual  debates  between  realists  and  anti-realists  in  other  contexts  might  actually 
9  See  Devitt  (1997)  p.  16  "The  realist  rejects  esse  estpercipi  for  the  objects  he  believes  in.  No  object  that 
is  tied  to  perception  for  its  very  existence  has  the  required  independence". 
10  I  follow  Divers  (2002)  in  using  `actualist  realism'  to  refer  to  the  position  that  Lewis  (1986)  terms  `ersatz 
realism',  and  Stalnaker  (1976)  terms  `moderate  realism'. 
11  One  way  would  be  to  avoid  talking  of  modal  realism  simpliciter,  and  instead  distinguish  e.  g.  realism 
about  possible  worlds,  from  realism  about  possibilia. 
14 proceed.  Rather  than  exploring  possible  ways  in  which  Devitt's  account  might  be 
developed,  however,  I  now  want  to  turn  my  attention  to  a  different  approach,  set  out  in 
recent  work  by  Crispin  Wright,  which  seems  to  build  in  from  the  start  exactly  the  kind  of 
generality,  fine-grainedness  and  dialectical  sensitivity  required  for  the  project  at  hand. 
1.4  Wright  on  Truth 
Wright's  approach  to  the  question  of  realism  proceeds  via  the  notion  of  truth.  He  is  a 
truth  minimalist  in  two  senses.  Firstly,  he  is  a  minimalist  about  truth.  In  this  context,  a 
minimalist  about  truth  is  someone  who  holds  that  it  is  necessary  and  sufficient  for  a 
particular  linguistic  expression  to  qualify  as  a  truth  predicate  that  its  use  accord  with  a 
particular  set  of  interlinked  `platitudes';  putatively  a  priori  principles  that  `chime  with 
12  our  ordinary  thinking  about  truth'.  These  platitudes  include,  for  example 
Transparency  to  assert,  doubt,  fear,  that  p  is  to  assert,  doubt,  fear,  that  p  is  true. 
Embedding  aptitude  for  truth  is  preserved  under  embedding  -  in  particular, 
truth-apt  propositions  have  negations,  conjunctions,  disjunctions, 
etc.,  that  are  themselves  truth-apt. 
Correspondence  for  a  proposition  to  be  true  is  for  it  to  reflect  reality,  accurately 
reflect  how  matters  stand,  `tell  it  like  it  is',  etc. 
Contrast  a  proposition  can  be  true  without  being  justified  and  vice  versa.  13 
The  platitudes  are  intended  to  capture  the  `minimal'  set  of  commitments  incurred  by  any 
theorist  who  is  concerned  with  truth  in  the  relevant  sense  at  all.  They  are  `common 
I, 
12  Wright  (1999)  `Truth:  A  traditional  debate  reviewed',  p.  226.  The  canonical  statement  of  Wright's 
minimalism  is  given  in  his  (1992).  See  also  his  (1998)  for  a  useful  summary  of  the  position. 
13  Wright  (1999)  p.  227.  Other  platitudes  relate  to  the  absoluteness  and  timelessness  of  truth,  as  well  as 
the  `opacity'  of  truth  -  this  latter  embracing  a  variety  of  principles  to  the  effect  that  a  particular  truth  might 
be  outside  a  particular  speaker's  or  community's  cognitive  reach  at  a  particular  time,  or  at  any  actual  time, 
or  for  any  possible  time. 
15 ground'  between  different  substantive  conceptions  of  the  nature  of  truth,  and  between 
proponents  of  substantive  theories  of  truth  and  their  deflationary  opponents.  For 
example,  both  correspondence  and  coherence  theorists  of  truth  are  committed  to  the. 
truth  of  the  correspondence  platitude,  although  only  the  former  attempts  to  base  a  theory 
of  truth  on  a  philosophically  rich  conception  of  what  that  relation  amounts  to.  In  effect, 
the  platitudes  serve  to  implicitly  define  the  notion  of  truth,  but  remain  silent  whether  it 
has  an  essential  nature,  or  if  so,  what  that  essence  might  consist  in. 
The  second  sense  in  which  Wright  is  a  minimalist  concerns  truth-aptitude.  A  utterance 
is  truth-apt  in  the  relevant  sense  if  it  can  be  (semantically)  correct  to  evaluate  it  as  true 
or  false.  14  A  discourse  about  a  particular  subject  matter  -  morality,  say,  or  colour  -  is 
truth  apt  if  a  suitable  range  of  the  utterances  which  go  to  make  up  the  discourse  are  truth 
apt.  This  second  aspect  of  minimalism  itself  involves  two  sub-components.  Wright 
argues  that  it  will  be  necessary  and  sufficient  for  a  particular  discourse  to  be  apt  for  the 
application  of  a  truth-predicate  that  the  discourse  in  question  involves  assertoric  content. 
This,  I  think,  ought  to  be  uncontroversial.  For  a  sentence  of  a  language  to  possess 
assertoric  content  is  simply  for  it  to  be  capable  of  being  used,  in  a  suitable  context,  to 
say  something  about  how  things  are.  Once  we  have  such  a  notion  of  a  sentence  saying 
how  things  are,  it  ought  to  be  a  short  step  to  characterising  a  sentence  as  true  if  things 
are  indeed  how  it  says  they  are,  and  false  otherwise.  15 
14  One  might  say:  if  it  can  have  the  property  of  being  true  or  false,  were  it  not  for  the  deflationist's  denial 
that  the  truth  predicate  genuinely  attributes  a  property.  I  should  note  here  that,  for  ease  of  exposition,  I 
blur  over  important  differences  between  describing  utterances,  sentences,  sentences  in  a  language,  etc,  as 
truth  apt. 
15  For  reasons  of  space,  I  here  will  rely  on  appeal  to  this  intuitive  link  between  possession  of  assertoric 
content  and  truth  aptitude.  For  an  explicit  demonstration  that  any  sentence  that  meets  the  constraints  of 
syntax  and  warrant  will  be  apt  for  the  application  of  a  predicate  that  accords  with  the  set  of  platitudes 
referred  to  above,  see  the  first  two  chapters  of  Wright  (1992).  The  basic  idea  is  that  if,  as  outlined  below, 
it  suffices  for  a  sentence  to  possess  assertoric  content  that  it  a)  has  a  certain  syntactic  form  and  b)  is 
associated  with  a  suitable  set  of  conditions  under  which  we  count  it  as  epistemically  warranted,  then  it 
ought  to  make  sense  of  it  being  capable  of  meeting  those  conditions,  and  of  it  continuing  to  do  so  under 
arbitrarily  close  scrutiny  of  the  warrant  with  which  we  hold  it,  and  arbitrarily  large  improvements  of  our 
`informational  state'.  Wright  calls  sentences  that  meet  such  conditions  superassertible,  and  argues  that 
superassertibility  counts  as  a  truth  predicate,  in  that  it  satisfies  all  the  relevant  platitudes.  I  discuss 
superassertibility  further  in  Section  1.6. 
16 The  second,  more  controversial  and  distinctive  claim  of  the  minimalist  about  truth- 
aptitude,  is  that  it  suffices  for  a  discourse  to  possess  assertoric  content  that  it  meet 
certain  constraints  regarding  firstly,  syntax  and  secondly,  discipline.  16  The  syntactic 
criteria  -  roughly,  that  the  relevant  sentences  should  embed  appropriately  within  the  right 
logical  and  propositional  attitude  contexts  -  suffice  to  ensure  that  an  utterance  is 
assertoric  in  character,  syntactically  suitable  to  act  as  a  conventional  vehicle  for  a  saying 
that  p.  Sayings  should  allow  for  the  expression  of  belief,  for  the  drawing  of  inferences 
on  the  basis  of  the  information  that  they  carry,  and  for  disagreement  about  their 
accuracy,  and  the  relevant  syntactic  embeddings  ensure  that  these  demands  can  be  met  in 
ways  that  are  syntactically  well-formed. 
The  second  constraint  insists  that  there  should  be  public  norms  which  determine  the 
conditions  under  which  particular  claims  within  the  discourse  in  question  ought  to  be 
asserted  or  denied.  '7  Wright  thinks  of  these  as  being  cashed  out  in  epistemic  terms, 
claiming  that  the  use  of  the  sentences  in  question  must  be  governed  by  `agreed  standards 
of  warrant'.  The  demand  that  a  discourse  display  this  kind  of  discipline  is  intended  to 
ensure  that  we  are  dealing  with  something  genuinely  worth  regarding  as  content- 
involving,  serving  to  carry  information  about  how  the  speaker  takes  the  world  to  be. 
Meeting  the  constraint  establishes  the  type  of  minimal  normative  standard  which  is 
often  taken  to  be  necessary  for  linguistic  meaning,  since  it  allows  a  distinction  to  be 
drawn  between  cases  in  which  a  sentence  or  term  is  correctly  used,  and  those  in  which  it 
is  misapplied.  It  is  an  important  component  of  Wright's  claim  that  such  standards  must 
include  prescriptive  and  descriptive  norms;  there  must  be  something  like  rules 
governing  particular  assertoric  moves  within  the  discourse,  and  participants  in  the 
discourse  must  to  some  degree  also  actually  respect  such  rules. 
41 
In  summary,  then  Wright's  key  claims  are  as  follows; 
16  So  again,  we  have  two  sub-components.  The  structure  is  as  follows:  Wright's  truth  minimalism  consists 
of  two  claims,  about  truth  and  truth-aptitude.  The  latter  comprises  two  sub-claims  a)  that  possession  of 
truth  aptitude  is  co-extensional  with  possession  of  assertoric  content  and  b)  that  it  suffices  for  an  utterance 
or  discourse  to  be  truth  apt  that  it  meet  two  constraints  regarding  i)  syntax  and  ii)  discipline. 
"See  Wright  (1998)  p.  185,  and,  for  a  fuller  account  of  the  nature  and  motivation  of  the  background 
conception  of  warranted  assertibility,  Wright  (1993)  pp.  35-40,403-433. 
17 1.  it  suffices  for  a  sentence  (which  comprises  part  of  a  linguistic  practice)  to  possess 
assertoric  content  that  it  meet  minimal  constraints  relating  to  syntactic  form  and 
public  standards  of  epistemic  warrant18 
2.  any  such  sentence  which  possesses  assertoric  content  will  be  suitable  for  the 
application  of  a  certain  predicate  T  that  accords  with  a  certain  set  of  platitudes 
3.  any  predicate  that  accords  with  such  platitudes  will  be  a  truth  predicate. 
1.5  Pluralism,  Truth  and  Realism 
As  well  as  subscribing  to  minimalism  about  truth  and  truth-aptitude,  Wright  endorses  a 
pluralism  about  truth.  This  should  not  be  thought  of  as  involving  an  ambiguity  in  the 
meaning  of  the  predicate  `_  is  true'.  That  term  can  be  thought  of  as  being  wholly 
(implicitly)  defined  by  the  set  of  platitudes  that  serve  to  identify  the  characteristic 
`marks'  of  truth.  Rather,  truth-pluralism  comprises  the  claim  that  what  constitutes  truth 
might  vary  from  discourse  to  discourse: 
The  kind  of  plurality  that's  envisaged  may  be  brought  out  by  a  comparison  with  identity. 
Minimally,  identity  can  be  characterised  as  that  relation  which  is  universally  reflexive 
and  a  congruence  for  an  arbitrary  property.  To  that  extent,  the  concept  of  identity  is 
uniform  across  varying  kinds  of  object.  But  that  uniformity  had  better  be  consistent  with 
our  recognising  that  what  constitutes  identity  is  subject  to  considerable  variation 
depending  on  the  kinds  of  objects  concerned.  The  identity  of  material  objects  is 
constituted  by  spatial  and  temporal  continuity;  for  cardinal  numbers,  according  to 
Frege's  famous  proposal,  identity  is  constituted  by  the  one  to  one  correspondence  of  an 
associated  pair  of  concepts;  for  the  directions'of  a  pair  of  straight  lines,  identity  is 
constituted  by  those  lines  being  parallel;  and  for  persons,  identity  is  constituted  by  - 
well,  it's  notoriously  difficult  to  say,  but  the  case  is different  from  each  of  the  preceding. 
Identity,  one  might  thus  say,  is  formally  uniform,  but  may  vary  in  constitution  as  we 
IS  I  prescind  here  from  the  interesting  a  pressing  question  of  how  we  can  genuinely  talk  in  terms  of 
epistemology  and  warrant  in  a  way  that  doesn't  presuppose  the  notion  of  truth,  contrary  to  the  direction  of 
Wright's  derivation. 
18 consider  different  potential  identicals.  Clearly  there  is  space  for  a  similar  contention 
about  truth  ... 
19 
Wright's  central  idea  in  Truth  and  Objectivity  is  that  we  can  profitably  approach  the 
question  of  realism  by  consideration  of  the  different  ways  in  which  truth  might  be 
constituted  in  different  areas  of  thought  and  language.  We  have  already  seen  that 
Wright  and  Devitt  converge  fairly  sharply  on  an  intuitive  construal  of  realism  about  the 
external  world.  Whereas  Devitt  tackles  the  issue  in  rigorously  anti-semantic  terms, 
however  -  witness  his  second  and  third  methodological  maxims  -  Wright  attempts  to 
approach  it  via  an  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  truth  as  we  apply  it  to  talk  about  observable, 
everyday  objects  (and  their  scientific  cousins). 
The  inquiry  takes  the  form  of  the  examination  of  a  number  of  `cruces';  distinctive 
properties  which  it  is  possible  for  truth-predicates  in  given  areas  of  discourse  to  display, 
and  which  can  serve  to  focus  the  debate  between  the  realist  and  anti-realist,  in  a 
satisfyingly  wide  number  of  philosophical  contests.  Wright  discusses  four  such  key 
properties  in  Truth  and  Objectivity:  Evidence  Transcendence,  the  Order-of- 
Determination  Test,  Cognitive  Command  and  Width  of  Cosmological  Role.  Since  I 
agree  that  each  of  these  marks  an  important  area  of  focus  for  disputes  about  realism,  and 
they  shall  play  an  important  role  in  later  chapters,  it  is  worth  examining  each  constraint 
in  some  detail  here. 
1.6  Evidence  Transcendence 
Michael  Dummett  has  famously,  or  infamously,  argued  that  realism  about  a  given  area 
of  fact  consists  in  the  view  that  the  language  in  which  we  describe  such  facts  includes 
sentences  with  `evidence-transcendent'  truth  conditions,  grasp  of  which  constitutes 
mastery  of  such  sentences.  20  For  example,  realism  about  the  external  world  is  the  view 
that  understanding  certain  sentences  (about  e.  g.  inaccessible  planets)  involves  grasping 
truth-conditions  that  in  a  certain  sense  `outrun'  our  current  evidence;  realism  about 
19  Wright  (1998)  p.  186 
20  Classic  statements  can  be  found  in  Dummett  (1978)  and  Dummett  (1991). 
19 mathematics  is  the  view  that  understanding  certain  sentences  (about  e.  g.  Goldbach's 
conjecture)  involves  grasping  truth-conditions  that  similarly  transcend  our  current 
evidence;  etc.  More  precisely,  Dummett's  Realism  consists  of  the  following  claim 
(DR)  The  literal  content  of  realism  about  a  given  area  of  fact  A  consists  in 
semantic  realism  about  the  sentences  that  concern  A 
where  semantic  realism  is  characterised  as  follows 
(SR)  Our  understanding  of  undecidable  sentences  about  an  area  of  fact  A 
consists  in  grasp  of  their  truth  conditions,  where  an  undecidable  sentence 
is  one  that  meets  the  following  two  conditions 
a)  we  currently  have  no  evidence  that  bears  on  its  truth  or  its  falsity 
b)  we  do  not  know  a  procedure  which,  if  correctly  implemented,  is 
guaranteed  after  finitely  many  steps  to  put  us  in  a  position  where  we  have 
evidence  that  it  is  either  true  or  false.  21 
There  are  some  important  issues  which  arise  with  respect  to  this  formulation  regarding, 
for  example,  the  question  of  whether  the  relevant  notion  of  evidence  is  one  which 
essentially  involves  a  certain  transparency,  so  that  one  who  had  such  evidence  would 
know  that  she  did  so;  the  extent  to  which  we  are  permitted  to  idealize  away  from  some 
of  our  contingent  human  limitations,  etc.  It  is  more  important  for  our  immediate 
purposes,  however,  to  get  clearer  on  the  motivation  for  Dummett's  view,  and  the  sense 
in  which  elements  of  such  a  Dummettian  approach  are  carried  over  into  Wright's 
Evidence  Transcendence  test. 
Few  contemporary  philosophers  are  convinced  that  debates  between  realists  and  anti- 
realists  can  only  be  literally  construed  in  terms  of  semantic  realism,  as  (DR)  claims. 
Certainly,  the  claim  requires  much  more  support  than  Dummett,  or  any  other 
21  Here  and  elsewhere  in  this  section  I  have  benefited  from  Alexander  Miller's  discussion  of  theses  issues 
in  Miller  (forthcoming,  a)  and  Miller  (forthcoming,  b).  My  formulation  of  semantic  realism  draws  directly 
on  Miller  (forthcoming,  a),  Sections  3  and  4. 
20 philosopher,  has  given  it  to  date,  if  it  is  to  deserve  acceptance.  A  more  modest  claim, 
however,  while  hardly  uncontroversial,  has  more  widespread  support: 
(DR*)  (At  least)  one  important  element  of  an  intuitive  realism  about  a  given  area 
of  fact  A,  in  the  presence  of  certain  fairly  plausible  background 
assumptions,  entails  semantic  realism  about  A-sentences. 
Why  ought  we  to  believe  (DR*)?  Firstly,  let's  get  clearer  on  the  nature  of  some 
`background  assumptions'  that  might  be  relied  upon  in  establishing  it.  These  include  the 
following: 
P1)  If  a  subject  S  understands  a  statement  T,  then  he  knows  what  it  states. 
P2)  If  a  statement  T  states  that  P,  and  a  subject  S  knows  what  T  states,  then  he  knows 
that  T  states  that  P. 
P3)  If  S  knows  that  T  states  that  P,  then,  by  virtue  of  that  very  fact,  S  knows  that 
(things  are  as  T  states  they  are  if  and  only  if  P) 
P4)  If,  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  S  knows  that  T  states  that  P,  S  knows  that  (things  are 
as  T  states  they  are  if  and  only  if  P),  then  S  knows  that  the  truth  condition  of  T  is 
P. 
These  seemingly  platitudinous  assumptions  can  be  employed  in  an  argument  to  the 
effect  that  understanding  a  given  statement  entails  grasping  its  truth  conditions. 
1)  S  understands  statement  T.  Assumption. 
2)  T  states  that  P.  Assumption 
3)  S  knows  what  T  states.  By  1,  P1),  MPP 
4)  S  knows  that  T  states  that  P  By  2,3,  P2),  MPP 
5)  In  virtue  of  the  fact  that  S  knows  that  T  states  that  P,  S  knows  that  (things 
are  as  T  states  they  are  if  and  only  if  P).  By  4,  P3,  MPP 
6)  S  knows  that  the  truth  condition  of  T  is  P  By  5,  P4,  MPP 
7)  If  S  understands  statement  T,  that  states  that  P,  then  he  knows  that  the 
truth  condition  of  T  is  P.  By  1,2,6, 
Conditional  Proof 
21 I  think  that  the  premises  of  the  above  argument  are  true,  for  one  important  sense  of 
linguistic  `understanding',  and  that  the  argument  is  valid.  22  Be  that  as  it  may,  it  must  be 
granted  that  the  premises  are  at  least  prima  facie  plausible  and  the  line  of  thought  prima 
facie  coherent.  23  Moreover,  the  argument  seems  to  provide  initial  support,  perhaps  via 
an  inference  to  the  best  explanation,  for  the  following  thesis 
(TC)  Understanding  an  assertoric  utterance  of  a  declarative  sentence  consists  in 
grasp  of  its  truth  conditions. 
Now,  recall  that  one  element  of  an  intuitive  realism  about  e.  g.  the  external  world 
identified  by  both  Devitt  and  Wright  comprised  a  certain  modesty  about  humanity's 
relationship  to  the  universe;  that  the  world's  existence  and  nature  does  not  depend  in  any 
way  on  our 
knowledge...  our  epistemic  values..  .  our  capacity  to  refer  to  it...  the  synthesizing  power 
of  the  mind..  .  our  imposition  of  concepts,  theories,  or  languages.  24 
Given  the  absence  of  such  dependence,  it  ought  to  be  possible,  by  the  realist's  lights,  for 
the  world  to  be  a  given  way  -  say,  for  conditions  C  to  obtain  in  the  heart  of  a  black  hole 
-  even  though  we  have  no  evidence  that  bears  on  the  matter,  and  have  no  idea  how  we 
might  even  begin  to  instigate  a  search  for  such  evidence.  The  case  is  similar  for  the 
mathematical  Platonist,  the  realist  about  the  past,  the  genuine  modal  realist,  etc.  Thus,  it 
22  In  this  I  diverge  from  both  Devitt  and  Miller,  who  are  sympathetic  to  the  thought  that  P2  involves  an 
illegitimate  substitution  into  an  opaque  `knows-what'  context.  I  think  this  is  simply  an  error.  Some 
`knows-what'  contexts  do  not  allow  certain  inferential  transitions.  For  example,  if  I  know  what  gold  is, 
and  gold  is  John's  favourite  element,  it  does  not  follow  that  I  know  what  John's  favourite  element  is,  or 
that  it  is  gold,  at  least  on  one  disambiguation  of  those  claims.  However,  some  other  such  contexts  clearly 
do  allow  such  transitions:  if  I  know  what  your  favourite  colour  is,  and  your  favourite  colour  is  red,  then  it 
follows  that  I  know  that  your  favourite  colour  is  red.  The  above  inference  is,  I  believe,  of  the  latter, 
harmless  kind.  See  Devitt  (1991)  pp.  270-271,  and  Miller  (forthcoming,  b),  Section  7  for  discussion. 
23  There  is  no  doubt  a  perfectly  good  sense  of  understanding  in  which  one  can  understand  a  declarative 
sentence  without  knowing  what  it  states  -  for  example,  if  you  don't  know  the  semantic  value  of  indexical 
or  demonstrative  expressions  it  contains.  Nevertheless,  there's  also  a  perfectly  good  sense  in  which  if  you 
don't  know  such  facts,  you  don't  really  understand  the  statement. 
24  Devitt  (1997)  p.  15 
22 seems  that  a  central  element  of  realism  about  certain  areas  entails  a  commitment  to  the 
possibility  of  there  being  undecidable  sentences  in  that  area,  in  the  sense  that  I  outlined 
above.  Now,  given  a  truth-conditional  conception  of  meaning,  as  characterised  in  (TC), 
we  can  argue  to  (SR)  as  follows 
1)  A  central  element  of  an  intuitive  realism  about  an  area  of  fact  A  is  the 
commitment  to  a  modest  conception  of  the  relationship  between  human  beings 
and  the  existence  and  nature  of  A-facts. 
2)  In  many  areas  where  realism  is  at  issue,  a  modest  conception  of  the  relationship 
between  human  beings  and  the  existence  and  nature  of  A-facts  entails  the 
possibility  of  there  being  an  undecidable  A-sentence  such  that 
a)  we  currently  have  no  evidence  that  bears  on  its  truth  or  its  falsity  and 
b)  we  do  not  know  a  procedure  which,  if  correctly  implemented,  is  guaranteed 
after  finitely  many  steps  to  put  us  in  a  position  where  we  have  evidence  that  it  is 
either  true  or  false. 
3)  Given  the  above  two  premises,  it  follows  that,  in  many  areas  where  realism  is  at 
issue,  a  central  element  of  an  intuitive  realist  view  of  an  area  of  fact  A  commits 
one  to  the  possible  existence  of  undecidable  A-sentences. 
4)  By  (TC),  understanding  an  assertoric  utterance  of  a  declarative  sentence  consists 
in  grasp  of  its  truth  conditions. 
5)  By  3)  and  4),  it  follows  that,  in  many  areas  where  realism  is  at  issue,  a  central 
element  of  an  intuitive  realist  view  of  an  area  of  fact  A  commits  one  to  the 
possible  existence  of  undecidable  A-sentences,  where  our  understanding  of 
assertoric  utterances  of  such  sentences  would  consist  in  grasp  of  their  truth 
conditions. 
6)  By  (SR),  semantic  realism  is  the  thesis  that  our  understanding  of  undecidable 
sentences  about  an  area  of  fact  A  consists  in  grasp  of  their  truth  conditions 
Conclusion:  In  many  areas  where  realism  is  at  issue,  a  central  element  of  an  intuitive 
realism  about  an  area  of  fact  A  commits  one  to  the  possibility  of  semantic 
realism  about  A-sentences. 
The  above  argument,  then,  seems  to  give  us  grounds  to  subscribe  to  (DR*) 
23 (DR*)  (At  least)  one  important  element  of  an  intuitive  realism  about  a  given  area 
of  fact  A,  in  the  presence  of  certain  fairly  plausible  background 
assumptions,  entails  semantic  realism  about  A-sentences. 
Such  grounds  are,  of  course,  defeasible,  and  the  line  of  argument  is  no  doubt  vulnerable 
to  attack  at  many  points.  Nevertheless,  given  (DR*),  we  can  begin  to  see  why  Wright 
identifies  the  question  of  whether  we  can  make  sense  ofA-facts  obtaining  in  an 
evidence-transcendent  manner  as  an  important  crux  for  realism  disputes. 
The  connection  runs  in  two  directions.  Firstly,  evidence  that  semantic  realism  is 
somehow  incoherent,  or  in  any  case  implausible  in  some  strong  sense,  will,  given  (TC), 
be  evidence  that  an  important  element  of  realism  is  implausible.  Dummett  and  Wright's 
reflections  on  e.  g.  how  semantic  competence  is  acquired  and  manifested,  the  rule- 
following  considerations,  etc.,  are  of  course  intended  to  provide  exactly  such  evidence 
against  semantic  realism.  25 
Secondly,  a  defence  of  the  claim  that  there  can  be  undecidable  sentences  of  a  given 
discourse  counts  against  the  claim  that  truth  in  that  area  can  be  constituted  by 
superassertibility.  A  sentence  is  superassertible,  remember,  if  we  are  capable  of  gaining 
evidence  that  would  epistemically  justify  its  assertion,  given  our  current  state  of 
information,  and  we  would  remain  so  justified  given  any  way  that  that  state  of 
information  might  be  `enlarged  or  improved'.  26  An  undecidable  sentence  is  one  whose 
assertion  cannot  be  so  justified,  and  thus  one  whose  truth  cannot  consist  merely  in  being 
superassertible.  Thus,  given  that  a  construal  of  truth  as  superassertibility  seems  to 
favour  an  anti-realist  construal  of  the  nature  of  the  contested  discourse,  with  truth  being 
`built  out  of'  uman  epistemic  concerns  and  standards,  a  demonstration  of  the  possibility 
of  undecidable  sentences  in  a  given  discourse  blocks  one  important  anti-realist  version 
25  See  e.  g.  Wright  (1993)  pp.  13-29,  Hale  (1997)  passim,  Miller  (forthcoming  aand  b),  Miller  (2002)  for  a 
detailed  overview  and  appraisal  of  the  strategy. 
26  See  Wright  (1992)  pp.  47-48.  The  formal  definition  he  gives  there  runs  as  follows:  a  sentence  is 
superassertible  if  and  only  if  it  is,  or  can  be,  warranted,  and  some  warrant  for  it  would  survive  arbitrarily 
close  scrutiny  of  its  pedigree  and  arbitrarily  extensive  increments  to  or  other  forms  of  improvement  of  our 
information.  The  notion  is  introduced  and  elaborated  in  Ch.  13  of  Wright  (1993). 
24 of  the  truth-constituting  property.  Providing  a  defence  of  the  possibility  of  undecidable 
A-sentences,  therefore  allows  the  realist  to  foreclose  on  an  anti-realist  account  of  A-facts 
which  presents  them  as  constructed  from  human  assertoric  practices  and  values. 
Much  more  could  and  should  be  said  here,  but  my  purpose  is  to  provide  an  outline  of 
why  evidence  transcendence  matters  to  realism  disputes,  not  to  extend  or  evaluate  those 
disputes.  Suffice  it  for  the  moment  to  say  that  the  following  test 
Evidence  Transcendence  Does  the  discourse  at  issue  include  sentences  with  regard 
to  which  a)  we27  have  no  evidence  that  bears  on  their  truth 
value,  and  b)  we  lack  a  conception  of  any  way  in  which 
we  might  come  to  get  such  evidence? 
seems  prima  facie  to  provides  one  genuine  and  important  focus  for  critical  attention 
when  determining  whether  a  realist  construal  of  that  discourse  is  appropriate. 
1.7  The  Order-of-Determination  Test 
The  second  focus  for  debates  about  realism  that  Wright  identifies  concerns  the 
Euthyphro  dileninia,  or  Order-of-Determination  test.  Wright  is  interested  in  different 
ways  of  interpreting  what  he  calls  `Provisional  Equations',  which  take  the  following 
general  form 
(PE)  For  a  set  of  optimal  conditions  C,  a  state  of  affairs  P,  and  a  subject  S: 
If  C  holds,  then  (It  would  be  the  case  that  P  iff  S  would  judge  that  P). 
There  are  two  different  ways,  Wright  thinks,  that  we  could  understand  the  case  where 
(PE)  holds  true  for  a  particular  C,  P  and  S.  We  could  understand  the  C-conditions  as 
being  such  as  to  allow  S  to  successfully  track  an  independently  obtaining  fact  that  P. 
That  is,  we  could  understand  the  biconditional  as  indicating  that  S  judges  that  P  because 
27  Or,  perhaps,  some  suitably  idealised  counterparts  of  us. 
25 P  is  the  case.  For  example,  we  might  understand  the  instance  of  (PE)  that  told  us  that, 
under  relevant  C-conditions,  S  judged  that  x  was  square  when  and  only  when  it  was 
square,  as  holding  because  (i)  x  was  in  fact  square,  and  (ii)  under  conditions  C,  S  is  a 
competent  judge  of  squareness.  Call  this  the  extension-reflecting  reading. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  could  understand  the  biconditional  as  indicating  that  it  is  S's  best 
opinion  that  constitutes  the  fact  that  P.  In  this  case,  we  understand  it  as  telling  us  that  P 
is  the  case  because  S  judges  that  P.  For  example,  we  might  take  the  instance  of  (PE) 
that  told  us  that,  under  relevant  C-conditions,  S  judged  that  x  was  funny  when  and  only 
when  it  was  funny,  as  holding  because  the  facts  about  funniness  depend  on  our  best 
judgements  about  what's  funny.  Call  this  the  extension-determining  reading.  28  It  is 
clear  that  the  extension-determining  reading  of  the  biconditional  is  far  more  conducive 
to  an  anti-realist  view  of  the  state  of  affairs  P,  and  that  the  extension-reflecting  reading  is 
similarly  conducive  to  realist  intuitions  about  the  mind-independence  of  the  relevant 
species  of  fact. 
How  are  we  to  tell  which  way  we  should  read  the  Provisional  Equation  in  any  given 
case?  Wright's  idea  is  that  it  should  be  read  as  extension  determining  just  in  case  it 
meets  a  set  of  further  constraints.  First,  the  C-conditions  must  be  specified  in 
philosophically  substantial  terms,  not  by  means  of  a  `whatever  it  takes'  ceteris  paribus 
clause.  Secondly,  they  must  be  a  priori  true.  Third,  whether  the  C-conditions  are 
satisfied  must  be  logically  independent  of  facts  about  P.  And  finally,  our  case  for 
reading  it  as  extension  determining  must  be  extremal:  there  must  be  no  better 
explanation  of  why  the  first  three  conditions  are  satisfied  than  the  claim  that  S's  best 
judgements  constitute  the  fact  that  P. 
What  is  the  motivation  behind  these  constraints?  Wright  wants  to  test  whether  or  not  a 
particular  biconditional  is  extension  determining  or  extension  reflecting  by  examining 
whether  or  not  there  is  a  merely  accidental,  a  posteriori,  contingent  link  between  our 
best  judgements  and  whether  or  not  the  fact  that  P  holds.  That  kind  of  link  is  what  we 
28  Since  the  PE  only  tells  us  about  what  is happening  in  optimal  conditions,  Wright  normally  describes  our 
optimal  judgement  of  whether  Pas  at  best  partially  determining  the  facts  about  P.  I  have  often  blurred 
this  distinction  here. 
26 would  expect  if  the  realm  of  fact  in  question  had  the  sort  of  constitutive  independence 
from  human  responses  that  realism  attributes  to  it.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  if  we  specify 
the  C-conditions  by  means  of  a  `whatever  it  takes'  clause,  the  biconditional  will  hold 
trivially  true,  and  thus  prevent  us  from  examining  whether  the  link  between  judgement 
and  fact  holds  merely  contingently.  29  So  we  must  specify  the  C-conditions  in  more 
detail,  without  appeal  to  ceteris  paribus  clauses.  If  we  do  so,  and  the  biconditional  holds 
a  priori,  then  that  will  be  a  sign  that  the  facts  of  the  matter  cannot  come  apart  from  our 
best  judgements  of  the  matter,  and  thus  that  we  should  construe  the  Equation  in  the 
extension-determining  sense.  But  such  a  sign  will  only  be  an  accurate  guide  if  the 
further  two  conditions  hold. 
The  independence  condition  is  required  in  order  that  we  can  allow  echoing,  making  use 
of  the  very  concepts  that  we  are  concerned  with  in  specifying  the  optimality  conditions, 
without  running  the  risk  that  we  might  be  jeopardising  the  idea  that  the  a  prioricity  of 
the  PE  can  be  a  test  of  whether  the  relevant  concepts  are  extension-reflecting  or  - 
determining.  By  making  sure  that  the  concepts  only  occur,  if  at  all,  in  contexts  governed 
by  intensional  operators,  we  ensure  that  there  is  no  'hidden  reference'  to  the  extension 
built  into  the  optimality  conditions.  We  avoid  the  charge  that  in  specifying  the 
conditions  under  which,  for  example,  we  can  best  judge  whether  something  is  red,  we 
have  implicitly  appealed  to  an  response-independent  property  of  redness,  thereby 
rendering  our  proposed  test  valueless. 
The  extremal  condition,  that  there  must  be  no  better  explanation  of  why  the  first  three 
conditions  are  satisfied  than  that  S's  best  opinions  constitute  the  fact  that  P,  is  intended 
to  leave  room  for  the  idea  that  the  a  priori  co-extensiveness  of  judgement  and  fact  might 
be  a  result  of  our  infallibility  about  a  particular  type  of  fact,  for  example,  and  not  an 
indication  that  our  judgements  constitute  the  relevant  facts.  In  effect,  the  condition 
ensures  that  if  we  are  to  be  justified  in  claiming  such  infallibility  we  must  be  able  to  give 
a  pretty  detailed  story  of  why  and  how  we  can  be  infallible  about  this  particular  type  of 
29  I  blur  here  the  important  distinction  between  necessity  and  a  prioricity.  In  the  case  of  extension 
determining  judgements,  Wright  seems  to  see  the  facts  about  our  judgements  as  being  the  truth  makers  for 
e.  g.  the  facts  about  what  we  meant.  The  a  prioricity  of  the  biconditional  is  interpreted  as  a  sign  that 
judgement  and  fact  are  non-contingently  linked. 
27 fact.  In  the  absence  of  such  a  story,  we  are  entitled  to  assume  that  our  best  judgements 
determine  what  the  facts  are. 
Given  the  fit  between  the  extension-determining  reading  and  anti-realism,  it  again  seems 
that  we  have  grounds  to  hold,  prima  facie  at  least,  that  Wright  has  identified  another 
important  question  for  disputants  to  focus  on 
Order-of-Determination  Given  that  we  can  identify  a  true  Provisional  Equation 
involving  the  discourse  at  issue,  do  the  best  judgements  of 
ideally  placed  subjects  constitute  the  relevant  facts,  or 
merely  track  independently  constituted  facts? 
1.8  Cognitive  Command 
The  third  test  suggested  by  Wright  attempts  to  establish  whether  thought  and  talk  about 
the  area  in  question  is  richly  representational,  in  the  sense  that  we  might  expect  if  a 
realist  construal  of  the  relevant  discourse  was  appropriate.  If  the  states  of  affairs  in 
question  really  do  have  the  kind  of  independence  and  autonomy  that  the  realist  attributes 
to  them,  then  when  we  come  to  successfully  represent  them  in  thought  and  talk,  we 
interact  with  the  world  in  a  way  which  is  cognitive  in  a  rich  sense.  On  the  contrary,  if 
the  states  of  affairs  are  essentially  best  thought  of  as  shadowy  projections  of  human 
thought  or  normative  practice,  as  the  anti-realist  maintains,  then  talk  of  substantive 
cognitive  achievement  is  misplaced,  and  such  `representation'  is  a  thin  relation,  secured 
merely  by  a  certain  sensitivity  to  the  internal  norms  of  the  language  game  in  question. 
Wright's  discussion  of  this  crux  for  realism  is  rather  confusing.  He  appeals  to  the 
following  `incontestable'  principle: 
28 Convergence/Representation  If  two  devices  each  function  to  produce 
Platitude  representations,  then  if  conditions  are  suitable, 
and  they  function  properly,  they  will  produce 
divergent  output  if  and  only  if  presented  with 
divergent  input.  30 
Given  such  a  platitude  about  representation,  Wright  thinks,  we  can  generalise  to  a  third 
test  for  realism 
Cognitive  Command  Does  the  discourse  display  Cognitive  Command? 
when  that  notion  is  defined  as  follows 
(CC)  A  discourse  displays  Cognitive  Command  if  and  only  if  it  is  a 
priori  that  differences  of  opinion  arising  within  a  given  discourse 
can  be  satisfactorily  explained  only  in  terms  of  `divergent  input' 
(that  is,  the  disputants  working  on  the  basis  of  different 
information,  and  hence  guilty  of  ignorance  or  error,  depending  on 
the  status  of  that  information),  or  `unsuitable  conditions' 
(resulting  in  inattention  or  distraction,  and  so  in  inferential  error, 
or  oversight  of  data,  etc.  ),  or  `malfunction'  (for  example, 
prejudicial  assessment  of  data,  upwards  or  downwards,  or  dogma, 
or  failings  in  other  categories  already  listed).  31 
As  Edwards  has  pointed  out,  however,  it  is  rather  difficult  to  see  the  route  that  Wright 
discerns  here.  32  If  the  Convergence/Representation  Platitude  is  really  a  platitude, 
then  it  seems  difficult  to  see  how  it  can  serve  to  differentiate  genuine,  thick 
30  Wright  (1992)  p.  91 
31  Wright  (1992)  pp  92-93.  See  also  Ch.  4,  passim,  where  he  defines  the  notion  as  follows  (p.  144):  a 
discourse  meets  Cognitive  Command  if  and  only  if  it  is  a  priori  that  differences  of  opinion  formulated 
within  the  discourse,  unless  excusable  as  a  result  of  vagueness  in  a  disputed  statement,  or  in  the  standards 
of  acceptability,  or  variation  in  personal  evidence  thresholds,  so  to  speak,  will  involve  something  that  may 
properly  be  regarded  as  a  cognitive  shortcoming. 
32  See  Edwards  (1994)  pp.  66-69 
29 representation  from  its  minimalist  simulacrum.  This  reflection,  of  course,  doesn't 
invalidate  the  proposed  test,  merely  the  considerations  that  Wright  appeals  to  in  order  to 
motivate  it.  It  can  still  mark  a  discourse  as  apt  for  a  realist  understanding  that  it  stand  in 
relations  of  representation  that  are  cognitive  in  a  thick  sense,  and  Cognitive  Command, 
correctly  understood,  may  provide  a  useful  first  step  towards  a  characterisation  of  just 
such  a  sense. 
What  if  somebody  insists  that  mere  ignorance  of  the  fact  in  question  -  whether  a 
particular  shade  is  red,  for  example,  or  whether  a  particular  metaphor  means  that  P- 
inevitably  does  involve  something  properly  thought  of  as  a  cognitive  shortcoming?  That 
is,  what  if  somebody  insists  that  the  real  effect  of  the  Convergence/Representation 
Platitude  is  to  ensure  that  the  mere  truth-aptness  of  a  discourse,  even  those  for  which 
only  a  minimalist  treatment  is  appropriate,  entails  that  any  disagreement  about  a  given 
statement  signals  a  lack  of  grasp  -  on  the  side  of  at  least  one  of  the  participants  -  of  the 
way  things  genuinely  are,  although  perhaps  only  resulting  from  ignorance  of  that  very 
fact?  For  this  type  of  objector,  the  price  of  the  notion  of  representational  content  that  the 
minimalist  employs  is  the  surrender  of  the  possibility  of  cognitively  faultless 
disagreement  about  whether  the  world  fits  a  given  representation  or  not. 
Wright  has  replied  in  various  ways  to  this  worry,  the  effect  of  which  is  to  trivialise  the 
(Cognitive  Command)  constraint  by  ensuring  that  any  disagreement,  whether 
apparently  relating  to  genuine  objective  fact,  or  reflecting  mere  differences  of 
inclination,  is  going  to  involve  one  of  the  disputants  getting  something  wrong,  namely, 
the  truth  value  of  the  very  proposition  that  they  are  disagreeing  about.  His  response  in 
Truth  and  Objectivity  is  to  claim  that  the  burden  of  proof  is  always  on  the  side  of  the 
party  who  wants  to  argue  that,  in  a  particular  discourse,  there  can  be  culpable  cognitive 
dysfunction  which  consists  solely  of  our  ignorance  of  the  very  proposition  whose  realist 
standing  is  at  issue.  33 
Consider  a  case  where  have  a  disagreement  about  say,  whether  a  certain  speaker  had  a 
given  communicative  intention.  In  order  for  such  discussion  to  display  Cognitive 
Command,  we  must  assume  that  the  parties  agree  on  all  questions  of  a  non-intentional 
33  And  e.  g.  disjunctions  involving  such  propositions,  etc. 
30 character,  (since  otherwise  the  parties  would  be  working  on  the  basis  of  different 
information,  contra  the  first  clause  of  the  constraint).  The  issue  at  hand  is  whether  or 
not  divergent  opinions  regarding,  say,  a  particular  intention,  must  betray  ignorance  on 
one  side  or  the  other,  given  that  none  of  the  other  explanations  noted  in  (CC)  are 
available. 
Wright's  claim  in  Truth  and  Objectivity  is  that  the  burden  of  proof  always  lies  on  the 
part  of  the  theorist  who  holds  that,  in  any  disagreement  about  the  truth  value  of  an 
assertion  -  even  one  in  which  all  other  relevant  facts  are  agreed  upon  -  there  is  always  a 
cognitive  shortcoming.  His  idea  is  that  talk  of  a  cognitive  shortcoming  betrays  a 
commitment  to  an  object,  fact  or  state  of  affairs  with  which  we  cognitively  interact  in 
some  sense,  even  if  merely  by  representing  it  as  obtaining.  Now,  either  the  existence  of 
such  an  entity  will  be  in  principle  detectable  or  it  will  not.  If  not,  then  we  need  an 
account  of  how  we  can  acquire  and  manifest  grasp  of  the  relevant  concept.  For  example, 
in  the  case  of  intention,  we  need  to  be  shown  how  to  make  sense  of  the  notion  of  action- 
directing  psychological  states  that  can  outrun  all  possibility  of  human  cognitive  contact. 
Such  a  demonstration  may  perhaps  be  given,  but  if  so,  it  will  surely  be  unsurprising  that 
the  discourse  deserves  a  realist  construal,  since  the  relevant  facts  will  clearly  have  the 
kind  of  autonomy  from  human  cognitive  affairs  that  realism  maintains.  The  interesting 
case,  therefore,  is  when  the  theorist  holds  that  we  can  come  to  have  warranted  beliefs 
about  such  facts. 
In  that  case,  Wright  thinks,  it  is  incumbent  on  the  theorist  who  holds  that  e.  g.  talk  about 
intentions  meets  Cognitive  Command  to  identify  an  epistemological  route  to  externally 
constituted  facts  about  intentions.  The  theorist  must,  that  is,  provide  details  of  when  and 
how  we  might  be  justified  in  holding  that  such  a  fact  obtains,  bearing  in  mind  that  all 
other  relevant  facts  are  agreed  upon,  and  that  vagueness,  varying  standards  of  evidence, 
etc.,  have  been  excluded  by  hypothesis.  Only  if  this  type  of  route  is  provided  has  the 
intended  sense  of  `cognitive'  been  respected.  Otherwise,  in  the  absence  of  a  substantive 
epistemology,  we  are  entitled  to  conclude  that  the  sense  of  cognition  in  question  is 
merely  a  minimal  one,  that  consists  in  no  more  than  adherence  to  the  relevant  practice- 
internal  standards  of  the  discourse. 
31 Such  an  epistemological  route  will  presumably  be  either  inferential,  as  in  e.  g.  our 
knowledge  of  mathematical  theorems  or  direct,  as  in  perception  and  memory.  If  direct, 
then  the  case  for  acceptance  of  a  perceptual  or  otherwise  intuitional  epistemology  needs 
to  be  made.  If  indirect,  it  seems  that  the  parties  who  disagree  about  whether  P  must 
disagree  about  the  inferential  transitions  that  `link'  that  fact  to  others,  since,  by 
hypothesis,  there  is  agreement  on  matters  that  don't  make  mention  of  the  particular  fact 
that  P,  and  on  norms  and  degrees  of  justification,  etc.  In  the  example  at  hand,  there  must 
be  disagreement  about  the  `principles'  linking  the  possession  of  a  given  intention  with 
e.  g.  uncontested  behavioural  and  dispositional  facts.  For  example,  I  might  assert,  and 
you  reject,  the  claim  that  a  particular  pattern  of  behaviour  is  constitutively  tied  to 
possession  of  the  intention  in  question,  so  that  if  the  subject  behaves  in  such  a  way,  she 
possesses  the  intention. 
Now,  the  status  of  these  (conditional)  principles  has  to  be  investigated.  Since  Cognitive 
Command  is  claimed  to  be  being  met  trivially,  these  conditionals  should  also  display  it. 
Otherwise,  the  standards  of  acceptability  that  govern  the  discourse  would  permit 
differing  opinions,  since  they  would  count  both  adherence  and  non-adherence  to  such 
principles  to  be  acceptable.  In  that  case,  the  discourse  would  not  meet  Cognitive 
Command.  34  So  now  we  either  need  an  intuitional  epistemology  for  these,  or  help  in 
understanding  how  their  truth  can  outrun  our  cognitive  powers,  or  another  conditional, 
containing  the  original  as  consequent,  for  which  the  same  problems  will  arise. 
Eventually,  the  thought  is,  the  `trivialising'  theorist  is  going  to  have  to  provide  some 
substantive  intuitional  epistemology  for  the  facts  in  question,  or  accept  that  the  relevant, 
`robust'  sense  of  cognitive  achievement  is  simply  not  in  play  here. 
In  effect,  Wright's  insistence  on  the  provision  of  an  epistemological  route  equates  to  the 
claim  that  `cognitive  shortcoming',  in  the  intended  sense,  entails  some  failure  of 
substantive  epistemological  process,  rather  than  being  signalled  merely  by  disagreement 
about  whether  a  given  representational  content  `fits  the  world'.  Cognitive  Command  is 
passed  when  it  makes  sense  to  think  of  us  coming  to  grasp  a  given  fact  by  means  of 
some  substantive  epistemological  procedure,  tracing  back  ultimately  to  the  fact  in 
34  See  note  31,  above  for  the  formulation  that  includes  `standards  of  acceptability'. 
32 question,  rather  than  merely  being  sensitive  to  the  assertoric  norms  of  a  given  linguistic 
practice. 
In  more  recent  work,  Wright  has  clarified  how  he  thinks  the  Cognitive  Command 
constraint  should  be  defended  in  the  light  of  a  more  telling  formulation  of  the  problem. 
The  overall  aim,  remember,  is  to  defend  the  constraint  from  the  trivialising  response, 
that  is,  the  claim  that  mere  ignorance  of  the  purported  fact  in  question  can  count  as  a 
cognitive  failing,  and  thus  that  all  discourses  in  which  talk  of  assertoric  content  is 
appropriate  will  trivially  meet  Cognitive  Command.  We  can  take  the  response  as 
crystallised  in  what  Wright  calls  the  Simple  Deduction.  Thus,  where  P  is  any  claim  that 
is  at  most  minimally  true,  held  true  by  a  thinker  A  and  held  false  by  a  thinker  B: 
1,1)  A  accepts  P-  A 
2  2)  B  accepts  ,P-A 
3  3)  A's  and  B's  disagreement  involve  no  cognitive  shortcoming.  -A 
4  4)  P 
-A 
2,4  5)  B  is  guilty  of  a  mistake,  hence  of  cognitive  shortcoming.  -2,4 
2,3  6)  ,P-4,5,3,  RAA 
1,2,3  7)  A  is  guilty  of  a  mistake,  hence  of  a  cognitive  shortcoming.  -1,6 
1,2  8)  Not-(3)  -3,3,7 
RAA 
I  canvassed  above  Wright's  idea  that  enforcing  a  distinction  between  the  sense  of 
cognitive  shortcoming  as  failure  of  process,  and  as  failure  of  agreement,  might  help  in 
avoiding  the  trivialising  objection.  The  distinction  was  there  left  intentionally  vague,  but 
is  fleshed  out  by  Wright  in  his  analogy  between  genuinely  representational  discourses 
and  taking  a  photograph 
two  cameras  that  produce  different  -  conflicting  -  representations  of  the  same  scene 
must,  one  or  both,  have  functioned  less  than  perfectly,  not  merely  in  the  sense  that  one 
(or  both)  gives  out  an  inaccurate  snapshot  but  in  the  sense  that  there  must  be  some 
independently  noticeable  defect,  or  limitation,  in  the  process  whereby  the  snapshot  was 
produced.  So  too,  it  might  be  suggested,  with  Cognitive  Command:  the  motivated 
requirement  is  that  differences  of  opinion  should  involve  imperfections  of  pedigree: 
33 shortcomings  in  the  manner  in  which,  one  or  both,  they  were  arrived  at,  of  a  kind  that 
might  be  appreciated  independently  of  any  imperfection  in  the  result.  35 
Unfortunately  for  that  plausible  thought,  it  looks  like  an  amended  version  of  the  Simple 
Deduction  can  be  run  for  the  `process'  sense  of  cognitive  shortcoming.  36  Consider  a  case 
where  we  are  dealing  with  a  subject  matter,  where  if  a  particular  fact  holds,  we  must  be 
able  to  come  to  know  that  it  does  by  implementing  a  humanly  feasible  process.  Thus, 
the  following  Evidential  Constraint  (EC)  holds  for  the  subject  matter  in  question: 
(EC)  P  ->  it  is  feasible  to  know  that  P. 
We  can  run  an  argument  structurally  parallel  to  the  Simple  Deduction,  with  A,  B,  P  as 
defined  there,  as  follows: 
1  (1)  A  believes  P,  B  believes  -'P,  and  neither  has  a  cognitive  shortcoming.  -  A 
2  (2)  P  -A 
2  (3)  It  is  feasible  to  know  that  P  -  2,  EC 
1,2  (4)  B  believes  the  negation  of  something  feasibly  knowable  -  1,3 
1,2  (5)  B  has  a  cognitive  shortcoming  -4 
1  (6)  -,  P  -  2,1,5  RAA 
1  (7)  It  is  feasible  to  know  that  ,P  -  6,  EC 
1  (8)  A  believes  the  negation  of  something  feasibly  knowable  -  1,7 
1  (9)  A  has  a  cognitive  shortcoming  -8 
(10)  Not-(1)  -  1,1,9  RAA. 
Since  the  cognitive  shortcoming  in  this  case  involves  error  about  something  which  is 
within  human  cognitive  grasp,  there  must  be  an  error  in  the  application  of  procedure  and 
not  just  concerning  the  particular  fact  at  issue.  Thus,  the  line  of  defence  proposed  by 
Wright  in  Truth  and  Objectivity,  where  he  suggests  that  the  burden  of  proof  should  be 
placed  on  the  side  of  the  `realist'  about  the  fact  at  issue  to  make  good  on  an  explanation 
of  the  relevant  epistemology,  looks  beside  the  point.  For  here  we  have  case  where  the 
's  Wright  (2001)  p.  57-5  8 
36  See  Shapiro  and  Taschek  (1996),  and  Wright  (2001)  59-62 
34 epistemology  of  the  matter  is,  by  hypothesis,  not  in  question,  since  EC  holds.  But  if  the 
discourse  is  one  in  which  we  want  to  hold  that  a  substantive  realism  is  not  an  option  - 
say,  talk  about  the  twee,  or  smug  -  then  it  seems  difficult  to  see  how  we  can  defend  such 
a  position.  For  if  EC  holds,  then  it  seems  that  there  can  be  no  room  for  intelligible, 
blameless,  differences  of  opinion  about  whether  e.  g.  Clive  James  is  smug.  One  party  is 
always  in  the  wrong.  Given  that  cognitive  blamelessness  seems  to  be  an  essential 
feature  of  such  disputes  of  inclination,  and  one  that  in  part  motivates  an  intuitive  anti- 
realism,  it  seems  that  Cognitive  Command  fails  to  adequately  capture  the  key 
distinction  in  the  area. 
Since  Cognitive  Command  plays  an  important  role  in  Alison  Denham's  defence  of  a 
non-reductive  cognitivism  about  metaphor,  which  I  discuss  in  Section  3.5,  I  have 
included  a  fairly  substantive  introduction  to  it  here.  I  ought  to  briefly  note,  however, 
that  Wright's  current  position  is  that  his  previous  conception  of  what  a  dispute  of 
inclination  fundamentally  consists  in  takes  us  down  the  wrong  path.  For  he  thinks  that 
leads  us  to  think  of  cognitively  blameless  situations  as  a  kind  of  third  option,  so  that  we 
know  that  either  (i)  A  knows  that  P  (ii)  B  knows  that  Not-P,  or  (iii)  we  know  that  neither 
P  nor  -P  is  knowable.  In  cases  where  EC  holds,  this  picture  clearly  cannot  work,  at 
least  as  long  as  LEM  is  assertible.  For  then  it  looks  like  we  are  holding  the  following 
inconsistent  set  true: 
(LEM)  P  or  -P 
(EC)  P  ->  OK(P) 
(X)  OK  (-,  OK(P)  &  -'OK(-'P)) 
In  conjunction  with  LEM,  EC  lets  us  derive  [OK(P)  or  OK(-'P)].  Another  application  of 
EC  tells  us  that  this  itself  is  feasibly  knowable.  But  then,  with  (*),  we  effectively  have 
the  claim  that  propositions  of  the  form  ('R  &  'S)  and  (R  or  S)  can  be  simultaneously 
feasible  to  know.  On  the  plausible  assumption  that  the  relevant  sense  of  feasible 
knowability  involves  knowledge  of  actual  fact,  this  is  contradictory. 
Wright's  suggestion  is  that  instead  of  construing  disputes  of  inclination  as  cases  where 
we  can  come  to  know  that  neither  side  is  at  fault,  we  should  instead  think  of  them  as 
35 cases  where  we  cannot,  in  some  suitably  epistemic  sense,  identify  which  side  the  fault  is 
on,  and,  moreover,  that  we  have  no  idea  whether  it  even  is  metaphysically  possible  to 
come  to  identify  such  fault.  In  this  case,  Wright  describes  us  as  being  in  a  Quandary 
with  respect  to  the  truth  value  of  the  disputed  proposition;  we  do  not  know  whether  or 
not  P,  or  any  means  or  method  of  coming  to  know  whether  or  not  P;  we  cannot  produce 
a  reason  for  thinking  there  is  any  way  of  knowing  whether  or  not  P  and  do  not  even 
know  whether  it  can  be  known  that  P,  (in  some  strongly  modal  sense  of  `can'). 
In  cases  where  we  find  ourselves  in  a  quandary,  Wright  holds,  we  should  reject  LEM, 
while  holding  onto  its  double  negation.  37  Since 
(LEM)  P  or  'P 
(EC)  P  ->  OK(P) 
(Q)  -K  (OK  (P  or  'P))38 
is  an  inconsistent  set,  39  while 
(--LEM)  -(P  or  -,  P) 
(EC)  P  ->  OK(P) 
(Q)  -'K  (OK  (P  or  -'P)) 
is  consistent,  the  way  is  open  for  Wright  to  claim  that  an  acceptable  anti-realist 
resolution  of  the  aporia  is  to  reject  LEM  in  cases  where  EC  and  Quandary  hold.  This 
provides  him  with  the  resources  to  finesse  the  Simple  Deduction  and  its  EC  counterpart. 
Since  the  claim  that  neither  A  nor  B  has  a  cognitive  shortcoming  has  the  form  of  a 
37  The  background  logic  is  assumed  to  be  neutral  as  to  the  question  of  whether  LEM  holds,  and  thus  to  be 
shared  ground  between  classical  and  intuitionist  logicians.  This  is  required  if  the  realist's  preferred 
resolution  of  the  inconsistency,  the  rejection  of  EC  for  the  discourse,  is  to  avoid  the  charge  of  question 
begging  against  Wright's  suggestion  that  in  disputes  of  inclination  we  should  adopt  only  the 
intuitionistically  acceptable  correlates  of  LEM. 
38  Wright  gives  the  conditions  for  being  in  a  quandary  as  a  conjunction.  Since  the  first  three  conjuncts 
follow  from  the  last,  I  have  only  considered  it  as  my  (Q). 
39  Assuming  LEM  as  a  substitution  instance  in  EC,  we  could  come  to  know  that  it  was  possible  to  know  P 
or  'P,  contra  Q. 
36 negative  existential  statement,  the  attempted  reductio  only  takes  us  to  a  doubly  negated 
existential  conclusion.  Since  this  is  not  intuitionistically  equivalent  to  the  existential 
claim  that  a  cognitive  shortcoming  exists,  Wright  thinks  the  bullet  can  be  safely  bitten 
without  incurring  unwanted  realist  commitment  to  the  existence  of  an  apparently 
unknowable  state  of  affairs  settling  the  dispute  `beyond  our  ken'.  (Of  course,  he  is  also 
committed  to  denying  that  such  a  state  of  affairs  fails  to  exist,  but  given  intuitionistic 
logic,  these  claims  are  compatible). 
We  may  seem  to  have  come  a  long  way  from  metaphorical  meaning.  But  the  relevance 
of  our  current  discussion  actually  isn't  hard  to  see.  We  will  want  to  know  whether  we 
can  safeguard  the  intuition  that  there  can  be  genuine  disputes  of  inclination  about 
metaphorical  content.  This  involves  giving  an  account  of  how  such  a  dispute  can 
genuinely  be  a  dispute  (contra  e.  g.  the  Indexical  Relativist,  and  the  Expressivist)  and 
genuinely  one  of  inclination  (contra  the  Realist  and  Error  theorist,  both  of  whom  are 
committed  to  holding  that  the  facts  are  holding  us  to  account  in  some  sense,  and  thus 
that  inclination  can  only  spring  from  ignorance  of  one  kind  or  another).  The  promise  of 
Wright's  account  was  that  minimalism  about  truth  could  guarantee  the  first,  and  failure 
of  Cognitive  Command  account  for  the  second.  The  Simple  Deduction  forced  a 
clarification  of  the  sense  in  which  inclination  holds  sway  in  the  kind  of  cases  we're 
interested  in.  The  key  result  turned  out  to  be  the  claim  that,  in  cases  where  EC  holds, 
ignorance  is  involved  in  disputes  of  inclination,  but  not  in  the  way  that  either  the  Realist 
or  the  Error  Theorist  claimed.  Rather,  Wright  claimed  that  while  the  assumption  that 
there  was  no  cognitive  shortcoming  led  to  a  contradiction,  this  did  not  automatically 
supply  us  with  a  warrant  to  assert  that  such  a  cognitive  shortcoming  must  exist  in  every 
case.  While  the  Simple  Deduction  threatened  to  trivialise  the  Cognitive  Command 
constraint  by  reducing  to  absurdity  the  idea  that  the  world  could  be  somehow  neutral  on 
the  issue  of  whether  P  or  not  P,  Wright's  argument  trades  on  the  fact  that  our  state  of 
information  warranting  assertions  can  be  so  neutral,  even  when  we  have  a  warrant  to 
assert  that  not-(P  or  Not-P)  does  not  hold. 
If  Wright's  suggestion  can  be  made  good,  then  we  have  the  promise  of  a  stable,  if 
revisionary,  account  of  how  a  genuine  dispute  about  metaphorical  meaning  can  involve 
no  attribution  of  fault  to  either  side,  even  in  principle.  Of  course,  this  only  evens  the 
score  with  e.  g.  a  determined  realist,  who  already  claims  to  have  such  an  account,  at  least 
37 if  `attribution  of  fault'  is  heard  as  implying  something  like  `in  principle  being  able  to  tell 
which  side  is  at  fault'.  Unlike  the  realist,  however,  Wright  is  not  committed  to  claiming 
that  such  a  fault  exists.  He  may  be  a  hair's  breadth  away,  given  his  acceptance  of  the 
claim  that  it  isn't  the  case  that  no  such  fault  exists,  but  perhaps  we  should  accustom 
ourselves  to  hair-splitting  in  philosophy. 
Nevertheless,  I  shall  tend  to  confine  my  later  discussion  to  Wright's  original  treatment  of 
the  Cognitive  Command  test.  There  are  a  number  of  reasons  for  this.  First,  I  want  to 
avoid  prejudging  the  question  of  whether  EC  holds  for  meaning,  as  much  as  possible. 
Though  I  offer  an  extended  discussion  of  Davidson  in  the  next  chapter,  I  explicitly  aim 
not  to  appeal  to  doctrines,  such  as  the  `transparency'  of  meaning,  that  might  not  be 
common  ground  between  rival  philosophical  treatments  of  semantics.  Second,  most  of 
what  I  say  elsewhere  about  Cognitive  Command  can  be  translated  fairly 
straightforwardly  into  the  new  approach,  and  it  would  grate  a  little  to  do  so  explicitly  on 
every  occasion.  Third,  no  sensible  realist  worth  his  salt  is  likely  to  accept  the  kind  of 
revision  of  logic  that  Wright  recommends.  Given  the  reservations  about  the  default 
status  of  anti-realism  I  raise  in  Section  1.10,  and  the  holistic  methodology  I  recommend 
in  its  place,  it  seems  less  likely  that  such  revision  will  turn  out  to  be  acceptable.  Fourth, 
my  concern  is  often  with  e.  g.  Denham's  and  Hopkins'  treatment  of  the  cognitive  status 
of  metaphor,  which  predated  Wright's  recent  discussion.  0  Finally,  the  difficulties  raised 
by  Wright's  admirable  efforts  to  clarify  the  relevant  sense  of  genuinely  cognitive  should 
not  lead  us  too  quickly  to  reject  this  notion  as  unclear  or  misguided.  It  may  well  prove 
more  useful  to  take  the  notion  as  primitive,  with  Cognitive  Command  having  the  status 
of  an  intuitive  introduction,  rather  than  an  explicit  definition.  In  any  case,  it  is  of 
independent  interest  to  grant  such  an  intuitive  sense,  and  explore  whether  ascriptions  of 
metaphorical  meaning  might  meet  it. 
1.9  Width  of  Cosmological  Role 
The  last  of  the  cruces  that  Wright  thinks  realism  debates  should  focus  on  is  Width  of 
Cosmological  Role.  This  has  received  least  attention  in  the  literature;  perhaps 
40  1  discuss  Denham  in  Chapter  2  and  3,  and  Hopkins  in  Chapter  4 
38 surprisingly,  given  that  Wright  sees  it  as  developing  and  generalising  a  widely  discussed 
view  of  Gilbert  Harman's,  which  contrasts  the  explanatory  efficacy  of  physical  facts  and 
moral  facts.  41  Wright  holds  that  the  most  interesting  element  of  the  contrast  concerns  not 
the  nature  of  the  explanation  involved,  but  rather  the  nature  and  diversity  of  the 
explananda.  Any  discourse  which  fulfils  the  minimal  conditions  requisite  for  talk  of 
assertoric  content  to  be  appropriate,  will,  according  to  Wright,  allow  certain  types  of 
explanation.  Appeal  to  the  property  of  being  funny,  to  take  a  stock  example  of  a  merely 
minimally  truth  apt  discourse,  will  allow  us  perfectly  respectable  explanations  of  e.  g. 
people's  television  viewing  behaviour,  or  the  contrasting  sales  of  certain  novels. 
Harman's  insight,  according  to  Wright,  is  not  best  captured  by  the  thought  that  cases 
where  anti-realism  is  the  appropriate  stance  are  cases  where  talk  of  explanation  is  wholly 
inappropriate,  but  rather  that  there  are  certain  extra  `explanatory  liaisons'  that  come  into 
play  in  realist  discourses. 
One  of  the  most  interesting  things  about  Wright's  account  of  realism  is  his  insight  that 
there  are  a  range  of  quite  distinct  and  separable  ways  in  which  the  realist  might  attempt 
to  give  substance  to  his  intuition  that  the  facts  in  question  are  somehow  constitutively 
independent  from  human  interests  and  responses.  Investigation  of  the  variety  of  ways 
that  such  facts  can  enter  into  quite  different  species  of  explanation  provides  another  such 
focus  for  investigation.  One  of  the  notable  things  about  the  type  of  explanatory  role 
played  by  the  comic  properties  of  television  programmes  and  novels,  for  example,  is  that 
it  involves  a  route  that  goes  `through'  a  certain  kind  of  human  response.  The  comic 
properties  of  things,  when  they  explain  the  features  of  a  certain  situation,  explain  it  in 
virtue  of  their  having  certain  effects  on  certain  human  beings,  suitably  equipped  with 
senses  of  humour.  In  contrast,  explanations  that  appeal  to  facts  which  we  tend  to  think 
of  in  realist  terms-  the  fact  that  a  certain  table  has  a  certain  shape,  for  example  -  while 
they  may  well  involve  certain  human  responses  in  certain  cases,  need  not  do  so  in  all. 
That  the  table  has  a  certain  shape  can  enter  into  explanations  of  why  I  choose  it  as  an 
example  in  a  physics  tutorial,  but  also  why  it  remains  stable  under  the  Earth's 
gravitational  pull,  why  the  dog  likes  to  lie  under  it,  why  it  won't  fit  through  the  door. 
These  latter  explanations  are  not  mediated  by  human  responses,  judgements  or  values, 
41  See  Harman  (1997)  Chapter  1 
39 and  their  existence  thus  helps  to  give  substance  to  realist  claims  about  the  independence 
of  facts  about  the  shape  of  the  table  from  human  subjectivity. 
Another  key  test  for  establishing  the  realist  standing  of  a  discourse,  then  is 
Width  of  Cosmological  Role  Can  the  putative  realm  of  fact  enter  into  explanations  in  a 
way  that  isn't  secured  merely  by  discourse  about  it  being 
apt  for  minimal  truth? 
It  isn't  wholly  clear  what  explanatory  role  is  secured  merely  by  possession  of  the 
relevant  kind  of  assertoric  content.  As  noted  above,  Wright's  discussion  suggests  that 
one  key  element  is  the  capacity  to  enter  into  explanations  that  aren't  mediated  by  the 
fully  conceptualised  attitudes  of  participants  in  the  discourse.  Something  clearly  seems 
right  about  this;  if  citing  the  existence  of  the  relevant  fact  to  explain  why  a  subject  holds 
a  given  attitude  is,  in  a  sense,  merely  a  long  winded  way  of  noting  that  the  subject  is 
confident  that  the  epistemic  standards  for  a  syntactically  assertoric  discourse  have  been 
met,  then  one  would  not  expect  that  `fact'  to  be  able  to  explain  the  behaviour  of  entities 
that  are  completely  insensitive  to  such  standards.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are 
complicating  factors.  Imagine  that  the  world  is  Cartesian,  and  that  concept  users  have 
non-material  Cartesian  egos  associated  with  their  bodies.  Wouldn't  it  be  possible  that 
such  egos  played  an  explanatory  role  only  in  ways  that  were  mediated  by  e.  g.  goals  and 
beliefs?  What  about  those  who  endorse  David  Lewis's  view  of  possible  worlds;  surely 
realists,  if  anybody  is?  Does  citing  other  possible  worlds  help  explain  what  happens  in 
this  one,  in  a  way  that  isn't  mediated  by  our  modal  sense? 
It  is  of  course  wholly  possible  for  talk  of  e.  g.  Cartesian  egos,  or  other  possible  worlds  to 
meet  other  of  the  tests,  and  yet  fail  this  one,  while  still  deserving  to  be  thought  of  as 
realist.  But  it's  not  clear  that  the  suggested  cases  genuinely  pose  a  problem  for  Width  of 
Cosmological  Role  properly  understood.  For  one  thing,  it  ought  to  be  enough,  perhaps, 
that  the  facts  in  question  can  potentially  enter  into  a  wider  range  of  explanations  than 
that  secured  by  minimalism.  For  example,  even  if  only  certain  kinds  of  causal  relations 
actually  do  hold  between  minds  and  bodies  in  the  Cartesian  world,  it  ought  to  have  been 
possible  that  a  broader  set  of  causal  relations  held  between  the  material  and  immaterial 
elements  of  the  world.  If  a  Cartesian  ego  can  raise  my  arm,  then  it  ought  to  be  possible 
40 for  a  vase  to  be  caused  to  break  just  by  having  such  an  ego  think  a  certain  thought,  for 
example.  Secondly,  although  the  Cartesian  case  essentially  involves  the  presence  of 
conceptualised  attitudes,  it's  not  clear  that  it  involves  them  in  the  right  way.  In  the  case 
where  talk  of  explanation  by  a  given  fact  is  really  just  a  matter  of  harmless  paraphrase,  it 
is  essential  that  conceptualised  attitudes  mediate  because  these  are  required  for 
sensitivity  to  the  relevant  communal  epistemic  standards.  The  Cartesian  case  makes 
conceptualised  attitudes  essential,  but  only  as  an  accompanying,  dependent  feature  of  a 
metaphysical  substratum,  not  as  the  genuine  source  of  the  facts  in  question. 
The  case  of  possible  worlds  might  invite  a  more  direct  reply.  Perhaps  the  existence  and 
nature  of  close  possible  worlds  can  partly  explain  e.  g.  why  an  animal's  perceptual 
capacities  deliver  information  about  its  environment,  or  why  non-actually-dissolved  salt 
is  soluble.  In  any  case,  the  primary  purpose  of  this  chapter  is,  as  noted,  to  outline 
Wright's  tests  for  realism,  and  not  to  pursue  specific  debates  further.  Since  the  case  of 
metaphorical  meaning  seems  unlikely  to  enter  into  the  explanatory  relationships  in 
question,  we  needn't  concern  ourselves  over  much  with  the  best  formulation  of  the 
constraint. 
1.10  Costs  and  benefits  of  Wright's  account 
At  the  end  of  section  1.2,  when  discussing  Devitt's  account  of  realism  about  the  external 
world,  I  asked  the  following  questions: 
1.  Is  it  unproblematic  to  extend  this  kind  of  general  picture  of  realism  to  debates 
between  realists  and  anti-realists  in  other  areas  of  discourse? 
2.  How  might  actual  debates  between  realists  and  anti-realists  be  profitably 
prosecuted? 
I  suggested  that  Devitt's  theory  did  not  invite  an  unproblematic  extension  to  wide  range 
of  disputes,  and  did  not  suggest  a  framework  in  which  such  disputes  could  proceed 
fruitfully.  Wright's  account,  in  contrast,  offers  a  welcome  topic-neutrality,  and  the 
various  tests,  schematic  as  they  are,  have  seemed  to  many  philosophers  to  provide  a 
41 focussed  dialectical  structure  in  which  longstanding  debates  might  advance.  Moreover, 
the  general  tactic,  of  establishing  key  constraints  or  tests,  which  serve  to  signal  the 
appropriate  metaphysical  attitude  one  ought  to  take  to  a  given  discourse,  is  one  that 
obviously  can  be  profitably  extended  beyond  the  set  of  cruces  that  Wright  himself 
identifies.  For  example,  in  recent  work  Christopher  Peacocke  has  suggested  the 
following  `indicators',  each  of  which  is  relevant  for  the  case  of  metaphorical  meaning: 
a)  Do  true  statements  in  the  area  have  an  a  priori  source? 
b)  Is  some  role  in  causal  explanation  essential  either  to  the  truth  of  statements  in  the 
area  in  question,  or  to  our  having  concepts  of  that  area? 
c)  Are  statements  in  the  problematic  area  predications  of  a  property  which  also 
features  in  predications  outside  the  problematic  area?  If  so,  does  grasp  of  this 
identity  of  properties  play  some  role  in  understanding  statements  in  the 
problematic  area?  42 
This  generalised,  pluralist,  fine-grained,  diagnostic  approach  to  disputes  about  the  realist 
standing  of  a  wide  variety  of  discourses  is  one  I  find  conducive,  and  will  comprise  the 
background  methodology  to  my  project  here.  I  do,  however,  want  to  distance  myself 
from  certain  other  elements  of  Wright's  recommended  framework  for  the  execution  of 
disputes  in  particular  areas. 
There  is  of  course  room  for  local  disagreement  about  e.  g.  the  exact  formulation  of  the 
relevant  cruces.  I  have  some  sympathy,  for  example,  with  a  complaint  that  Williamson 
and  Blackburn  make  about  the  inclusion  of  a  prioricity  in  the  formulation  of  e.  g. 
Cognitive  Command,  and  the  Order-of-Determination  test.  3  It  might  well  seem  that  this 
inclusion  counts  against  the  generality  and  topic-neutrality  of  the  approach,  and  that, 
given  that  there  are  philosophers  who  reject  the  claim  that  we  can  know  anything  a 
priori,  a  more  neutral  formulation  should  be  given  rather  in  terms  of  e.  g.  `best  overall 
explanation',  with  the  putative  a  prioricity  being  a  special  case  of  the  generic 
requirement,  to  be  made  out  on  its  own  terms  by  those  sympathetic  to  that  species  of 
42  See  Peacocke  (1999)  Section  2.4 
43  See  Williamson  (1996b)  p  905-907,  Blackburn  (1998)  p.  172 
42 knowledge.  My  divergence  from  Wright's  framework  concerns  a  more  fundamental 
structural  element,  however.  He  writes 
A  truth  predicate,  I  have  argued  is  one  which  satisfies  a  small  set  of  basic  principles  - 
most  centrally,  certain  platitudes  linking  truth  with  assertion  and  negation.  The 
characteristics  possessed  by  any  satisfier  of  these  principles  are  the  only  characteristics 
essential  to  truth.  Moreover,  they  are  insufficient  to  motivate  an  intuitive  realism  about 
a  discourse  in  which  such  a  predicate  applies.  But  a  particular  satisfier  may,  of  course, 
have  other  characteristics  as  well.  A  basic  anti-realism  -  minimalism  -  about  a 
discourse  contends  that  nothing  further  is  true  of  the  local  truth  predicate  which  can 
serve  somehow  to  fill  out  and  substantiate  an  intuitively  realist  view  of  its  subject 
matter.  Because  of  its  unassuming  character,  this  minimalism,  I  suggested,  should 
always  be  viewed  as  the  "default  stance",  from  which  we  have  to  be  shown  that  we 
ought  to  move  ... 
It  is  realism  which  must  try  to  make  good  its  case,  by  showing  that 
minimalism  about  the  relevant  discourse  is  wrong  -  showing  that  the  minimal  platitudes 
leave  out  features  of  the  local  truth  predicate  which  substantially  justify  the  rhetoric  of 
independence,  autonomy  and  full-fledged  cognitive  interaction  by  which  realism 
pretheoretically  defines  itself.  44 
Wright  thus  takes  it  that  the  unassuming  character  of  minimalism  shifts  the  burden  of 
proof  onto  the  realist  in  any  given  debate.  I  have  several  worries  about  this  move. 
Firstly,  it  is  not  clear  that  this  way  of  presenting  the  ground  rules  of  the  debate  actually 
corresponds  to  the  way  in  which  Wright  actually  proceeds.  For  example,  in  the  case  of 
the  Order-of-Determination  test,  the  burden  of  proof  seems  to  be  on  the  anti-realist.  It  is 
she  who  has  to  demonstrate  that  the  coextension  of  fact  and  best  opinion  holds  a  priori, 
can  be  specified  in  philosophically  substantive  terms,  etc.  Presumably,  by  Wright's 
lights,  until  this  demonstration  is  carried  out  successfully,  we  have  no  warrant  to  shift 
from  an  extension-reflecting  reading  of  the  relevant  biconditional.  But  that  seems  to 
signal  that  an  intuitive  realism,  rather  than  anti-realism,  comprises  the  default  position  in 
considering  whether  this  test  is  met.  45 
44  Wright  (1992)  p.  174 
45  1  owe  this  point  to  John  Divers. 
p  43 A  second  worry  is  that  it  is  simply  not  clear  why  considerations  of  modesty  alone  should 
determine  something  as  dialectically  important  as  burden  of  proof.  Why  shouldn't  other 
theoretical  virtues  -  parsimony,  simplicity,  coherence  with  other  established  theories, 
prior  plausibility,  elegance  -  also  be  taken  into  account?  Take  the  question  of  realism 
about  the  external  world.  Very  few  philosophers  would  want  to  insist  that  scepticism  of 
a  particular  kind  is  the  default  position,  even  if,  in  a  particular  case,  the  sceptic's  claims 
assume  much  less  than  our  own.  A  standing  worry  is  that  an  overly  modest  starting 
position  can  itself  serve  to  rob  a  realist  of  the  resources  that  she  requires  to  secure  his 
case. 
Wright  might,  with  some  justification,  complain  that  such  a  line  of  argument  misplaces 
the  sense  in  which  minimalism  is  unassuming.  It  is  not  merely  that  the  minimalist 
makes  claims  that  are  more  ontologically  parsimonious,  or  epistemically  cautious,  as  the 
sceptic  claims  to  do,  but  that  she  can  explain  features  of  our  thought  and  practice  in  a 
given  area  in  terms  that  respect  -  but  don't  exceed  -  our  pre  theoretic  intuitions. 
(Contrast  the  revisionary  implications  of  scepticism).  In  a  sense,  the  minimalist's 
demand  is  only  that  the  realist  justify  his  rhetoric,  and  what  could  be  intrinsically. 
objectionable  about  that?  Nevertheless,  even  if  Wright  is  correct  to  hold  that  many  of 
the  platitudes  we  associate  with  the  notion  of  objectivity  are  in  themselves  inadequate  to 
motivate  a  realist  construal,  I  think  it  is  still  fair  to  ask  why  this  consideration  should 
always  be  considered  forceful  enough  to  land  the  realist  with  the  burden  of  proof.  In 
cases  where  we  pre-theoretically  don't  associate  a  robust  sense  of  objectivity  with  mere 
philosophical  hyperbole  -  say,  in  the  case  of  the  past,  or  the  existence  of  other  minds  - 
why  should  the  failure  of  the  realist  to  identify  the  precise  features  of  the  discourse  that 
justify  such  a  stance  automatically  entail  that  we  ought  to  concede  that  the  anti-realist  is, 
so  far,  vindicated?  The  revisionary  implications  of  such  a  position  seems  to  me  rather  to 
demand,  at  the  minimum,  that  the  anti-realist  give  us  good  grounds  for  abandoning  our 
intuitive  realism,  rather  than  merely  taking  the  travails  of  the  realist  as  motivation 
enough  for  persisting  with  a  minimalist  view. 
In  my  discussion  so  far  I  have  been  conceding,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  the 
minimalist  position  is  unassuming.  Actually,  however,  this  is  far  less  clear  than  Wright 
makes  it  sound.  I  have  already  noted  that  several  of  the  dialectical  cruces  that  Wright 
identifies  are  formulated  in  terms  of  a  notion  of  a  prioricity  that  simply  isn't  common 
44 ground  among  participants  in  the  debate.  Similarly,  Timothy  Williamson  has  pointed 
out  that  Wright's  characterisation  of  warranted  assertibility  assumes  that  warrant  for 
assertion  demands  something  less  than  knowledge.  6  Wright  defends  this  claim  as 
uncontroversial  given  its  prevalence  in  a  certain  tradition  in  epistemology,  47  but  this 
seems  to  me  to  be  less  than  is  required  if  minimalism  is  genuinely  to  appeal  only  to 
platitudinous  common  sense.  (Actually,  even  if  Wright's  reply  were  sufficient  in  this 
context,  an  unsympathetic  reader  might  point  to  the  reliance  on  the  deliverances  of 
common  sense  as  itself  manifesting  a  philosophically  substantive  commitment). 
Another  group  of  critics  have  worried  over  the  issue  of  whether  Wright's  position  makes 
non-platitudinous  demands  in  the  philosophy  of  mind.  8  Given  the  extent  of  this  kind  of 
disagreement,  we  might  wonder  whether  staking  a  claim  to  a  philosophically  neutral 
default  position  is  really  worth  the  candle.  To  determined  realists  about,  say,  the  past, 
Wright's  characterisation  of  the  burden  of  proof  is  bound  to  appear  simply  as  special 
pleading  on  behalf  of  the  anti-realist. 
In  any  case,  I  shall  not  appeal  to  this  element  of  Wright's  framework  in  my  discussion  of 
realism  about  metaphorical  meaning.  Rather,  I  hold  that  the  debate  ought  to  proceed  in  a 
more  even  handed  and  holistic  manner  -  as  it  inevitably  actually  will,  even  for 
philosophers  who  are  sympathetic  to  Wright's  claims  about  burden  of  proof.  The 
challenge  to  each  participant  is  to  reconcile  the  data,  in  the  form  of  the  results  of  the 
suggested  tests,  with  their  own  preferred  epistemology,  semantics  and  metaphysics  for 
the  area  in  question.  9  Of  course,  as  in  many  cases,  the  proposed  data  may  end  up  being 
reinterpreted,  reformulated  or  even  rejected,  and  there  may  well  be  more  than  one 
defensible  overall  position  at  any  given  stage  of  the  process.  I  thus  preserve  the 
admirable  generality,  topic-neutrality  and  dialectical  focus  of  Wright's  account,  but 
46  Williamson  (1996b)  p.  907-908.  Williamson  provides  a  sustained  defence  of  the  opposing  claim  in  his 
(1996a) 
47  Wright  (1996)  p.  934-935 
48  See  Smith  (1994a),  Jackson,  Oppy  and  Smith  (1994)  and  Blackburn  (1998)  for  the  prosecution;  Divers 
and  Miller  (1994)  and  (1995),  Wright  (1999)  for  the  defence.  .  I- 
49  I  do  not  mean  to  exclude  e.  g.  their  philosophy  of  mind,  science,  logic,  ethics,  religion,  etc.,  but  rather  to 
assimilate  these  under  the  broader  headings  outlined  above. 
45 substitute  a  general  rush  for  coherence  for  Wright's  advance  from  a  default 
minimalism.  5° 
It  might  be  difficult  to  see  how  to  reconcile  such  a  methodology  with  Wright's  idea  that 
degree  of  realism  is  a  matter  of  the  relevant  features  of  the  local  truth  predicate.  After 
all,  doesn't  that  commit  us  to  a  `semantics  first'  approach  which  is  inconsistent  with  the 
kind  of  dialectical  free-for-all  endorsed  above?  I'm  not  wholly  clear  on  whether  there  is 
any  genuine  difficulty  here,  but  to  the  extent  that  there  is,  I  would  sacrifice  the  relevant 
semanticism.  None  of  the  tests  that  I  have  outlined  seem  to  me  resistant  to  rephrasing  in 
terms  that  omit  the  notion  of  truth.  The  question  of  whether  the  proposed  objects,  facts 
or  states  of  affairs  might  obtain  without  our  having  any  evidence  for  them  so  doing,  for 
example,  seems  to  be  one  that  only  appeals  to  metaphysical  and  epistemological  notions. 
If  each  such  test  can  be  rephrased  in  terms  that  alethiphobes  can  endorse,  then  no 
objectionable  semanticism  seems  to  be  being  presupposed. 
A  more  substantive  worry  concerns  a  kind  of  self-reflective  worry  that  arises  for  the 
philosophical  treatment  of  realism.  What  happens  if  the  philosophical  facts,  the  facts 
that  philosophers  interested  in  realism  about  a  given  area  attempt  to  establish,  themselves 
are  only  apt  for  a  minimalist  treatment?  After  all,  such  facts  seem  to  admit  of 
permissible  disagreement,  at  least  in  the  sense  that  there  can  be  long-lasting,  entrenched 
disputes  between  sincere  and  willing  participants,  that  we  don't  know  how  to  resolve. 
Evidence  that  we  can  be  in  a  quandary  with  regard  to  e.  g.  moral  facts  will  surely  carry 
over  to  the  philosophical  case.  Philosophical  facts  do  not  seem  to  display  Wide 
Cosmological  Role,  and  it  seems  to  me  to  be  an  open  question  whether  we  can  make 
sense  of  their  outrunning  the  potential  evidence  that  we  might  have  for  them,  or  whether 
a  `tracking'  epistemology  is  appropriate  for  them.  If  such  facts  deserve  a  less  than 
maximally  realist  treatment,  however,  how  can  any  discourse  deserve  a  more  robust 
one?  The  claim  that  e.  g.  talk  about  the  external  world  deserves  a  maximally  realist 
construal  will  itself  only  be  less  than  maximally  realist.  If  it  is  e.  g.  cognitively 
permissible  to  reject  such  a  claim,  then  how  seriously  can  we  take  the  supposed  realist 
50  This  methodological  position  is hardly  novel,  and  bears  a  fairly  close  resemblance  to  those  outlined  in 
Peacocke  (1999)  and  Miller  (forthcoming  a  and  b).  Blackburn  (1984)  pp.  3-7  is  an  early  advocate  of  a 
broadly  coherentist  methodology. 
46 result  which  claimed  to  have  established  it?  Doesn't  the  reflection  that  an  intuitive  anti- 
realism  was  equally  cognitively  respectable  itself  serve  to  undercut  the  idea  that  the 
world  is  really  out  there,  wholly  independently  of  any  decision  we  might  have  made  on 
the  matter?  It  seems  that  the  degree  to  which  one  is  anti-realist  about  the  claims  of 
philosophy  to  establish  degrees  of  realism  sets  a  limit  to  the  degree  to  which  one  can  be 
a  realist  in  any  other  area,  threatening  a  much  wider  anti-realist  victory. 
It  is  a  familiar  phenomenon  in  epistemology  that  a  dialectical  draw  favours  the  sceptic; 
here  we  seem  to  have  the  beginnings  of  a  line  of  thought  that  would  establish  a  similar 
outcome  for  anti-realism  more  generally.  To  use  a  phrase  of  Wright's  drawn  from  a 
different  but  related  context  -  that  of  Wittgenstein's  rule-following  considerations  -  the 
worry  has  to  be  that  any  form  of  restricted  realism  about  the  outcome  of  philosophical 
theorising  sets  `an  upper  bound  on  the  robustness  of  the  realism  which  is  available 
anywhere'.  sl 
I  think  this  is  a  serious  worry,  and  it  is  not  one  I  have  an  answer  to.  For  the  purposes  of 
this  project,  I  intend  to  ignore  it.  It  is,  of  course,  fairly  common  methodological  practice 
to  ignore  deep  and  dangerous  problems  while  pursuing  more  limited  concerns.  In  the 
case  of  metaphorical  meaning,  however,  where  many  of  the  most  plausible  positions 
involve  a  substantially  anti-realist  component,  the  move  is  perhaps  slightly  more 
principled  than  normal.  Even  if  the  upper  bound  to  realism  does  turn  out  to  be 
determined  by  the  status  of  philosophy  itself,  there  is  still  room  to  examine  the 
interesting  range  of  local  debates  which  fall  short  of  that  limit.  The  case  of  discourse 
about  metaphorical  meaning  is  an  example  of  this  latter  class,  in  which  one  of  the  best 
argued  positions  -  that  presented  by  Donald  Davidson  -  maintains  that  such  talk  falls 
short  even  of  the  modest  standards  that  are  requisite  for  minimal  truth.  It  is  to 
elaboration  of  this  position  that  I  now  turn. 
51  Wright  (1992)  p.  212 
47 48 2.  Davidson,  Meaning  and  Metaphor 
2.1  Introduction 
Davidson  is  an  anti-realist  about  metaphorical  meaning.  That  thesis  is  true,  but  the  sense 
-  or  rather  senses  -  in  which  it  is  true  have  not  always  been  easy  to  grasp.  The 
motivation  for  his  position  has  not  always  been  clearly  brought  out,  for  all  the  wealth  of 
commentary  that  his  first,  seminal,  paper  on  the  topic  attracted.  52  Nor,  relatedly,  has  the 
connection  between  Davidson's  anti-realism  and  broader  philosophical  concerns  with 
the  nature  of  meaning  been  satisfactorily  elucidated.  There  are,  of  course,  honourable 
exceptions.  53  But  the  insights  and  blindspots,  costs  and  benefits  of  Davidson's  position 
have  yet  to  receive  a  fully  satisfactory  treatment.  My  aim  here  is  to  make  a  pass  at  it 
from  within  the  framework  of  a  broadly  Wrightian  conception  of  the  realism  debate,  in 
the  hope  that  a  new  angle  of  illumination  might  reveal  its  contours  more  clearly.  My 
aim,  however,  is  more  substantive  than  exegetical.  While  I  will  aim  to  characterize  and 
interpret  Davidson's  position  in  a  manner  that  is  broadly  consistent  with  his  compressed 
remarks  on  metaphor,  my  primary  concern  will  be  to  present  his  arguments  in  what  I 
take  to  be  their  strongest  and  most  interesting  form. 
I  will  begin  by  examining  the  sense  in  which  we  should  think  of  Davidson  as  an  anti- 
realist  about 
metaphorical  meaning,  and  then  go  on  to  set  out  an  argument  for  his 
position.  The  argument  as  presented  is  not  wholly  explicit  in  Davidson's  work,  but 
draws  upon  recognisably  Davidsonian  themes  and  principles.  I  will  then  go  on  to 
clarify,  motivate  and  evaluate  the  status  of  the  premises  of  that  argument. 
52  Davidson  (1984a) 
s'  The  best  discussions  of  the  position  that  I  know  are  those  included  in  Stern  (2000),  White  (1996)  and 
especially  White  (unpublished).  I  am very  grateful  to  Roger  White  for  allowing  me  access  to  this  latter 
work,  from  which  I  have  benefited  immensely. 
49 2.2  The  Character  of  Davidson's  Anti-Realism 
Davidson  describes  the  central  thrust  of  his  paper  in  the  following  terms: 
This  paper  is  concerned  with  that  metaphors  mean,  and  its  thesis  is  that  metaphors  mean 
what  the  words,  in  their  most  literal  interpretation,  mean,  and  nothing  more.  Since  this 
thesis  flies  in  the  face  of  contemporary  views  with  which  I  am  familiar,  much  of  what  I 
have  to  say  is  critical.  But  I  think  the  picture  of  metaphor  that  emerges  when  error  and 
confusion  are  cleared  away  makes  metaphor  a  more,  not  less  interesting  phenomenon. 
The  central  mistake  against  which  I  will  be  inveighing  is  the  idea  that  metaphor  has,  in 
addition  to  its  literal  sense  or  meaning,  another  sense  or  meaning...  if  I  am  right,  a 
metaphor  doesn't  say  anything,  beyond  its  literal  meaning  (nor  does  its  maker  say 
anything,  in  using  the  metaphor,  beyond  the  literal).  This  is  not,  of  course,  to  deny  that 
14  metaphor  has  a  point,  nor  that  that  point  can  be  brought  out  using  further  words. 
He  summarizes  his  contrasting  view  of  how  `metaphor  works  its  wonders'  as  follows 
I  depend  on  the  distinction  between  what  words  mean  and  what  they  are  used  to  do.  I 
think  metaphor  belongs  exclusively  to  the  domain  of  use.  It  is  something  brought  off  by 
the  imaginative  employment  of  words  and  sentences  and  depends  entirely  on  the 
ordinary  meaning  of  those  words  and  hence  on  the  ordinary  meanings  of  the  sentences 
they  comprise.  55 
And  later  he  writes 
The  central  error  about  metaphor  is  most  easily  attacked  when  it  takes  the  form  of  a 
theory  of  metaphorical  meaning,  but  behind  that  theory,  and  statable  independently,  is 
the  thesis  that  associated  with  a  metaphor  is  a  definite  cognitive  content  that  its  author 
wishes  to  convey  and  that  the  interpreter  must  grasp  if  he  is  to  get  the  message.  This 
theory  is  false  as  a  full  theory  of  metaphor,  whether  or  not  we  call  the  purported 
cognitive  content  a  meaning.  56 
54  Davidson  (1984a)  p.  245-246 
55  ibid  p.  247 
56  Ibid  p.  262 
50 Three  theses  seem  to  be  clearly  endorsed  in  these  passages: 
(Dl)  The  words  that  are  employed  in  metaphorical  utterances  do  not  thereby  acquire 
new,  distinctive,  `metaphorical'  senses,  but  rather  play  the  same  semantic  role  as 
they  do  in  straightforwardly  literal  utterances. 
(D2)  The  sentences  that  are  employed  in  metaphorical  utterances  do  not  thereby 
become  associated  with  new,  distinctive  `metaphorical'  contents,  but  rather 
continue  to  have  their  ordinary  literal  meanings,  which  are  determined  by  the 
literal  meanings  of  the  words  that  make  them  up  (together  with  the  mode  of 
composition  of  such  words). 
(D3)  Metaphorical  utterances  are  not  only,  or  typically,  or  characteristically,  vehicles 
for  the  communication  of  a  distinctive  cognitive  content. 
Theses  (D1-D3)  are  clearly  expressions  of  an  anti-realist  view  regarding  the  existence  of 
distinctive  `metaphorical  meanings',  whether  these  are  thought  of  as  associated  with 
words,  sentences  or  communicative  acts.  But  what  is  the  character  of  this  anti-realism? 
In  evaluating  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  a  given  realist  or  anti-realist  stance  with 
regard  to  a  particular  set  of  issues,  it  is  often  useful  to  begin  by  identifying  the  position 
as  an  instance  of  a  generic  kind.  This  allows  us  to  clarify  key  aspects  of  the  position;  to 
identify  promising  analogies  between  the  case  at  issue  and  other,  structurally  related, 
debates;  and  to  look  for  'shortcuts'  when  developing  a  given  dialectic.  How,  then, 
should  we  classify  Davidson's  anti-realism?  Three  broad  interpretative  paradigms 
suggest  themselves 
Reductionism  Davidson  is  a  reductionist  about  metaphorical  meaning.  He 
rejects  the  idea  that  there  are  sui  generis  metaphorical  meanings 
by  simply  identifying  metaphorical  meanings  of  words  or 
sentences  with  the  corresponding  literal  meanings.  ("This  paper  is 
concerned  with  that  metaphors  mean,  and  its  thesis  is  that 
metaphors  mean  what  the  words,  in  their  most  literal 
interpretation,  mean,  and  nothing  more").  Davidson's  position  is 
51 analogous  to  e.  g.  a  primary  quality  view  of  colour,  or  a  type- 
identity  view  of  the  mind. 
Expressivism  Davidson  is  a  kind  of  expressivist,  emotivist,  non-cognitivist  or 
non-factualist  about  metaphor.  57  He  rejects  the  idea  that  there  are 
sui  generis  metaphorical  meanings,  replacing  the  idea  that 
metaphors  typically  work  by  communicating  propositional  . 
contents  with  the  idea  that  metaphor  is  a  distinctive  type  of  speech 
act.  ("I  depend  on  the  distinction  between  what  words  mean  and 
what  they  are  used  to  do").  Davidson's  position  is  analogous  to 
Blackburn's  moral  expressivism,  or  Wittgenstein's  view  of  self- 
ascriptions  of  intentions. 
Error  theorist  Davidson  is  an  error  theorist  about  metaphorical  meaning.  He 
holds  that  talk  of  sui  generis  metaphorical  meaning  makes  sense, 
but  attributions  of  it  to  utterances  or  their  parts  are  globally  false. 
("The  picture  of  metaphor  that  emerges  when  error  and  confusion 
are  cleared  away  makes  metaphor  a  more,  not  less  interesting 
phenomenon").  His  position  is  analogous  to  Mackie's  view  of 
moral  facts,  or  Field's  view  of  mathematics. 
Each  of  these  suggestions  has  something  going  for  it,  and  I  will  endeavour  to  say 
something  about  each  in  turn.  However,  I  think  it  is  important,  both  in  getting  to  grips 
with  Davidson's  arguments  for  his  anti-realism,  and  for  the  more  general  project  of 
understanding  how  the  debate  about  metaphorical  meaning  relates  to  other  realism 
debates,  that  we  see  that  the  third  interpretation  is  the  correct  one. 
2.3  Reductionism  and  Expressivism 
There  is  clearly  a  sense  in  which  the  Reductionist  reading  of  Davidson  is  right  to  insist 
that  he  holds  that  metaphorical  meaning  is  simply  literal  meaning.  After  all, 
57  For  my  purposes  in  the  chapter,  I  will  treat  these  terms  as  merely  stylistic  variations  of  one  another. 
52 `metaphorical  meaning',  in  one  sense  at  least,  can  surely  be  equated  with  `meaning 
possessed  or  expressed  by  the  metaphor',  and  Davidson  openly  claims  that  the  only 
meaning  expressed  by  the  metaphor  is  the  literal  meaning. 
This  is  rather  misleading,  however.  Firstly,  the  sense  in  which  Davidson  is  using 
`metaphorical  meaning',  when  e.  g.  he  talks  about  attacking  a  `theory  of  metaphorical 
meaning'  in  the  third  quotation  above,  is  not  the  sense  which  is  appealed  to  by  the 
Reductionist.  The  phrase  doesn't  simply  equate  to  `meaning  expressed  by  the  metaphor' 
when  understood  in  its  intended  sense.  Rather,  it  is  equivalent  to  something  like  `result 
of  a  meaning-shift  undergone  by  sub-sentential  parts  in  virtue  of  being  included  in  a 
metaphorical  utterance'.  Understood  as  it  ought  to  be,  it  is  clear  that  Davidson  is  not 
identifying  the  metaphorical  meaning  of  the  utterance  or  its  parts  with  the  corresponding 
literal  meaning,  and  that  any  suggestion  to  that  effect  at  the  beginning  of  `What 
metaphors  mean'  can  only  be  the  result  of  an  ill-timed  rhetorical  flourish. 
Secondly,  the  Reductionist  construal  simply  mischaracterizes  the  nature  of  the  error 
Davidson  takes  his  opponents  to  have  committed.  Consider  the  supposedly  analogous 
positions  in  the  philosophy  of  mind  or  colour.  Someone  who  endorses  the  primary 
quality  view  of  colour,  or  a  type-identity  view  of  mental  states  and  properties,  will 
typically  hold  that  these  physicalistically  respectable  properties  have  always  been  the 
intentional  objects  of  our  thought  and  talk.  Pain  was  always  C-fibre  stimulation,  or 
whatever;  it  is  simply  that  we  didn't  recognise  it  as  so,  as  a  result  of  a  subjective  mode 
of  presentation,  or  a  misleading  philosophical  mythology.  That  thesis,  in  part,  is  what 
distinguishes  the  Reductionist  position  from  its  Error  theoretic  rival,  which  maintains 
that  our  pre-theoretic  thought  and  talk  about  the  area  in  question  simply  has  nothing 
answering  to  it. 
Davidson  isn't  claiming,  however,  that  we,  and  his  opponents,  have  always  been 
referring  to  the  literal  meaning  of  the  words  and  sentences  in  question,  when  we  invoke 
the  notion  of  metaphorical  meaning.  On  the  contrary,  his  claim  is  that  we  have  been 
conflating  `what  the  metaphor  makes  us  notice',  or  `calls  to  our  attention',  or  what  is 
`brought  to  mind'  when  interpreting  the  metaphor,  with  something  correctly  thought  of 
as  a  meaning.  Construing  Davidson  as  a  Reductionist,  therefore,  obscures,  rather  than 
53 illuminates,  the  nature  of  his  position,  and  also  the  analogies  that  hold  between  it  and 
related  standpoints  in  other  philosophical  debates. 
What  then  of  the  reading  that  thinks  of  Davidson  as  an  Expressivist?  This  interpretation 
agrees  with  the  Reductionist  one  insofar  as  they  both  have  Davidson  rejecting  sui 
generis  metaphorical  meanings,  but  rather  than  seeing  him  as  arguing  that  metaphorical 
meaning  just  is  literal  meaning,  the  Expressivist  account  has  him  denying  that  making 
metaphors  is  usefully  assimilated  to  assertions  of  any  type  of  content.  Rather,  some 
other  linguistic  act,  some  distinctive  use  of  language  is  involved. 
An  early  sketch  of  a  naive  Expressivist  position  is  provided  by  Beardsley 
according  to  the  Emotive  theory,  a  word  has  meaning  only  if  there  is  some  way  of 
confirming  its  applicability  to  a  given  situation  -  roughly,  only  if  it  has  a  clear 
designation.  For  example,  the  sharpness  of  a  knife  can  be  tested  by  various  means,  so 
that  the  phrase  `sharp  knife'  is  meaningful.  We  may  also  suppose  that  `sharp'  has  some 
negative  emotive  import,  deriving  from  our  experience  with  sharp  things.  Now,  when 
we  speak  of  a  `sharp  razor'  or  a  `sharp  drill',  the  emotive  import  is  not  active,  because 
these  phrases  are  meaningful.  But  when  we  speak  of  a  `sharp  wind',  'a  sharp  dealer',  or 
`a  sharp  tongue',  the  tests  for  sharpness  cannot  be  applied,  and  therefore,  though  the 
individual  words  are  meaningful,  the  combinations  of  them  are  not.  In  this  way  the 
58  emotive  import  of  the  adjective  is  released  and  intensified. 
For  this  type  of  Expressivist,  then,  the  metaphor  maker  is  not  dealing  with  any  genuine 
content  when  she  utters  the  metaphorical  sentence,  since  there  is  just  none  there  for  her 
to  be  asserting.  Rather,  she  must  be  doing  something  else  with  the  sentence,  such  as 
trying  to  affect  her  interlocutor's  attitudes  or  emotions  in  a  particular  way. 
Numerous  well  known  problems  lurk  here.  Firstly,  the  notion  of  `emotive  import'  is 
unclear,  and  does  not  account  for  how  the  same  word  or  phrase  can  be  used  with 
58  Beardsley  (1958)  pp.  134-5,  quoted  in  Soskice  (1985)  p.  26.  Beardsley  characterises  the  possession  of 
content  along  verificationist  lines,  but  this  is  strictly  inessential  to  Expressivism,  naive  or  sophisticated. 
Some  criterion  for  the  possession  of  genuine  content  is  presumably  required,  however.  That  the  fact  that 
the  naive  Expressivist  cannot  take  successful  embedding  in  logical  and  propositional  attitude  contexts  as 
such  a  criterion  may  well  constitute  her  greatest  problem. 
54 `opposing  emotive  import',  as,  for  example  when  we  use  the  commendatory  phrases  `a 
sharp  mind'  or  `a  sharp  wit'  along  with  the  denigratory  ones  mentioned  in  the  passage 
above.  59  Secondly,  we  lack  an  explanation  of  the  analogies  between  the  inferential 
behaviour  of  genuinely  contentful  statements  and  that  of  merely  emotive  ones.  Thirdly, 
it  just  seems  plain  phenomenologically  wrong  to  claim  that  `getting'  a  metaphor  is 
merely  a  matter  of  being  prompted  into  a  certain  affective  state. 
The  naive  Expressivist  admittedly  has  some  room  to  manoeuvre,  especially  with  respect 
to  this  last  problem.  She  may  hold,  for  example,  that  what  metaphor  brings  about  need 
not  be-purely  affective,  but  can  include  items  which  bear  content.  In  this  case,  making  a 
metaphor  is  similar  to,  say,  uttering  nonsense  syllables  in  an  attempt  to  make  the  spy 
tapping  your  phone  believe  that  you  have  a  secret  code.  Your  utterance  possesses  no 
literal  meaning  in  itself,  but  is  intentionally  produced  to  cause  another  to  have  thoughts 
which  do  have  a  content. 
Nevertheless,  deep  problems  remain  with  the  naive  Expressivist  account  of  the 
inferential  behaviour  of  metaphors,  given  the  thesis  that  they  lack  literal  content.  Even 
relatively  extreme  poetic  metaphors  seem  to  be  able  to  embed  in  conditionals  (if 
philosophy  is  just  showing  the  fly  the  ivay  out  of  the  fly-bottle,  then  it  does  not  reveal 
deep  metaphysical  truths  about  the  structure  of  reality)  and  under  negation  (Dan  Quayle 
was  no  Kennedy).  Expressivists  such  as  Blackburn  and  Gibbard  have  aimed  to  discharge 
the  explanatory  burden  of  accounting  for  such  behaviour  in  the  moral  case,  and  it  cannot 
be  ruled  out  a  priori  that  an  account  could  be  given  in  the  metaphorical  one.  However, 
it  is  fair  to  say  that  we  currently  lack  such  an  account  and  have  little  idea  of  how  to  get 
hold  of  one.  60 
A  simple  minded  Expressivism,  then,  will  hold  that  truth  conditional  contents  are  not 
involved  at  all  in  metaphor,  and  thus  incur  the  difficult  burden  of  explaining  why  such 
`expressions'  can  embed  in  e.  g.  logical  and  propositional  attitude  contexts.  A  more 
plausible  line  for  the  Expressivist  is  available,  however.  Typically,  this  will  involve 
59  Beardsley  makes  this  point  in  his  discussion  of  the  position. 
60  For  an  introduction  to  the  debate  see  Blackburn  (1984)  Ch.  6,  Blackburn  (1988),  Gibbard  (1990).  For 
criticism  of  Blackburn's  project  see  Hale  (1986)  and  (1990).  A  useful  discussion  and  overview  is 
provided  in  Miller  (2003).  1  sketch  a  pseudo-fictionalist  solution  to  the  embedding  problem  in  Chapter  3. 
55 granting  that  the  propositions  in  question  possess  a  truth  conditional  content,  which  is 
apt  for  assertion,  but  denying  that  the  characteristic  purpose  of  making  a  metaphor  is  to 
assert  something. 
A  sophisticated  Expressivist  might  draw  an  analogies  between  metaphor  and  linguistic 
phenomena  such  as  performatives.  In  using  a  performative  such  as  "I  hereby  promise  to 
pay  you  £10" 
,I  arguably  do  not  assert  anything,  that  is,  represent  myself  as  believing 
that  I  am  making  a  particular  promise.  Rather,  I  typically  make  the  promise  by  uttering 
the  words.  This  is  not  because  I  could  not  use  the  sentence  to  make  an  assertion:  the 
sentence  has  a  content,  determined  by  the  conventional  rules  of  English,  which  I  could 
sincerely  present  as  true.  It  is  this  propositional  content  which  enables  the  sentence  to  be 
embedded  in  logical  and  propositional  attitude  contexts,  and  which  explains  the  relation 
between  the  promising  and  temporally  related  descriptions  ('I  will  promise  her  the 
money',  `If  I  promise  her  the  money,  then  I  will  give  her  the  money').  In  a  similar  way, 
according  to  the  sophisticated  Expressivist,  the  literal  vehicle  of  a  metaphor  may  well 
have  a  truth  conditional  content  available  for  assertion,  but  our  typical  practice  of 
making  such  claims  is  not  best  represented  as  assertoric. 
The  sophisticated  Expressivist  position  thus  begins  to  address  the  problem  of  accounting 
for  the  inferential  behaviour  of  metaphor  by  allowing  that  metaphors  usually  have  a  truth 
conditional  content  associated  with  them,  which  allows  them  to  embed  in  conditionals, 
etc.  However,  in  making  metaphors,  we  do  not  assert  this  content,  but  use  the  sentence 
in  question  in  some  other  way.  This  might  be  to  perform  a  sari  generis  speech  act  (often 
referred  to  as  nzetaphorizing),  to  perform  some  other  distinctive  illocutionary  act  (such 
as  inviting  or  encouraging  the  interpretation  of  the  metaphor),  or  simply  to  achieve  some 
aim  of  the  speaker's  (to  draw  attention  to  certain  features  of  a  situation,  or  to  make  us 
think  of  somebody  in  a  certain  way,  for  example). 
The  story,  applied  to  the  case  of  metaphor,  typically  looks  something  like  this.  The 
maker  of  a  metaphor  utters  a  sentence,  which  typically  possesses  literal  content,  and  is 
thus  apt  for  assertion.  However,  the  speaker  does  not  assert  the  sentence,  which  in  the 
56 normal  case  will  be  obviously  literally  false.  61  Rather,  the  metaphor  maker  implicitly 
invites,  via  contextual  clues,  shared  adherence  to  Gricean  conversational  maxims,  etc, 
the  interpreter  of  the  metaphor  to  look  for  a  certain  set  of  similarities  between  two  or 
more  objects,  events,  situations  etc.  The  metaphor  maker  will  typically  intend  that  the 
interpreter  get  hold  of  some  central  similarities  or  analogies,  but  need  not,  and  can  in  any 
case  intend  that  the  interpreter  have  an  element  of  free  play  in  coming  up  with  ways  in 
which  the  metaphor  is  apt.  It  is  this  aspect  of  metaphor  making,  the  implicit  invitation  to 
`make  the  most  of  it',  which  accounts  for  the  oft  cited  open-endedness  of  metaphor.  Of 
course,  the  metaphor  may  also  prompt  various  affective  states,  and  be  intended  by  its 
maker  so  to  do. 
This  position  has  proved  attractive  to  a  number  of  careful  philosophers,  both  as  an 
interpretation  of  Davidson,  and  as  a  plausible  account  of  metaphor  in  its  own  right. 
Simon  Blackburn,  for  example,  writes 
[Metaphors]  are  typically  couched  in  indicative  sentences,  certainly  governed  by  norms 
of  appropriateness,  found  in  complex  embeddings,  yet  certainly  not  intended  as 
straightforward  cases  of  truths  or  falsehoods.  This  is  how  the  expressivist  says  it  is  in 
more  controversial  examples,  such  as  commitment  to  conditional,  moral  or  modal 
claims.  62 
Of  course,  supporters  of  such  a  position  accept  that  much  still  has  to  be  filled  in;  the 
nature  of  the  contextual  clues,  the  nature  of  the  actual  mechanism  by  which  we  get  hold 
of  the  various  relevant  similarities,  the  scope  for  invention,  etc.  As  far  as  the  semantics 
and  pragmatics  of  metaphor  go  they  argue,  however,  the  broad  picture  is  tolerably  clear. 
Metaphor  is  a  way  of  using  a  pre-existing,  truth  apt  content  to  prompt,  encourage  or 
invite  contemplation  of  or  active  investigation  into  some  open-ended  set  of  similarities. 
I  am  in  agreement  with  much  of  what  this  type  of  position  has  to  say,  both  exegetically 
and  substantively.  It  is  certainly  true,  for  example  that  Davidson  argues  against  the  idea 
that  the  typical  job  of  metaphorical  speech  is  to  convey  a  `coded  message',  and 
61  Or  perhaps  nonsensical:  see  White  (1996)  pp.  204-226.  I  argue  against  the  `nonsensical'  view  of 
metaphor  in  Chapter  3. 
62  Blackburn  (1998)  p.  159. 
57 compares  it  instead  with  distinctive  uses  of  language  such  as  joking,  promising,  hinting, 
criticizing  and,  in  an  extended  passage,  lying 
Now,  let  me  raise  a  somewhat  Platonic  issue  by  comparing  the  making  of  a  metaphor 
with  telling  a  lie.  The  comparison  is  apt  because  lying,  like  making  a  metaphor, 
concerns  not  the  meaning  of  words  but  their  use...  The  parallel  between  making  a 
metaphor  and  telling  a  lie  is  emphasized  by  the  fact  that  the  same  sentence  can  be  used, 
with  meaning  unchanged,  for  either  purpose.  So  a  woman  who  believed  in  witches  but 
did  not  think  her  neighbour  a  witch  might  say  `She's  a  witch',  meaning  it 
metaphorically;  the  same  woman  still  believing  the  same  of  witches  and  her  neighbour 
but  intending  to  deceive,  might  use  the  same  words  to  very  different  effect...  What 
makes  the  difference  between  a  lie  and  a  metaphor  is  not  a  difference  in  the  words  used 
or  what  they  mean  (in  any  strict  sense  of  meaning)  but  in  how  the  words  are  used.  Using 
a  sentence  to  tell  a  lie  and  using  it  to  make  a  metaphor  are,  of  course,  totally  different 
uses,  so  different  that  they  do  not  interfere  with  one  another,  as  say,  acting  and  lying  do. 
In  lying,  one  must  make  an  assertion  so  as  to  represent  oneself  as  believing  what  one 
does  not;  in  acting,  assertion  is  excluded.  Metaphor  is  careless  of  the  difference.  3 
The  Expressivist  reading  of  Davidson,  then  is  correct  to  attribute  something  like  the 
following  thesis  to  him 
(E)  A  metaphorical  utterance  involves  a  distinctive  use  of  a  segment  of  literal 
language,  which  does  not  alter  in  meaning  by  being  so  used,  typically  in  order 
that  a  speaker  might  intentionally  `provoke  or  invite'  a  certain  view  of  the 
subject  matter  of  the  metaphor,  (although  it  is  also  possible  e.  g.  that  the  purpose 
of  such  an  utterance  might  be  to  make  us  `appreciate  some  fact',  and  that  the 
metaphor  itself  may  `prompt  or  inspire'  us  in  ways  that  the  speaker  does  not 
actively  intend.  )64 
I  believe  we  will  go  astray,  however,  if  we  conflate  (i)  Davidson's  position  with  respect 
to  the  question  of  realism  about  metaphorical  meaning  with  (ii)  his  positive  account  of 
how  metaphor  `works  its  wonders'.  The  latter,  but  not  the  former,  is  broadly  analogous 
63  Davidson  (1984a)  pp.  258-259 
6'  For  support  for  the  idea  that  Davidson  subscribes  to  (E)  see  his  (1984a)  p  261-264.  (The  quoted  phrases 
in  my  formulation  of  that  thesis  can  also  be  found  there.  ) 
58 to  a  typical  non-cognitivist  account  of  the  function  of  e.  g.  moral  or  modal  language.  The 
purpose  of  metaphor,  like  the  purpose  of  moral  language  on  an  Expressivist  account,  is 
often  to  do  something,  not  to  say  something.  But  that  should  not  mislead  us  into 
characterizing  Davidson  as  an  Expressivist  about  metaphorical  meaning.  His  position 
with  respect  to  metaphorical  meaning  is  structurally  significantly  different  from 
Expressivism  about  moral  or  aesthetic  facts,  whether  naive  or  sophisticated  in  form. 
Alison  Denham  is  one  contemporary  writer  who  falls  into  the  trap  of  mistaking  surface 
similarity  in  the  treatment  of  linguistic  role  for  depth  of  correspondence  of  metaphysical 
stance.  65  In  her  Metaphor  and  Moral  Experience,  a  work  whose  partial  aim,  like  my 
own,  is  to  approach  metaphor  from  within  the  compass  of  a  Wrightian  approach  to 
realism,  she  writes 
Some  claim  that  it  is  not  possible  to  state  the  truth-conditions  of  moral  discourse  in  non- 
6 
evaluative  terms;  the  parallel  thought  [in  the  case  of  metaphor]  is  that  it  is  not  possible  to 
state  the  truth  conditions  of  some  metaphorical  discourse  in  non-figurative  terms.  66 
Again,  in  her  introduction  to  that  volume,  she  writes 
The  parallels  [between  moral  judgements  and  metaphors]  run  deep,  as  can  be  seen  by 
reflecting  for  a  moment  on  the  kinds  of  questions  which  often  arise  with  respect  to  each. 
For  instance:  1)  Are  moral  judgements  candidates  for  the  assignment  of  truth  values,  or 
are  they  actually  covert  expressions  of  sentiment,  not  in  themselves  either  true  or  false? 
Compare:  Are  metaphorical  expressions  genuine,  truth-apt  judgements,  or  do  they  serve 
merely  to  evince  emotion  and  the  play  of  imagery?  2)  Can  moral  concepts  be  analysed 
in  wholly  non-evaluative  terms?  Compare:  can  metaphorical  expressions  be  reduced  to 
literal  paraphrase?  67 
65  Other  theorists  of  metaphor  who  sail  close  to  the  wind  include  Blackburn  (1998),  who  I  quoted  above; 
Soskice  (1985)  pp.  26-27,  who  calls  Davidson's  position  non-cognitivist,  and  notes  its  similarities  to 
Emotivism;  and  Moran  (1997)  p.  260,  who  draws  comparisons  between  Davidson  and  moral  non- 
cognitivists.  Unlike  Denham,  however,  most  of  these  theorists  manage  to  refrain  from  sailing  too  close. 
66  Denham  (2000)  p.  283.  n.  5. 
67  Denham  (2000)  p.  2.  She  goes  on  there  to  note  two  further  `deep  parallels'  concerning,  firstly,  the 
epistemological  immediacy  of  facts  about  morals  and  metaphorical  meanings,  and  secondly,  the 
phenomenon  of  persistent,  conflicting  responses  in  each  case. 
59 I  want  to  argue  that,  in  fact,  no  relevant  parallel  of  the  kind  that  Denham  appeals  to 
actually  holds  between  morals  and  metaphors.  A  bad  analogy  has  led  her  astray,  and  led 
her  to  ignore  the  genuine  differences  between  dominant  forms  of  anti-realism  about 
metaphorical  discourse  on  the  one  hand,  and  moral  discourse  on  the  other. 
To  see  where  and  why  the  putative  parallel  fails,  let's  think  more  closely  at  what  a 
discourse  is,  in  the  sense  in  which  it  has  come  to  be  used  in  debates  about  realism.  For 
Denham,  as  for  Wright,  a  discourse  is  an  essentially  intentional  entity;  discourse  is 
always  discourse-about.  Denham  writes 
...  a  discourse  is  loosely  defined  as  a  linguistic  practice  governed  by  community  norms. 
A  particular  discourse  within  a  linguistic  community  will  be  circumscribed  by  some 
distinctive,  or  more  or  less  distinctive,  set  of  concepts:  aesthetic  discourse,  for  instance, 
is  circumscribed  by  the  exercise  of  concepts  such  as  'beauty',  'elegance',  'grace', 
'lyricism',  'ugliness',  while  moral  discourse  features  concepts  such  as  'right,  'evil', 
'malice',  'kindness',  'deceit',  'duty'  and  so  on  68 
Since  to  have  a  concept  is  to  have  a  "way  of  conceiving  of  some  object  (including  object 
kinds)  or  property,  whereby  one  is  able  to  form  true  and  rationally  warranted  beliefs 
concerning  it",  69  discourses  are  fundamentally  world-directed,  with  discourses 
individuated  by  the  particular  'realm  of  fact'  that  they  concern. 
It  should  have  made  Denham  question  the  degree  to  which  significant  parallels  hold 
between  moral  discourse  and  'metaphorical  discourse',  conceived  of  as  the  production  of 
metaphorical  utterances  or  assertions,  that  the  latter,  in  absolute  contrast  with  the  former, 
is  not  concerned  with  any  particular  feature  or  cluster  of  features  of  the  world. 
Metaphors  can  be  about  phenomenal  experiences,  the  external  world,  aesthetic 
properties,  moral  properties,  persons,  numbers,  actions,  God,  the  weather  -  anything,  in 
fact,  that  any  other  discourse  can  talk  about  literally  (and,  according  to  some  theorists,  a 
bit  more  besides). 
68  Denham  (2000)  p.  44.  For  Wright's  view,  see  his  (1992)  pp.  2-18 
69  Denham  (2000)  p.  44. 
60 It  seems  that  Denham  has  been  misled  by  an  ambiguity  in  the  phrase  'metaphorical 
discourse'.  On  one  reading,  indubitably  the  more  natural  and  everyday,  the  phrase  refers 
to  discourse  which  is  metaphorical  in  character.  On  this  resolution  of  the  ambiguity,  it 
is  easy  to  see  why  metaphorical  discourse,  as  opposed  to,  say,  moral  discourse,  has  no 
distinct  subject  matter;  the  relation  to  metaphor  consists  in  the  way  a  given  state  of 
affairs  is  being  talked  about,  not  the  nature  of  the  state  of  affairs  itself. 
On  the  second  reading,  however,  the  one  Denham  requires  if  her  supposed  parallel  is  to 
go  through,  metaphorical  discourse  is  discourse  about  the  nature  and  meaning  of 
metaphorical  utterances;  discourse  whose  individuating  concepts  include  'metaphorical 
meaning',  'simile',  'literal',  'dead  metaphor',  etc.  This  kind  of  discourse,  though  clearly 
concerned  with  a  feature  of  the  world,  is  a  metadiscourse,  since  the  feature  of  the  world 
it  concerns  is  a  particular  subset  of  what  we  might  call  first-order  discourses,  which  in 
turn  directly  concern  non-linguistic  features  of  the  world.  70 
Denham's  confusion  is  made  clear  in  her  discussion  of  what  she  terms  the  Reductionist 
position,  which  holds  that  the  meaning  expressed  by  metaphors  can  be  fully  spelled  out 
in  literal  terms.  She  writes  that  for  the  Reductionist 
Metaphorical  discourse,  if  it  is  meaningful  at  all,  is  not  conceptually  autonomous,  but 
parasitic  or  conceptually  supervenient:  all  intelligible  disagreements  about  the  truth  of 
judgements  expressed  metaphorically  will  thus  depend  on  disagreements  about  the  truth 
of  judgements  expressed  in  non-figurative  terms.  (The  Reductionist's  position  with 
respect  to  metaphor  is  in  this  respect  analogous  to  that  of  some  moral  cognitivists  who 
win  cognitive  standing  for  evaluative  discourse  by  proposing  to  provide  definitions  of 
the  concepts  distinctive  of  it  in  naturalistic  terms).  '' 
Denham  here  simply  overlooks  the  fact  that  the  sense  of  `discourse'  in  which  concepts 
are  distinctive  of  particular  discourses  is  not  the  one  we  usually  intend  when  we  talk 
70  This  account  actually  needs  to  be  complicated  slightly,  given  that  we  can  e.  g.  use  metaphor  to  describe 
metaphor,  or  literal  language  to  describe  linguistic  practice,  so  that  not  all  metadiscourses  need  concern 
first  order  discourses. 
71  Denham  (1998)  pp.  230-231.  I  will  go  on  to  discuss  Denham's  positive  views  on  reduction  and 
metaphor  further  in  Chapter  3  below. 
61 about  metaphorical  discourse;  the  latter  usage  most  often  refers  to  a  mode  of  expression, 
not  a  particular  subject  matter. 
How  does  getting  clear  on  this  ambiguity  help  us  elucidate  the  character  of  Davidson's 
anti-realism?  For  a  start,  it  helps  us  to  see  that  Davidson  is  no  Expressivist,  although 
there  are  surface  similarities.  The  moral  expressivist  holds  that  (a)  moral  discourse  is 
not  typically  used  to  state  facts  and  (b)  there  are  no  moral  facts.  Davidson  holds  that  (a) 
metaphors  are  not  typically  used  to  state  facts  and  (b)  there  are  no  facts  about 
metaphorical  meaning.  Convergence  in  doctrine  is  more  real  than  apparent,  however. 
Expressivists  hold  that  moral  discourse  is  not  typically  used  to  state  e.  g.  the  moral  facts 
because  there  simply  aren't  any  such  facts  around  to  be  stated.  In  the  case  of  metaphor, 
however,  there  are  plenty  of  facts  around  that  metaphor  could  be  used  to  state  -  in  a 
pragmatic  sense,  rather  than  a  semantic  one  -  since  metaphor  can  be  used  in  the 
characterization  of  any  subject  matter.  Davidson  isn't  disputing  that  metaphor  could  be 
used  in  such  a  way,  only  that  it  typically  is. 
Generically,  Expressivism  combines  an  anti-realism  about  a  particular  kind  of  fact  with 
the  view  that  the  discourse  that  we  (or  folk  semantics,  or  philosophical  prejudice)  might 
mistakenly  classify  as  representative  of  such  facts  actually  has  some  quite  different 
linguistic  function.  Davidson  is  an  anti-realist  about  metaphorical  meaning  all  right,  but 
he  does  not  hold  that  talk  about  metaphorical  meaning  actually  has  some  non-, 
representational  linguistic  function.  The  aim  of  his  paper  isn't  to  reveal  that  Richards, 
Empson,  Black,  Goodman,  and  the  rest  were  really  expressing  some  non-cognitive 
attitude  when  they  told  us  that  sub-sentential  parts  of  metaphors  acquired  new  meanings 
in  metaphorical  contexts.  On  the  contrary,  the  attitudes  were  cognitive  enough,  and 
aimed  at  delimiting  certain  linguistic  facts;  Davidson's  complaint  is  simply  that  they  got 
the  relevant  facts  wrong.  When  Davidson  characterizes  Henle's  theory  as  saying  that  `in 
its  metaphorical  role  the  word  applies  to  everything  that  it  applies  to  in  its  literal  role, 
and  then  some',  72  he  is  attributing  a  theory  to  Henle,  not  some  non-representational 
attitude.  The  analogies  between  Expressivism  and  Davidson  on  metaphor,  then,  flatter 
to  deceive;  they  are  real  enough  to  mislead,  but  represent  only  surface  similarities  rather 
than  continuities  of  metaphysical  and  semantic  doctrine. 
72  Davidson  (1984a)  p.  250 
62 2.4  The  Nature  of  Davidson's  Error-theoretic  Approach 
Davidson  is  an  error  theorist  about  metaphorical  meaning.  He  holds  that  talk  of  sui 
generis  metaphorical  meaning  makes  sense,  and  is  to  be  construed  in  straightforwardly 
representational  terms,  but  attributions  of  it  to  utterances  or  their  parts  are  globally  false. 
Error  theorists  in  other  areas,  such  as  John  Mackie  in  the  case  of  morality  and  aesthetics, 
or  Hartry  Field  in  philosophy  of  mathematics,  likewise  claim  that  the  relevant  class  of 
statements  are  genuinely  assertoric  in  character,  as  a  face-value  construal  would  suggest 
(thus  diverging  from  an  Expressivist  account)  but  that  we  are  systematically  mistaken 
about  their  truth  values  (thus  diverging  from  e.  g.  non-reductive  realists,  reductivists, 
quasi-realists,  indexical  relativists  and  minimalists,  each  of  whom  hold  that  the 
statements  in  question  are  often  true).  It  is  to  the  fairly  detailed  and  advanced  critical 
discussion  of  such  positions  that  we  should  look  when  seeking  outside  aid  in  evaluating 
structural  features  of  Davidson's  position. 
It  is  important  here  to  recall  that  we  are  here  concerned  with  facts  about  metaphorical 
content,  in  the  sense  of  commitment  to  the  truth  or  falsity  of  claims  like 
(M)  `Philosophy's  proper  aim  is  to  show  the  fly  the  way  out  of  the  fly  bottle'  means 
that  philosophy's  proper  aim  is  to  dissolve  persistent  and  frustratingly  complex 
conceptual  problems  that  impede  our  progress  through  life,  and  prevent  our 
living  in  a  fulfilling  manner. 
rather  than  facts  about  metaphor  production,  as  when  we  quarrel  about  the  type  of 
linguistic  function  metaphors  characteristically  or  typically  perform.  An  Error-theorist 
can  endorse  the  idea  that  metaphor's  role  is  typically  not  to  state  facts  or  make 
assertions;  his  point  is  that  positive  ascriptions  of  meaning  to  metaphors  are  uniformly 
false. 
We  can  distinguish  two  degrees  of  Error  theory  about  metaphorical  meanings.  Firstly, 
one  might  hold  that  there  are  no  strictly  semantic  facts  which  make  claims  about 
63 metaphorical  meaning  true.  73  Of  course,  this  has  to  go  along  with  the  claim  that  we 
thought  that  there  were,  in  order  to  count  as  an  Error  theory.  But  perhaps  this  isn't 
totally  implausible;  lots  of  philosophers,  literary  critics,  theologians  and  linguists  did 
(and  do)  write  as  if  metaphorical  meanings  were  semantic  in  this  sense,  and  we  might  be 
able  to  tell  some  story  about  epistemological  deference  to  experts  that  convicted  our 
linguistic  community  more  generally.  Let's  call  somebody  who  holds  this  kind  of  view 
a  semantic  error  theorist.  It  will  be  useful  to  distinguish  two  varieties  of  semantic  error 
theory;  a  folk  version  that  held  that  the  mistake  was  ingrained  in  the  practices  of  the 
linguistic  community  at  large,  and  an  expert  version  that  locates  the  mistake  rather  in  the 
application  of  a  semi-technical  term.  The  phenomenon  of  epistemological  deference 
mentioned  above  no  doubt  renders  this  a  slightly  artificial  distinction,  but  I  hope  it  will 
serve  to  mark  out  a  difference  in  emphasis  nevertheless.  (For  example,  Mackie's 
discussion  suggests  that  he  endorses  the  folk  version  of  semantic  error  theory  about 
morals;  we  are  all  error  theorists  in  the  expert  sense  about  phlogiston.  ) 
A  more  charitable  view  holds  that  semantics  offers  a  bad  model  of  what  talk  about 
metaphorical  meanings  really  involves,  which  is  fundamentally  pragmatic  in  nature  - 
perhaps  involving  something  like  Gricean  speaker-meanings,  although  this  is  clearly  not 
mandatory.  The  pragmatic  error  theorist  holds  that  even  this  more  charitable  account  is 
mistaken;  there  are  just  no  facts  about  metaphorical  meaning,  whether  this  is  construed 
in  the  narrow  semantic  sense  or  in  a  broader  pragmatic  sense,  which  could  make 
sentences  like  (M)  true.  74  The  reason  that  we  assert  or  deny  such  sentences  is  that  we 
are  mistaken  about  what  kind  of  facts  there  are,  for  whatever  reason.  The  explanatory 
burden  the  Error  theorist  of  either  pragmatic  or  semantic  stripe  must  discharge  is, 
therefore,  threefold.  Their  aim  ought  to  be  to  (1)  give  us  a  plausible  account  of  how  the 
facts  actually  stand;  (2)  explain  how  we  could  have  been  led  into  such  massive  error 
concerning  them  and  (3)  elucidate  what  the  upshot  of  our  mistake  finally  amounts  to. 
"  My  aim  is  to  remain  relatively  neutral  on  what  counts  as  e.  g.  `strictly  semantic';  it  should  be  heard  here 
in  a  broad  and  intuitive  sense. 
74  There  is  logical  space  for  an  error  theory  that  holds  that,  while  the  semantics  of  ascriptions  of 
metaphorical  meaning  involve  e.  g.  speaker  meaning,  these  are  all  in  fact  false,  and  some  other,  strictly 
semantic  theory  of  metaphorical  meaning  is  in  fact  correct.  I  don't  know  of  any  theorist  who  defends  this 
rather  unattractive  position,  and  shall  in  any  case  ignore  it  here;  my  pragmatic  error  theorist  holds  that 
metaphors  don't  have  meanings  in  either  a  semantic  or  a  pragmatic  sense  of  `meaning'. 
64 Typically,  an  Error  theoretic  account  will  go  most  smoothly  if  the  effect  of  our  mistake 
is  fairly  minimal.  Field,  for  example,  does  not  counsel  us  to  immediately  abandon  all 
scientific  theory  that  relies  on  our  metaphysically  suspect  beliefs  about  the  existence  of 
numbers,  but  rather  tries  to  provide  nominalistically  respectable  translations  of  such 
science.  We  might  want  to  make  some  further  distinctions  in  this  area  about  how  such 
translations  are  construed.  Let  an  eliminativist  be  an  Error  theorist  who  holds  that  our 
talk  in  a  particular  area  is  mistaken  because,  taken  literally,  it  is  straightforwardly  false. 
A  hard  eliminativist  counsels  us  to  abandon  the  discourse  altogether;  a  soft  eliminativist 
provides  us  with  a  functionally  equivalent  replacement  discourse. 
I  take  Davidson's  position,  in  a  nutshell,  to  be  the  following:  he  is  a  pragmatic  error 
theorist,  of  the  `expert'  variety,  and  a  soft  eliminativist.  75  As  noted  above,  I  take  him  to 
subscribe  to  the  following  theses: 
(D1)  The  words  that  are  employed  in  metaphorical  utterances  do  not  thereby  acquire 
new,  distinctive,  `metaphorical'  senses,  but  rather  play  the  same  semantic  role  as 
they  do  in  straightforwardly  literal  utterances. 
(D2)  The  sentences  that  are  employed  in  metaphorical  utterances  do  not  thereby 
become  associated  with  new,  distinctive  `metaphorical'  semantic  contents,  but 
rather  continue  to  have  their  ordinary  literal  meanings,  which  are  determined  by 
the  literal  meanings  of  the  words  that  make  them  up  (together  with  the  mode  of 
composition  of  such  words). 
75  I  thus  disagree  with  a  recent  commentator,  Garry  Hagberg,  (2001)  p  289  who  says  that  Davidson's 
position  is  `by  no  means  an  eliminative  one...  he  allows  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  metaphorical  truth". 
Hagberg  justifies  this  interpretation  with  reference  to  the  following  remark  of  Davidson's:  "metaphor 
does  lead  us  to  notice  what  might  not  otherwise  be  noticed,  and  there  is  no  reason,  I  suppose,  not  to  say 
that  these  thoughts  and  feelings  inspired  by  the  metaphor  are  true  or  false.  "  I  suspect  Hagberg  is here 
confusing  the  functional  replacement  that  Davidson  proposes  with  the  kind  of  distinctively  metaphorical 
truth  that  he  explicitly  rejects.  For  Davidson,  the  metaphor  isn't  true  in  anything  like  the  way  that 
ordinary  senses  are  true.  In  the  sense  he  allows,  we  could  equally  well  say  that  e.  g.  hints,  jokes  or  thought 
experiments  were  true  or  false. 
65 (D3)  Metaphorical  utterances  are  not  only,  or  typically,  or  characteristically,  vehicles 
for  the  communication  of  a  distinctive  cognitive  content,  even  when  such 
communication  is  pragmatically  construed. 
(D4)  Previous  influential  theories  of  metaphor  falsely  subscribed  to  doctrines  that 
were  inconsistent  with  (D1-D3)  above.  However,  much  of  what  such  theorists 
wanted  to  capture  about  metaphor  can  be  best  upheld  by  dropping  the  idea  that  a 
given  metaphor  is  a  vehicle  for  the  communication  of  a  distinctive  cognitive 
content,  and  instead  thinking  in  terms  of  what  it  `intimates',  `brings  to  our 
attention',  or  `leads  us  to  see'. 
That  Davidson  subscribes  to  such  doctrines  is  perhaps  relatively  uncontroversial.  I  hope 
that  in  the  preceding  I  have  made  the  case  that  we  should  see  his  adherence  to  such 
theses  as  revelatory  of  an  Error-theoretic  position,  with  certain  distinctive  features.  In 
the  following  sections,  I  will  go  on  to  examine  the  nature  of  his  arguments  for  (D1-D3). 
This  will  clear  the  way  for  a  discussion  of  Davidson's  suggested  functional  replacement 
of  talk  of  metaphorical  meaning  in  the  next  chapter. 
2.5  Davidson's  Master  Argument  Against  Metaphorical  Meanings 
Davidson's  "What  Metaphors  Mean"  contains  several  direct  and  indirect  arguments  for 
(D1)-(D3).  However,  these  arguments  need  not  be  thought  of  bringing  wholly 
independent  considerations  to  bear  on  the  matter,  although  that  is  how  they  are 
sometimes  presented.  76  In  this  section,  I  will  outline  how  I  think  the  arguments  are 
intended  to  work  together  in  a  unified  way  to  establish  the  desired  conclusions.  I  will 
then  go  on  to  evaluate  these  arguments  in  the  following  four  sections. 
Early  discussions  of  metaphor  which  appealed  to  the  existence  of  the  `metaphorical 
meanings'  of  words  or  sentences  often  left  the  nature  of  these  supposed  senses  inexplicit, 
to  put  it  mildly.  Nevertheless,  we  might  hope  that  they  would  agree  with  the  following 
principle: 
76  E.  g.  in  Nogales  (1999)  pp.  75-121 
66 (Al)  The  parts  of  metaphorical  utterances  only  acquire  distinctive  metaphorical  senses 
if  they  thereby  become  associated  with  something  that  deserves  to  be  called  their 
`metaphorical  meaning'.  Nothing  deserves  to  be  called  a  metaphorical  meaning 
unless  (a)  there  is  something  genuinely  meaning-like  about  it  and  (b)  there  is 
something  about  it  that  distinctively  relates  to  the  metaphorical  nature  of  the 
utterances  it  is  putatively  associated  with. 
Such  a  principle  is,  I  hope,  unexceptionable.  Realism  about  metaphorical  meanings  is 
not  secured  by  demonstrating  the  existence  of  elephants,  eggplants  or  electrons,  since 
those  entities  don't  count  as  metaphorical  meanings.  The  principle  would  perhaps  seem 
dubious  if  it  was  read  as  reaming  meanings,  perhaps  implicitly  subscribing  to  the  idea 
that  meanings  must  be  objects  of  some  special  kind,  that  words  serve  to  name  or  denote. 
This  is  not  its  intended  import  however.  (Al)  merely  demands  that  whatever  the 
supposed  metaphorical  meaning  of  words  consists  in  -  whether  associated  patterns  of 
use,  ways  of  thinking  about  the  world,  intentional  properties,  inferential  roles, 
satisfaction  conditions  or  whatever  -  that  `entity',  however  pleonastically  construed, 
must  be  the  kind  of  thing  that  invites  us  to  think  of  it  as  a  metaphorical  meaning. 
I  also  take  it  that  the  two  conditions  outlined  in  (Al),  regarding  meaning  and  relevance 
to  metaphor,  ought  to  be  uncontroversial.  Imagine  that  we  had  adopted  the  convention 
of  printing  (all  and  only)  written  metaphors  in  red  ink,  perhaps  to  alert  the  unwary  reader 
to  their  metaphorical  character.  The  ink  colour  thus  associated  with  metaphors  would 
clearly  not  thereby  be  correctly  describable  as  the  metaphorical  meaning  (henceforth,  in- 
meaning)  of  the  words,  even  though  it  was  distinctively  related  to  their  occurrence  in 
metaphors.  The  colour  of  tokens  of  the  words  would  simply  not  be  sufficiently  closely 
related  to  the  words'  `semantic  role'  to  count  as  a  metaphorical  meaning.  The  fact  that 
we  feel  no  temptation  at  all  to  think  of  the  ink  colour  as  metaphorical  meaning  in  this 
case,  even  though  condition  (b)  is  met,  seems  to  indicate  our  implicit  acceptance  of 
something  like  condition  (a). 
Similarly,  imagine  that  we  spoke  a  language  in  which  the  extension  of  every  predicate 
systematically  shifted  in  certain  linguistic  contexts.  Perhaps  certain  forms  of  words 
were  taken  to  indicate  that  the  extension  of  the  predicate  was  to  be  restricted  to  entities 
67 that  normally  fall  under  this  predicate  and  are  owned  by  the  speaker,  for  example.  It 
would  clearly  not  be  correct  to  call  this  `restricted'  extension  the  m-meaning  of  a  given 
predicate,  since  there  is  simply  nothing  about  it  that  relates  in  any  distinctive  way  to 
metaphor.  Such  a  systematic  shift  could  occur  in  a  linguistic  community  where  nobody 
ever  spoke  metaphorically.  Again,  our  reluctance  to  describe  of  this  kind  of  case  in 
terms  of  metaphorical  meaning  appears  to  indicate  that  some  condition  similar  to  (b) 
accurately  captures  a  minimal  constraint  on  what  metaphorical  meanings  must  be  like. 
I  will  also  appeal  to  two  auxiliary  principles  that  are  required  for  Davidson's  master 
argument  to  go  through,  which  again,  seems  like  it  ought  to  be  common  ground  between 
himself  and  his  opponents 
(A2)  If  a  proposed  assignment  of  a  metaphorical  content  to  a  utterance  results  solely 
from  an  unacceptable  theory  of  metaphor,  then  the  utterance  does  not  express 
that  content. 
(A3)  If  a  sentence  is  associated  with  a  metaphorical  content  solely  in  virtue 
of  being  a  compositional  product  of  its  component  semantic  parts,  then  some  of 
those  parts  must  themselves  have  (or  determine)  metaphorical  meanings. 
So  much,  I  hope,  ought  to  be  common  ground  between  Davidson  and  his  opponents.  77 
The  body  of  Davidson's  article,  however,  comprises  arguments  for  three  premises  that 
have  proved  to  be  more  controversial: 
(A4)  The  words  employed  in  a  metaphorical  utterance  do  not  come  to  be  associated 
with  anything  that  is  both  (a)  genuinely  meaning-like  and  (b)  distinctively  related 
to  the  metaphorical  nature  of  the  utterances  in  question. 
(A5)  The  m-meaning  conveyed  by  a  sentence  used  metaphorically  would  be  identical 
with  either  (a)  what  is  said  by  the  utterance,  which  results  solely  from  the 
"  (A3)  may  well  seem  less  obviously  neutral  territory  than  (A2).  For  exegetical  reasons,  I  delay  my 
argument  for  (A3)'s  independent  plausibility  until  Section  2.7.  Basically,  I  argue  that  rejecting  (A3) 
entails  rejecting  compositional  principles  governing  genuine  word  and  sentence  meaning  that  simply 
aren't  up  for  grabs,  given  (Al). 
68 meanings  of  its  component  parts,  together  with  their  mode  of  composition,  or  (b) 
the  extra  propositional  content  communicated  by  the  author  of  the  metaphor, 
over  and  above  what  it  says,  as  determined  by  a  linguistic  theory  of  pragmatics. 
(A6)  An  account  of  m-meaning  which  identifies  it  with  the  extra  propositional  content 
communicated  by  the  author  of  the  metaphor,  over  and  above  what  it  says,  as 
determined  by  a  linguistic  theory  of  pragmatics,  provides  an  unacceptably 
incomplete  and  misleading  account  of  our  practices  of  producing,  using  and 
reflecting  on  metaphors. 
In  what  follows,  I  will  assume  that  (Al)-(A3)  are  either  uncontroversial,  (or  at  least,  that 
they  can  be  made  so  by  more  careful  reformulation,  in  a  way  that  does  not  substantively 
affect  the  rest  of  the  argument).  In  a  moment,  we  will  look  more  closely  at  Davidson's 
arguments  for  (A4)-(A6).  First,  though,  let  us  briefly  assure  ourselves  that,  if  true,  they 
would  serve  to  establish  Davidson's  negative  theses  regarding  metaphorical  meaning. 
Let  s  be  a  sentence  uttered  metaphorically,  iv  be  a  semantically  significant  part  of  s,  and 
the  following  abbreviations  hold 
W=  iv  has  a  metaphorical  meaning  Mi 
A=  M1  is  meaning-like 
B=  M1  is  distinctively  related  to  the  metaphorical  nature  of  the  relevant  utterance 
S=s  has  a  metaphorical  meaning  Si 
C=S1  is  an  m-meaning  that  results  solely  from  composing  the  meanings  of  the  component  parts  of  s. 
D=  SI  is  an  m-meaning  that  is  determined  pragmatically. 
U=  Attribution  of  S1  to  s  results  from  appeal  to  an  unacceptable  theory  of  metaphor 
Then  the  above  assumptions  correspond  to  the  following  schemas 
(Al)  W->A&B 
(A2)  U  ->  -S 
(A3)  C  ->  W 
(A4)  -,  (W  &A&  B) 
(A5)  S->CvD 
(A6)  D  ->  U 
Davidson's  argument  can  then  be  taken  to  run  roughly  as  follows: 
69 Al  1)W->A&B  (Al) 
2  2)  W  Assumption,  for  reductio 
Al,  2  3)  A&B  1,2  MPP 
Al,  2  4)W&A&B  2,3,  &I 
A4  5)  ,  (W  &A&  B)  A4 
Al,  A4  6)  -W  2,4,5,  RAA 
A5  7)S->CvD  AS 
8  8)  S  Assumption,  for  reductio 
8,  A5  9)  CvD  7,8,  MPP 
10  10)  C  Assumption,  for  v-E 
A3  11)  C  ->  W  A3 
10,  A3  12)  W  10,11,  MPP 
Al,  A3,  A4,10  13)  W  &,  W  6,12,  &I 
A6,  A2  14)  (D  ->  U)  &  (U  ->  ,  S)  A6,  A2 
15  15)  D  Assumption,  for  v-E 
15,  A6,  A2  16)-S  14,15,  &E,  MPPx2 
8,15,  A  6,  A2  17)  S&  ,S  8,16,  &I 
8,  Al-A  6  18)  ,  (C  v  D)  9,10,13,15,17,  v-E 
Al-A6  19)-S  9,18,  RAA 
The  outline  of  Davidson's  master-argument  is  thus,  I  hope,  clear.  By  (A4),  nothing 
meets  the  conditions  outlined  in  (Al),  so  by  (Al),  anti-realism  about  m-meanings  is  the 
correct  position.  Thus,  if  we  begin  to  understand  a  metaphor  by  coming  to  understand 
what  its  parts  mean,  and  how  they  are  structured,  as  we  clearly  do,  the  meaning  in 
question  can  only  be  literal.  That  establishes  (D1).  By  (A5),  a  sentence  could  only 
express  a  distinctive  metaphorical  content  if  it  was  either  determined  by  the  meanings 
and  arrangement  of  its  parts,  or  by  the  relevant  pragmatic  features  involved  in  its 
utterance.  If  the  former,  then  given  (A3),  and  that  (D1)  has  been  established,  the 
meaning  in  question  would  have  to  be  the  literal  meaning  of  the  sentence,  violating  (Al). 
If  the  latter,  then,  by  (A6),  we  would  be  left  with  an  unacceptable  theory  of  metaphor,  so 
by  (A2),  no  such  content  is  thus  associated  with  the  sentence.  So  sentences  used 
metaphorically  are  not  associated  with  distinctive  cognitive  contents,  which  is  (D2).  If 
metaphors  were  typically,  or  characteristically,  vehicles  for  the  communication  of 
distinctive,  pragmatically  determined  contents,  then  a  pragmatic  theory  of  metaphor 
70 would  be  acceptable,  so  if  (A6)  is  true,  then  no  such  contents  are  characteristically 
expressed,  which  is  (D3). 
I  therefore  take  myself  to  have  established  that  Davidson's  argument,  as  presented  is 
valid,  and  relies  on  at  least  three  assumptions  which  seem  relatively  uncontroversial. 
Our  task  in  the  next  few  sections,  then,  is  to  examine  the  prima  facie  plausibility  of  the 
three  remaining  assumptions: 
(A4)  The  words  employed  in  a  metaphorical  utterance  do  not  come  to  be  associated 
with  anything  that  is  both  a)  genuinely  meaning-like  and  b)  distinctively  related 
to  the  metaphorical  nature  of  the  utterances  in  question. 
(A5)  The  m-meaning  conveyed  by  a  sentence  used  metaphorically  would  be  identical 
with  either  a)  what  is  said  by  the  utterance,  which  results  solely  from  the 
meanings  of  its  component  words,  together  with  their  mode  of  composition,  or  b) 
the  extra  propositional  content  communicated  by  the  author  of  the  metaphor, 
over  and  above  what  it  says,  as  determined  by  a  linguistic  theory  of  pragmatics. 
(A6)  An  account  of  m-meaning  which  identifies  it  with  the  extra  propositional  content 
communicated  by  the  author  of  the  metaphor,  over  and  above  what  it  says,  as 
determined  by  a  linguistic  theory  of  pragmatics,  provides  an  unacceptably 
incomplete  and  misleading  account  of  our  practices  of  producing,  using  and 
reflecting  on  metaphors. 
I  shall  take  these  one  at  a  time. 
2.6  Word-meaning  and  Metaphor 
What  would  it  be  for  the  words  in  a  metaphorical  utterance  to  be  associated  with 
something  `meaning  like'?  In  a  recent  paper,  discussing  his  support  for  Quine's  thesis 
of  the  inscrutability  of  reference,  Davidson  tells  us: 
71 individual  words  don't  have  meanings.  They  have  a  role  in  determining  the  truth 
conditions  of  sentences. 
78 
In  Chapter  1,  Section  6,  I  gave  an  argument  to  the  effect  that  understanding  the  meaning 
of  an  declarative  sentence  (in  one  important  sense  of  that  phrase)  consists  in  grasping  its 
truth  conditions.  However,  for  the  moment,  I  wish  to  stay  as  neutral  as  possible  about 
whether  this  is  true.  It  would  be  disappointing  if  Davidson's  arguments  relied  heavily 
on  a  background  theory  of  meaning  that  his  opponents  rejected.  That  would  entail  that 
the  dispute  between  them  didn't  really  turn  on  the  nature  of  metaphor  per  se,  but  rather 
on  another  dispute  in  the  philosophy  of  language.  The  interest  of  Davidson's  arguments 
would  be  increased  if  it  turned  out  that  this  was  not  the  case;  that  they  turned  out  to  be 
compatible  with  quite  different  conceptions  of  the  nature  of  semantics.  I  will,  therefore, 
try  not  to  trade  on  features  of  Davidson's  account  that  his  opponents  might  reasonably 
reject  -  e.  g.  the  identification  of  meaning  with  truth  conditions,  79  the  inscrutability  of 
reference,  etc. 
Nevertheless,  the  notion  that  the  meaning  of  an  individual  word  is  exhausted  by  its 
semantic  role,  and  that  the  semantic  role  of  a  word  is  the  way  it  makes  a  systematic 
contribution  to  the  meaning  of  sentences  in  which  it  occurs,  is  not,  I  think,  up  for 
grabs.  8°  That  would  lead  to  tension  with  the  following  plausible  principles: 
(Compositionality)  The  meaning  of  complex  linguistic  expressions  is  wholly 
determined  by  their  syntax,  together  with  the  meanings  of  their 
parts  (in  context).  For  example,  the  meaning  of  `dogs  bark' 
'$  Davidson  (2001)  p.  79 
79  Or  elimination  of  meaning  in  favour  of  something  related  to  truth  conditions,  which  is  probably  a  more 
accurate  way  of  stating  Davidson's  views. 
80  I  say  `involves  making  a  systematic  contribution'  rather  than  `is  the  systematic  contribution',  since  on 
some  theories,  the  meaning  of  a  word  relates  not  only  to  the  sentences  it  can  compose,  but  also  to  other, 
related  words.  For  example,  full  grasp  of  the  meaning  of  `healthy,  ',  as  predicated  of  an  diet,  may  involve 
understanding  a  family  of  closely  related  predicates  (e.  g.  the  homonyms  `healthy2'  `healthy3'  as  predicted 
of  a  man,  and  his  complexion).  This  goes  beyond  the  minimal  capacity  to  grasp  the  compositional  role  of 
the  predicate. 
72 depends  on  the  meaning  of  `dogs  and  `barks',  and  the  manner  in 
which  they  are  syntactically  composed. 
(Systematicity)  Languages  that  can  express  a  given  propositional  content 
composed  via  compositional  route  F  out  of  sub-sentential  parts 
W1-Wn  can  also  express  any  other  content  which  can  be 
constructed  from  W1-Wn  using  F.  For  example,  a  language  that 
can  express  `dogs  bark  and  cows  moo'  can  also  express  `dogs 
moo  and  cows  bark'. 
(Reverse  The  meaning  of  constituent  expressions  (in  context)  supervene 
Compositionality)  on  the  complexes  of  which  they  are  parts.  For  example,  the 
meaning  of  `dogs'  and  `bark'  couldn't  change  without  the 
meaning  of  `dogs  bark'  changing. 
Such  principles,  however,  are  widely  subscribed  to,  81  and  play  a  familiar  and  currently 
indispensable  role  in  explaining  the  productive  and  systematic  character  of  human 
mastery  of  language.  They  are  not  peculiar  to  truth-conditional  theories  of  meaning,  and 
it  is  often  held  to  be  a  minimal  condition  on  any  satisfactory  theory  of  meaning  that  it 
entail  them.  I  will  assume  therefore,  that  Davidson  is  entitled,  pro  tens,  to  rely  on  the 
notion  that  the  meaning  of  an  individual  word  is  its  semantic  role,  and  that  the  semantic 
role  of  a  word  involves  making  a  systematic  contribution  to  the  meaning  of  sentences  in 
which  it  occurs.  82 
What  significance  does  thinking  of  the  meaning  of  a  word  in  such  a  way  have  for 
Davidson's  argument  against  metaphorical  meaning?  It  provides  the  relevant  way  of 
explicating  the  similarity  condition  (a)  that  (Al)  places  upon  any  prospective  such 
meaning: 
81  See  Szabo  (2004)  for  a  note  of  caution,  however.  The  three  principles  above  could  be  weakened  further 
by  reading  them  as  generic  statement,  rather  than  universal  claims,  without  the  force  of  the  point  being 
seriously  weakened. 
82  For  further  defence  of  the  importance  and  nature  of  compositionality  et  al,  see  Fodor  and  Lepore  (2002). 
I  will  return  to  discuss  the  issues  briefly  when  I  discuss  the  radical  pragmatist  objection  to  Davidson's 
position. 
73 Al)  The  parts  of  metaphorical  utterances  only  acquire  distinctive  metaphorical  senses 
if  they  thereby  become  associated  with  something  that  deserves  to  be  called  their 
`metaphorical  meaning'.  Nothing  deserves  to  be  called  a  metaphorical  meaning 
unless  (a)  there  is  something  genuinely  meaning-like  about  it  and  (b)  there  is 
something  about  it  that  distinctively  relates  to  the  metaphorical  nature  of  the 
utterances  it  is  putatively  associated  with. 
Nothing  is  genuinely  worth  calling  the  metaphorical  meaning  of  a  word  that  isn't 
similar  to  the  literal  meaning  of  a  word  in  this  respect:  it  makes  a  systematic  contribution 
to  the  meaning  of  sentences  to  which  it  occurs.  For  it  is  precisely  this  feature  of  words 
that  theorists  of  language  posit  word-meanings  for:  if  it  wasn't  for  this  feature,  it  is  far 
from  clear  what  theoretical  profit  there  would  be  in  talking  about  word  meanings  at  all. 
Word  meanings  are  like  phlogiston,  the  humours,  and  the  ether;  if  they  can't  do  the 
theoretical  job  that  they  were  designed  to  do,  then  there's  absolutely  no  point  in  having 
them  around.  So  if  theorists  like  Richards,  Empson,  Black  and  Ricoeur  are  to  defend  the 
claim  that  words  acquire  distinctive  new  senses  when  used  metaphorically,  then  they 
ought  to  ensure  that  those  senses  are  playing  the  right  kind  of  theoretical  role. 
Otherwise,  it's  a  bit  like  categorising  afterimages  as  a  distinctive  new  variety  of  pains 
(one  that  doesn't  feel  bad)  or  cabbages  as  distinctive  instances  of  kings  (ones  that  don't 
have  a  lot  of  power,  or  move  about  much). 
The  problem  for  such  theorists  is  that  they  precisely  introduced  such  distinctive  senses  in 
a  way  that  seems  to  prohibit  the  kind  of  systematic  semantic  role  that  (Al)  rightfully 
proscribes.  For  example,  Richards  writes: 
In  the  simplest  formulation,  when  we  use  a  metaphor  we  have  two  thoughts  of  different 
things  active  together  and  supported  by  a  single  word,  or  phrase,  whose  meaning  is  a 
result  of  their  interaction.  83 
83  Richards  (1965)  p.  93?  check  page  ref.  The  idea  that  metaphors  involved  two  distinct  word  or  phrasal 
`meanings  was  widely  shared  before  Davidson's  article  was  first  published  in  1979.  Beardsley  (1976)  p. 
219  describes  the  `conventional  wisdom  about  metaphor'  as  maintaining  that  "in  the  usual  case,  to 
recognize  a  controlled  sentence  as  metaphorical  involves  discerning  two  senses  of  the  predicate  term,  in 
one  of  which  the  sentence  is  false". 
74 This  conception  of  the  process  which  determines  the  metaphorical  meaning  of  a  word, 
however,  completely  rules  out  the  possibility  of  the  kind  of  systematic  role  mandated  by 
(Al).  Given  that  the  m-meaning  of  the  relevant  phrase  is  wholly  resultant  from  the  local 
linguistic  context,  any  shift  to  a  new  context  leaves  it  open  that  a  completely  different 
sense  might  arise.  And  in  fact,  unsurprisingly,  that  is  what  seems  to  happen.  Consider 
the  role  the  word  `bronze'  plays  in  the  following  two  metaphors: 
1)  In  cities  you  build  a  language  of  circumspection  and  tact,  a  thousand  little  intimations, 
the  nuance  that  has  a  shimmer  of  rubbed  bronze.  (DeLillo)8; 
2)  Pythagoras  planned  it.  Why  did  the  people  stare? 
His  numbers,  though  they  moved,  or  seemed  to  move 
In  marble  or  in  bronze,  lacked  character.  5  (Yeats) 
How  do  we  understand  the  role  the  word  `bronze'  is  playing  in  these  two  utterances?  In 
the  first,  the  `two  thoughts  of  different  things  active  together'  involve  the  metal  and  the 
dark,  warm,  elegant  and  unyielding  mores  of  the  city.  In  the  second,  the  comparison  is 
between  the  stark,  unchanging  abstract  world  of  Pythagorean  numbers,  and  the  chilled, 
balanced  perfection  of  the  art  that  they  made  possible.  86  Two  things  seem  clear.  Firstly, 
we  clearly  do  not  approach  either  utterance  with  a  prior  grasp  of  a  preordained 
`metaphorical  class'  of  entities  which  are  picked  out  by  the  metaphorical  sense  of  the 
word,  wholly  independently  of  the  immediately  local  linguistic  context  in  which  it 
appears.  When  asked  for  things  that  are  metaphorically  bronze,  I  am  confident  that  very 
few  people  would  include  a  certain  restricted  class  of  nuances,  and  Pythagorean 
numbers.  Secondly,  we  only  come  to  grasp  the  supposed.  metaphorical  sense  by  first 
coming  to  understand  the  utterance  in  which  it  plays  a  role.  One  simply  cannot 
84  DeLillo  (1997)  p.  446 
85  Yeats  (1962)  p.  173 
86  I  am assuming  that  the  richness  of  Yeats'  image  results  in  part  from  our  being  encouraged  by  the 
grammatical  structure  of  the  lines  to  think  firstly  of  the  numbers  as  things  which  metaphorically  move  in 
bronze,  and  then  to  reverse  direction,  conceiving  of  the  statues  as  `containing'  the  numbers  that  measure 
their  form.  Nothing  hangs  on  whether  this  is  the  right  way  to  read  the  lines.  Yeats  says  in  On  the  Boiler 
p.  37  "There  are  moments  when  I  am certain  that  art  must  once  again  accept  those  Greek  proportions 
which  carry  into  plastic  art  the  Pythagorean  numbers,  those  faces  which  are  divine  because  all  there  is 
empty  and  measured". 
75 determine  what  the  relevant  sense  is  supposed  to  be,  without  first  coming  to  understand 
the  utterance  as  a  whole;  for  it  is  only  by  so  coming  to  understand  it  that  we  can  identify 
what  precisely  the  `two  thoughts  of  different  things'  are,  and  how  precisely  they 
`interact'  so  as  to  determine  the  meaning  of  the  relevant  phrase.  Compare  and  contrast 
the  following  literal  examples: 
3)  John  bought  a  bronze  statue  yesterday,  which  was  very  reasonably  priced. 
4)  My  favourite  plate  is bronze. 
5)  Nobody  much  visited  the  bronze  factory  in  Africa  any  more,  where  the  workers  were 
reputedly  ill  paid  and  married  very  early. 
In  the  first  two  examples,  the  linguistic  meaning  we  attribute  to  the  word  bronze  can 
potentially  do  some  genuine  explanatory  work.  We  can  explain  how  we  come  to 
understand  the  utterances  by  adverting  (a)  to  the  fact  that  we  approach  them  with  a  grasp 
of  which  kind  of  objects  counts  as  the  bronze  ones,  and  (b)  that  we  know  enough  about 
semantic  roles  of  the  other  constituent  words  in  the  sentences,  together  with  the  way  in 
which  they  are  syntactically  related,  to  be  able  to  determine  the  content  of  the  whole 
sentence  as  a  function  of  the  meaning  and  arrangement  of  its  parts.  By  appealing  to  our 
systematic  mastery  of  a  finite  lexicon  and  set  of  compositional  rules,  we  can  explain 
how  we  are  able  to  instantly  recognize  the  meaning  of  two  sentences  that  we  have  never 
come  across  before.  Moreover,  such  an  explanation  admits  of  extension  to  cases  where 
the  meaning  varies  systematically.  A  bronze  factory  is  not  related  to  bronze  in  the  sense 
that  a  bronze  statue  is,  but  nevertheless,  mastery  of  what  it  is  for  an  object  to  be  bronze 
can  interact  with  systematic  linguistic  processes  to  explain  how  we  can  understand  a 
cluster  of  related  uses  of  the  word.  87  But  no  such  explanation  is  possible  in  the  case  of 
the  two  metaphors.  In  that  case,  we  do  not  compute  the  semantic  value  of  the  sentence 
based  on  our  knowledge  of  the  semantics  and  structure  of  its  parts.  It  is  only  by  first 
determining  what  the  metaphor  is  supposed  to  get  across  that  we  can  then  begin  to 
determine  what  the  supposed  metaphorical  sense  of  one  of  its  component  words  might 
be. 
87  Perhaps  via  grasping  the  various  thematic  roles  of  the  subjects  qualified  by  the  term  `bronze'  -a  bronze 
factory  being  a  source  of  bronze,  a  bronze  sheen  being  the  characteristic  effect  of  it,  etc. 
76 Similarly,  Max  Black  claims  that  in  the  famous  opening  sentence  of  Davidson's  article, 
Metaphor  is  the  dreamwork  of  language,  "dreamwork"  is  used  metaphorically,  via 
Davidson's  `attaching  an  altered  sense  to  the  words  he  is  using  in  context',  allowing  him 
thereby  to  say  something  distinctively  different  from  the  meaning  of  the  words  taken 
literally88.  But  it  is  not  through  mastery  of  this  altered  sense  that  we  come  to  understand 
the  utterance,  as  in  the  case  of  sub-sentential  parts  with  genuine  meanings.  How  would 
the  nature  of  such  a  sense  become  evident?  Rather,  all  that  can  happen in  this  case  is 
that  we  understand  -  or  endeavour  to  begin  to  understand  -  what  Davidson  is  trying  to 
get  across  by  his  remark,  and  then  assign  a  corresponding  `meaning'  to  the  relevant  parts 
of  it.  But  this  last  step  seems  wholly  redundant.  Since  we  only  want  word  meanings  to 
explain  how  we  compute  utterance-meanings,  etc,  then  it  is  perfectly  useless  to  assign 
distinctive  word-meanings  that  depend  wholly  on  our  first  understanding  the  meanings 
of  the  metaphors  that  they  occur  in. 
Of  course,  it  is  fair  enough  to  engage  in  such  a  practice  as  part  of  the  process  of  learning 
unfamiliar  words.  If,  lacking  a  dictionary  or  knowledgeable  companion,  I  read  Manley 
Hopkins'  lines 
Glory  be  to  God  for  dappled  things 
For  skies  of  couple-colour  as  a  brinded  cow 
and  wonder  what  `brinded'  means,  then  I  only  have  the  evidence  of  the  surrounding 
linguistic  context,  together  with  my  extra-linguistic  knowledge  (e.  g.  of  skies,  cows  and 
the  stylistic  habits  of  Hopkins)  to  go  on.  But  this  is  quite  different  from  the  case  of  the 
type  of  metaphorical  meaning  that  Black  adverts  to.  Having  got  as  far  as  working  out 
that  brinded  means  something  like  streaked  or  patched  with  colour,  I  have  a  chance  of 
using  my  new  found  knowledge  to  help  work  out  the  meaning  of  e.  g. 
(6)  The  brinded  cat  wound  its  way  through  the  streets. 
(7)  The  outside  of  the  house  was  ill-kempt  and  brinded,  not  recently  painted  and  polished  as 
she'd  expected. 
88  Black  (1978)  pp.  185-187 
77 But  the  type  of  metaphorical  meaning  assigned  to  words  by  Richards  and  Black  is 
intended  to  be  far  more  radically  dependent  on  immediate  linguistic  context  than  the 
above  type  of  case.  To  borrow  a  nice  example  of  Roger  White's,  try  using  `pheasant'  in 
the  same  metaphorical  sense  in  (9)  as  is  most  naturally  `assigned'  to  it  in  (8) 
(8)  A  poem  is  a  pheasant. 
(9)  Shakespeare's  Juliet  is  a  pheasant,  not  a  dove  or  a  hawk. 
or  `metaphysician'  the  same  metaphorical  sense  in  the  following  two  metaphors 
(10)  The  actor  is 
A  metaphysician  in  the  dark,  twanging 
An  instrument,  twanging  a  wiry  string  that  gives 
Sounds  passing  through  sudden  rightnesses,  wholly 
Containing  the  mind,  below  which  it  cannot  descend, 
Beyond  which  it  has  no  will  to  rise.  (Stevens) 
(11)  [Dylan]  was  re-incarnated  as  a  travelling  musical  salesman  in  the  spirit 
of  James  Brown  or  B.  B.  King:  one  hundred  and  twenty  shows  a  year,  the  hardest 
working  metaphysician  in  showbiz.  (Mick  Gold) 
In  the  case  where  we  use  linguistic  and  contextual  clues  to  master  a  genuine  word-sense, 
we  can  go  on  to  explain  how  that  sense  can  contribute  to  an  indefinite  number  of  quite 
different  and  novel  sentences.  But  in  the  case  of  the  putatively  metaphorical  sense,  we 
find  this  difficult  to  do,  especially  in  the  most  interesting  and  effective  metaphors. 
Typically,  understanding  the  role  that  a  word  plays  in  a  metaphor  is  quite  unlike  learning 
the  meaning  of  an  unknown  word  by  examining  its  use  in  partially  understood  sentences. 
No  doubt  this  isn't  always  the  case.  Perhaps  when  we  come  to  grasp  what  it  would  be 
for  Juliet  to  be  a  pheasant  in  the  relevant  sense,  we  can  apply  that  term  in  just  the  same 
sense  to  other  fictional  characters,  acquaintances  of  ours,  or  film  stars,  for  example.  But 
thus  securing  condition  a)  of  (Al)  -  that  anything  worth  calling  a  metaphorical  meaning 
should  be  genuinely  meaning  like  -  comes  at  the  cost  of  surrendering  condition  b), 
which  insists  that  it  should  also  be  distinctively  related  to  the  metaphorical  nature  of  the 
78 utterances  in  question.  For  it  now  seems  clear  that  this  new  sense  of  `pheasant'  -  which 
we  can  stipulate  is  to  serve  as  the  meaning  of  a  new  coinage,  `m-pheasant'  -  admits  of 
mastery  by  careful  observers  of  our  practice  who  don't  know  what  pheasants  are.  Once 
they  cotton  onto  the  type  of  properties  of  people  that  we  apply  `m-pheasant'  to,  they 
seem  to  know  all  they  need  to  accord  with  our  application  of  the  term.  They  don't  have 
to  think  of  the  people  as  pheasants,  through  a  prior  literal  sense  of  `pheasant';  they 
simply  need  to  master  the  sense  of  `m-pheasant'.  And  that  they  can  presumably  do  in 
the  same  way  that  they  can  learn  other  words  of  our  language,  by  observation,  imitation, 
guesswork,  empathy,  simulation  and  theory  building.  But  that  means  that  there's 
nothing  distinctively  metaphorical  about  the  new  meaning  that  has  been  introduced, 
except  for  its  origin.  Since  many  words  that  we  now  take  to  be  associated  with 
uncontroversially  literal  meanings  similarly  have  etymologies  involving  metaphor,  it 
seems  that  origin  simply  isn't  enough  to  establish  the  distinctive  relation  that  condition 
b)  demands. 
It  seems  then,  that  Davidson  can  offer  a  fairly  convincing  defence  of  (A4)  by  offering  a 
dilemma  to  his  opponents.  Is  the  supposed  metaphorical  meaning  of  the  relevant  sub- 
sentential  part  straightforwardly  extensible  to  a  wide  range  of  novel  linguistic  contexts 
or  not?  If  not,  then  it  doesn't  bear  a  close  enough  relation  to  the  standard  theoretical  role 
of  word-meanings  to  deserve  the  name.  If  so,  then  we  have  so  far  been  given  no  reason 
to  think  of  such  a  sense  as  distinctively  metaphorical,  depending  for  its  existence  and 
efficacy  on  our  taking  one  thing  as  another,  rather  than  as  a  new  literal  sense;  possibly 
introduced,  as  many  such  senses  have  been,  by  the  use  of  metaphor,  but  now  bearing  no 
essential  or  distinctive  relationship  to  metaphor  at  all. 
There  is  no  doubt  much  more  to  be  said.  For  example,  it  is  often  claimed  that  apparently 
stone-dead  metaphors,  that  don't  demand  our  thinking  of  one  thing  as  another,  can 
`come  to  life'  again  given  the  right  context.  Such  contexts  often  include  cases  where  we 
mix  dead  metaphors  to  jarring  effect: 
(12)  She  was  hot,  but  cold. 
Moreover,  a  case  might  be  made  that  it  may  not  in  fact  be  straightforward  for  observers 
who  do  not  determine  the  new  sense  of  `pheasant'  via  a  metaphorical  process  to  know 
79 how  it  is  to  be  extended  to  new  cases.  It  is  a  familiar  theme  of  a  certain  type  of 
Wittgensteinian  approach  to  the  application  of  concepts  that  one  might  need  to  be 
inducted  into  a  communal  practice  in  order  to  extend  them  reliably  to  new  cases,  and 
there  seems  to  be  no  obvious  reason  a  priori  why  that  might  not  include  going  at  the 
thing  via  the  metaphorical  process.  In  any  case,  I  have  left  the  nature  of  the  `distinctive 
relation'  that  (Al)  demands  at  such  an  intuitive  level  that  it  might  seem  unfair  to  rule  out 
certain  kinds  of  etymological  relations  as  potential  satisfiers.  So  there  is  definitely  much 
more  that  needs  to  be  said  to  secure  Davidson's  defence  of  (A4).  Nevertheless,  I  intend 
to  rest  content  with  the  claim  that  there  are  at  least  prima  facie  good  grounds  for 
thinking  that  something  suitably  similar  to  (A4)  might  be  a  safe  principle  for  Davidson 
to  rely  on. 
2.7  Sentence-meaning  and  Metaphor 
As  we  have  seen,  my  reconstruction  of  Davidson's  master  argument  attributes  to  him  the 
following  thesis 
(A5)  The  m-meaning  conveyed  by  a  sentence  used  metaphorically  would  be  identical 
with  either  (a)  what  is  said  by  the  utterance,  which  results  solely  from  the 
meanings  of  its  component  words,  together  with  their  mode  of  composition,  or 
(b)  the  extra  propositional  content  communicated  by  the  author  of  the  metaphor, 
over  and  above  what  it  says,  as  determined  by  a  linguistic  theory  of  pragmatics. 
Call  the  putative  distinctive  metaphorical  content  expressed  by  the  utterance  the 
semantic  sentential  m-meaning,  and  that  communicated  by  the  author  the  pragmatic 
sentential  m-meaning.  89  What  reason  is  there  to  think  that  the  m-meaning  of  sentences 
used  metaphorically  must  be  either  semantic  or  pragmatic  in  the  relevant  sense? 
We  have  already  met  independently  plausible  principles  that  seem  to  support  the  idea 
that  defending  semantic  sentential  m-meaning  entails  defending  the  claim  that  the  parts 
of  sentences  have  metaphorical  meanings.  Firstly,  we  can  note  that  (A1)'s  demand  that 
89  Henceforth,  the  semantic  m-meaning  and  the  pragmatic  m-meaning. 
80 m-meanings  are  both  meaning  like,  and  suitably  related  to  the  metaphorical  *character  of 
the  utterance,  applies  equally  to  the  sentential  case.  Secondly,  we  can  note  that  e.  g.  the 
following  principles  tell  us  a  lot  about  the  character  of  genuine  sentential  meanings 
(Compositionality)  The  meaning  of  complex  linguistic  expressions  is  wholly 
determined  by  their  syntax,  together  with  the  meanings  of  their 
parts  (in  context).  For  example,  the  meaning  of  `dogs  bark' 
depends  on  the  meaning  of  `dogs  and  `barks',  and  the  manner  in 
which  they  are  syntactically  composed. 
(Reverse  The  meaning  of  constituent  expressions  (in  context)  supervene 
Compositionality)  on  the  complexes  of  which  they  are  parts.  For  example,  the 
meaning  of  `dogs'  and  `bark'  couldn't  change  without  the 
meaning  of  `dogs  bark'  changing. 
It  seems  reasonable  to  demand  that  putative  semantic  m-meanings  accord  with  these 
central  principles  governing  genuine  sentential  meanings.  But  that  seems  sufficient  for 
us  to  conclude  that  any  such  metaphorical  sentence  meanings  would  have  to  be 
determined  by  the  metaphorical  meanings  of  words.  Otherwise,  (Compositionality)  and 
its  sister  principle  would  seem  to  fail.  We  can  argue  as  follows. 
1.  Assume  that  a  metaphorical  utterance  U  expresses  a  distinct  propositional 
content  M  that  is  distinct  from  its  literal  content  L. 
2.  Assume  further,  for  reductio,  that  M  does  not  result  from  a  compositional  process 
on  sub-sentential  parts  that  themselves  have  distinctive  m-meanings. 
3.  Since  the  sub-sentential  parts  of  U  have  only  their  literal  meanings,  their 
compositional  product  will  be  L. 
4.  By  hypothesis,  L  and  M  are  distinct,  so  the  semantic  m-meaning  of  isn't 
determined  by  U's  syntax,  together  with  the  meanings  of  its  parts  (in  context).  So 
(Compositionality)  fails. 
5.  Since  M  is  distinct  from  L,  and  not  determined  by  the  compositional  process  that 
fixed  the  meaning  of  L,  and  since  the  component  words  of  U  have  only  their 
literal  meaning,  there  seems  to  be  no  obvious  reason  why  M  might  not  remain 
81 the  content  of  U  while  the  meaning  of  U's  parts  changed.  So  (Reverse 
Compositionality)  seems  tb  be  under  pressure  too. 
6.  Since  giving  up  those  two  principles  robs  m-meanings  of  the  right  to  be  thought 
of  as  meanings,  the  assumption  in  line  2  must  be  rejected.  So  sentential  m- 
meanings  require  sub-sentential  m-meanings.  90 
Given  that  the  good  standing  of  (A3)  is  secured  by  the  above  line  of  thought,  however, 
anybody  who  (i)  wants  to  defend  the  existence  of  metaphorical  sentence-meanings,  and 
(ii)  has  some  sympathy  with  the  arguments  of  the  previous  section  against  metaphorical 
word-meanings,  will  no  doubt  want  to  take  a  different.  approach.  (After  all,  (A3)  simply 
tells  us  the  sentence  m-meanings  require  word  m-meanings,  so  if  it's  secure,  and  you 
don't  want  the  latter,  you'd  better  not  take  the  former).  The  metaphorical  content  is  not 
expressed  by  the  utterance,  such  theorists  might  hold,  but  arises  in  some  other  way. 
However,  given  (Al),  room  for  manoeuvre  is  limited  somewhat.  It's  no  good  finding 
some  apt  propositional  content,  and  simply  proclaiming  it  the  meaning  of  the 
metaphorical  utterance.  To  be  a  meaning  is  to  play  a  role  which  is  similar  enough  to 
things  deservedly  regarded  as  meanings.  It's  no  good  just  recalling  some  thought  that 
the  metaphor  inspires,  and  proclaiming  it  the  meaning  of  the  metaphor.  Such  a  content 
needs  to  link  tip  in  the  right  way  to  the  linguistic  knowledge  that  governs  the 
communication  of  representational  contents  by  means  of  natural  language  or  other 
relevant  representations.  For  metaphorical  meanings  to  be  of  distinctive  interest  to 
linguistics  and  the  philosophy  of  language,  as  their  proponents  typically  take  them  to  be, 
they  need  to  resemble  in  relevant  ways  linguistic  meanings.  Since  linguistic  meaning  is 
fundamentally  what  is  communicated  in  successful  instances  of  linguistic 
communication,  metaphorical  meaning  had  better  be  what  is  communicated  by  the 
making  and  taking  of  metaphors.  If  that  communication  does  not  take  place  in  virtue  of 
shared  mastery  of  the  m-meanings  of  words,  then  it  had  better  be  explicable  in  terms  of 
some  other  distinctively  linguistic  capacity.  Call  any  theory  which  aims  to  explicate  the 
nature  of  such  non-semantic  but  still  linguistic  communication  a  pragmatic  theory.  It 
90  This  is  the  proof  of  the  independent  good  standing  of  (A3)  promised  in  Section  5  above.  I  take  it  that  . 
(Al)  and  the  two  principles  governing  compositionality  ought  to  be  common  ground  between  any  serious 
participants  in  the  debate  about  metaphorical  meanings. 
82 seems  then,  that  if  metaphors  genuinely  have  meanings,  and  those  meanings  aren't 
explicable  in  semantic  terms,  then  they  will  have  to  be  explicable  in  pragmatic  ones,  if 
we  can  explain  them  at  all.  Bracketing  appeal  to  mystery,  it  seems  that  semantics  and 
pragmatics  offer  the  exclusive  options  for  a  genuine  theory  of  metaphorical  meaning.. 
But  that's  just  what  (A5)  asserts. 
If  the  above  line  of  thought  is  correct,  then  it  seems  that  (A5)  can  in  a  sense  be  seen  as 
an  elucidation  of  (Al);  metaphorical  contents  had  better  be  meaning-like,  so  if  they  are 
not  explicable  in  terms  of  word-meanings  and  compositional  rules,  they  had  better  be 
suitably  related  to  some  more  general  theory  of  communication.  However,  it  is  worth 
keeping  the  two  principles  separate.  Since  (A5)  claims  more  about  what  being  meaning- 
like  demands,  it  is  correspondingly  more  open  to  challenge  than  the  seemingly 
platitudinous  (Al). 
It's  notable  how  little  we  have  needed  to  say  in  the  above  discussion  about  the  shape  of  a 
linguistic  pragmatics.  We  have  not  committed  Davidson  to  the  eventual  success  of  a 
broadly  Gricean  model,  for  example,  over  a  Relevance-Theoretic  rival.  91  Nevertheless,  I 
hope  that  I  have  offered  some  prima  facie  reason  to  think  that  (A5)  defensible,  and 
Davidson  is  entitled  to  rely  on  it,  or  a  close  counterpart,  in  his  master  argument  against 
metaphorical  meanings. 
2.8  Metaphor,  System  and  Error 
We  are  left,  then  with  the  task  of  examining  and  evaluating  (A6) 
(A6)  An  account  of  m-meaning  which  identifies  it  with  the  extra  propositional  content 
communicated  by  the  author  of  the  metaphor,  over  and  above  what  it  says,  as 
determined  by  a  linguistic  theory  of  pragmatics,  provides  an  unacceptably 
incomplete  and  misleading  account  of  our  practices  of  producing,  using  and 
reflecting  on  metaphors. 
91  See  Sperber  and  Wilson  (1986) 
83 Davidson's  remarks  in  defence  of  this  thesis  are  compressed  in  the  extreme,  and  it  is  fair 
to  say  that  it  seems  at  first  face  to  be  the  most  controversial  of  the  principles  that  his 
argument  relies  on.  Many  philosophers  have  been  attracted  by  the  idea  that  metaphor 
makers  use  the  literally  false  content  of  one  sentence  to  get  across  some  quite  distinct 
content.  Although  this  model  of  metaphor  has  been  widely  criticised  in  contemporary 
work  on  the  topic,  it  remains  a  widespread  and  popular  view  among  philosophers,  and 
probably  deserves  to  be  thought  of  as  the  default  position.  An  early  and  influential 
statement  of  the  essence  of  the  view  comes  from  John  Searle 
The  problem  of  explaining  how  metaphors  work  is  a  special  case  of  the  general  problem 
of  explaining  how  speaker  meaning  and  sentence  or  word  meaning  come  apart.  It  is  a 
special  case,  that  is,  of  the  problem  of  how  it  is  possible  to  say  one  thing  and  mean 
something  else,  where  one  succeeds  in  communicating  what  one  means  even  though 
both  the  speaker  and  the  hearer  know  that  the  meanings  of  the  words  uttered  by  the 
speaker  do  not  exactly  and  literally  express  what  the  speaker  meant.  Some  other 
instances  of  the  break  between  speaker's  utterance  meaning  and  literal  sentence  meaning 
are  irony  and  indirect  speech  acts.  In  each  of  these  cases,  what  the  speaker  means  is  not 
identical  with  what  the  sentence  means,  and  yet  what  he  means  is  in  various  ways 
dependent  on  what  the  sentence  means. 
92 
We  have  seen  in  Section  2.3  above  that  Davidson  agrees  with  theorists  like  Searle  that 
metaphor  is  a  matter  of  how  words  are  used,  rather  than  what  they  mean.  Why  then, 
does  he  think  that  holding  that  they  are  typically  used  by  the  speaker  to  communicate 
some  other  proposition  leads  to  an  unacceptable  account  of  metaphor? 
Some  philosophers  have  thought  that  a  certain  kind  of  systematicity,  or  rather  the  lack  of 
it,  is  the  issue.  93  Thus  Joseph  Stem  says  that  the  view  that  no  speaker's  meaning  is 
conveyed  is 
92  Searle  (1993)  p.  84 
93  Systematicity  in  this  sense  is  clearly  different  from  the  type  of  systematic  linguistic  creativity  adverted 
to  above.  It  concerns,  rather,  the  idea  that  the  interpretation  of  metaphors  does  not  depend  on  a  codifiable 
set  of  strictly  linguistic  rules  and  abilities. 
84 ...  not  peculiar  to  Davidson's  discussion  of  metaphor.  For  in  general  he  expresses  doubt 
about  the  possibility  of  codifying  the  abilities  and  skills  involved  in  so-called 
"speaker's"  or  "utterance  meaning"  in  the  form  of  "principles"  (ä  la  Searle)  or  "maxims" 
(ä  la  Grice),  pre-established  or  conventional  rules  which  would  be  either  specific  to 
language  or  linguistic  activities  like  conversation.  Instead  the  kinds  of  inferences  and 
reasoning  these  activities  involve  require  only,  he  says,  the  "cleverness",  "intuition,  luck 
and  skill"  which  are  necessary  for  any  rational  activity  or  for  "devising  a  new  theory  in 
any  field".  94 
Similarly,  William  Lycan  treats  Davidson's  claim  that 
There  are  no  instructions  for  devising  metaphors;  there  is  no  manual  for  determining 
what  a  metaphor  `means'  or  `says';  there  is  no  test  for  metaphor  that  does  not  call  for 
taste.  95 
as  an  argument  against  the  `Pragmatic  View',  commenting 
As  if  directly  inspired  by  that  passage,  Searle  produced  quite  a  number  of  such  rules,  and 
so  far  as  they  go  they  are  plausible.  96 
Although  the  aim  of  this  chapter  is  not  textual  exegesis  of  Davidson,  I  think  that  this 
interpretation  is  neither  very  plausible  as  account  of  what  actually  drives  Davidson  to 
endorse  something  like  (A6),  nor  the  most  charitable  way  of  defending  that  principle. 
The  suggested  motivation  runs  roughly  as  follows: 
(1)  Anything  worth  regarding  as  a  meaning  relates  constitutively  to  distinctively 
linguistic  knowledge,  abilities,  rules  or  conventions. 
(2)  The  type  of  interchange  of  propositional  content  -  with  the  interpreter  coming  to 
recognise  what  the  speaker  is  trying  to  get  across  -  which  is  involved  in 
metaphor,  though  genuine  enough,  is  not  constitutively  related  to  distinctively 
9;  Stern  (1991)  p.  16 
9s  Davidson  (1984a)  p.  245 
96  Lycan  (2000)  p.  221 
85 linguistic  knowledge,  abilities,  rules  or  conventions.  Rather,  it  draws  on  quite 
general  epistemic  and  practical  knowledge  and  abilities. 
(3)  Therefore,  the  type  of  interchange  of  propositional  content  which  is  involved  in 
metaphor,  though  genuine  enough,  is  not  worth  regarding  as  the  meaning  of  the 
metaphor,  whether  construed  in  semantic  or  pragmatic  terms. 
Firstly,  there  is  little  textual  evidence  in  `What  Metaphors  Mean'  that  this  line  of  thought 
is  what  is  motivating  Davidson  there.  Stern  quotes  from  a  different  essay, 
"Communication  and  Convention",  97  which  does  not  discuss  the  case  of  metaphor,  and 
which  is  primarily  concerned  with  the  question  of  whether  appeal  to  public  conventions 
is  explanatorily  essential  in  constructing  a  theory  of  communication.  98  The  Davidsonian 
quotation  that  Lycan  appeals  to  is  immediately  preceded  by  a  remark  that  makes  it  clear 
that  Davidson  means  it  to  speak  to  semantic  accounts  of  metaphor,  rather  than  the  kind 
of  pragmatic  account  adverted  to  here.  99  His  point  seems  to  be  that  there  are  no 
additional  compositional  rules  that  serve  to  determine  metaphorical  meanings  on  the 
basis  of  literal  ones. 
I  am  not  claiming  that  Davidson  would  wholly  reject  the  spirit  of  the  premises  of  the 
above  argument.  The  idea  that  a  theory  of  meaning,  properly  so-called,  deals  with  only 
a  very  limited  pattern  of  predictable  behaviour,  teased  out  painstakingly  from  the  unruly 
97  Davidson  (1984b) 
98  Stern  also  cites  remarks  made  by  Davidson  in  an  introductory  summary  to  that  essay.  Davidson  writes: 
"It  is  always  an  open  question  how  well  the  theory  an  interpreter  brings  to  a  linguistic  encounter  will  cope. 
In  practice  an  interpreter  keeps  the  conversation  going  by  adjusting  his  theory  on  the  spot.  The  principles 
of  such  inventive  accommodation  are  not  themselves  reducible  to  theory,  involving  as  they  do  nothing  less 
than  all  our  skills  at  theory  construction.  "  Since  the  kind  of  pragmatic  account  discussed  by  Searle 
explicitly  does  not  involve  revision  of  the  semantic  theory  which  assigns  satisfaction  conditions  to  the 
parts  of  the  language,  this  remark  does  not  seem  to  speak  to  it.  See  Stern  (1991)  p.  46  and  Davidson 
(1984)  p.  xix.  Davidson  explicitly  distinguishes  between  metaphor  and  malapropism,  where  such  theory 
adjustment  does  occur,  in  Davidson  (1986). 
99" 
.  all  communication  by  speech  assumes  the  interplay  of  inventive  construction  and  inventive 
construal.  What  metaphor  adds  to  the  ordinary  is  an  achievement  that  uses  no  semantic  resources  beyond 
the  resources  on  which  the  ordinary  depend.  There  are  no  instructions  for  devising  metaphors...  ". 
Davidson  (1984a)  p  246.  The  remark  comes  at  the  very  beginning  of  Davidson's  essay,  whereas  the 
discussion  of  pragmatic  communication  comes  at  the  very  end. 
86 flux  of  linguistic  interaction,  is  definitely  a  recurrent  theme  in  his  work.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  idea  that  he  hangs  anything  very  much  on  the  distinction  adverted  to  in  the 
second  premise  is  simply  not  faithful  to  his  stated  view 
[Grice]  has  shown  why  it  is  essential  to  distinguish  between  the  literal  meaning...  of 
words  and  what  is  often  implied  (or  implicated)  by  someone  who  uses  those  words.  He 
has  explored  the  general  principles  behind  our  ability  to  figure  out  such  implicatures, 
and  these  principles  must,  of  course,  be  known  by  speakers  who  expect  to  be  taken  up 
on  them.  Whether  knowledge  of  these  principles  ought  to  be  included  in  the  description 
of  linguistic  competence  may  not  have  to  be  settled:  on  the  one  hand  they  are  things  a 
clever  person  could  often  figure  out  without  previous  training  or  exposure,  and  they  are 
things  we  could  get  along  without.  On  the  other  hand  they  represent  a  kind  of  skill  we 
expect  of  an  interpreter  and  without  which  communication  would  be  greatly 
impoverished.  '00 
Davidson  is  wise  to  profess  neutrality  on  the  question  of  whether  we  should  accept  the 
two  premises  of  the  above  argument.  Linguists  and  philosophers  of  language  have  long 
found  it  plausible  and  profitable  to  suppose  that  some  theory  of  implicature  can  play  an 
explanatory  role  in  understanding  communication.  Such  work  is  no  doubt  provisional 
and  in  need  of  development.  Furthermore,  it  is  surely  too  much  to  hope  that  the  type  of 
theory  that  emerges,  even  in  the  most  favourable  case,  is  likely  to  allow  for  the  type  of 
productive  and  predictive  formalization  available  in  syntax  and  semantics.  Nevertheless, 
it's  not  clear  why  we  are  to  accept  the  claim  of  the  first  premise  that  anything  worth 
regarding  as  a  meaning  must  be  constitutively  related  to  distinctively  linguistic 
knowledge  and  abilities.  Why  shouldn't  it  be  sufficient  that  a  pragmatics  show  how 
speaker  meanings  characteristically  relate  to  a  fairly  typical,  delimited  set  of  skills  and 
assumptions?  It's  all  too  easy  to  get  slightly  hysterical  about  such  demarcatory  issues. 
Given  that  working  linguists  typically  find  speaker  meaning  a  useful  explanatory  posit, 
philosophers  ought  not  to  get  too  excited  about  what  is  in  effect  a  terminological 
decision,  made  on  the  basis  of  a  fluid  and  shifting  pattern  of  use. 
Neither  textual  exegesis,  nor  a  spirit  of  interpretative  charity,  then,  lead  us  to  conclude 
that  Davidson's  pragmatic  error  theory  is  motivated  by  a  general  scepticism  about  the 
100  Davidson  (1986)  p.  437 
87 place  of  pragmatics  in  linguistic  explanation.  Rather,  I  will  suggest,  the  intended 
supporting  argument  for  (A6)  runs  somewhat  as  follows: 
a)  Anything  worth  regarding  as  a  tolerably  complete  and  informative  account  of 
our  practices  of  producing,  using  and  reflecting  on  metaphors  must  account 
for  all  of  the  distinctive  marks  of  metaphor. 
b)  An  account  of  metaphor  that,  like  Searle's,  characterizes  such  practices  as 
being  in  essence  a  special  case  of  saying  one  thing  and  meaning  another, 
cannot  account  for  all  of  the  distinctive  marks  of  metaphor. 
c)  Therefore,  such  pragmatic  accounts  of  metaphor  provide  at  best  an 
incomplete  and  misleading  account  of  our  practices  of  producing,  using  and 
reflecting  on  metaphors. 
Several  comments  on  this  argument  are  immediately  required.  Firstly,  by  `marks  of 
metaphor',  I  mean  the  distinctive  features  of  our  practice  of  composing,  employing  and 
engaging  with  metaphor,  that  give  it  the  role  in  our  thought  and  practice  that  it 
possesses.  Secondly,  it  ought  to  be  clear  that  the  above  argument  does  not  aim  to 
demonstrate  that  metaphor-as-implication  never  takes  place,  nor  that  a  theory  like 
Searle's  might  comprise  apart  of  a  more  general  theory  of  metaphorical  talk.  Davidson 
has  often  been  attacked  for  holding  that  such  communication  never  takes  place,  but  this 
may  be  to  attack  a  straw  man.  He  writes  of  the  thesis  that  metaphors  are  associated  with 
a  distinctive  cognitive  content  that  the  speaker  intends  to  convey  to  an  interpreter 
This  theory  is  false  as  a  full  account  of  metaphor,  whether  or  not  we  call  the  purported 
cognitive  content  a  meaning. 
'0' 
Similarly,  Davidson  treats  Donnellan's  case  of  Smith's  murderer  as  a  case  where  Jones 
has  "said  something  true  by  using  a  sentence  that  is  false",  adding 
This  is  done  intentionally  all  the  time,  for  example  in  irony  or  metaphor. 
'°2 
101  Davidson  (1984a)  p  262,  my  italics.  The  italicised  section  did  not  appear  in  the  original  version  of  the 
article,  which  might  either  suggest  a  change  of  heart,  or,  more  likely,  the  correction  of  a  rhetorical 
flourish. 
102  Davidson  (1986)  p.  440 
88 Admittedly,  Davidson  does  include  the  previously  quoted  remark 
if  I  am  right,  a  metaphor  doesn't  say  anything,  beyond  its  literal  meaning  (nor  does  its 
maker  say  anything,  in  using  the  metaphor,  beyond  the  literal).  '03 
There  are,  however,  a  number  of  ways  to  interpret  this  charitably.  We  might  see  it  as  an 
ill-timed  rhetorical  flourish,  a  deliberately  eye-catching  overstatement  of  the  actual 
thesis  defended.  We  might  take  it  as  a  sign  that  Davidson  is  here  speaking  of  metaphor 
in  generic  terms,  rather  than  making  a  universally  quantified  claim.  We  might  take  its 
inclusion  as  an  oversight,  a  hangover  from  an  early,  less  plausible  version  of  the 
position. 
Later  work  suggests  that  the  latter  interpretation  is  probably  the  most  likely.  In 
`Locating  Literary  Language',  Davidson  distinguishes  three  species  of  intention  that  he 
holds  must  be  present  in  any  speech  act.  104  Firstly,  there  are  `ulterior'  intentions  which 
aim  at  the  achievement  of  some  extra-linguistic  end;  a  goal  or  purpose  that  could,  at  least 
in  principle,  be  achieved  in  other  ways.  For  example,  one  might  want  to  call 
somebody's  attention  to  similarities  between  philosophers  and  flies  trapped  in  fly- 
bottles,  or  get  them  to  think  of  the  former  as  the  latter.  Secondly,  there  are  pragmatic 
intentions  to  utter  a  sentence  with  a  given  illocutionary  force.  A  given  remark  is 
intended  to  be  taken  as  a  command,  a  request,  an  invitation,  etc.  105  It  is  unclear  whether 
Davidson  thinks  that  the  intention  to  speak  metaphorically  fits  in  at  this  level,  partly 
because  metaphor  seems  to  relate  more  closely  to  the  manner  of  what  is  said,  than  the 
force  with  which  it  is  put  forward.  Finally,  there  are  the  `strictly  semantic'  intentions, 
where  one  intends  one's  words  to  have  certain  meanings  that  will  be  taken  as  such  by 
one's  interpreter.  For  example,  Wittgenstein  intended  the  words  "Mendelssohn  is  not  a 
peak,  but  a  plateau"  106  to  mean  that  Mendelssohn  is  not  a  peak,  but  a  plateau.  (Had  he 
103  Davidson  (1984a)  p.  246,  my  italics.  The  remark  is  included  both  the  original  version  of  the  article, 
and  the  revised  version  which  I  have  relied  on  in  this  thesis. 
1°'  Davidson  (1993)  p.  298-299 
105  Davidson  accepts  the  possibilities  of  borderline  cases  -  as  when  "see  you  in  July"  is  half  promise  and 
half  prediction  -  but  only  when  such  a  mixed  force  is  intended  by  the  speaker. 
106  Wittgenstein  (1998)  p.  4e 
89 mistaken  the  meaning  of  `plateau'  for  that  of  `platypus',  his  intention  would  not  have 
been  fulfilled.  ) 
Davidson  uses  the  label  `first  meaning'  for  the  meanings  of  words  picked  out  by  the 
latter  type  of  intentions.  He  writes 
The  usefulness  of  the  concept  of  first  meaning  emerges  when  we  consider  cases  where 
what  is  stated  or  implied  differs  from  what  the  words  mean.  "Sometimes  too  hot  the  eye 
of  heaven  shines"  means  that  the  sun  sometimes  shines  too  brightly.  But  the  first 
meaning  of  "the  eye  of  heaven"  purports  to  refer  to  the  one  and  only  eye  of  heaven.  We 
can  tell  this  because  Shakespeare  (we  assume)  intended  to  use  words  that  would  be 
recognised  by  a  reader  to  refer  to  the  one  and  only  eye  of  heaven  (if  such  a  thing  existed) 
in  order  to  prompt  the  reader  to  understand  that  he  meant  the  sun.  We  may  wish  to  use 
the  word  "meaning"  for  both  the  first  meaning  and  what  the  metaphor  carries  us  to,  but 
only  the  first  meaning  has  a  systematic  place  in  the  language  of  the  author.  107 
As  if  to  eliminate  any  doubt,  in  a  footnote  to  the  above  he  adds 
In  my  essay  "What  Metaphors  Mean"  I  was  foolishly  stubborn  about  the  word 
"meaning"  when  all  I  cared  about  was  the  primacy  of  "first  meaning". 
In  any  case,  I  will  assume  that  the  best  defence  of  the  type  of  pragmatic  error  theory 
canvassed  by  Davidson  in  his  original  article  involves  granting  that  a  speaker-meaning 
account  might  be  applicable  on  occasion,  but  deny  that  it  provides  a  satisfactory  theory 
of  metaphor.  108 
Such  a  concession,  while  seemingly  inevitable  given  the  widely  acknowledged  datum 
that  we  sometimes  do,  or  at  the  very  least  could,  convey  a  cognitive  content  when 
speaking  metaphorically,  entails  an  immediate  weakening  of  Davidson's  argument  as 
presented  above.  Compare  (A6)  and  (A2) 
107  Davidson  (1993)  p.  300 
103  For  stylistic  convenience,  I  will  continue  to  refer  to  the  proponent  of  such  a  position  as  `Davidson'  and 
the  position  itself  as  `Davidsonian,  etc.  This  should  not  be  understood  as  an  implicit  commitment  to  the 
actual  Donald  Davidson  being  willing  to  endorse  them  in  letter  or  spirit. 
90 (A2)  If  a  proposed  assignment  of  a  metaphorical  content  to  a  utterance  results  solely  from 
an  unacceptable  theory  of  metaphor,  then  the  utterance  does  not  express  that  content. 
(A6)  An  account  of  m-meaning  which  identifies  it  with  the  extra  propositional  content 
communicated  by  the  author  of  the  metaphor,  over  and  above  what  it  says,  as 
determined  by  a  linguistic  theory  of  pragmatics,  provides  an  unacceptably  incomplete 
and  misleading  account  of  our  practices  of  producing,  using  and  reflecting  on 
metaphors. 
The  surface  plausibility  of  these  two  principles  seems  to  result  from  two  quite  different 
conceptions  of  an  `unacceptable  theory  of  metaphor'.  Imagine  that  the  only  putative 
warrant  we  could  get,  even  in  relatively  idealized  conditions,  for  assigning  a  certain  m- 
meaning  to  an  utterance  is  a  crazy  theory  of  metaphor.  Then,  it  seems,  the  utterance 
does  not  express  that  meaning.  That's  the  intended  sense  of  (A2),  and  it's  the  sense  in 
which  it  ought  to  be  common  ground  between  Davidson  and  his  opponents.  Such  a 
principle  can  be  seen  as  resting  on  one  incontrovertible  principle,  and  one  widely  shared 
assumption  about  what  metaphorical  meaning  must  be  like 
(Warrant)  If  a  theory  is  crazy,  then  it  doesn't  give  warrant  to  beliefs  formed  on  the 
basis  of  it. 
(Epistemic  Access)  If  a  metaphor  m-means  that  P,  then  (in  somewhat  idealized 
conditions)  we  can  get  some  warrant  for  believing  that  it  m-means 
that  P. 
Assume  that  the  only  putative  warrant  that  we  could  get  for  an  ascription  of  m-meaning 
was  a  crazy  theory.  By  (Warrant),  no  warrant  for  believing  that  the  metaphor  did  have 
such  a  content  would  spring  from  that  theory.  So  we  would  have  no  warrant  at  all  for 
accepting  the  ascription.  Modus  tollens  on  (Epistemic  Access)  gives  us  that  the 
91 metaphor  does  not  have  that  content,  and  conditional  proof  gives  us  the  plausible  version 
of  (A2). 
However,  (A6)  is  only  plausible  if  we  apply  quite  a  different  sense  of  `unacceptable 
theory'.  Grant  Davidson  that  any  acceptable  theory  must  account  for  all  the  marks  of 
metaphor,  and  that  a  speaker-meaning  account  does  not.  Even  so,  if  there  are  grounds 
for  thinking  that  such  an  account  is  only  unacceptable  in  the  sense  it  is  incomplete, 
partial  or  narrow  in  application,  then  that  is  a  quite  different  thing  than  being  the  type  of 
crazy  theory  that  (Warrant)  involves.  Similarly,  if  the  theory  does  not  mislead  us  with 
respect  to  its  proper  objects,  but  only  beguiles  us  into  ignoring  more  complex  cases  of 
metaphor  than  straightforward  implicatures.  In  those  type  of  cases,  an  unacceptable 
theory  may  well  be  capable  of  giving  warrant  to  beliefs,  just  as  Newtonian  mechanics 
gave  warrant  despite  incompleteness  and  misleadingness  of  a  similar  kind.  So  it  seems 
that  Davidson  currently  lacks  a  unitary  notion  of  `unacceptable  theory  of  metaphor' 
upon  which  all  of  the  principles  he  implicitly  relies  upon  come  out  true. 
It  seems,  then,  that  even  before  we  begin  to  evaluate  Davidson's  claim  regarding  the 
explanatory  power  of  a  pragmatic  theory  of  metaphorical  content,  his  argument  runs  into 
trouble.  Even  if  we  grant  that  a  pragmatic  theory  is  unacceptably  incomplete  in  the  way 
that  he  suggests,  that  does  not  warrant  the  application  of  (A2),  in  the  sense  in  which  that 
principle  is  neutral  territory. 
The  only  answer  available  to  a  Davidsonian  seems  to  be  to  restrict  the  scope  of  the 
argument.  Let  in  be  a  metaphorical  utterance  that  the  pragmatic  theory  really  does  give  a 
crazily  unsatisfactory  account  of.  Then  (A2)  and  (A6)  hold  true  of  metaphors  like  in. 
The  Davidsonian  had  better  hope  that  a  significant  proportion  of  our  metaphors  are  more 
like  m,  than  the  type  of  communicative  metaphors  adverted  to  by  Searle  et  al. 
Otherwise,  the  pragmatic  error  theory  seems  to  be  a  considerably  less  revisionary,  and 
interesting,  position  than  it  originally  seemed. 
92 Imagine  that  Davidson  is  right  to  hold  that  a  significant  proportion  of  metaphors  are  not 
best  explained  in  terms  of  pragmatic  communication,  but  that  some  are.  Does  even  this 
limited  concession  undercut  the  motivation  for,  or  substance  of,  a  pragmatic  error 
theory?  After  all,  we  can't  be  making  all  that  much  of  an  error  if  we  are  right  about 
metaphor  expressing  cognitive  contents  in  a  number  of  familiar  cases. 
It  is  instructive  to  consider  analogous  cases  from  other  areas  of  philosophy.  Hartry 
Field,  for  example,  does  not  hold  that  every  mathematical  sentence  is  false,  just  that  a 
substantial  and  interesting  class  are.  Negative  existentials  that  are  counted  as  true  by 
realists  about  mathematics  -  there  is  no  greatest  prime  number,  for  example  -  will  also 
be  counted  true  by  Field.  That  case,  admittedly,  might  be  thought  to  turn  on  a  peculiar 
feature  of  the  case.  But  there  is  comfort  elsewhere.  Take  a  Nietzschean  view  on 
everyday  moral  talk,  for  example.  Nietzsche  rejects  the  idea  that  the  majority  of  claims 
about  moral  worth  are  literally  true,  holding  instead  that  people  generally  are  radically 
self-deceived  about  e.  g.  the  value  of  giving  money  to  famine  relief  out  of  a  sense  of  pity 
for  the  poor  and  suffering.  He  does  not  try  to  reconstruct  the  semantics  for  such  talk  in 
terms  more  acceptable  to  an  anti-realist  worldview,  however.  It  is  thus  appropriate  to 
regard  him  as  an  error  theorist  about  everyday  morality.  But  that  does  not  entail  that  he 
rejects,  or  ought  to  reject,  every  claim  that  everyday  morality  would  make.  Folk 
morality  and  Nietzschean  master-morality  may  well  converge  on  their  appraisals  of  e.  g. 
the  moral  worth  of  character  traits  like  creativity,  self-sufficiency,  inner  strength  and 
dedication.  If  we're  content  to  continue  to  regard  Nietzsche  as  the  moral  revisionist  and 
error-theorist  par  excellence,  then  it  seems  that  the  Davidson  has  some  room  for  limited 
concession. 
2.9  Two  Marks  of  Metaphor 
What  marks  of  metaphor,  then,  might  a  speaker-meaning  account  be  thought  to  give  a 
radically  unsatisfactory  account  of?  Davidson  suggests  two  potential  lines  in  "What 
Metaphors  Mean".  Though  neither  is  developed  in  any  great  detail  there,  both  have 
proved  suggestive.  Firstly,  there  is  the  idea  that  what  a  metaphor  brings  to  our  attention 
is  in  a  certain  sense  limitless. 
93 Stanley  Cavell  mentions  the  fact  that  most  attempt  at  paraphrase  [of  metaphors]  end  with 
`and  so  on'  and  refers  to  Empson's  remark  that  metaphors  are  `pregnant'.  But  Cavell 
doesn't  explain  the  endlessness  of  paraphrase  as  I  do,  as  can  be  learned  from  the  fact  that 
he  thinks  it  distinguishes  metaphor  from  some  ('but  perhaps  not  all')  literal  discourse.  I 
hold  that  the  endless  character  of  what  we  call  the  paraphrase  of  a  metaphor  springs 
from  the  fact  that  it  attempts  to  spell  out  what  the  metaphor  makes  us  notice,  and  to  this 
there  is  no  clear  end.  I  would  say  the  same  for  any  use  of  language.  109 
Secondly,  there  is  the  idea  that  this  limitlessness  has  a  partial  source  in  the  non- 
propositional  character  of  what  metaphor  guides  us  to 
It's  not  only  that  we  can't  provide  an  exhaustive  catalogue  of  what  has  been  attended  to 
when  we  are  led  to  see  something  in  a  new  light;  the  difficulty  is  more  fundamental. 
What  we  notice  or  see  is  not,  in  general,  propositional  in  character.  Of  course  it  may  be, 
and  when  it  is,  it  usually  may  be  stated  in  fairly  plain  words.  But  if  I  show  you 
Wittgenstein's  duck-rabbit  and  I  say,  `It's  a  duck',  then  with  luck  you  see  it  as  a  duck;  if 
I  say,  `It's  a  rabbit',  you  see  it  as  a  rabbit.  But  no  proposition  expresses  what  I  have  led 
you  to  see...  Seeing  as  is  not  seeing  that.  Metaphor  makes  us  see  one  thing  as  another  by 
making  some  literal  statement  that  inspires  or  prompts  the  insight.  Since  in  most  cases 
what  the  metaphor  prompts  or  inspires  is  not  entirely,  or  even  at  all,  recognition  of  some 
truth  or  fact,  the  attempt  to  give  literal  expression  to  the  content  of  the  metaphor  is 
simply  misguided.  1° 
There  are  two  issues  that  become  pressing  here.  Firstly,  there  is  the  question  of  how  we 
should  best  understand  the  character  of  the  suggested  marks  of  metaphor.  Secondly, 
there  is  the  question  of  whether  they  are  wholly  inadequately  explained  by  a  pragmatic 
theory  of  metaphor.  Since  the  last  two  chapters  of  this  thesis  will  be  concerned  with 
addressing  both  topics  in  a  degree  of  depth,  I  will  offer  a  fairly  compressed  discussion  at 
109  Davidson  (1984a)  p.  263 
110  Davidson  (1984a)  p.  263.  It  is  worth  drawing  attention  to  the  fact  that  Davidson  here  claims  that  in 
most  cases,  what  the  metaphor  prompts  is  not  propositional,  giving  textual  support  to  the  suggested 
interpretation  offered  above. 
94 this  stage.  Nevertheless,  it  is  worth  dealing  with  a  few  issues  here.  I  shall  proceed  in 
reverse  order. 
A  pragmatic  account  of  metaphor  typically  distinguishes  between  what  is 
communicated,  or  implicated,  by  the  use  of  a  sentence,  and  what  that  sentence  literally 
says.  Admittedly,  pragmatic  accounts  need  not  limit  themselves  to  such  models.  More 
radical  pragmatist  accounts  challenge  the  idea  that  what  a  sentence  means  is  wholly 
independent  of  the  linguistic  and  social  context  in  which  it  is  uttered,  even  when  all  e.  g. 
indexical  and  demonstrative  elements  of  the  sentence  are  taken  into  account.  l"1 
Nevertheless,  even  such  radical  theories  agree  that  pragmatic  processes  result  in 
something  that  can  be  specified  using  a  `that'  clause.  If  John,  holding  a  cigarette,  asks 
Susan  if  she  has  any  matches,  we  can  take  it  that  he  is  implicating,  inter  alia,  that  the 
matches  are  writable  for  lighting  the  cigarette.  Even  if  Sperber,  Wilson  and  Carston  are 
right  to  hold  that  processes  of  pragmatic  enrichment  determine  that  saying  "John  has  had 
breakfast"  typically  states,  rather  than  merely  implicates,  that  John  has  had  breakfast 
this  morning,  the  output  of  the  pragmatic  process  is  still  a  propositional  content.  112 
Such  convergence  is  unsurprising.  The  aim  of  a  pragmatic  theory  isn't  wholly  clear,  but 
often  in  practice  amounts  to  the  systematic  investigation  of  what  Gazdar  has  called 
`meaning  minus  truth-conditions'.  113  Since  what  is  meant  or  said  by  using  a  sentence 
can  typically  be  expressed  using  `S  said  that  P'  or  `U  means  that  P'  constructions, 
pragmatics  is  typically  concerned  with  assigning  propositional  contents  to  utterances. 
Moreover,  since  pragmatics  aspires  to  the  status  of  a  well-confirmed  linguistic  theory, 
and  linguistics  aspires  to  be  a  (special)  science,  such  attributions  are  typically  literal 
statements  of  what  is  said  by  an  utterance.  114 
111  See  e.  g.  Searle  (1978)  and  Travis  (1997)  for  statements  of  a  view  similar  to  this. 
112  See  Recanati  (1993)  p.  261  for  a  useful  discussion  of  the  case. 
113  Gazdar  (1979)  p.  2.  Levinson  (1983)  pp  12-32  suggests  `Pragmatics  is  the  study  of  all  those  aspects  of 
meaning  not  captured  in  a  semantic  theory'  as  the  most  promising  definition. 
114  1  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  metaphor  has  no  place  in  science.  It  clearly  does.  However,  the 
systematic  attribution  of  contents  to  utterances  by  linguistic  theories  are  typically  not  cases  in  point. 
95 It  is  thus  a  serious  problem  for  a  pragmatic  theory  if  what  a  metaphor  gets  across  is  non- 
finitely  specifiable,  and  even  worse  if  it  is  wholly  non-propositional.  We  can  argue  as 
follows 
1)  If  a  pragmatic  theory  of  metaphor  is  to  be  successful,  then  it  ought  to 
issue  in  attributions  like  `Speaker  S  communicates  that  p  by  uttering 
metaphor  M',  or  `Metaphor  M  states  that  p'. 
2)  The  limitlessness  and  non-propositional  character  of  most  metaphors 
means  that  no  such  attributions  will  be  forthcoming  by  a  pragmatic 
theory. 
3)  A  pragmatic  theory  of  metaphor  will  not  be  successful. 
The  first  premise  seems  to  be  secured  by  the  general  aims  of  a  linguistic  pragmatics, 
while  the  second  seems  relatively  secure,  given  then  methods  by  which  such  a  theory 
aims  to  match  utterances  and  contents.  It  seems  then,  that  if  Davidson  is  right  about  the 
characteristic  marks  of  metaphor,  he  has  the  chance  to  establish  that  pragmatic  theories 
of  metaphor  are  unacceptable  in  just  the  way  that  a  unified  reading  of  (A2)  and  (A6) 
demands. 
The  matter  turns,  then,  on  the  status  of  the  two  marks  of  metaphor.  The  first, 
limitlessness,  has  often  been  associated  with  a  demand  for  paraphrasability.  In 
specifying  the  pragmatic  content  of  an  indexical  utterance,  we  may  have  to  use  a 
different  but  related  sentence,  that  expresses  a  suitably  related  content.  For  example,  if  I 
ask  you  if  you  can  pass  the  salt,  implicating  that  I  would  like  you  to  pass  the  salt  to  me, 
then  a  theoretical  specification  of  that  content  might  replace  the  two  indexicals  with 
suitable  proper  names.  '  is  Similarly,  the  thought  goes,  a  demand  for  a  theoretical 
specification  of  the  pragmatic  content  of  a  metaphor  will  involve  the  identification  of  a 
suitably  related  proposition. 
115  Perhaps  with  an  indication  that  the  utterance  was  originally  de  se  in  form. 
96 Thus  Nogales  reconstructs  Davidson's  argument  as  follows 
(1)  Metaphorical  utterances  typically  do  not  admit  of  paraphrasing. 
(2)  Any  cognitive  content  can  be  expressed  in  at  least  two  different  ways  (i.  e.  it  can 
be  paraphrased) 
(3)  Being  (easily)  paraphrasable  is  a  test  of  whether  the  cognitive  content  of  a 
sentence  captures  its  cognitive  effect. 
(4)  Therefore,  the  cognitive  effect  of  a  metaphorical  utterance  does  not  lie  in  the 
cognitive  content  of  its  terms. 
(5)  Metaphorical  meaning  is  defined  so  as  to  capture  the  cognitive  effect  of  the 
utterance  through  cognitive  content. 
(6)  Therefore,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  metaphorical  meaning  as  defined.  116 
The  idea  expressed  in  line  2-  that  Davidson  thinks  that  anything  can  be  said  in  two 
ways  -  has  gained  a  strangely  wide  currency  in  recent  work.  Thus  Goodman  notes  that 
`paraphrase  of  many  literal  sentences  is  also  exceedingly  difficult,  and  indeed  we  may 
seriously  question  whether  any  sentence  can  be  translated  exactly  into  other  words  in  the 
same  or  other  language",  117  an  argument  echoed  approvingly  by  Nogales.  Similarly, 
Denham  suggests  that  the  claim  of  non-paraphrasability,  if  it  is  to  provide  a  distinction 
between  utterances  that  express  pragmatic  contents  and  those  that  do  not,  must  become 
one  of  two  claims 
Either  (1)  metaphorical  contents  are  non-replaceable  because  the  truth-conditions  of 
metaphorical  sentences,  unlike  those  of  literal  sentences,  cannot  be  stated  independently 
of  the  sentence  itself,  or  (2)  metaphorical  contents  are  non-replaceable  because  they  do 
not  exist;  unlike  literal  sentences,  metaphorical  sentences  have  no  truth  conditions  (apart 
1  16  Nogales  (1999)  p.  75.  I  have  set  out  Nogales  reconstruction  verbatim.  In  a  footnote  commenting  on 
line  (3),  she  says  "Underlying  this  argument  is  Davidson's  conception  of  what  it  means  to  be 
paraphrasable,  which  seems  to  involve  not  only  the  cognitive  content  of  an  utterance,  as  evidenced  by  its 
truth  conditions,  but  also  its  effect,  which  seems  to  include  feelings  as  well  as  thoughts  we  are  led  to 
contemplate". 
117  Goodman  (1981)  p.  176. 
97 from  those  attaching  to  them  as  literally  read)  and  hence  no  cognitive  content  (apart 
from  their  literal  content.  It  is  not  open  to  Davidson  to  opt  for  (1)  because  he  has 
already  rejected  the  view  that  the  truth-conditions  of  structurally  simple  literal  sentences 
can  be  stated  independently  of  the  sentences  themselves  -  which  leaves  them  on  a  level 
with  metaphors.  He  thus  opts  for  (2):  118 
All  these  views  seem  to  me  to  miss  some  fairly  obvious  disanalogies  between  the  case  of 
metaphors  and  those  of  other  utterances.  Firstly,  Davidson  is  arguing  against  the  idea 
that  a  pragmatic  theory  might  ascribe  speaker-meanings,  or  other  pragmatically 
determined  propositional  contents,  to  metaphors.  Since,  in  the  case  where  theorist  and 
speaker  share  a  language,  such  a  theory  can  straightforwardly  give  a  literal  specification 
of  what  is  being  said  by  a  literal  utterance  by  using  that  very  sentence,  or,  in  the  case  of 
indexicals,  etc,  a  suitably  related  one,  the  issue  of  paraphrasability  does  not  arise.  When 
John  utters  assertorically  `the  cat  is  on  the  mat',  he  typically  aims  to  communicate,  inter 
alia,  that  the  contextually  salient  cat  is  on  the  contextually  salient  mat.  There  is  simply 
no  need,  contra  Nogales,  for  Davidson  to  commit  himself  to  the  idea  that  everything  can 
be  said  in  two  ways;  nor,  unsurprisingly,  does  he  do  so.  Goodman's  point  is  thus  an 
ignoratio  elenchi,  based  on  a  misreading  of  Davidson's  line  of  argument. 
Denham's  diagnosis  of  what  motivates  Davidson's  concern  with  paraphrase  is  similarly 
misguided.  '  19  Davidson  clearly  does  hold  that  the  truth  conditions  of  `structurally 
simple'  sentences  can  be  stated  independently  of  those  sentences,  since  e.  g.  (a)  radical 
interpretation  in  the  non-homophonic  case  would  otherwise  be  impossible  and  (b)  even 
in  the  homophonic  case,  indexical  transformations  require  that  quite  different  sentences 
be  used  to  specify  truth  conditions.  So  Davidson  could  just  as  easily  opt  for  (1),  for  all 
Denham  has  shown.  (Denham  is  right  to  wonder  whether  the  pragmatic  theorist  might 
profitably  surrender  the  idea  that  a  linguistic  theory  ought  to  issue  specifications  of 
content  in  only  literal  terms.  I  will  discuss  this  idea  in  the  next  chapter). 
11$  Denham  (2000)  p.  259 
119  Rather  unsurprisingly,  given  the  wholly  misleading  and  uncharitable  construal  of  his  position  that 
precedes  it,  during  which  she  accuses  Davidson  of  `muddling'  meaning  with  perlocutionary  effect  (!  )  and, 
in  an  `oversight  of  convenience',  having  `neglected'  the  `sense/force'  distinction. 
98 The  paraphrasability  of  literal  sentences,  and  related  red  herrings  relating  to  the  non- 
preservation  of  Fregean  `tone',  ought  then  to  be  put  aside.  The  question  is  whether  it  is 
reasonable  to  believe  that  a  systematic  pragmatics  is  likely  to  be  able  to  assign  suitable 
truth-conditional  equivalents  to  metaphorical  utterances.  Unfortunately,  however,  it  is  at 
this  point  that  the  debate  tends  to  collapse  into  appeal  to  theoretically  loaded  intuitions. 
Realists  about  metaphorical  meaning,  confident  in  the  idea  that  metaphors  can  be  true  or 
truth-apt,  tend  to  characterise  Davidson's  scepticism  as  mistaking  difficulty  for 
impossibility.  Sometimes  they  even  go  so  far  as  to  provide  putative  paraphrases,  often 
for  relatively  stale,  straightforward  or  one-dimensional  metaphors,  and  then  extrapolate 
to  the  general  case.  Anti-realist  attention  is  divided  between  two  contrasting  rejections. 
In  the  case  of  superficial  and  glib  summary,  they  are  wracked  with  the  uneasy 
apprehension  that  more  than  mode-of-presentation  is  omitted  from  such  construals.  In 
the  (rare)  case  where  a  substantive  elucidation  of  a  metaphor  is  presented,  they  become 
sceptical  of  the  idea  that  the  speaker  could  really  have  intended  to  convey  all  that  by  her 
metaphor.  Even  for  a  single  theorist,  it  is  easy  to  vacillate  between  rejecting  the 
phenomenology  of  content  (surely  Wittgenstein  was  saying  something  about 
Mendelssohn,  that  we  might  reject,  endorse  as  true,  or  ask  for  proof  of?  )  and  the 
phenomenology  of  paraphrase  (surely  it's  true  that  we  can't  say  what  a  given  metaphor 
conveys  in  non-metaphorical  terms  -  isn't  that  partly  why  we  appeal  to  metaphor?  ) 
An  account  that  attempted  to  reconcile  both  intuitions  is  clearly  desirable,  and  has  been 
much  attempted.  Since  I  will  revisit  the  question  of  the  possibility  of  paraphrase  in  some 
depth  in  the  final  two  chapters,  and  offer  a  sustained  discussion  of  the  putatively  non- 
propositional  character  of  metaphor  in  Chapter  5,  I  shall  draw  my  discussion  to  a  close 
here.  Let  us  return  to  (A6). 
(A6)  An  account  of  m-meaning  which  identifies  it  with  the  extra  propositional  content 
communicated  by  the  author  of  the  metaphor,  over  and  above  what  it  says,  as 
determined  by  a  linguistic  theory  of  pragmatics,  provides  an  unacceptably 
incomplete  and  misleading  account  of  our  practices  of  producing,  using  and 
reflecting  on  metaphors 
I  have  argued  that  this  principle,  and  with  it  much  of  the  surface  plausibility  of 
Davidson's  case  for  a  pragmatic  error  theory,  depends  upon  (i)  the  way  in  which  the 
99 putative  distinguishing  marks  of  metaphor  are  developed  and  elaborated,  (ii)  the  case 
being  made  that  no  suitable  pragmatic  theory  can  account  for  them  and  (iii)  a  significant 
class  of  metaphors  actually  displaying  the  supposed  distinguishing  marks.  Each  of  these 
issues  requires  a  good  deal  of  work  to  be  made  good,  and  the  principle  is 
correspondingly  far  less  plausible,  prima  facie,  than  the  others  adverted  to  in  Davidson's 
argument.  Nevertheless,  we  have  not  yet  identified  an  unambiguous  reason  to  reject  it 
outright. 
2.10  Conclusion 
I  have  argued  that  we  should  think  of  Davidson  as  an  error  theorist  about  metaphorical 
meaning,  whether  construed  in  semantic  or  pragmatic  terms.  In  the  latter  half  of  this 
chapter,  I  have  examined  the  negative  aspect  of  that  position.  Davidson's  argument 
against  metaphorical  meaning  relied  on  the  following  six  fundamental  principles. 
(Al)  The  parts  of  metaphorical  utterances  only  acquire  distinctive 
metaphorical  senses  if  they  thereby  become  associated  with  something 
that  deserves  to  be  called  their  `metaphorical  meaning'.  Nothing  deserves 
to  be  called  a  metaphorical  meaning  unless  (a)  there  is  something 
genuinely  meaning-like  about  it  and  (b)  there  is  something  about  it  that 
distinctively  relates  to  the  metaphorical  nature  of  the  utterances  it  is 
putatively  associated  with. 
(A2)  If  a  proposed  assignment  of  a  metaphorical  content  to  a  utterance  results 
solely 
from  an  unacceptable  theory  of  metaphor,  then  the  utterance  does  not 
express  that  content. 
(A3)  If  a  sentence  is  associated  with  a  metaphorical  content  solely  in  virtue  of 
being  a  compositional  product  of  its  component  semantic  parts,  then 
some  of  those  parts  must  themselves  have  (or  determine)  metaphorical 
meanings. 
100 (A4)  The  words  employed  in  a  metaphorical  utterance  do  not  come  to  be 
associated  with  anything  that  is  both  a)  genuinely  meaning-like  and  b) 
distinctively  related  to  the  metaphorical  nature  of  the  utterances  in 
question. 
(A5)  The  m-meaning  conveyed  by  a  sentence  used  metaphorically  would  be 
identical  with  either  a)  what  is  said  by  the  utterance,  which  results  solely 
from  the  meanings  of  its  component  parts,  together  with  their  mode  of 
composition,  or  b)  the  extra  propositional  content  communicated  by  the 
author  of  the  metaphor,  over  and  above  what  it  says,  as  determined  by  a 
linguistic  theory  of  pragmatics. 
(A6)  An  account  of  m-meaning  which  identifies  it  with  the  extra  propositional 
content  communicated  by  the  author  of  the  metaphor,  over  and  above 
what  it  says,  as  determined  by  a  linguistic  theory  of  pragmatics,  provides 
an  unacceptably  incomplete  and  misleading  account  of  our  practices  of 
producing,  using  and  reflecting  on  metaphors. 
The  first  of  these  I  took  to  be  a  priori  defensible.  The  second,  (A2),  was  derivable  from 
two  more  fundamental  principles,  one  a  priori,  and  the  other  a  substantive  but  widely 
endorsed  anti-realist  principle  about  meaning  of  any  kind: 
(Warrant)  If  a  theory  is  crazy,  then  it  doesn't  give  warrant  to  beliefs  formed  on  the 
basis  of  it. 
(Epistemic  Access)  If  a  metaphor  m-means  that  P,  then  (in  somewhat  idealized 
conditions)  we  can  get  some  warrant  for  believing  that  it  m-means 
that  P. 
101 The  third  principle  was  defended  on  the  grounds  that  its  rejection  entailed  the  rejection 
of  independently  plausible  principles  governing  the  relationship  between  the  meanings 
of  sentences  and  those  of  their  parts,  such  as 
(Compositionality)  The  meaning  of  complex  linguistic  expressions  is  wholly 
determined  by  their  syntax,  together  with  the  meanings  of  their 
parts  (in  context).  For  example,  the  meaning  of  `dogs  bark' 
depends  on  the  meaning  of  `dogs  and  `barks',  and  the  manner  in 
which  they  are  syntactically  composed. 
The  fourth  was  defended  by  a  dilemma.  Either  supposed  metaphorical  senses  of  words 
are  compositional  or  they  are  not.  If  not,  then  they  are  not  genuinely  meaning-like.  If 
so,  then  their  distinctively  metaphorical  character  has  been  covertly  abandoned.  The 
defence  of  (A5)  had  a  similar  structure:  metaphorical  meanings  had  better  be  meaning- 
like,  so  if  they  are  not  explicable  in  terms  of  word-meanings  and  composition,  they  had 
better  be  suitably  related  to  some  more  general  theory  of  communication. 
I  took  it  that  the  arguments  offered  here  gave  us  some  reason  to  take  these  principles 
seriously.  Of  course,  prima  facie  plausibility  is  not  truth,  and  each  of  those  principles 
needs  considerably  more  in  the  way  of  defence  than  I  have  offered  here.  Some  of  this 
work  will  begin  in  the  next  chapter.  Nevertheless,  the  majority  of  the  remainder  of  this 
thesis  will  relate  to  the  most  controversial  principle,  (A6),  and  I  will  resume  discussion 
of  that  principle  in  the  final  two  chapters.  For  the  moment,  however,  I  turn  to  objections 
to  the  Davidsonian  account  outlined  here. 
102 3.  Replies,  Objections  and  Suggestions 
3.1  Introduction 
Davidson's  error  theory  has  rightly  commanded  a  lot  of  critical  attention  over  the  last 
twenty  five  years.  Each  component  of  that  theory  -  the  negative  case  for  semantic  and 
pragmatic  anti-realism  about  metaphor,  the  diagnosis  of  the  mistakes  that  led  theorists  to 
posit  metaphorical  meanings,  the  suggested  functional  replacement  -  has  been 
examined,  reformulated  and  criticised.  The  evaluation  of  the  theory  has  been  far  from 
uniformly  negative.  It  is  widely  recognized,  even  by  realists  about  metaphorical 
meaning,  that  the  `conventional  wisdom'  about  `discerning  two  senses  of  the  predicate 
term'  that  Beardsley  had  adverted  to  three  years  earlier,  was  shown  to  be  misguided  by 
the  considerations  that  Davidson  brought  to  bear.  120  Contemporary  recognition  of  the 
importance  of  elucidating  the  dependence  of  metaphorical  language  upon  its  literal  base, 
and  upon  its  context  of  utterance,  can  also  be  seen  to  have  resulted  from  sustained 
critical  engagement  with  Davidson's  article. 
Nevertheless,  and  unsurprisingly,  Davidson's  position  as  a  whole  has  not  commanded 
widespread  acceptance.  An  error  theory  of  whatever  stripe  is  typically  a  revisionary 
enterprise,  so  it  is  predictable  that  philosophers  have  been  interested  in  investigating 
whether  a  more  conservative  position,  consistent  with  the  genuine  insights  of  Davidson's 
argument,  might  enable  us  to  preserve  our  pre-theoretic  practice  of  ascribing  truth  and 
meaning  to  metaphors.  In  this  chapter,  I  will  outline  and  evaluate  some  influential 
objections  to  Davidson's  theses.  I  do  not  pretend  to  completeness;  there  are  no  doubt 
many  objections,  good,  bad  and  indifferent,  that  I  do  not  consider  here.  My  purpose  is  to 
rather  complement  and  reinforce  the  discussion  of  the  previous  chapter  by  addressing  a 
selection  of  the  concerns  that  the  Davidsonian  approach  regularly  provokes.  In 
particular,  I  will  concentrate  most  of  my  attention  on  worries  relating  to  the  adequacy  of 
an  error  theoretic  `functional  replacement'  for  talk  of  metaphorical  meaning. 
120  See  Beardsley  (1976) 
103 3.2  -  Complaints  about  the  `Causal  Theory' 
Davidson's  error  theoretic  approach  fails  to  provide  an  acceptable  functional 
replacement  for  our  pre-theoretic  talk  about  the  workings  of  metaphor.  His 
`Causal  Theory'  suggests  that  metaphors  work  by  brute  causation,  `nudging  us' 
into  noticing  similarities  in  a  way  that  might  just  as  well  be  brought  about  by  a  pill, 
or  a  bump  on  the  head.  But  that's  hopeless.  In  particular: 
1.  Such  an  account  ignores  the  fact  that  metaphors  are  produced  and 
interpreted  within  `the  space  of  reasons'.  Metaphors  can  be  misinterpreted, 
supported  by  evidence,  produced  for  reasons,  rejected  as  unwarranted  or 
false,  etc.  (Lycan,  Nogales)  121 
2.  Such  an  account  wantonly  ignores  the  fact  that  we  know  very  little  about 
each  other's  cognitive  architecture  and  subjective  associations,  and  thus  can 
hardly  be  expected  to  predict  the  causal  effects  of  producing  a  given 
metaphor. 
3.  Such  an  account  cannot  explain  why  the  syntax  of  metaphors  might  be 
important,  and  thus  cannot  account  for  the  clear  metaphorical  difference 
between  e.  g.  "Surgeons  are  butchers"  and  "Butchers  are  surgeons"  (Stern, 
Nogales).  122  Such  an  account  also  blurs  the  difference  between  metaphors 
and  strings  of  nonsense  syllables,  or  word-salads,  which  might  equally  well 
causally  bring  about  some  recognition  of  similarities,  etc.  (Lycan).  123 
Davidson  is  often  presented  as  endorsing  a  `Causal  Theory'  of  the  way  in  which 
metaphor  works  its  wonders,  albeit  one  that  is  only  sketchily  developed.  This  is  slightly 
misleading.  In  many  ways,  it  would  be  more  accurate  to  say  that  Davidson's  scattered 
121  See  Lycan  (1999)  p.  212,  Nogales  (1999)  p.  121 
122  Stern  (2000)  pp.  47-48,  Nogales  (1999)  p.  118 
123  Lycan  (1999)  p.  211 
104 remarks  on  the  subject  are  an  attempt  to  indicate  why  we  should  not  expect  to  have  any 
interesting  explanatory  theory  of  the  workings  of  metaphor.  It  is  true,  however,  that,  like 
many  error  theorists,  he  does  see  the  need  to  explain  how  what  is  genuinely  valuable 
about  our  practices  can  outlast  the  discovery  of  the  falsity  of  much  of  our  theorizing 
about  them.  The  nature  of  this  account  has,  however,  been  widely  misunderstood. 
We  began,  in  the  last  chapter,  to  investigate  the  source  of  the  error  that  Davidson  takes 
us  to  have  fallen  into  in  our  pre-theoretic  thought  about  metaphor.  A  misunderstanding 
of  the  nature  of  meaning  in  general  -  in  particular,  a  failure  to  give  proper  weight  to  the 
a  priori  connections  between  word-meaning  on  the  one  hand  and  principles  such  as 
(Compositionality)  and  (Warrant)  on  the  other  -  has  led  us  to  make  a  useless 
theoretical  posit,  a  cog  that  turns  out  to  be  driven  by  what  it  was  intended  to  drive. 
Getting  clearer  on  meaning  and  metaphor  is  supposed  to  let  us  see  that  to  the  extent  that 
systematic  enquiry  into  the  latter  is  possible,  its  place  is  external  to  linguistic  theory 
properly  so-called,  being  concerned  instead  with  the  realm  of  extra-linguistic  goals  and 
perlocutionary  effects. 
To  help  us  get  clearer  on  Davidson's  line  of  thought  here,  let  us  consider  two  analogous 
cases.  Firstly,  take  the  case  of  warnings.  A  warning  is  something  that  can  be  achieved 
without  recourse  to  natural  language.  For  example,  one  might  draw  a  picture  of  a  bull, 
and  leave  it  attached  to  a  suitable  fence.  Nevertheless,  it  is  clear  that  warnings  often  are 
expressed  linguistically,  and  that  when  they  are,  they  make  use  of  e.  g.  the  syntactic  and 
semantic  properties  of  language.  Consider  the  case  of  warning  somebody  that  a  bull  is 
in  the  field,  by  uttering  the  sentence  `there's  a  bull  in  that  field'.  Such  a  speech  act  can 
clearly  be  done  for  reasons,  often  very  good  ones  in  fact.  It  can  be  morally  and 
practically  evaluated,  and  one  can  be  held  to  account  for  performing  it  e.  g.  on  the  basis 
of  limited  or  irrelevant  evidence.  It  can  be  misinterpreted  by  the  unwary;  as  a  dare,  for 
example.  One's  purposes  in  so  acting  can  go  unrecognised,  remain  unfulfilled  or  be 
challenged.  Nobody  thinks  that  the  words  `bull'  or  `field'  change  their  meaning  in  the 
utterance,  and  implications  made  by  the  utterance  -  that  the  bull  is  dangerous,  for 
example  -  do  not  take  on  the  status  of  a  special  `warning  meaning'  of  the  utterance. 
Consider  also  the  case  of  speaking  pedantically.  When  one  speaks  pedantically  - 
"actually,  you  haven't  shown  that  asserting  the  consequent  is  invalid,  just  invalid  in  first 
105 order  logic  with  identity"  -  one  may  aim  to  bring  about  quite  definite  effects.  For 
example,  one  may  wish  to  prompt  one's  student  into  being  careful  not  to  confuse  logic 
as  a  whole  with  the  type  of  logic  we  teach  at  an  elementary  level.  Those  aims,  again, 
may  be  well-  or  ill-advised,  pursued  with  wilful  disregard  for  pedagogical  evidence,  etc. 
Nobody  thinks  that  the  words  `logic'  or  identity'  change  their  meaning  in  such 
utterances,  and  nobody  confuses  the  aim  of  the  utterance  with  what  is  conversationally 
implicated  by  one  who  makes  it.  Nor  does  anybody  think  that  it  is  a  particularly  sensible 
project  to  investigate  the  mechanism  by  which  warnings  and  pedantic  reminders  about 
logic  work  their  wonders.  (Apart  from  anything  else,  the  holism  of  evidence  means  that 
there  are  simply  too  many  ways  in  which  we  can  come  to  believe  that  e.  g.  somebody  is 
warning  us  of  something). 
A  Davidsonian  thinks  of  metaphor  in  similar  ways.  In  making  a  metaphor,  one  typically 
has  some  goal  or  purpose  in  mind.  Often,  the  point  of  a  metaphorical  utterance  is  to  get 
somebody  to  see  similarities  and  analogies  between  two  things,  or  two  situations.  Often, 
it  is  to  get  somebody  to  see  or  think  of  one  thing  as  another;  or  to  put  it  less 
conventionally,  if  just  as  obliquely,  to  think  of  one  thing  through  another.  This  goal  is 
typically  extra-linguistic  in  the  sense  that  it  is  often  something  that,  in  principle,  one 
could  achieve  without  using  natural  language.  The  purpose  with  which  a  metaphor  is 
made  can  be  evaluated,  rejected  or  endorsed,  and  the  means  chosen  to  achieve  that 
purpose  criticised  or  applauded.  People  may  fail  to  take  up  the  metaphor  in  the  intended 
sense,  or  may  respond  with  ridiculously  far-fetched  comments  and  elucidations. 
This  does  not  imply,  however,  that  we  should  assimilate  speaking  metaphorically  to  a 
distinctive  kind  of  speech  act.  Speaking  metaphorically  is  most  naturally  contrasted 
with  speaking  literally,  and  speaking  literally  is  not  a  distinctive  speech  act.  To  say 
something  literally  is  a  way  of  saying  something,  not  an  alternative  to  saying  something. 
The  same  is  true  of  making  metaphors,  although  if  Davidson  is  correct,  our  purpose  in 
making  metaphors  only  involves  communicating  a  particular  proposition  in  relatively 
atypical  cases.  Inviting  someone  to  see  philosophers  as  flies  trapped  in  fly-bottles  is 
something  that  could  be  done  in  a  number  of  ways,  only  some  of  them  linguistic; 
speaking  metaphorically  is  one  effective  way  to  do  it.  In  this  respect,  speaking 
metaphorically  is  more  like  the  practice  of  speaking  pedantically  than  that  of  giving 
warnings. 
106 Nevertheless,  it  ought  to  be  clear  that  such  acts  typically  take  place  within  the  `space  of 
reasons',  on  any  reasonable  understanding  of  that  enigmatic  phrase.  An  invitation  is 
something  that  can  be  offered  for  good  reasons  or  bad;  its  nature  and  purpose  can  be 
mistaken  and  misconstrued  in  a  variety  of  familiar  ways;  it  can  be  based  on  mistaken 
beliefs,  or  comprise  an  ineffective  route  to  its  goal.  A  Davidsonian  simply  need  not 
think  of  metaphors  as  brute  causal  prompts,  not  amenable  to  intentional  explanation,  and 
to  think  that  she  must  is  to  misread  Davidson's  remarks  on  the  topic. 
A  worry  might  remain  about  the  case  of  falsehood.  Surely,  we  can  often  reject 
metaphors,  deny  them,  etc,  in  ways  that  go  beyond  the  clash  of  purposes  here  expressed. 
I  will  deal  with  this  in  Section  3.3  below.  For  the  moment,  my  concern  has  been  to 
defuse  a  more  general  worry;  that  a  causal  account  of  metaphor  assimilates  it  to  brute 
psychological  promptings,  which  do  not  admit  of  explication  in  terms  of  reasons,  and 
whose  effects  it  unreasonable  to  expect  a  normal  producer  of  metaphor  to  predict.  I  take 
this  charge  to  be  misguided.  '24 
It  seems  to  be  this  misunderstanding  of  the  Davidsonian  account  that  underlies  the  final 
objection  outlined  above.  125  Stern  claims: 
... 
in  point  of  fact,  Davidson's  own  explanation  of  how  metaphor  works  does  not  appeal 
to  more  than  the  separate  literal  meanings  of  the  individual  words  in  the  sentence, 
ignoring  any  contribution  made  by  the  string  syntactically  or  semantically  structured  as 
a  sentence.  For  Davidson,  there  is  no  difference  between  a  metaphor  and  a  poem  like  T. 
S.  Eliot's  "The  Hippopotamus":  both  are  "devices  that  alert  us  to  aspects  of  the  world  by 
124  This  misreading  of  Davidson  seems  to  have  been  fostered  by  the  construal  of  his  account  offered  by 
Richard  Rorty.  See  in  particular  Rorty  (1991)  p.  167,  where  he  compares  metaphors  with  `anomalous 
non-linguistic  phenomena  like  platypuses  and  pulsars'  that  can  prompt  new  insights  in  a  wholly 
unpredictable  manner.  Much  of  what  Rorty  says  in  that  article  is  strictly  correct,  if  expressed  in  way 
which  is  likely  to  mislead,  but  some  of  it  seems  to  me  to  be  straightforwardly  incorrect.  For  example: 
"'live  metaphors  can  justify  belief  only  in  the  same  metaphorical  sense  in  which  one  may  `justify'  a  belief 
not  by  citing  another  belief,  but  by  using  a  non-sentence  to  stimulate  one's  interlocutor's  sense  organs"  p. 
169.  This  is  about  as  plausible  as  holding  that  my  recognition  of  the  fact  that  somebody  is  warning  me 
that  a  bull  is  in  the  field  cannot  justify  my  belief  that  a  dangerous  bull  is  in  the  field. 
125  Or  at  least,  if  it  is  not  this,  the  objections  seems  to  me  to  be  wholly  unmotivated. 
107 inviting  us  to  make  comparisons.  "  But  Eliot's  poem  works  simply  by  the  alternating 
presentation  or  display  -  the  brute  juxtaposition,  as  it  were  -  of  stanzas  or  clauses 
referring  to  hippopotami  and  the  Church.  Likewise,  Davidson  would  have  us  believe 
that  metaphor  works  simply  by  way  of  the  linear  sequence  of  literal  meanings  of  the 
individual  words  of  the  utterance,  regardless  of  its  sentential  syntax.  '26 
Like  many  commentaries  on  Davidson's  position,  this  is  uncharitable  and  implausible  in 
the  extreme.  A  disaffected  teenager  who  asserts  that  all  politicians  are  the  same  is  not 
thereby  credited  with  believing  that  they  resemble  each  other  in  every  respect. 
Similarly,  even  if  Davidson  had  said  there  is  `no  difference'  between  the  way  metaphors 
work  and  the  way  that  poems  like  Eliot's  work  -  which  he  didn't  -  he  might  be 
reasonably  be  taken  to  mean,  given  the  immediate  context,  that  they  are  both  things  that 
can  alert  us  to  similarities  in  the  world  without  requiring  special  meaning-shifts.  127  He 
would  not  have  thereby  committed  himself  to  regarding  them  as  equivalent  in  every 
respect.  In  particular,  he  need  not  hold  that  it  is  simply  the  `brute  juxtaposition'  of  the 
terms  in  the  metaphorical  sentence  that  `brutely  causes'  the  perception  of  certain 
similarities  to  spring  to  our  minds.  When  dealing  with  the  complexity  and  efficacy  of 
our  norm-governed  practices,  he  can  easily  afford  to  be  far  less  brutish  than  that,  without 
giving  up  on  his  basic  claim,  that  we  have  mistakenly  assigned  to  metaphorical  meaning 
what  belongs  to  the  realm  of  perlocutionary  effect. 
If  Davidson's  account  relied  on  treating  the  sentences  used  in  metaphor  as  unstructured 
strings  of  words  or  sounds,  which  then  served  to  prompt  comparisons  between  two 
subjects,  then  he  would  be  vulnerable  to  the  Surgeons/Butchers  objection,  and  to  the 
worry  that  he  cannot  distinguish  the  case.  of  metaphor  from  that  of  nonsensical  strings. 
But  it  doesn't.  For  all  Stem  has  shown,  a  Davidsonian  can  perfectly  well  hold  that  quite 
complex  syntactic,  semantic  and  pragmatic  properties  of  sentences  play  a  practically. 
126  Stern  (2000)  p.  47-48 
127  Davidson  (1984a)  p.  256  comments  on  the  poem  as  follows.  "Here  we  are  neither  told  that  the  Church 
resembles  a  hippopotamus  (as  in  simile)  or  bullied  into  making  this  comparison  (as  in  metaphor),  but  there 
can  be  no  doubt  the  words  are  being  used  to  direct  our  attention  to  similarities  between  the  two.  Nor 
should  there  be  much  inclination,  in  this  case,  to  posit  figurative  meanings,  for  in  what  words  or  sentences 
would  we  lodge  them?  " 
108 essential  role  in  bringing  about  the  intended  perlocutionary  effects.  128  1  take  Davidson  to 
be  a  Davidsonian  in  this  regard. 
3.3  Metaphor  and  Context 
1.  Davidson  argues  that  the  context-dependence  of  metaphor  is  inconsistent 
with  semantic  or  pragmatic  realism  about  m-meanings.  But  literal  language 
is  equally  context  dependent.  Therefore,  Davidson  is  either  confused, 
inconsistent,  or  making  an  ad  hoc  ideological  exception.  (Kittay,  Denham)  129 
2.  The  suggested  defence  of  (A3)  and  (A4)  ignore  the  possibility  of  treating 
metaphors  as  analogous  to  indexical  and  demonstrative  utterances. 
(Stern)  130 
3.  The  suggested  defence  of  (A3)  and  (A4)  ignore  the  possibility  of 
metaphorical  meaning  resulting  from  primary  pragmatic  processes  (Sag, 
Recanati)131,132 
Davidson's  famously  compressed  style  of  argument  arguably  reaches  its  apotheosis  in 
the  following  much-cited  passage 
Once  we  understand  a  metaphor  we  can  call  what  we  grasp  the  `metaphorical  truth'  and 
(up  to  a  point)  say  what  the  `metaphorical  meaning'  is.  But  simply  to  lodge  this  meaning 
in  metaphor  is  like  explaining  why  a  pill  puts  you  to  sleep  by  saying  it  has  a  dormative 
power.  Literal  meaning  and  literal  truth-conditions  can  be  assigned  to  words  and 
128  The  above  quotation  from  Stern's  immediately  follows  discussion  of  an  objection  of  White's  and 
Margalit's  to  the  effect  that  metaphors  taken  literally  are  often  nonsensical.  Stern  may  think  that  the 
suggested  feature  of  Davidson's  account  enables  him  to  sidestep  this  latter  objection,  but  if  so,  it's  clearly 
a  poisoned  chalice.  I  discuss  the  White/Margalit  objection  below,  in  section  3.3 
129  Denham  (2000)  pp.  262-263 
130  Stern  (2000)  passim. 
131  Recanati  (1993)  p.  263-264 
132  Sag(1981)p.  264 
109 sentences  apart  from  particular  contexts  of  use.  This  is  why  adverting  to  them  has 
genuine  explanatory  power. 
133 
I  have  already  made  some  suggestions  regarding  how  I  think  we  should  understand 
Davidson's  point  here  (in  Section  2.6.  above),  which  I  will  not  recapitulate  here. 
However,  given  that  misunderstandings  of  the  sense  in  which  Davidson  views  the  literal 
as  essentially  context-independent  are  still  fairly  commonplace,  it  may  be  worth  making 
some  brief  remarks.  Thankfully,  a  useful  set  of  distinctions  has  recently  been  articulated 
by  Josef  Stem,  that  serve  to  address  the  Kittay/Denham  mistake  succinctly.  Let  us 
distinguish  three  types  of  context  dependence;  presemantic,  semantic  and  post-semantic. 
Pre-semantic  context  dependence  springs  from  the  fact  that  in  interpreting  a  linguistic 
act  as  involving  the  utterance  of  some  sentence-type,  we  are  forced  to  draw  on  a 
substantial  number  of  rich  and  detailed  contextual  cues  and  clues.  Stem  gives  an 
apposite  example: 
I  hear  the  sound  pattern  T.  Even  knowing  that  the  speaker  is  speaking  English,  I  must 
decide  whether  what  I  heard  was  the  first  person  indexical  `I'  or  the  common  noun  `eye' 
or  the  affirmative  `aye'  or  the  groan  `ai'.  In  making  this  judgement,  we  rely  on  all  sorts 
of  contextual  cues  -  the  appropriateness  of  the  alternative  types  within  the  immediate 
string  and  then  within  the  larger  discourse,  our  beliefs  about  the  speaker  and  his 
intentions,  and  so  on. 
134 
The  fact  that  both  metaphorical  and  literal  speech  are  context  dependent  in  this  sense 
does  not,  clearly,  invalidate  Davidson's  argument.  For  it  is  surely  common  ground  that 
understanding  what  is  being  said  in  this  sense  requires  contextual  information. 
A  sentence-type  S  is  semantically  context-dependent  just  in  case  an  utterance  of  S  only 
expresses  a  propositional  content  after  its  indexical  and  demonstrative  parts  are  assigned 
determinate  semantic  values  by  context.  Thus  "That  is  a  hat"  is  intuitively  semantically 
context-dependent,  and  "The  largest  terrestrial  sea  is  wet"  is  not.  Stem  accommodates 
the  context-dependence  of  metaphor  by  assimilating  it  to  a  form  of  semantic  context- 
dependence.  But  Kittay  and  Denham  do  not  endorse  such  a  view,  and  this  is  not  the 
133  Davidson  (1984a)  p.  247 
134  Stern  (2000)  p.  42 
110 significance  of  their  claim  that  the  metaphorical  is  on  a  par  with  the  literal  with  respect 
to  degree  of  context-dependence. 
The  relevant  conception  required  for  Davidson's  point  is  post-semantic  context- 
dependence.  Imagine  that  we  have  assigned  a  propositional  content  to  S,  by  resolving 
pre-semantic  contextual  alternatives  in  order  to  identify  literal  word-meanings  and  mode 
of  composition,  and  then  filling  in  any  indexical  `gaps'  with  relevant  semantic  values. 
Call  this  the  first  meaning  of  the  utterance.  Then 
...  that  utterance  may  then  be  used  for  an  indefinite  number  of  extra-linguistic  ulterior 
purposes  or  intentions:  to  warn,  promise,  deceive  or  threaten.  Which  of  these  secondary 
intentions  is  realized  also  depends  on  the  context  -  the  speaker's  and  interpreter's 
mutual  beliefs,  intentions  and  expectations.  Yet,  whichever  further  intention  is 
attributed  to  the  speaker,  and  however  the  utterance  is  used,  its  first  meaning  remains, 
indifferently 
,  as  the  first  of  the  means  to  these  ends.  Hence  the  first  meaning  is  the 
meaning  it  has  on  all  its  uses  or,  more  accurately,  regardless  of  how  it  is  so  used.  135 
Literal  meaning  and  metaphorical  meaning,  as  conceived  of  by  e.  g.  Richards  and 
Beardsley,  clearly  differ  with  respect  to  this  property  of  indifference.  M-meaning, 
thought  of  as  a  new  sense  of  the  predicate  term,  varied  from  context  to  context, 
unpredictably,  and  in  a  way  that  could  only  be  read  back  into  the  metaphor  by  somebody 
who  had  already  grasped  its  impact.  In  the  case  of  literal  word  meaning,  in  contrast,  a 
predictable  and  systematic  contribution  is  made  to  a  whole  range  of  utterances,  across  a 
whole  range  of  contexts.  Davidson's  point  -  and  this  ought  surely  to  have  been  clear  - 
simply  could  not  have  been  that  literal  sentences  were  in  no  sense  dependent  on  context. 
That  would  have  been  crazy.  Rather,  it  was  that  m-meanings  were  sensitive  to  both 
local  linguistic  context  and  broader,  post-semantic  purpose,  while  meanings  proper  are 
not. 
That  said,  more  sophisticated  theorists,  like  Stern,  Recanati  and  Sag,  have  argued  for  a 
variety  of  conceptions  of  the  dependence  of  metaphor  on  context  that  makes  more 
trouble  for  the  Davidsonian.  For  Stern,  sentences  like  `Juliet  is  the  sun'  when  used 
metaphorically,  have  a  hidden  indexical  element,  making  them  semantically  context- 
135  Stern  (2000)  p.  43 
111 dependent.  For  rich  pragmatists,  the  proposition  directly  expressed  by  a  sentence  is  not 
its  first  meaning,  as  defined  above,  but  rather  some  related  proposition,  which  the 
pragmatic  context  of  utterance  helps  determine.  136  I  do  not  have  space  to  investigate 
either  of  these  theories  in  depth  here,  and  they  must  remain  as  standing  and  sophisticated 
challenges  to  any  error-theoretic  project.  However,  I  will  make  the  following  few 
remarks  with  regard  to  Stern's  theory. 
Stern's  idea  is  that  e.  g.  a  sentence  like 
a)  Grey  trees  whose  lungs  had  filled  up  with  winter 
suddenly  exhaled  a  breath  of  leaves 
does  not  have  the  semantic  and  syntactic  structure  that  it  appears  to,  but  rather 
something  like 
b)  Grey  trees  whose  Mthat  <lungs  had  filled  up>  with  winter 
suddenly  Mthat  <exhaled>  a  breath  of  leaves. 
Stern's  outline  and  defence  of  the  Mthat  operator  is  fairly  complicated,  and  I  cannot 
explore  its  intricacies  here.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  it  is  an  operator,  somewhat  analogous 
to  Kaplan's  Dthat,  137  which  converts  a  literal  expression  into  a  metaphorical  expression, 
whose  contribution  to  the  truth-conditions  of  the  whole  sentence  varies  from  context  to 
context.  Thus,  while  the  context  of  (b)  assigns  `Mthat  <exhaled>'  one  set  of  properties, 
the  treatment  of  (c)-(e)  as  metaphorical  expressions  will  assign  it  different  ones. 
136  As  well  as  the  reference  cited  above,  see  e.  g.  Bezuidenhout  (2001)  for  a  defence  of  this  type  of 
position. 
137  See  Stern  (2000),  passim,  for  a  thorough  introduction  to  and  defence  of  the  mysteries  of  the  Mthat 
operator.  Some  significant  differences  from  Kaplan  include  (1)  the  fact  that  whereas  Dthat  attaches  to 
descriptive  expressions  to  form  directly  referential  terms,  Mthat's  paradigmatic  use  involves  attaching  to 
predicates  to  form  new,  context  sensitive  predicative  terms  (2)  that  whereas  the  character  of  a  Dthat 
expression  is  a  function  from  contexts  to  individuals,  the  character  of  an  Mthat  expression  is  a  function 
from  sets  of  pragmatic  presuppositions  to  sets  of  properties  (3)  that  whereas  Dthat  requires  some  form  of 
demonstration,  Mthat  does  not,  being  parametric,  like  genuine  indexicals  (`I',  `now',  etc). 
112 c)  The  city  languidly  exhaled  the  vapour  that  it  had  breathed  in  from  the  clouds. 
d)  Wittgenstein  exhaled  philosophy. 
e)  This  was  Clinton;  he  exhaled,  while  never  apparently  inhaling. 
In  each  of  (b)-(e),  some  distinct  set  of  properties  is  determined  as  the  semantic  value  of 
the  metaphorical  component  `Mthat<exhaled>'.  These  properties  are  determined,  as  in 
the  case  of  pure  indexicals  like  `I'  and  `now',  by  a  general  semantic  rule,  namely,  that 
the  properties  in  question  are  those  ni-associated  with  `exhaled'  in  the  relevant  context. 
How  a  property  gets  to  be  m-associated  with  a  given  expression  in  context  is  a  pragmatic 
matter,  rather  unclear  in  detail,  but  Stern  makes  some  more  general  suggestions.  The 
key  point  is  that  Stem  takes  himself  to  have  offered  a  broadly  semantic  model,  similar  to 
those  applied  in  the  case  of  indexicals  and  demonstratives,  which  can  be  used  to  model 
competence  with  metaphor.  When  one  understands  a  metaphor,  one  (a)  maps  the  literal 
string  onto  a  string  containing  a  Mthat  operator  (b)  identifies  the  set  of  properties  that 
the  expression  within  the  scope  of  the  operator  is  pragmatically  presupposed  to  be 
associated  with  in  context  and  (c)  substitutes  those  properties  for  those  of  the 
corresponding  literal  predicate.  138  Of  course,  to  the  sceptic,  it  will  look  as  if  all  Stern  has 
done  is  to  defer  all  the  difficulties  attendant  on  explaining  metaphor's  relationship  to 
context  to  a  pragmatic  `theory',  thereby  allowing  himself  a  simple  semantics. 
Nevertheless,  the  position  is  a  serious  challenge  to  the  Davidsonian,  and  deserves  to  be 
taken  seriously. 
I  will  content  myself  with  the  following  observation.  Stem  apparently  thinks  of  Mthat 
as  expressing  an  tacitly  known  rule,  which  is  `psychologically  real'  in  the  sense  of  being 
represented  in  some  mental  lexicon.  139  He  explicitly  defends  the  idea  that  nobody  who 
failed  to  master  such  a  rule  could  count  as  genuinely  understanding  or  making 
metaphors.  He  says: 
Metaphorical  competence  involves  mastery  of  a  general  skill  that  one  can  apply  to 
arbitrary  expressions  across  the  language.  More  theoretically,  metaphorical  competence 
consists  in  knowledge  of  a  schematic  rule  that  applies  to  all  expressions  that  admit  a 
metaphorical  interpretation.  This  schematic  rule  governs  the  characters  of  all 
138  Stern  gives  a  different  but  related  account  for  nominative  metaphors,  etc.  See  Stern  (2000)  p.  225-229 
139  See  Stern  (2000)  p.  198-205 
113 metaphorical  expressions  of  the  type  `Mthat  [CD]',  for  each  substitution  instance  of  (D. 
The  metaphorically  competent  speaker  knows  how  to  generate  metaphorical  expressions 
given  her  knowledge  of  the  expressions  (1)  to  be  interpreted  metaphorically...  . 
Either  one 
knows  this  schematic  rule  and  has  the  general  skill  or  one  doesn't.  It  makes  no  sense  to 
say  that  one  could  know  this  rule,  or  have  this  skill,  for  some  expressions  but  not  for 
others.  140 
There  are  two  key  points  here.  Firstly,  it  only  manages  to  seem  even  remotely  plausible 
that  a  single  rule  is  involved  in  interpreting  all  metaphors  because  Stem  has  kicked  all 
the  difficult  work  -  of  saying  what  determines  which  properties  are  m-associated  with 
each  given  J,  and  how  we  recognise  this  -  into  the  pragmatics.  Secondly,  Stem's  claim 
seems  to  run  into  trouble  with  a  test  for  semantic  commitment  that  Kripke  famously 
suggested  we  apply  in  the  case  of  Donnellan-type  objections  to  Russellian  theories  of 
definite  descriptions.  141  Stem's  theory  clearly  differs  from  the  Davidsonian  account 
with  regard  to  the  question  of  whether  English  contains  a  special 
indexical/demonstrative  rule  of  metaphor.  How  are  we  to  decide  who  is  correct? 
Following  Kripke's  suggestion,  we  might  consider  a  hypothetical  language,  which  is  as 
like  English  as  possible,  except  that  it  is  stipulated  not  to  contain  a  psychologically  real 
Mthat  operator.  In  such  a  language,  would  people  still  formulate  and  understand 
metaphors  in  much  the  way  that  they  actually  do?  If  so,  then  there  seems  to  be  little 
need  to  posit  such  an  operator,  since  it  seems  designed  to  explain  the  emergence  of  a 
phenomenon  that  would  equally  arise  in  its  absence.  As  Kripke  asks,  why  posit  a 
semantic  ambiguity  that  is  "insufficient  in  general,  and  superfluous  for  the  special  case  it 
seeks  to  explain"?  142 
It  is  rather  difficult  to  apply  this  test  with  any  certainty,  given  the  obscurities  about  what 
determines  which  properties  are  m-associated  with  expressions,  but  the  overwhelming 
tendency  is  surely  to  affirm  that  the  phenomena  would  arise  in  any  case.  Even  if  we  had 
not  mastered  a  rule  that  mapped  literal  predicates  onto  sets  of  metaphorically  apt 
properties,  we  could  surely  still  come  to  see  what  somebody  was  getting  at  by  means  of 
a  peculiar  form  of  words.  Indeed,  given  that  there  doesn't  seem  to  be  anything 
140  Stern  (2000)  p.  198 
'41  Kripke  (1979)  pp.  85-91 
142  Ibid  p.  88 
114 distinctively  linguistic  about  thinking  of  one  thing  as  another  -I  can  have  a  sudden 
sense  of  the  childish  or  animalistic  character  of  a  companion,  without  employing  any 
expressions  of  natural  language  -  it  would  be  wholly  surprising  if  the  absence  of  such  a 
rule  prohibited  metaphoric  thought.  Stern  does  tell  us  that  the  properties  which  are  m- 
associated  with  an  expression  ct  in  a  context  C  are  pragmatically  presupposed  to  be 
associated  with  (D  in  C,  in  the  following  sense: 
(P1*)  Speaker  S  presupposes  a  proposition  p  in  a  context  c  by  uttering  the 
sentence  s  iff  (1)  S  represents  herself  as  believing  that  p;  (2)  S  represents 
herself  as  believing  that  the  other  members  of  c  represent  themselves  as 
believing  that  p;  and  (3)  S  represents  herself  as  believing  that  the  other 
members  of  c  recognize  that  she,  S,  represents  herself  as  believing  that  p 
from  her  utterance  of  s.  143 
But  since  Mthat  only  works  when  such  presuppositions  are  identified,  it  seems  that  Stern 
can  give  no  account  of  metaphorical  thought  in  the  absence  of  conversation.  This  is bad 
enough,  but  devastating  in  the  context  of  Kripke's  test.  For  since,  in  a  community  that 
lacked  mastery  of  Mthat,  speakers  could  presumably  still  articulate  such  thought,  and 
hearers  latch  on  to  the  fact  that  they  were  doing  so,  it  seems  that  metaphorical  practice 
could  carry  on  much  as  it  actually  does.  And  that  simply  signals  the  uselessness  of  the 
appeal  to  Mthat  in  getting  to  the  heart  of  metaphorical  competence. 
3.4  Metaphor  and  Other  Linguistic  Phenomena 
Davidson's  error-theoretical  approach  makes  a  mystery  of  some  incontrovertible 
linguistic  data  related  to  metaphor.  This  undermines  the  claim  to  have  provided  a 
suitable  functional  replacement  for  ascriptions  of  metaphorical  meaning.  In 
particular 
143  On  the  basis  of  this  root  definition,  Stern  goes  on  to  define  what  it  is  for  a  sentence  and  an  utterance  to 
presuppose  a  proposition,  and  defines  Mthat  with  respect  to  the  latter.  But  this  makes  no  difference  to  the 
point  made  above.  See  Stern  (2000)  p.  122-123  for  details. 
115 (1)  Error  theory  about  metaphorical  meaning  cannot  account  for  the  behaviour 
of  metaphors  which  are  embedded  in  non-assertoric  contexts.  (Cohen,  Stern, 
Moran).  '44 
(2)  Syntactic  facts  about  metaphor  demand  the  positing  of  metaphorical 
meanings  which  are  independent  of  speaker  intentions.  (Stern).  145 
(3)  Such  an  account  is  committed  to  treating  metaphorical  sentences  as  false 
when  they  are  taken  literally,  when  in  fact  many  are  neither  true  or  false, 
but  rather  semantically  anomalous  (White,  Margalit  and  Goldblum,  Stern). 
146,147,148 
The  Frege-Geach  problem  -  the  demand  for  an  explanation  of  how  utterances  that  lack 
cognitive  content  can  embed  in  non-assertoric  linguistic  contexts,  such  as  negated  or 
conditional  sentences  -  has  been  a  deep  and  painful  thorn  in  the  side  of  expressivist 
accounts  of  e.  g.  morality,  modality  and  aesthetics.  At  first  glance,  it  is  difficult  to  see 
why  anybody  would  think  that  it  was  a  problem  for  error-theorists,  however.  After  all, 
the  error-theorist  diverges  from  the  expressivist  precisely  in  allowing  the  kind  of 
straightforwardly  truth-conditional  treatment  of  such  contexts  that  the  realist  herself 
proposes. 
Things  are  interestingly  more  complicated  than  that  in  the  case  of  metaphor,  and  realism 
about  meaning  more  generally.  An  error  theorist  about  meaning  in  general  cannot,  it 
would  seem,  help  herself  to  the  above  explanation  of  the  semantic  nature  of  non- 
assertoric  contexts,  for  the  simple  reason  that  by  she  will,  by  definition,  reject  such 
explanations  as  erroneous,  given  the  plausible  assumption  that  a  sentence  cannot  be  apt 
144  Cohen  (1993)  passim,  Stern  (2000)  p  69-71,  Moran  (1997)  p.  260 
145  Stern  (2000)  p.  69 
146  White  (1996)  pp.  204-226 
147  Stern  (2000)  p.  47 
148  Margalit  and  Goldblum  (1994)  pp.  234-237 
116 for  truth  if  it  does  not  say  anything.  149  Assume  that  a  theorist  holds  that  we  are  wrong  to 
assert  any  claims  like 
(*)  `Snow  is  white'  says  that  snow  is  white. 
perhaps  because  they  see  semantic  talk  as  a  regrettable  hangover  of  a  scientifically 
dubious  folk  theory.  150  Given  that  all  sentences  like  (*)  are  false,  it  seems  that  `snow  is 
white'  does  not  say  anything,  and  is  thus  neither  true  or  false,  given  the  assumption  that 
truth-aptitude  requires  content.  We  therefore  cannot  use  the  standard  truth-conditional 
explanation  of  the  way  in  which  the  meaning  of 
(**)  If  snow  is  white  then  it  is  coloured. 
depends  on  the  meaning  of  its  parts,  since  that  explanation  relies  on  the  antecedent 
sentence  having  a  truth  value.  151  An  error  theorist  about  the  metadiscourse,  who  holds 
most  of  our  claims  about  semantic  talk  is  false,  may  thus  also  end  up  struggling  to 
account  for  linguistic  practice  in  first-order  discourses.  152 
A  similar  phenomenon  is  alleged  to  occur  in  the  case  of  metaphorical  meaning. 
Stipulate  that  metaphors  don't  express  (distinctively  metaphorical)  propositional 
contents,  whether  semantically  or  pragmatically  construed.  The  question  then  becomes 
how  we  should  understand  linguistic  contexts  like 
149  I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  every  form  or  degree  of  anti-realism  about  meaning  entails  rejection  of  a 
truth-conditional  explanation  of  negation  and  conditionals.  A  minimalist  about  meaning  might  give  such  a 
truth-conditional  account,  but  characterise  truth  as  superassertibility.  Wright's  response-dependent 
account  of  meaning  can  also  endorse  a  truth-conditional  explanation.  (See  e.  g.  Wright  (1987),  (1989a-c)). 
I  discuss  Wright's  account,  and  its  relevance  to  the  case  of  metaphor,  in  the  next  chapter. 
150  Such  a  theory  would  be  analogous  to  the  eliminativism  about  `folk  psychology'  notoriously  defended 
by  the  Churchlands. 
151  I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  such  a  semantic  error  theorist  is  likely  to  see  this  failing  as  causing  any 
further  problems  not  already  inherent  in  the  position. 
152  This  type  of  phenomenon  provides  another  reason  to  substitute  the  type  of  `rush  for  coherence'  adopted 
in  chapter  1  for  Wright's  `burden  of  proof  on  the  realist'  approach.  The  a  priori  links  between  different 
discourses  where  realism  is  an  issue  means  that  it  is  implausible  to  treat  them  as  a  series  of  isolated 
debates,  with  realism  always  on  the  back  foot. 
117 (M1)  It's  just  not  the  case  that,  as  the  Wittgensteinian  quietists  seem  to  think, 
philosophy  is  just  getting  flies  out  of  fly  bottles. 
(M2)  If  the  garden  was  a  slum  of  bloom,  then  it  could  hardly  have  been  winter  that 
Stevens  was  writing  about  in  `Banal  Sojourn' 
It  is  clear,  firstly,  that  the  immediate  problem  faced  by  the  error  theory  about  meaning  in 
general  can  be  avoided.  Because  metaphorical  utterances  are  typically  straightforwardly 
false,  and  thus  truth-valued,  when  taken  literally,  there  is  space  for  a  truth-conditional 
account  of  non-assertoric  contexts.  Unlike  the  crude  expressivist  about  moral  sentences, 
or  the  global  irrealist  about  meaning,  the  Davidsonian  can  appeal  to  the  literal  content  of 
metaphors  to  explain  why  they  can  imbed  in  more  complex  sentences  at  all. 
The  Davidsonian  isn't  quite  off  the  hook,  however.  The  deeper  challenge  is  to  give  an 
account  of  what  is  going  on  when  we  react  to  metaphors  by  apparently  negating  them,  or 
making  conditional  inferences  from  them,  or  reporting  beliefs  concerning  them.  The 
realist  about  metaphorical  meaning  has  a  relatively  straightforward  account.  For  the 
semantic  realist,  the  metaphorical  sentence  comes  to  express  a  new  proposition,  distinct 
from  the  literal,  which  can  then  be  negated,  conditionalised,  feature  in  belief  reports,  etc. 
For  the  pragmatic  realist,  the  implicated  proposition  is  available  to  play  a  similar  role. 
Assume  that  someone  asserts 
(a)  Susan  has  two  children 
thereby  implicating 
(b)  Susan  has  exactly  two  children 
The  following  seem  perfectly  normal  responses  to  (a) 
(c)  No,  she  has  three  children 
(d)  Well  if  she  has  two  children,  we'll  only  need  two  presents. 
118 (e)  You  may  believe  that  she  has  two  children,  but  I  think  you're  wrong  -  I'm  sure 
she  has  three. 
In  each  case,  however,  it  is  the  implicated  proposition,  and  not  the  proposition  which  is 
literally  expressed,  that  is  negated,  conditionalized,  etc.  (Or  at  least,  if  there  is  a  more 
general  problem  here  about  how  merely  implicated  propositions  can  apparently  be 
negated,  etc,  the  speaker-meaning  theory  of  metaphor  has  only  one  problem  to  solve. 
The  Davidsonian  apparently  has  two:  how  negation  can  govern  implied  rather  than 
expressed  propositions,  and  how  negation  can  govern  metaphors  when  no  proposition  is 
implicated.  ) 
The  problem  is  not  one  that  the  Davidsonian  can  duck.  Responses  like  (M1)  and  (M2) 
are'completely  central  and  everyday  aspects  of  our  dealings  with  metaphor.  Any  attempt 
to  write  them  off  as  the  result  of  an  unfortunate  mythology  of  meaning  would  entail  that 
the  error-theoretic  position  was  radically  revisionary  of  our  practice,  so  that  it  would 
require  significantly  more  in  the  way  of  detailed  argument  than  has  been  offered  to'date. 
Let  us  return  to  the  case  of  warnings.  If,  in  response  to  your  warning  about  the  bull  in 
the  field,  I  reply  with  any  of  the  following 
(i)  If  the  bull's  in  the  field,  we  had  better  walk  around  the  long  way 
(ii)  It  might  be  in  the  field,  or  it  might  be  penned  in  there  at  the  back. 
(iii)  Yes,  I  had  thought  that  it  would  be. 
the  force  of  your  utterance  is  not  preserved  in  the  new  contexts.  Similarly,  although,  on 
the  Davidsonian  account,  Wittgenstein  and  Stevens  may  have  put  forward  their 
metaphors  as  a  means  of  encouraging  us  to  see  the  end  of  philosophy  as  escape,  or 
flowers  as  slum-dwellers,  the  illocutionary  force  of  such  speech  acts  is  presumably  not 
preserved  in  (M1)  and  (M2).  So  what  is  going  on  in  those  cases? 
The  problem  is  a  difficult  one,  and  it  is  not  an  issue  that  I  have  resolved  to  my  own 
satisfaction.  But  there  is  perhaps  room  for  Davidsonian  to  take  something  like  the 
following  line.  Although  the  illocutionary  force  of  a  warning,  or  an  invitation,  might  not 
survive  into  non-asserted  contexts,  pedantry  and  literality  certainly  can 
119 (iv)  John  hasn't  submitted  a  list  of  his  research  publications,  but  rather  a  list  of  his 
publications  along  with  those  of  his  articles  that  have  been  accepted  for 
publication  but  have  not  yet  appeared. 
(v)  If  John  hadn't  submitted  a  list  of  his  research  publications,  but  rather  a  list  of  his 
publications  along  with  those  of  his  articles  that  have  been  accepted  for 
publication  but  have  not  yet  appeared,  then  we  must  point  it  out  to  him. 
(vi)  John  -  and  I'm  speaking  literally  here  -  researches  the  sex  life  of  pot  plants. 
(vii)  She  had  a  sudden  insight  into  university  life  when  she  realised  that  John  -  and 
I'm  speaking  literally  here  -  researches  the  sex  life  of  pot  plants. 
Illocutionary  force  might  not  hold  up  well  under  embedding,  but  ways  of  speaking 
certainly  do.  In  a  similar  vein,  I  don't  think  that  it  is  unreasonable  to  construe 
(Ml)  It's  just  not  the  case  that,  as  the  Wittgensteinian  quietists  seem  to  think, 
philosophy  is  just  getting  flies  out  of  fly  bottles. 
(M2)  If  the  garden  was  a  slum  of  bloom,  then  it  could  hardly  have  been  winter  that 
Stevens  was  writing  about  in  `Banal  Sojourn' 
as 
(M3)  It's  just  not  the  case  that,  as  the  Wittgensteinian  quietists  seem  to  think, 
philosophy  is  just  -  to  put  it  metaphorically  -  getting  flies  out  of  fly  bottles. 
(M4)  If  the  garden  was  indeed  -  as  in  Stevens'  metaphor  -a  slum  of  bloom,  then  it 
could  hardly  have  been  winter  that  Stevens  was  writing  about  in  `Banal  Sojourn' 
How  do  this  help?  The  basic  'problem,  remember,  was  not  to  account  for  how 
metaphorical  utterances  can  embed  in  logical  and  propositional  attitude  contexts,  but  to 
give  an  account  of  what  is  going  on  when  we  do  so.  The  first  step  that  might  be  made 
here  is  to  hold  that  such  a  treatment  of  (M1)  and  (M2),  taking  them  to  be  saying 
implicitly  what  their  counterpart  utterances  say  explicitly,  makes  space  for  thinking  of 
their  component  sentences  as  governed  by  some  kind  of  modifying  operator,  qualifier  or 
120 marker.  '53  Our  mutual  recognition  that  such  an  element  was,  in  some  sense,  modifying 
the  component  sentences,  might  help  to  explain  why  we  react  to  such  utterances  in  a 
fairly  structured  and  predictable  way.  The  problem  now  is  to  see  how  appeal  to  such  an 
modifier  can  avoid  surrendering  the  error-theoretic  character  of  Davidson's  account. 
For  example,  imagine  that,  with  Stern,  we  think  of  the  relevant  sentence  as  governed  by 
an  Mthat  operator.  Such  an  operator,  remember,  converts  a  literal  expression  -  "getting 
flies  out  of  fly  bottles"  -  into  a  metaphorical  expression,  whose  contribution  to  the  truth- 
conditions  of  the  whole  sentence  varies  from  context  to  context,  in  somewhat  the  way 
that  Kaplan's  Dthat  operator  does.  Then  we  have  e.  g.  (M1)  and  (M3)  modelled  by 
(M5)  It's  just  not  the  case  that,  as  the  Wittgensteinian  quietists  seem  to  think, 
philosophy  is  just  Mthat  (getting  flies  out  of  fly  bottles). 
Since  "Mthat  (getting  flies  out  of  fly  bottles)"  is  alleged  to  determine  the  same  truth- 
conditional  contribution,  in  our  present  context,  as  e.  g.  "dissolving  persistent  and 
frustratingly  complex  conceptual  problems  that  impede  our  progress  through  life,  and 
prevent  our  living  in  a  fulfilling  manner",  we  seem  to  have  surrendered  our  anti-realism 
about  metaphorical  meaning  completely.  Employing  an  operator  like  Mthat  -  which  is 
essentially  just  a  way  of  mapping  old  expressions  onto  new  metaphorical  senses,  in  a 
context-dependent  manner  -  entails  adopting  realism  about  metaphorical  meanings.  So 
a  Davidsonian  has  to  steer  a  careful  course.  He  has  to  give  an  account  of  what  is  going 
on  in  when  we  embed  metaphors,  while  preserving  a  suitably  anti-realist  account.  What 
is  at  issue,  in  effect,  is  Davidson's  right  to  subscribe  to  the  final  of  his  key  theses, 
discussion  of  which  I  delayed  to  this  chapter: 
(D4)  Previous  influential  theories  of  metaphor  falsely  subscribed  to  doctrines  thatwere 
inconsistent  with  (D1-D3)  above.  However,  much  of  what  such  theorists  wanted 
to  capture  about  metaphor  can  be  best  upheld  by  dropping  the  idea  that  a  given 
153  I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  such  an  operator  must  be  psychologically  real,  or  syntactically 
represented.  The  hope  is  that  some  theory  of  `asides'  will  allow  such  modifiers  to  guide  interpretation, 
without  thereby  becoming  genuine  parts  of  the  string.  They  should  rather  be  thought  of  as  metalinguistic 
self-interruptions,  intended  to  ease  interpretation.  In  cases  where  the  need  for  such  interruption  is  left 
implicit,  their  separability  from  the  sentence  is  not  impugned. 
121 metaphor  is  a  vehicle  for  the  communication  of  a  distinctive  cognitive  content, 
and  instead  thinking  in  terms  of  what  it  `intimates',  `brings  to  our  attention',  or 
`leads  us  to  see'. 
The  time  has  come  to  examine  how  a  Davidsonian  might  earn  the  right  to  (D4),  in  the 
light  of  the  phenomenon  of  metaphor's  embedding  in  non-assertoric  contexts.  To  help 
identify  one  potential  such  course,  I  suggest  we  return  to  Davidson's  positive 
characterization  of  metaphorical  practice,  slender  though  that  is: 
if  I  show  you  Wittgenstein's  duck-rabbit  and  I  say,  `It's  a  duck',  then  with  luck  you  see 
it  as  a  duck;  if  I  say,  `It's  a  rabbit',  you  see  it  as  a  rabbit.  But  no  proposition  expresses 
what  I  have  led  you  to  see...  Seeing  as  is  not  seeing  that.  Metaphor  makes  us  see  one 
thing  as  another  by  making  some  literal  statement  that  inspires  or  prompts  the  insight.  '  54 
Let  us  set  aside  bizarrely  literalistic  interpretations  of  this  passage,  that  take  Davidson  to 
be  proposing  an  account  of  metaphor  which  relies  wholly  on  the  phenomenon  of 
perceptual  aspect  perception.  155  Davidson's  thought  is  clearly  that,  via  the  making  some 
wholly  literal  statement,  we  are  brought  to  some  sort  of  imaginative  insight  into  a 
situation.  The  metaphor  presents  us  with  a  kind  of  lens  or  prism  through  which  we  think 
of  one  object,  event  or  situation  in  the  light  of  another.  It  is  difficult  to  spell  out  what 
such  a  thought  amounts  to,  although  it  seems  fairly  clear  that  such  a  process  is  (i)  not 
intrinsically  linguistic  (ii)  often  passive,  in  the  sense  that  a  given  metaphoric  point  of 
view  can  force  itself  upon  us,  as  when  I  am  suddenly  struck  by  the  sheer  childishness  of 
a  colleague  (iii)  often  draws  on  the  rich  resources  of  the  imagination,  in  both 
propositional  and  experiential  ways.  Perhaps  despite  its  vagueness,  we  might  appeal  to 
such  a  conception  of  the  effects  metaphor  can  have  upon  us,  opening  up  the  possibility 
that  we  might  think  of  embedded  sentential  contexts  as  somehow  relating  not  to  the 
content  of  the  metaphor,  but  to  the  content  of  such  an  imaginative  engagement.  We 
might  take  the  qualifying  marker  -'metaphorically  speaking'  -  as  a  pragmatic  cue  that 
such  an  shift  in  interpretive  approach  is  required.  '56 
154  Davidson  (1984a)  p.  263 
iss  Kemp  (1991)  rightfully  takes  such  theories  to  task. 
156  Similarly,  we  might  take  `  I'm  guessing  here'  to  defeat  the  normal  presupposition  of  informed 
inference  in  "If  John  comes  then  -  I'm  guessing  here  -  Jane  will  leave'. 
122 A  preliminary  and  crude  attempt  at  this  might  be  to  take: 
(F)  Metaphorical  utterance  S1  (in  part)  metaphorically-means*  that  P  iff  according 
to  an  apt  act  of  imaginative  insight  I  that  SAl,  in  context,  itself  prompts  or 
suggests,  P. 
Consider  an  example.  Wittgenstein's  metaphor  encourages  me  to  imaginatively 
construe  philosophers  as  flies  trapped  in  fly-bottles.  Such  an  activity  might,  inter  alia, 
lead  me  to  think  of  philosophical  problems  as  essentially  dissoluble  puzzles  that  prevent 
us  living  in  a  fulfilling  manner.  Such  a  course  of  thought  is,  arguably,  mandated  by  the 
metaphor  itself  in  context,  given  Wittgenstein's  view  of  philosophical  endeavour.  At  the 
very  least,  such  a  construal  is  interpretively  appropriate.  So  (F)  warrants  my  claim  that 
the  famous  metaphor  metaphorically-means*  that  philosophical  problems  as  essentially 
dissoluble  puzzles  that  prevent  us  living  in  a  fulfilling  manner.  But  that  claim  is 
consistent  with  my  holding  that  strictly  speaking,  there  are  no  metaphorical  meanings. 
It  is  true  that  expressions  will  become  associated  with  metaphorical-meanings*,  but 
that's  simply  a  useful  fiction;  a  convenient  way  of  relating  metaphors  to  the  content  of 
the  imaginative  acts  they  prompt.  Nothing  deserves  to  be  called  a  metaphorical 
meaning,  since  nothing  is  suitably  meaning-like,  and  suitably  related  to  the  metaphorical 
character  of  the  relevant  utterance.  But  we  might  mock  up  a  simulacrum  of  our  talk 
about  metaphorical  meaning,  projecting  a  certain  kind  of  perlocutionary  effect  of  the 
metaphorical  utterance  back  onto  the  metaphor  itself.  In  this  way,  we  can  hope  to  avoid 
the  charge  that  we  confuse  what  the  metaphor  makes  us  notice  with  its  meaning,  while 
hoping  to  explain  the  inferential  linkages  that  embedded  contexts  reflect.  157 
157  This  move  may  seem  very  non-Davidsonian,  in  the  light  of  the  marks  of  metaphor  discussed  in  Section 
2.9  above.  After  all,  doesn't  Davidson  explicitly  distance  himself  from  such  a  suggestion?  He  says, 
remember:  "If  what  the  metaphor  makes  us  notice  were  finite  in  scope  and  propositional  in  nature..  .  we 
would  simply  project  the  content  the  metaphor  brought  to  mind  onto  the  metaphor"  (Davidson  (1984a)  p. 
263).  So  it  might  well  seem  that  he  takes  the  kind  of  fictionalist  projection  suggested  above  to  be  ruled 
out  by  the  limitless,  non-propositional  character  of  metaphor.  There  is  much  in  this  criticism,  and  I  will 
address  the  relevance  of  such  marks  in  later  chapters.  For  the  moment,  my  concern  is  less  Davidson 
exegesis,  than  an  examination  of  whether  an  error  theorist  who  rejects  metaphorical  meaning  when 
speaking  strictu  sensu  can  nevertheless  give  some  structured  account  of  embedding.  But  it  is  worth  noting 
123 What  is  it  for  a  proposition  to  hold  according  to  an  apt  act  of  imaginative  insight?  This 
is  hard  to  spell  out,  although  I  hope  the  intuitive  idea  is  clear  enough.  Basically,  it  is  for 
that  proposition  to  comprise  part  of  the  content  of  the  imagining;  the  way  the  imagining 
presents  things  in  general  as  being.  This  intuitive  characterization  allows  for 
representations  drawing  on  expressive  resources  from  both  the  imagined  world  and  the 
real  tivorld  to  enter  into  the  propositional  content  of  the  imagining.  Thus,  we  can  say 
both  that  Wittgenstein  characterizes  philosophical  talk  as  being  a  useless,  frustrated, 
buzzing,  and  that  he  thinks  that  it  is  not  a  worthwhile  intellectual  pursuit.  The  former 
type  of  propositions  will  often  be  presented  in  sentences  that  are  themselves  seemingly 
metaphorical  in  character.  Those  who  believe  in  the  eventual  dispensability  of 
metaphorical  modes  of  speech  will  be  able  to  hold  that  the  content  of  the  imagining  will 
eventually  be  able  to  be  fleshed  out  in  wholly  literal  terms.  Those  who  do  not  may  be 
reassured  that  the  `non-reductive'  element  of  Davidson's  account  is  preserved  by  such  a 
fictionalist  addendum.  158 
Given  such  a  translation  from  the  imagined  world,  the  Davidsonian  might  try  to  develop 
a  suitable  semantics.  I  shall  not  try  to  outline  such  a  semantics  in  detail  here,  but  rather 
simply  continue  to  sketch  an  approach  which  is  avowedly  rough,  and  no  doubt  flawed  in 
detail,  to  illustrate  how  one  might  begin  on  such  ä  task.  Imagine  that  we  divide  the 
sentences  of  our  language  up  into  literal  sentences  like: 
that  the  following  remark  can  be  taken  in  a  way  that  accords  fairly  well  with  the  suggested  strategy. 
"Once  we  understand  a  metaphor  we  can  call  what  we  grasp  the  'metaphorical  truth'  and  (up  to  a  point) 
say  what  the  'metaphorical  meaning'  is.  But  simply  to  lodge  this  meaning  in  metaphor  is  like  explaining 
why  a  pill  puts  you  to  sleep  by  saying  it  has  a  dormative  power.  "  Davidson  (1984a)  p.  247.  This  suggests 
that  we  do  grasp  something  when  we  understand  a  metaphor,  but  that  this  is  the  effect,  rather  than  the 
explanation,  of  the  metaphor's  success. 
158  Why  not  take  the  metaphors  to  be  direct  expressions  of  such  imaginative  states,  rather  than  the  more 
roundabout  route  canvassed  above?  While  there  is  no  doubt  room  for  an  expressivist  or  quasi-realist 
development  of  such  a  theory,  I  will  not  explore  it  here.  It  is  worth  noting  that  one  primafacie  advantage 
of  the  current  proposal  over  such  an  account  is  that  the  above  account  does  not  require  that  anybody  had 
such  thoughts  prior  to  reflection  onthe  metaphor  itself,  whereas  the  expressivist  account  would  tend  to  see 
the  metaphor  as  in  some  sense  the  result  of  some  prior  imaginative  state.  But  there  is  no  doubt  room  for 
skirmishing,  and  for  compromise  solutions.  My  primary  concern  here  is  with  the  standing  of  an  error- 
theoretic  account  in  the  light  of  worries  about  embedding. 
124 (1)  Juliet  is  the  sun 
and  metaphorical  sentences  like 
(2)  Juliet  -  metaphorically  speaking  -  is  the  sun. 
Metaphorical  sentences  aren't  a  syntactic  kind,  obviously.  Rather,  they  contain 
expressions  that  are  correctly  recognisable  as  having  been  uttered  metaphorically. 
Sentences  like  (1)  are  typically  straightforwardly  false,  whereas  metaphorical  sentences 
can  be  said  (in  an  extended,  fictional  sense)  to  be  true,  when  things  are  as  a  related  apt 
act  of  imaginative  insight  I  suggests  they  are.  In  more  detail 
(F)  Metaphorical  sentence  SA!  (in  part)  metaphorically-means*  that  P  iff  according 
to  an  apt  act  of  imaginative  insight  I  that  SAf,  in  context,  itself  prompts  or 
suggests,  P. 
Now  let 
ISM,  Pi-P.  ] 
abbreviate 
S:  SM  metaphorically-means*  that  P1,  &  SM  metaphorically-means*  that  P2,  &...  SM 
metaphorically-means*  that  P￿ 
Such  a  notation  simply  lets  us  conjoin  the  various  particular  propositions  that  (F)  allows 
us  to  ascribe  to  the  metaphor.  Then  we  have 
(1)  Sf  is  true  with  respect  to  P;  iff  *[  SAf,  P;  ]  &  P; 
(2)  SAf  is  true  simpliciter  iff  Shf  is  true  with  respect  to  each  member  Pj  of  some 
suitably  weighted  subset  of  {P1,  P2,...  P￿} 
and  then  the  standard  semantics  for  non-atomic  sentences 
125 (3)  "A  &  B"  is  true  iffA  is  true  and  B  is  true 
(4)  "not  A"  is  true  iff  A  is  not  true. 
(5)  "If  A  then  B"  is  true  iff  not-A  is  true  or  B  is  true. 
and  so  on.  Such  a  semantics  clearly  doesn't  commit  the  Davidsonian  to  realism  about 
metaphorical  meanings,  since  we  are  distinguishing  them  from  the  merely  fictional 
metaphorical-meanings*.  However,  it  seems  that  such  a  semantics  can  help  the  error- 
theorist  set  out  a  realist-style  semantics  for  embedded  contexts  in  a  straightforward  way. 
Take,  for  example, 
(Ml)  It's  just  not  the  case  that,  as  the  Wittgensteinian  quietists  seem  to  think, 
philosophy  is  just  getting  flies  out  of  fly  bottles. 
Contextual  clues  help  us  identify  this  as  equivalent  to 
(M3)  It's  just  not  the  case  that,  as  the  Wittgensteinian  quietists  seem  to  think, 
philosophy  is  just  -  to  put  it  metaphorically  -  getting  flies  out  of  fly  bottles. 
which  (somehow)  combines  two  propositions: 
(a)  It's  not  the  case  that  philosophy  is  just  -  to  put  it  metaphorically  -  getting  flies 
out  of  fly  bottles 
(b)  Wittgensteinian  quietists  seem  to  think  philosophy  is  just  -  to  put  it 
metaphorically  -  getting  flies  out  of  fly  bottles. 
For  ease  of  presentation,  I  shall  ignore  the  latter,  and  concentrate  on  the  former.  It  has 
the  form  not-SN,  where 
SN  =  "Philosophy  is  just  -  to  put  it  metaphorically  -  getting  flies  out  of  fly  bottles" 
Now  we  know  that 
126 Metaphorical  sentence  Sxf  (in  part)  metaphorically-means*  that  P  iff  according  to  an  apt 
act  of  imaginative  insight  I  (that  SAf,  in  context,  itself  suggests),  P. 
Imagine  that  the  relevant  act  of  imaginative  insight  IN  has  as  its  content:  philosophy's 
proper  aim  is  to  dissolve  persistent  and  frustratingly  complex  conceptual  problems  that 
impede  our  progress  through  life,  and  prevent  our  living  in  a  fulfilling  manner.  Then  by 
semantic  axiom  (1)  we  have 
SN  is  true  iff  (according  to  IN,  philosophy's  proper  aim  is  to  dissolve  persistent  and 
frustratingly  complex  conceptual  problems  that  impede  our  progress 
through  life,  and  prevent  our  living  in  a  fulfilling  manner),  & 
(philosophy's  proper  aim  is  to  dissolve  persistent  and  frustratingly 
complex  conceptual  problems  that  impede  our  progress  through  life,  and 
prevent  our  living  in  a  fulfilling  manner) 
So  by  employing  semantic  axiom  (4),  we  can  derive 
not-SN  is  true  iff  it's  not  the  case  that  [(according  to  IN,  philosophy's  proper  aim  is 
to  dissolve  persistent  and  frustratingly  complex  conceptual 
problems  that  impede  our  progress  through  life,  and  prevent  our 
living  in  a  fulfilling  manner),  &  (philosophy's  proper  aim  is  to 
dissolve  persistent  and  frustratingly  complex  conceptual  problems 
that  impede  our  progress  through  life,  and  prevent  our  living  in  a 
fulfilling  manner)] 
Since,  by  hypothesis,  first  conjunct  of  the  right-hand-side  is  true,  the  above 
biconditional  is  equivalent  to 
not-SN  is  true  iff  It's  not  the  case  that  (philosophy's  proper  aim  is  to  dissolve 
persistent  and  frustratingly  complex  conceptual  problems  that 
impede  our  progress  through  life,  and  prevent  our  living  in  a 
fulfilling  manner) 
and  since 
127 SN  =  "Philosophy  is  just  -  to  put  it  metaphorically  -  getting  flies  out  of  fly  bottles" 
we  have  more  or  less  the  desired  result.  The  metaphorical  sentence  is  correctly  rejected 
just  in  case  things  aren't  the  way  the  imaginative  viewpoint  they  prompt  presents  them 
as  being.  Similarly,  from 
(M2)  If  the  garden  was  a  slum  of  bloom,  then  it  could  hardly  have  been  winter  that 
Stevens  was  writing  about  in  'Banal  Sojourn' 
we  move  to 
(M4)  If  the  garden  was  indeed  -  as  in  Stevens'  metaphor  -a  slum  of  bloom,  then  it 
could  hardly  have  been  winter  that  Stevens  was  writing  about  in  'Banal 
Sojourn' 
which  has  the  form  IfSp  then  P,  where  the  obvious  abbreviations  are  made.  Axiom  (5) 
tells  us  that  this  is  true  iff  not-Sp  is  true  or  P  is  true.  And  this.  -  modulo  the  standard 
worries  about  the  paradoxes  of  the  material  conditional,  is  exactly  what  we  would 
expect.  The  conditional  comes  out  as  false  when  things  are  as  the  metaphor  prompts  us 
to  see  them,  and  yet  the  interpretation  presented  in  the  consequent  does  not  fit  with 
them.  So  we  have  some  explanation  of  the  use  of  the  conditional,  and  its  place  in  our 
talk  and  thought  about  metaphor.  In  rejecting  metaphors,  we  reject  the  imagined  view  of 
the  world  that  they  invite.  In  extending  them  via  conditional  thought,  we  implicitly 
move  within  such  a  worldview,  and  when  we  interpret  them,  we  examine  the  actual 
world  through  the  intellectual  and  experiential  lens  that  they  provide. 
It  seems  then,  that  in  tackling  metaphors  which  occur  in  e.  g.  negated  contexts,  mixed 
conditionals,  belief-attributions,  etc,  the  Davidsonian  has  some  room  to  manoeuvre. 
Perhaps  the  above  account,  sketchy  and  provisional  as  it  is,  will  ultimately  prove  to  be 
unsatisfactory.  Nevertheless,  the  general  approach  should  surely  seem  attractive.  The 
great  appeal  of  such  a  fictionalist  strategy  is  that  it  seems  to  provide  the  error  theorist 
128 with  a  means  of  appropriating  realist-style  semantics,  while  rejecting  realist  ontology.  159 
Such  an  approach  makes  it  far  easier  to  provide  ftinctionally  equivalent  replacements  for 
rejected  discourses  than  would  otherwise  be  the  case.  Of  course,  success  is  far  from 
guaranteed,  and  must  be  earned,  via  the  provision  of  a  plausible  translation  scheme  in 
and  out  of  the  fiction.  A  fully  defensible  version  of  fictionalism  about  metaphorical 
meaning  can  scarcely  be  attempted  here.  Nevertheless,  I  hope  to  have  indicated  one 
promising  strategy  for  the  Davidsonian,  and  given  the  beginnings  of  an  outline  of  how 
such  an  account  might  go.  160 
Such  an  approach  might  also  be  employed  to  deal  with  an  interesting  problem  recently 
raised  by  Stem.  161  Stem  notices  that  though  we  might  agree  that  both 
(1)  Achilles  is  the  sun 
(2)  Juliet  is  the  sun 
where  the  relevant  imaginative  viewpoints  are  very  different  in  each  case,  there  is 
something  strange  about  the  sentence 
(3)  Juliet  is  the  sun,  and  Achilles  is,  too. 
while 
(4)  Sol  is  the  sun,  and  Juliet  is,  too. 
is  even  worse.  Stem  holds  that  this  shows  that  metaphorical  meanings  are  necessary 
linguistic  posits.  He  appeals  to  an  analogous  case,  arguing  that  the  semantic  distinctness 
159  1  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  the  semantics  sketched  above  works  exactly  like  a  standard  fictionalism, 
say  in  modality  or  morality.  The  point  is  merely  that  the  introduction  of  pseudo-meaning  promises  the 
best  strategy  for  a  Davidsonian  who  wishes  to  give  some  account  of  embedded  contexts. 
160  1  do  not  pretend  originality  in  linking  metaphorical  content  and  imaginative  construal.  The  above 
account  has  obvious  affinities  to  ideas  set  out  in  e.  g.  Walton  (1990),  (1993)  and  Yablo  (1998).  However, 
Yablo  takes  his  account  to  underwrite  a  realism  about  metaphorical  content,  rather  than  the  type  of 
pseudo-fictionalism  mooted  here. 
16 
.1 
Stem  (2000)  p.  70-71 
129 of  the  'may'  of  possibility  and  that  of  permission  is  established  by  reflection  that  while 
in  a  given  use  of 
(5)  John  may  leave  tomorrow 
cmay'  can  be  assigned  either  interpretation,  in  the  following 
(6)  John  may  leave  tomorrow,  and  Harry,  too 
grammar  demands  that  we  assign  the  same  interpretation  to  antecedent  and  anaphoric 
term.  Explaining  such  an  external  constraint  on  what  speakers  can  manage  to  111ean  by 
(6)  is  just,  thinks  Stem,  what  we  want  word  and  sentence  meaningfoi-.  And  since  a 
seemingly  similar  phenomenon  occurs  in  (3)  and  (4),  it  might  seem  that  metaphorical 
meaning  is  required  there  too. 
However,  it  is  clear  that  the  account  sketched  earlier  gives  the  Davidsonian  some  chance 
of  addressing  this  worry.  Firstly,  reading  (2)  as 
2*.  Juliet  -  metaphorically  speaking  -  is  the  sun 
itself  seems  to  might  serve  to  explain  why  we  find  (4)  problematic.  After  all,  (2*) 
invites  an  imaginative  construal  of  Juliet  as  the  sun,  which  the  literal  statement 
frustrates.  Davidson  might  argue  that 
4*  Sol  is  the  sun,  and  Juliet  is  -  metaphorically  speaking  -  too. 
is  actually  semantically  and  syntactically  fine,  but  that  the  intrusive  presence  of  the 
literal  identity  claim  simply  frustrates  the  ability  of  the  metaphor  to  conjure  up  a  suitable 
imaginative  viewpoint.  Similarly 
3*:  Juliet  is-  metaphorically  speaking  -  the  sun,  and  Achilles  is  -  metaphorically 
speaking  -  too. 
130 is  actually  true,  but  simply  makes  a  demand  on  imaginative  focus  that  we  find  it  hard  to 
discharge.  After  all,  Stem's  case  is  surely  overstated  if  the  claim  is  supposed  to  be  that 
we  simply  can't  hear  the  sentences  in  their  intended  sense,  as  happens  in  the  case  of 
'may'.  The  following  sentence  seems  fine  to  my  ears: 
7.  Juliet  is  (metaphorically  speaking)  the  sun,  and  Achilles  is  (metaphorically 
speaking)  too;  but  the  sense  in  which  the  fonner  characterization  is  apt  is  very 
different  from  that  of  the  latter. 
whereas  no  such  move  seems  available  in  (6).  Again,  such  a  prospective  reply  needs  to 
be  examined  and  defended  in  greater  detail  than  I  can  spare  here.  My  aim  is  only  to 
examine  whether  it  is  obvious  that  a  Davidsonian  must  retreat  in  the  light  of  such 
linguistically  based  objections.  And,  although  the  matter  is  a  delicate  one,  it  doesn't 
seem  to  me  that  the  case  has  yet  been  established. 
What  then,  about  the  charge  that  Davidson  cannot  give  a  plausible  account  of  clearly 
anomalous  sentences?  That  worry,  remember,  was  expressed  as  follows: 
Such  an  account  is  committed  to  treating  metaphorical  sentences  as  false 
when  they  are  taken  literally,  when  in  fact  many  are  neither  true  or  false, 
but  rather  semantically  anomolous  (White,  Margalit  and  Goldblum, 
Stern) 
162,163,164 
Several  philosophers  have  taken  issue  with  Davidson's  remark  that  'most  metaphorical 
sentences  are  patently  false 
...  on  occasion  patent  truth  will  do  as  well'.  165  Even 
philosophers  like  White  and  Stem,  who  are  in  general  sympathetic  to  Davidson's 
position,  or  at  least  willing  to  accept  that  he  is  right  about  words  retaining  their  usual 
literal  meaning  in  metaphor,  resist  the  idea  that  the  sentences  composed  out  of  those 
words  need  have  any  literal  meaning  at  all.  Such  philosophers  are  willing  to  give  up  the 
idea  that  a  syntactically  well-formed  sentence  composed  of  significant  parts  must  also  be 
162  White  (1996)  pp.  204-226 
163  Margalit  and  Goldblum  (1994)  pp.  234-237 
164  Stern  (2000)  p.  47 
165  Davidson  (1984a)  p.  258.  Davidson  make  related  remarks  elsewhere. 
131 significant;  insisting  instead  that  metaphors  like  "they  donated  his  face  to  the  wildlife 
fund"  are  semantically  anomalous,  or  nonsensical. 
Stem  suggests  that  Davidson  might  argue  that  the  suggested  distinction  between  the 
literally  meaningless  and  the  false  rests  on  a  discredited  analytic-synthetic  distinction. 
He  envisages  a  'persistent  objector'  who  replies  that  the  rejection  of  analyticity  is 
primarily  a  rejection  of  'its  epistemological  use  to  ground  an  a  priori  /a  posteriori 
distinction  which  is  simply  not  what  is  at  issue  here.  166  But  actually,  leaving  aside  his 
actual  motivation  for  assimilating  the  nonsensical  to  the  false,  it  is  not  clear  that 
Davidson  need  appeal  to  that  principle  at  all.  A  more  straightforward  procedure  would 
be  to  argue  as  follows.  Let  W  be  a  thing  that  it  is  supposedly  nonsensical  to  imagine 
donated  to  a  wildlife  ftind  -  my  face,  say  -  and  let  sentence  S  be  instance  of  the  form  "W 
is  donated  to  the  wildlife  fund".  Then  Davidson  can  run  through  instances  of  the 
following  schematic  argument 
(1)  It  is  a  priori  that  for  all  x,  if  x  is  donated  to  the  wildlife  fund,  then  x  is  the  kind  of 
thing  that  can  be  donated  to  wildlife  funds.  (Assumption) 
(2)  It  is  a  priori  that,  for  all  x,  if  x  is  not  the  kind  of  thing  that  can  be  donated  to 
wildlife  funds,  then  it  is  not  the  case  that  x  is  donated  to  the  wildlife  fund. 
(From  1,  Modus  tollens) 
(3)  It  is  a  priori  that  W  is  not  the  kind  of  thing  that  can  be  donated  to  wildlife  funds. 
(Assumption) 
(4)  So,  it  is  a  priori  that  it  is  not  the  case  that  W  is  donated  to  the  wildlife  fund. 
(From  2  and  3,  Universal  Quantifier  rules  and  Modus  ponens) 
(5)  It  is  not  the  case  that  W  is  donated  to  the  wildlife  fund.  (From  4) 
(6)  Line  5  follows  from  a  priori  true  statements  by  truth-preserving  steps,  and  is  thus 
true.  (A  prioricity  of  1,3) 
(7)  Line  5  is  the  sentential  negation  of  S  (Definition  of  S) 
(8)  For  all  sentences  X,  if  X  is  the  sentential  negation  of  Y,  and  Y  is  true,  then  X  is 
false.  (Definition  of  classical  negation) 
(9)  S  is  false  (from  6,7,8,  &-1,  Universal  Quantifier  rules  and  Modus  ponens) 
(10)  If  S  is  false,  then  it  is  not  nonsensical.  (Assumption) 
166  Stern  (2000)  p.  328 
132 (.  11)  S  is  not  nonsensical.  (From  9,10,  Modus  ponens) 
Thus  it  seems  that  Davidson  has  an  argument  that  proceeds  from  relatively 
uncontroversial  steps,  from  plausible  or  shared  assumptions,  to  the  conclusion  that 
metaphorical  sentences  are  false  when  taken  literally.  The  issue  of  analyticity  needn't 
arise.  167 
This  section  has  been  a  long  one,  so  let  me  recap  briefly.  As  in  the  case  of  many  other 
error-theories,  a  lot  turns  on  whether  a  suitable  functional  replacement  for  our  existing 
practices  of  ascribing  m-meanings  can  be  provided.  I  have  argued  that,  unlike  many 
error-theorists,  the  Davidsonian  faces  a  difficult  variant  of  the  Frege-Geach  problem.  I 
have  attempted  to  sketch  the  beginnings  of  a  reply  to  this  worry  on  behalf  of  Davidson, 
introducing  a  way  of  talking  as  ifthe  content  of  the  imaginative  viewpoints  that 
metaphor  provokes  really  comprised  the  meaning  of  the  metaphorical  utterance.  On  the 
basis  of  such  a  fiction,  I  have  attempted  to  show  how  worries  about  e.  g.  metaphor's 
appearance  in  negated  or  conditional  contexts  might  be  addressed.  I  do,  not  pretend  to 
have  set  out  anything  detailed  enough  to  be  regarded  as  a  theory;  rather,  my  aim  was  to 
set  out  a  strategy  for  the  Davidsonian,  hoping  to  provide  just  enough  illustrative  detail 
for  its  contours  to  be  discerned.  I  then  speculated  whether  the  appeal  to  imaginative 
viewpoints  might  help  finesse  Stem's  problem  regarding  metaphor  and  anaphora,  and 
concluded  by  rejecting  a  distinct  set  of  worries  related  to  semantic  anomaly. 
3.5  Metaphor  and  Reduction 
(1)  Davidson's  objection  to  simile  theories  of  metaphor  illegitimately 
characterises  such  theories  as  committed  to  the  idea  that  metaphors  be 
reduced  to  explicit  literal  similes.  (Fogelin)  168 
(2)  Davidson's  account  illegitimately  demands  that  a  linguistic  theory  ought  to 
issue  specifications  of  content  in  only  literal  terms  (Denham)  169 
167  Thanks  are  due  to  Gary  Kemp  for  the  argument  presented  here  (inter  alia!  ). 
168  Fogelin  (1988)  Ch  2. 
133 Davidson  makes  a  series  of  objections  to  simile  theories  of  metaphor.  Famously,  he 
argues  that  everything  is  like  everything  else,  so  if  metaphors  were  literal  comparisons, 
they  would  be  trivially  true,  instead  of  interestingly  significant,  as  the  supporters  of 
metaphorical  meanings  had  held.  Recently,  Fogelin  has  argued  that  this  reply  overlooks 
the  obvious;  the  simile-theorist  should  identify  the  meaning  of  the  metaphor  with  the 
figurative  meaning  of  the  corresponding  simile.  Fogelin  sketches  an  account  of  the 
difference  between  literal  similitude  and  its  figurative  counterpart  in  terms  of  varying 
standards  of  salience,  'modes  of  relevance  and  evaluation  governing  the  likeness 
claim'. 
170 
The  reply  masks  a  deeper  worry, which  is  the  sheer  underdevelopment  of  the'Simile 
theory,  whether  literal  or  figurative.  We  are  simply  not  shown  that  every  metaphor  can 
be  parsed  into  a  corresponding  simile.  Davidson's  jokey  paraphrase  of  Virginia  Woolf's 
definition  of  a  highbrow  is  designed  to  highlight  the  point.  Woolf's 
(a)  A  highbrow  is  a  man  or  woman  of  thoroughbred  intelligence  who  rides  his 
mind  at  a  gallop  across  country  in  pursuit  of  an  idea. 
becomes 
(b)  A  highbrow  is  a  man  or  woman  whose  intelligence  is  like  a  thoroughbred 
horse  and  who  persists  in  thinking  about  an  idea  like  a  rider  galloping 
across  a  country  in  pursuit  of  ...  well,  something. 
The  attempt  is  manful,  and  the  joke  light-hearted  enough,  but  the  philosophical  point  is 
there,  and  ought  to  have  been  addressed  by  Fogelin.  We  simply  haven't  been  shown 
how  to  turn  e.  g. 
(C)  The  garden  was  a  slum  of  bloom 
169  Denham  (2000)  p.  259.  See  pp.  318-328  for  an  extended  discussion. 
170  Fogelin  (1988)  pp.  75-76 
134 into  simile  form.  Perhaps:  "The  garden  was  like  a  slum  of  bloom"?  But  what's  a  slum 
of  bloom?  It  seems  that  we  have  to  understand  the  metaphor  in  order  to  make  the 
comparison,  so  rephrasing  as  a  comparison  scarcely  casts  light  upon  the  metaphor. 
Similarly  with  e.  g. 
(d)  The  Dean  gloated  into  the  office. 
(e)  The  Dean  did  something  into  the  office  that  was  like  gloating. 
Grammar  and  insightful  analysis  tend  to  come  under  strain,  if  we  take  Fogelin's 
approach  seriously. 
A  more  interesting  question  is  whether  Davidson  implicitly  appeals  to  reductivist 
presuppositions  that  can  be  challenged  even  by  non-simile  theorists.  Perhaps  the  idea 
that  a  systematic  linguistic  pragmatics  requires  the  possibility  of  literal  paraphrase  can 
be  challenged.  If  I  understand  her  correctly,  that  is  what  Alison  Denham  aims  to  do  in 
her  Metaphor  and  Moral  Experience  and  elsewhere.  171  There,  Denham  is  interested  in 
what  she  terms  the  conceptual  autonomy  of  the  metaphorical.  She  gives  two  different 
glosses  on  the  nature  of  conceptual  autonomy  as  applied  to  metaphors.  The  first  seems 
to  coincide  with  the  condition  that  Wright  has  called  disputationalptirity; 
(DP)  A  discourse  conceming  a  particular  realm  of  fact  -  moral  discourse,  modal 
discourse,  etc  -  is  disputationally  pure  just  in  case  there  is  no  other  discourse 
such  that  "the  rational  intelligibility  of  differences  of  opinion  expressible  in  the 
fonner  will  depend  on  the  existence  of  differences  expressible  in  the  latter".  172 
Denham,  citing  Wright,  gives  the  following  definition  of  conceptual  autonomy 
171  See  Denham  (1998)  and  (2000),  passim. 
172  Wright  (19  94)  p.  15  5. 
135 (W)  A  discourse  is  conceptually  autonomous  if  and  only  if  it  is  not  possible  to  state 
the  truth  conditions  of  assertoric  utterances  within  it  solely  in  terms  of  concepts 
extraneous  to  it.  173,174 
She  goes  on  to  assert  the  equivalence  of  this  account  with  Wright's  notion,  as  expressed 
in  (DP) 
An  alternative  way  of  thinking  about  conceptual  autonomy  is  this:  A  discourse  fails  to 
be  conceptually  autonomous  if  and  only  if  all  intelligible  disagreements  about  the  truth 
ofjudgements  expressible  in  the  discourse  finally  depend  on  disagreements  about  the 
truth  ofjudgements  extraneous  to  it.  If  it  fails  in  this  way,  we  may  say  that  it  is 
conceptually  supervenient.  175 
I  do  not  disagree  with  this  equivalence  claim,  but  since  it  may  not  seem  immediately 
obvious  how  the  intended  equivalence  with  Wright's  original  forraulation  runs,  it  is 
worth  examining  a  little  further.  Let  us  take,  for  example,  assertoric  utterances  of  the 
form 
(M)  Metaphorical  utterance  m  in  context  C  metaphorically  means  that  p.  176 
If  it  is  possible  to  satisfactorily  state  the  truth  conditions  of  claims  like  (M)  in  terms 
which  do  not  mention  metaphorical  meaning  or  the  like,  then,  if  two  subjects  should 
disagree  about  whether  or  not  (M)  is  true  for  a  given  m,  C  and  p,  this  should  ramify  into 
some  disagreement  statable  in  those  other  terms.  Intelligible  disagreement  is  going  to 
presuppose  that  either  some  aspect  of  the  subjects'  reasoning  is  incorrect,  or  that  they 
disagree  about  whether  or  not  the  truth  conditions  of  (M)-sentences  have  been  met. 
Moreover,  if  these  truth  conditions  can  be  stated  in  other  terms,  then  the  two  subjects 
ought,  if  they  are  thinking  rationally,  to  disagree  about  whether  some  fact  expressible  in 
173  Denham  actually  uses'if  on  both  occasions  where  I  have  usedif  and  only  if;  since  this  weaker  claim 
seems  unmotivated,  and  since  Wright  makes  the  stronger,  I  have  used  the  latter. 
174  Denham  (2000)  p.  283.  n.  5.  A  similar  definition  is  given  in  Denham  (1998)  p.  228  n.  3. 
175  Denham  (2000)  p.  283.  n.  5. 
176  We  don't  actually  say  this  kind  of  thing  too  much  ,  so  (M)  has  to  be  heard  as  a  useful  simplification. 
136 these  other  terms  obtains,  since  their  disagreement  should  carry  over  into  the  new  idiom. 
Call  the  way  of  thinking  about  conceptual  autonomy  expressed  by  (W)  the  Wright  ivay. 
The  second  elucidation  of  conceptual  autonomy  that  Denham  gives,  however,  seems 
rather  different.  On  this  account,  metaphorical  utterances  are  conceptually  autonomous 
if  and  only  if  "the  contents  they  express  are  not  reducible  to  literal  paraphrase"  177  or 
"metaphorical  assertions  admit  of  no  non-circular  analysis  in  non-figurative  terms".  178 
This  is  not  an  entirely  happy  characterisation,  since  Denham  wants  to  hold  that  theorists 
like  Davidson  and  Rorty,  who  are  anti-realists  about  metaphorical  content,  agree  that 
metaphors  are  conceptually  autonomous.  Let  us  amend  the  definition,  then,  to 
(D)  Metaphorical  utterances  are  conceptually  autonomous  if  and  only  if  either  they 
do  not  express  propositional  contents,  or  the  contents  they  express  are  not 
reducible  to  literal  paraphrase  or  admit  of  no  non-circular  analysis  in  non- 
figurative  terms. 
Call  this  way  of  thinking  about  conceptual  autonomy  the  Denhani  way. 
Denham  clearly  thinks  that  (D)  is  relevantly  equivalent  to  (W).  Thus,  in  the  same 
footnote  as  she  gives  the  two  definitions  cited  above,  she  writes 
Thus  some  claim  that  it  is  not  possible  to  state  the  truth-conditions  of  moral  discourse  in 
non-evaluative  terms;  the  parallel  thought  here  is  that  it  is  not  possible  to  state  the  truth 
conditions  of  some  metaphorical  discourse  in  non-figurative  terms.  179 
Again,  in  her  introduction  she  writes 
The  parallels  [between  moral  judgements  and  metaphors]  run  deep,  as  can  be  seen  by 
reflecting  for  a  moment  on  the  kinds  of  questions  which  often  arise  with  respect  to  each. 
177  Denham  (1998)  p.  228. 
178  Denham  (2000)  p.  307. 
179  Denham  (2000)  p.  283.  n.  5. 
137 For  instance 
...  can  moral  concepts  be  analysed  in  wholly  non-evaluative  terms? 
Compare:  can  metaphorical  expressions  be  reduced  to  literal  paraphrase?  "O 
I  have  argued  above  (Section  2.3)  that  distinguishing  between  discourses  and 
inetadiscourses  help  us  see  that  this  has  to  be  the  wrong  way  to  think  about  the 
relationship  between  metaphors  and  morals.  I  will  not  repeat  that  discussion  here.  181 
My  interest  is  rather  in  the  second  elucidation  of  conceptual  autonomy  that  Denham 
gives. 
(D)  Metaphorical  utterances  are  conceptually  autonomous  if  and  only  if  either  they 
do  not  express  propositional  contents,  or  the  contents  they  express  are  not 
reducible  to  literal  paraphrase  or  admit  of  no  non-circular  analysis  in  non- 
figurative  terms. 
Since  Denham's  aim  is  to  show  that  certain  metaphors  which  meet  this  condition  do 
express  propositional  contents,  she  clearly  embraces  the  second  disjunct  of  the  right- 
hand-side  of  (D).  The  category  of  metaphors  Denham  is  concerned  with  are  those  she 
terms  phenomenological  metaphors.  These,  she  holds,  have  the  following  properties 
(a)  They  function  catachretically,  in  that  they  introduce  a  new  use  for  an  old 
concept,  to  fill  a  lexical  gap. 
180  Denham  (2000)  p.  2. 
181  It  is  perhaps  worth  noting  that  the  two  definitions  offered  by  Denham,  (W)  and  (D),  seem  non- 
equivalent.  Say  we  grant  that  metaphors  express  propositions  that  don't  admit  of  literal  expression.  Still, 
it  seems  at  least  consistent  to  hold  that  the  truth  about  whether  a  given  metaphor  expresses  such  a 
proposition  p  is  analysable  into  some  statement  about  whether  its  author  intended  to  say  that  p,  or  about 
some  pattern  of  use  of  p,  or  the  like,  as  long  as  p  remains  non-literally  expressible.  Thus  disagreements 
stated  in  terms  of  metaphorical  meanings  might  be  held  to  depend  on  disagreements  about  speaker 
intentions,  or  about  use  properties.  Hence,  an  issue  of  whether  m  metaphorically  means  that  p  or  not 
might  be  conceptually  autonomous  is  Denham's  sense  and  not  in  Wright's.  Conversely,  if  all  metaphors 
were  amenable  to  literal  paraphrase,  it  might  still  come  out  that  disagreement  about  metaphorical  meaning 
was  compatible  with  complete  agreement  on  facts  concerning  speaker  intentions,  use,  context  and  the  like. 
Just  as  disagreement  about  whether  some  particular  incident  is  funny  might  be  consistent  with  shared 
knowledge  of  all  other  relevant  facts  of  the  matter  (to  take  Wright's  example  of  a  disputationally  pure 
discourse),  so  metaphorical  meaning  might  be  more  intimately  related  to  individual  taste  and  preference 
than  we  tend  to  think. 
138 (b)  They  "take  on  a  representational  role  which  would  otherwise  be  fulfilled  by  a 
response-dependent  concept,  i.  e.,  a  role  which  would  be  filled  by  a  response 
dependent  concept  were  one  available  in  the  speaker's  lexicon".  182 
(c)  They  are  minimally  truth-apt. 
(d)  They  are  conceptually  autonomous,  in  the  sense  expressed  by  (D). 
Moreover,  given  that  she  holds  that  a  metaphor  implicitly  proposes  some  relation  of 
similarity  to  obtain  between  its  topic  and  vehicle,  she  suggests 
(e)  If  any  metaphors  are  of  this  kind,  then  their  truth  or  assertibility  conditions  will 
consist  in  the  obtaining  of  some  relation  of  similarity  that  is  i)  capable  of  yielding 
determinate  truth  assignments  ii)  cannot  be  expressed  in  non-figurative  terms  and 
iii)  is  a  property  that  would  otherwise  be  identified  by  a  response  dependent 
concept. 
Denham  introduces  the  notion  of  austere  similarity,  to  describe  such  a  relation,  and 
argues  that  it  is  best  thought  of  as  being  constituted  by  the  responses  of  suitably  situated 
subjects.  She  draws  an  analogy  with  the  perceptual  case.  Defenders  of  response 
dependent  accounts  of  colour  hold  that  the  similarity  between  two  shades  of  e.  g.  pink  is 
not  reducible  to  any  'deeper'  metaphysical  feature  that  the  two  shades  have  in  common, 
but  consists  merely  in  the  fact  that  epistemically  well-placed  subjects  judge  that  they 
look  the  same.  In  the  same  way,  argues  Denham,  the  relations  of  austere  similarity 
expressed  by  phenomenological  metaphors  does  not  pick  out  a  set  of  common  features, 
that  we  might  in  principle  enumerate.  Rather,  such  relations  obtain  in  virtue  of  the  fact 
that  certain  external  states  of  affairs,  picked  out  by  the  vehicle  of  the  metaphor,  strike  us 
as  brutely  similar  to  certain  of  our  experiential  states.  We  may  not  be  capable,  even  in 
principle,  of  setting  out  any  exhaustive  list  of  common  features  'underwriting'  such 
judgements,  but  only  of  to  appealing  to  a  limited  and  provisional  set  of  seemingly 
relevant  features.  In  extreme  cases,  we  may  even  be  debarred  from 
doing  much  more  than  recording  the  proposed  similarity  in  the  very  same  terms  as  the 
metaphor,  merely  making  explicit  that  the  relation  is  one  of  similarity  by  inserting  the 
182 
Denham  (1998)  p.  236. 
139 requisite  'like'  or  'as'.  Even  if  the  reader  is  able  to  proffer  some  non-circular 
elucidation,  that  elucidation  may  fail  to  be  given  in  wholly  non-figurative  terms  -  it  may 
be  that  his  best  prospects  lie  in  offering  further  metaphors  and  further  figurative 
similarity  claims  as  elaborations  of  the  target  one.  183 
Denham's  theory  thus  bears  some  resemblance  to  the  Fogelin's  theory  outlined  above.  184 
Fogelin's  is  a  non-reductive  simile  theory,  since  it  does  not  attempt  to  assimilate 
metaphors  and  similes  to  cases  of  literal  comparison.  185  Denham's  theory  of 
phenomenological  metaphors  is  doubly  non-reductive,  however.  Not  only  does  she 
claim  that  the  simile  obtained  from  the  metaphorical.  utterance  is  an  (implicit)  non-literal 
comparison,  but  she  casts  doubt  on  the  idea  that  either  explicit  or  implicit  figurative 
comparisons  can  be  fully  spelled  out  in  literal  terms.  Fogelin  takes  similarity  to  consist 
in  a  shared  set  of  salient  features,  and  differentiates  between  literal  and  non-literal 
comparisons  by  postulating  a  contextually  variable  parameter  for  salience.  Denham,  in 
contrast,  holds  that  the  facts  about  similarity  that  constitute  the  metaphor's  truth 
condition  need  not  hold  in  virtue  of  any  shared  set  of  features,  except,  trivially,  their 
striking  us  as  similar. 
To  summarise,  Denham  seems  committed  to  the  truth  of  the  following  schema 
(PI)  Phenomenological  metaphor  q  means  that  phenomenological  state  Xis  like  Z 
where  Z  is  a  placeholder  for  some  actual  or  possible  type  of  state  of  affairs  picked  out  by 
the  vehicle  of  the  metaphor  q,  and  where  the  relevant  concept  of  likeness  is  one  that  can 
be  fully  captured  via  the  following  (a  priori  and  necessary)  provisional  equation 
(P2)  For  all  subjects  S  in  ideal  epistemic  circumstances,  (Phenomenological  state  X  is 
like  state  of  affairs  Z  iff  S  judges  that  X  is  like  Z) 
The  truth  conditions  for  the  metaphor  q  can  thus  be  given  as  follows 
183  Denham  (1998)  pp.  249-250. 
184  Fogelin  (1988) 
185  See  Tirrell  (199  1). 
140 (N)  q  is  true  iff  for  some  X  and  Zq  means  that  phenomenological  state  Xis  like  Z, 
and  all  subjects  S  in  ideal  epistemic  circumstances  would  judge  that  X  is  like  Z. 
Since  the  truth  conditions  essentially  include  a  type  of  state  of  affairs  picked  out  via  a 
figurative  comparison,  ('X  is  like  T)  phenomenological  metaphors  are  conceptually 
autonomous  in  the  Denham  sense. 
Is  an  analysis  of  this  kind  consistent?  As  we  can  see,  Denham's  preferred  account  of  the 
truth  conditions  for  phenomenological  metaphors  involve  appeal  to  ideal  subjects.  The 
judgements  of  such  subjects  constitute  the  facts  about  whether  a  given  experiential  state 
is  primitively  similar  to  the  state  of  affairs  picked  out  by  the  vehicle  of  the  metaphor.  186 
Now,  there  are  well  known  problems  with  explicating  metaphorical  meaning  in  terms  of 
likeness,  some  deriving  from  the  fact  that  as  can  be  like  Ps  in  irrelevant  respects,  and 
some  from  the  fact  that  as  can  fail  to  be  like  Ps  and  yet  befalsely  believed  to  be  so.  For 
example,  Wittgenstein  is  like  Kim  Cattrall  in  virtue,  inter  alia,  of  being  human,  but  the 
metaphor  'Wittgenstein  was  a  real  Kim  Cattrall'  is  not  thereby  appropriate.  Similarly, 
gorillas  are  shy,  retiring  creatures,  but  'The  bouncer  was  a  gorilla'  does  not  convey  that 
he  was  shy  and  retiring.  If  Denham  is  to  avoid  these.  problems  carrying  over  her 
account,  she  needs  some  principled  way  of  excluding  the  possibility  that  her  supposedly 
ideal  subjects  might  make  their  judgements  as  a  result  of  false  or  irrelevant  beliefs.  187 
It  might  seem  that  Denham's  appeal  to  austere  similarities  would  circumvent  this 
problem.  After  all,  that  appeal  was  supposed  to  allow  Denham  to  reject  the  idea  that 
whether  a  given  metaphor  is  true  ultimately  depends  on  the  obtaining  of  some  set  of 
similarities  which  might,  in  principle,  be  stated  in  literal  terms.  However,  it  is  important 
to  be  clear  that  this  move  does  not  remove  the  need  for  an  account  of  the  ideal  subject 
that  explains  why  such  subjects  would  not  have  false  or  irrelevant  beliefs.  Denham 
agrees  with  Wright  that  any  j  udgement-  dependent  account  of  some  putative  realm  of 
186  The  connection  with  the  Order  of  Determination  test  outlined  in  Chapter  I  should  be  obvious.  I 
discuss  the  various  tests  for  realism  further  in  the  next  chapter. 
187  It's  not  enough  to  simply  rule  this  out  by  fiat,  since  that  would  render  (P2)  trivial,  violating  the 
substantiality  constraint  on  provisional  equations.  I  refer  the  reader  back  to  Section  1.7  for  further 
discussion  of  the  constraints  on  such  equations. 
141 facts  must  give  a  substantive  account  of  the  nature  of  the  subjects  and  conditions  that 
allow  constitutive  judgements  to  be  made.  188 
Denham  is,  of  course,  aware  of  the  old  worries  about  similitude.  She  writes 
As  Goodman  and  Davidson  are  fond  of  pointing  out,  all  similarity  statements  are 
trivially  true:  they  cannot  fail  to  be  true,  since  everything  is  in  some  respects  similar  to 
everything  else  ...  If  I  were  concerned  with  absolute  truth  conditions  attaching  to 
sentences  in  null  contexts  this  would  be  problematic,  for  it  would  suggest  that  the  truth 
conditions  of  metaphors  (viewed  as  implicit  similes)  were  hopelessly  underdetermined. 
However,  the  level  of  meaning  at  which  I  have  located  the  determination  of  truth 
conditions  is  context  relative  (Grice's  utterance  type  occasion  meaning),  and  so  that 
worry  need  not  detain  us:  we  can  rely  on  our  knowledge  of  the  background  discourse 
and  situational  context  in  which  the  metaphor  occurs  to  constrain  the  range  of  possible 
similarities  to  a  class  of  relevant  ones.  189 
The  idea  seems  to  be,  then,  that  the  ideal  subjects  whose  judgements  constitute  the  facts 
about  whether  X  austerely  resembles  Z  can  be  a  priori  guaranteed  not  to  do  so  on 
irrelevant  grounds,  since  their  background  linguistic  knowledge  will  always  constrain 
the  range  of  similarities  to  relevant  ones. 
As  above,  then,  we  can  represent  such  putative  background  knowledge  as  I,  and  the 
linguistic  knowledge  that  entitles  us  to  constrain  the  'range  of  possible  similarities'  as  a 
conditional  of  the  form  I  ->  F,  where  F  stands  for  the  class  of  similarities  relevant  to  a 
given  utterance  of,  say  q.  But  now  an  incoherence  emerges  in  Denham's  theory.  For  if  a 
given  phenomenological  metaphor  q  is  to  be  conceptually  autonomous  in  the  sense  of 
being  irreducible  to  literal  paraphrase,  then  F  must  include  either  the  corresponding 
simile  s  or  some  other  irreducible  figurative  expressions  f]  -fn.  Otherwise  we  would 
have  identified  some  set  of  similarities  which  could  provide  a  literal  paraphrase  of  q, 
namely,  the  very  set  specified  in  the  consequent  of  the  relevant  conditional  I  ->  F.  The 
class  of  similarities  F,  if  it  is  not  to  provide  exactly  the  type  of  literal  paraphrase  that 
Denham  aims  to  avoid,  must  therefore  itself  include  figurative  elements. 
188  See  Wright  (1994)  p.  112,  Denham  (1998)  pp.  45-49 
189  Denham  (2000)  pp.  292-293. 
142 Now,  however,  we  are  back  where  we  started.  For  the  problem  of  how  we  narrowed 
down  the  set  of  possible  similarities,  excluding  irrelevant  ones  in  a  principled  manner, 
was  supposed  to  have  been  solved  by  citing  our  mastery  of  such  conditionals.  Since  it 
seems  that,  in  order  to  master  such  conditionals,  we  must  already  have  identified  the 
relevant  set  -  given  that  the  conditionals  involve  either  the  very  figurative  expression  in 
question  or  some  other  for  which  the  original  problem  arises  -  it  seems  that  we  have 
merely  deferred  the  hard  question;  why  those  similarities. 
Moreover,  this  requirement  seems  inconsistent  with  one  of  the  defining  characteristics  of 
phenomenological  metaphors,  namely,  the  fact  they  represent  an  instance  of  catachresis, 
plugging  a  lexical  gap  by  introducing  a  new  use  for  an  old  word  or  phrase.  Denham 
writes 
Phenomenological  metaphors  are  used  to  represent  phenomenally  characterized  states  of 
affairs  and  so  used  because  (to  the  knowledge  of  informed  and  competent  speakers)  no 
equally  suitable  word  or  expression  occurs  in  the  language  ...  they  are  one  way  of 
attempting  to  conceptualize  phenomenology  in  contexts  in  which  the  character  of  an 
experience  or  its  objects  is  too  fine-grained  or  too  idiosyncratic  to  be  represented  by  our 
standard  reperto  . ire  of  linguistic  concepts  -  our  standard  lexicon.  190 
But  if,  ex  hypothesi,  a  phenomenological  metaphor  is  being  introduced  to  make  up  for 
the  lack  of  a  linguistic  concept  in  our  standard  repertoire,  how  could  we  have  already 
mastered  conditionals  like  I  ->  F,  which  use  either  thevery  concept  that  was  supposed  to 
be  being  introduced,  or  some  other,  for  which  analogous  problems  arise? 
To  summarize,  Denham's  theory  seems  committed  to  both 
(a)  grasping  a  conditional  which  includes  some  irreducibly  metaphorical  element  q 
is  part  of,  or  entailed  by,  speaker  competence  with  a  given  language  L 
and 
190  Denham  (2000)  pp.  283. 
143 (b)  the  metaphor  q  can  be  introduced  into  a  language  for  the  first  time,  'to  fill  a 
lexical  gap',  by  means  of  some  linguistic  rule  that  only  draws  on  the  existing 
conceptual  resources  of  the  language  L. 
But  the  two  theses  seem  inconsistent.  Since  it  seems  that  q  (or  some  other  figure  for 
which  a  parallel  problem  arises)  must  be  apart  of  the  pre-existing  linguistic  rule  that 
supposedly  enables  us  to  master  its  truth-conditions,  (a)  and  (b)  are  mutually  exclusive. 
I  conclude  that  we  have,  so  far,  no  reason  to  believe  that  phenomenological  metaphors 
are  both  cognitive  and  conceptually  autonomous,  on  either  of  the  resolutions  of  that 
notion.  So  Denham's  attempt  to  elaborate  a  theory  of  metaphor  that  allows  metaphors 
both  to  express  distinctive  cogniti  ve  contents,  and  to  be  resistant  to  literal  paraphrase,  is, 
I  believe,  unsuccessful. 
That  said,  it  is  clear  that  rejecting  an  instance  of  a  theory-type  is  clearly  not  to 
undermine  the  approach  in  general.  In  Chapter  5,1  will  outline  an  approach  to 
metaphorical  content  that  would  provide  the  combination  of  propositional  content  and 
irreducibility  that  Denham  aims  to  secure. 
3.6  Conclusion 
There  are  many  objections  to  Davidson's  theory  of  metaphor,  and  many  rival  theories 
have  been  constructed  in  the  thirty  or  so  years  since  'What  Metaphors  Mean'  was 
published.  I  have  not  attempted  to  address  all  of  them  here,  and  nor  have  I  aimed  to  treat 
those  I  did  discuss  in  the  depth  that  they  deserve.  However,  I  hope  to  have  demonstrated 
that  certain  influential  objections  may  be  more  tractable  than  is  sometimes 
acknowledged,  and  that  some  key  rival  theories  may  face  distinctive  difficulties  of  their 
own.  My  central  aim  has  been  to  elaborate  the  Davidsonian  position  in  a  way  that 
complements  the  discussion  of  the  previous  chapter,  and  to  demonstrate  its  prinlafacie 
defensibility  in  the  light  of  popular  criticism. 
I  will  now  broaden  my  focus  of  attention,  turning  to  the  'marks  of  realism'  outlined  in 
Chapter  1.  How  do  considerations  of  Truth-Minimalism,  Evidence  Transcendence, 
Cognitive  Command  and  Order  of  Determination  bear  on  my  conclusions  to  date? 
144 145 4.  Metaphor  and  the  Tests  for  Realism 
4.1  Introduction 
In  Chapter  1,1  set  out  a  generic  approach  to  disputes  involving  the  objective  status  of  a 
given  realm  of  fact.  I  elaborated  Wright's  minimalist  and  pluralist  approach  to  truth,  and 
outlined  the  range  of  'tests'  that  he  suggests  might  serve  to  focus  debate  between  the 
realist  and  anti-realist.  In  the  next  chapter,  I  went  on  to  examine  the  nature  of 
Davidson's  well  known  anti-realism  about  metaphorical  meaning,  and  to  describe  what  I 
took  to  be  his  motivation  for  that  position.  The  detailed  character  of  Davidson's  error 
theory  emerged  more  clearly  in  the  last  chapter,  in  the  course  of  correcting  misplaced 
objections  to  it.  Moreover,  I  there  attempted  to  highlight  the  range  of  dialectical 
resources,  defensive  and  offensive,  that  are  seemingly  open  to  the  error-theorist  in 
securing  his  position  against  more  serious  objections,  and  making  trouble  for  his  realist 
opponents. 
My  stated  aim  in  this  work  is  to  offer  a  preliminary  examination  of  the  significance  of 
recent  work  on  realism  for  the  question  of  whether  we  should  think  of  metaphors  as 
expressing  propositional  linguistic  contents.  It  ought  to  be  clear  at  this  stage  that  I  face  a 
strategic  difficulty.  On  the  one  hand,  a  comprehensive  review  of  theories  of  metaphor, 
and  putative  replies  to  Davidson,  is  far  too  ambitious  a  project  to  attempt  here.  I  have 
endeavoured  to  develop  error-theoretic  rejoinders  to  central,  widely  endorsed  and 
influential  objections,  and  to  point  out  some  of  the  difficulties  faced  by  Davidson's 
opponents,  but  no  doubt  many  questions  still  remain,  with  many  more  being  raised  by 
my  suggested  replies. 
On  the  other  hand,  having  outlined  in  some  degree  of  detail  the  motivation  and 
dialectical  resources  of  error  theory  about  m-meaning,  and  offered  a  cautious  optimism 
about  that  position's  standing  in  each  case,  it  might  seem  that  I  have  rather  foreclosed  on 
146 a  broader  examination  of  the  various  cruces  I  set  out  in  Chapter  1.  As  I  will  argue  in 
Section  4.2  below,  the  fact  that  the  error  theorist's  fundamental  motivation  relies  on 
appeal  to  norms  which  are  internal  to  semantic  discourse,  broadly  construed,  seems  to 
entail  that  such  a  discussion  could  only  concern  the  realist  standing  of  semantic  talk  in 
general,  since  that  is  what  realists  about  m-meaning  can  be  defensibly  held  to  aspire  to. 
Such  a  task  is  clearly  also  much  too  ambitious  to  be  undertaken  here.  Moreover,  given 
that  such  work  would  have  served  merely  a  prelude  to  pointing  out  the  error-theoretic 
reasons  for  holding  that,  in  the  case  of  metaphor  such  talk  failed  of  truth,  whatever  its 
realist  pretensions,  the  overall  effect  would  be  rather  bathetic. 
I  intend  to  proceed  as  follows.  From  Section  4.3  onwards,  I  bring  the  detailed 
discussion  of  the  character  of  Davidson's  error  theory  to  a  close,  and  instead  embark 
upon  a  slightly  more  neutral  enquiry  into  the  standing  of  his  (A6).  I  shall  try  not  to  rely 
on  the  assumption  that  other  aspects  of  a  broadly  Davidsonian  theory  have  been 
demonstrated  to  be  correct,  since  (a)  there  are  significant  rival  theories  that  I  have  not 
(and  will  not)  consider  in  depth,  and  (b)  I  have  conceded  that  even  a  Davidsonian  should 
accept  that  a  'speaker-meaning'  account  of  metaphorical  meaning  has  its  place.  I  will 
endeavour  to  relate  the  supposed  limitlessness  and  non-conceptual  character  of  metaphor 
to  the  tests  for  realism  about  m-meaning  in  a  way  that  of  interest  to,  and  consistent  with, 
a  number  of  different  theories  of  metaphor. 
However,  I  do  think  that  the  ontological  parsimony  and  printafacie  defensibility  of  an 
error-theoretic  account  places  a  significant  burden  of  proof  on  Davidson's  realist  rivals. 
Ib  egin,  therefore,  by  considering  one  final  argument  against  a  generic  error-theoretic 
position,  an  argument  that,  if  good,  and  applicable  to  the  case  at  hand,  would 
successfully  serve  to  undermine  the  motivation  for  Davidson's  position. 
4.2  Wright's  Argument  against  Error  theories 
Wright,  remember,  is  a  minimalist  and  a  pluralist  about  truth.  His  truth  minimalism 
consists  of  two  claims,  relating  to  (1)  truth  and  (2)  truth-aptitude.  The  former  amounts 
to  the  claim  that  it  is  sufficient  for  a  given  predicate  T  to  meet  the  conceptual 
147 requirements  on  truth  that  it  accord  with  a  series  ofpIatitudes.  A  richly  metaphysical  or 
epistemic  account  of  truth  is  not  secured  merely  by  reflective  appeal  to  such 
uncontroversial  principles.  Minimalism  about  truth  aptitude  comprises  two  sub-claims; 
(a)  that  possession  of  truth  aptitude  is  co-extensional  with  possession  of  assertoric 
content  and  (b)  that  it  suffices  for  an  utterance  or  discourse  to  be  assertoric  that  it  meet 
two  constraints  regarding  (i)  syntax  and  (ii)  discipline.  Roughly,  if  a  sentence  embeds 
appropriately  under  negation,  etc,  and  there  are  publicly  shared  standards  which 
determine  when  it  is  correct  and  incorrect  to  employ  it,  then  the  sentence  possesses 
assertoric  content.  Finally,  Wright's  pluralism  results  from  his  view  that  although  truth 
is  conceptually  minimal,  it  may  be  metaphysically  robust,  in  a  variety  of  kinds  and 
degrees,  across  different  subject  areas.  Truth  can  be  de/Ined  in  minimal  terms;  but  what 
falls  under  or  realizes  that  definition  in  particulaK  cases  may  be  metaphysically 
substantial. 
Wright  argues  that  such  a  conception  of  truth  makes  life  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for 
error  theorists.  Discussing  the  question  of  whether  scope  for  error  theory  is  simply 
closed  off  by  a  minimal  theory  of  truth,  he  writes: 
The  position,  I  think,  is  that  error-theoretic  proposals  remain  theoretically  feasible  but 
that  their  development  is  interestingly  constrained.  Suppose  a  philosopher  denies  that 
anything  or  much  of  what  we  say  within  a  given  discourse  is  true  but  grants  that  its  truth 
predicate  admits  interpretation  as  superassertibility  by  its  standards  of  assertoric 
warrant.  191  Then  he  has  to  produce  reason  to  deny  that  anything,  or  very  much,  of  what 
we  say  is  superassertible  by  the  lights  of  those  standards.  And  that  will  be  a 
commitment  to  denying  that  any,  or  very  many,  of  the  statements  of  the  discourse  are 
even  assertible  by  those  standards. 
Wright  goes  on  to  identify  two  possible  strategies  for  the  error-theorist  who  aims  to 
show  precisely  this: 
191  A  sentence  is  superassertible,  remember,  if  we  are  episternically  justified  in  asserting  it,  given  our 
current  state  of  information,  and  we  would  remain  so  justified  given  any  way  that  that  state  of  information 
might  be  'enlarged  or  improved'. 
148 One  is  to  contend  that  while  the  standards  in  question  are  perfectly  coherent,  little  of 
what  we  accept  really  complies  with  them;  our  'error',  on  this  view,  will  consist  in  a 
propensity  to  apply  those  standards  erroneously.  The  other  is  to  argue  that  the  discourse 
is  not  governed  by  coherent  standards  of  assertoric,  warrant,  and  consequently  that 
nothing  is  genuinely  warranted  by  those  standards  ...  The  great  question,  it  seems  to  me, 
is  not  the  coherence  of  error  theory  but  its  motivation;  why  insist  on  construing  the 
discourse  in  terms  of  a  notion  of  truth  which  has  us  in  massive  error  when  the  alternative 
of  superassertibility  isprintafacie  available  and  would  avoid  the  charge?  192 
Wright's  question  is  an  important  one,  and  pressing  in  the  present  instance.  Davidson's 
theory  of  metaphor  apparently  represents  everyday  talk  and  thought  as  being  in  massive 
error.  When  we  call  metaphors  true  or  false,  or  talk  about  what  they  say,  or  signify  or 
mean,  we  are  completely  mistaken.  How  can  this  be  the  most  charitable  interpretation  of 
our  practice?  Isn't  the  minimalist  account  -  that  represents  us  as  being  answerable  to 
standards  of  warrant  which  are  internal  to  the  practice  of  making/interpreting  metaphors, 
and  which  can,  therefore,  secure  the  defensibility  of  our  standard  ways  of  thinking  about 
metaphorical  meaning  -  by  far  the  more  plausible  position?  This  seems  especially 
worrying  in  the  light  of  the  'mocked-up'  account  of  truth  and  falsity  that  I  sketched  on 
behalf  of  the  Davidsonian  in  the  last  chapter.  If  some  such  account  is  available,  then 
why  not  simply  identify  the  norms  governing  our  attributions  of  m-meaning  with  the 
norms  of  the  alleged  fiction?  The  error  theorist  seems  compelled  to  explain  why  he 
takes  the  standards  of  correct  use  that  govern  our  way  with  metaphors  as  having  been  set 
so  high  that  we  almost  always  fail  to  accord  with  them,  when  he  himself  is  committed  to 
the  existence  of  a  much  lower  standard,  whose  demands  we  manage  regularly  to  respect. 
The  idea  that  minimalist  theories  of  metaphorical  meaning  have  such  a  default  status  has 
been  defended  in  the  literature,  notably  by  Denham.  193  She  writes: 
How  does  my  account  of  phenomenological  metaphor  answer  the  objection  that 
irreducible  metaphors  do  not  express  truth-apt  judgements?  Can  it  show  that 
phenomenological  metaphors  are  held  accountable  to  sufficiently  stable  standards  of 
correctness  in  the  absence  of  any  non-circular  analysis  in  literal  terms?  I  aim  to  do  that 
192 
Wright  (1992)  pp.  86-87 
193 
Denham  (2000)  Ch  7-9 
149 somewhat  indirectly,  by  showing  how  we  might  assess  whether  or  not  a  subject 
understands  a  given  metaphor;  I  take  it  that  if  we  have  to  hand  standards  or  norms  which 
are  sufficiently  disciplined  to  determine  attributions  of  understanding,  we  have  also 
standards  or  norms  which  are  sufficiently  disciplined  to  confer  the  status  'truth-apt'.  194 
I  actually  agree  with  many  of  the  suggestions  Denham  makes  regarding  the  criteria  for 
'manifesting  understanding'  of  a  metaphor.  The  capacity  to  elaborate  a  metaphor  using 
a  mixture  of  literal  commentary  and  further  figuration;  the  fact  that  one  is  able  to  pick 
out  paradigm  instances  of  objects,  events,  etc,  that  would  fall  under  particular 
metaphorical  characterizations;  the  ability  to  extend  the  metaphor  in  the  natural  way  - 
all  these  suggestions  seem  eminently  sensible.  So  it  may  seem  that  Wright's  minimalist 
-challenge  to  the  error-theorist  can  be  reinforced  by  the  development  of  a  set  of  plausible 
proposals  describing  the  nature  of  the  more  modest  standards  the  minimalist  appeals  to. 
However,  such  an  argument  is  not,  I  think,  nearly  as  attractive  in  the  case  at  hand  as  it  is 
in  e.  g.  that  of  moral,  aesthetic  or  mathematical  talk.  Consider  an  analogy.  It  ought  to  be 
uncontroversial  that  error-theory  about  phlogiston,  or  the  humours,  is  the  appropriate 
position  to  take.  When  scientists  posited  the  existence  of  such  substances,  it  was  hoped 
that  they  would  thereby  play  a  genuinely  explanatory  role  in  accounting  for  certain 
natural  phenomena.  When  it  turned  out  that  such  explanatory  work  could  not  be 
delivered  in  a  way  that  was  consistent  with  other  of  the  commitments  of  natural  science, 
the  original  motivation  for  believing  in  such  entities  simply  lapsed.  The  good  standing 
of  assertions  about  phlogiston  depended  upon  their  being  sanctioned  by  the  existing, 
reflectively  endorsed  norms  governing  scientific  practice  and  discussion.  It  would  have 
been  wholly  inappropriate  to  think  of  retreating  to  a  less  denianding  norin  of  correctness 
for  e.  g.  phlogiston-assertions.  The  point  of  the  standards  that  govern  scientific  discourse 
as  a  ivhole  would  simply  have  been  undermined  by  such  a  move.  The  same,  the 
Davidsonian  should  maintain,  is  true  of  the  case  of  metaphorical  meaning.  Better 
founded,  more  fundamental  commitments  of  our  thought  about  meaning  count  seriously 
against  us  our  taking  talk  of  m-meaning  seriously. 
194 
Denham  (2000)  p.  318-319 
150 It  is  no  doubt  arguable  that  talk  about  meaning  is  less  robustly  objective  than  theoretical 
science,  although  this  is  scarcely  uncontroversial.  The  issue  can  be  pressed  on  a  number 
of  fronts.  For  example,  in  Section  2.8  above,  I  committed  the  Davidsonian  to  the 
following  principle; 
(Epistemic  Access)  If  a  metaphor  m-means  that  P,  then  (in  somewhat  idealized 
conditions)  we  can  get  some  warrant  for  believing  that  it  m-means 
that  P. 
Such  a  principle  bears  in  an  obvious  way  on  the  question  of  how  the  objective  standing 
of  the  discourse  is  illuminated  by  the  first  of  Wright's  key  tests: 
(Evidence  Transcendence)  Does  the  discourse  at  issue  include  sentences  with  regard 
to  which  a)  we'95  have  no  evidence  that  bears  on  their 
truth  value,  and  b)  we  lack  a  conception  of  any  way  in 
which  we  might-come  to  get  such  evidence? 
Moreover,  Davidson's  well-known  identification  of  amenability  to  radical  interpretation 
as  the  constitutive  mark  of  the  semantic  might  lead  us  to  think  that  meaning-talk  is  best 
construed  in  a  response-dependent  manner,  with  semantic  facts  being  constituted  rather 
than  tracked  by  the  judgements  of  a  suitably  informed  radical  interpreter.  1  96  So  the 
Order  of  Determination  test  might  also  be  taken  to  be  resolved  in  the  favour  of  the 
anti-realist  about  semantic  facts,  broadly  construed; 
(Order-of-Determination)  Given  that  we  can  identify  a  true  Provisional  Equation 
involving  the  discourse  at  issue,  do  the  best  judgements  of 
ideally  placed  subjects  constititte  the  relevant  facts,  or 
merely  track  independently  constituted  facts? 
Questions  regarding  Wide  Cosmological  Role  seem  similarly  resoluble,  since  there 
seems  little  priniafacie  reason  to  suppose  that  semantic  facts  enter  into  a  suitably  wide 
195  Or,  perhaps,  some  suitably  idealised  counterparts  of  us. 
196  See  (1984)  passim,  especially  Essays  1,2,9  and  10. 
151 variety  of  explanations.  Finally,  it  is  unclear  whether  it  is  really  apriori  that  every 
disagreement  over  a  semantic  fact  results  from  a  cognitive  failing,  in  the  way  that 
Cognitive  Command  demands,  since  it  is  unclear  exactly  what  e.  g.  Quinean-style 
semantic  indeterminacy  shows  us  about  the  cognitive  standing  of  judgements  of 
linguistic  meaning.  197  So  it  might  seem  that  minimalism  about  meaning  in  general  is 
mandated  by  broadly  Davidsonian  commitments  in  other  areas  of  philosophy  of 
language,  providing  a  disanalogy  with  the  scientific  case  alluded  to  above.  198 
This  would  be  to  mistake  the  point  of  the  analogy  with  outdated  scientific  theory, 
however.  The  point  is  rather  that  ivhatever  the  realist  standing  ofthe  constitutive  nornis 
governing  a  given  discourse,  it  must  always  be  a  live  possibility  that  assertions  which 
appeared  to  be  warranted  by  such  norms  might  turn  out  not  to  be.  So  much  is  written 
into  the  notion  of  a  genuine  norm  or  standard.  A  standard  that  could  not,  even  in 
principle,  fail  to  be  lived  up  to,  could  provide  no  conceivable  influence  on  action  or 
belief,  and  thus  would  hardly  be  playing  a  normative  role  at  all.  One  cannot  sincerely 
intend  to  bring  one's  actions  into  accord  with  something  that  will  sanction  them  no 
matter  what.  199  Susceptibility  to  error  is  built  into  the  notion  of  respecting  a  norm.  So 
even  if  semantic  discourse  is  accountable  to  merely  minimal  standards  of  correctness  - 
which  is  itself,  of  course,  hotly  debatable  -  there  ought  still  to  be  an  open  possibility  that 
we  have  mistakenly  taken  certain  of  our  judgements  to  be  warranted  by  those  standards, 
when  in  fact  they  ought  to  have  been  rejected. 
That,  in  effect,  is  the  contention  of  the  Davidsonian  position  I  have  been  sketching  in 
earlier  chapters.  Such  a  position  does  not  accept  that  discourse  about  the  meaning  of 
metaphors  is  independent  of  semantic  discourse  more  widely  construed.  Rather,  it  holds 
that  constitutive  elements  of  that  wider  discourse  -  Compositionality,  Episternic 
Access,  the  constitutive  goals  of  a  pragmatic  theory,  et  al  -  provide  the  resources  for  a. 
demonstration  that  no  suitable  account  of  m-meaning  is  genuinely  forthcoming  even  by 
the  potentially  minimal  lights  of  that  very  discourse.  Just  as  in  the  scientific  cases, 
principles  and  data  that  we  count  as  better  grounded,  or  at  least  more  fundamental,  are 
197S  ee  e.  g.  Quine  (1960)  Ch  2,  Evans  (1975)  for  discussion  of  such  semantic  indeterminacy. 
198  Wittgensteinian  and  Kripkean  worries  about  rule-following  might  also  serve  to  establish  a  meaning- 
minimalism.  For  relevant  discussion  of  the  stability  of  such  a  position,  see  Wright  (1992)  Ch  6. 
199  See  Petitt  (1990)  for  an  extended  defence  of  this  thought. 
152 alleged  to  overthrow  the  apparent  warrant  for  committing  to  a  given  theoretical  entity. 
This  does  not  seem  a  wholly  implausible  position  to  take.  Accord  with  principles  like 
Composition  ality,  or  something  very  in  their  neighbourhood,  seems  simply  mandatory 
for  anything  worth  regarding  a  properly  semantic  discourse  at  all.  And  if  discourse 
about  m-meaning  -  realism  about  distinctive  propositional  contents  conveyed  by 
metaphors  -  is  not  a  form  of  semantic  discourse,  it  becomes  very  unclear  what  is. 
In  a  sense,  then,  the  Davidsonian  error  theorist  takes  the  first  of  the  two  dialectical 
strategies  that  Wright  offers: 
to  contend  that  while  the  standards  in  question  are  perfectly  coherent,  little  of  what 
we  accept  really  complies  with  them;  our  'error',  on  this  view,  will  consist  in  a 
propensity  to  apply  those  standards  erroneously. 
However,  this  has  to  be  understood  in  a  qualified  manner.  The  error  theorist  will 
typically  concede  that  much  of  semantic  discourse  is  well-founded  in  the  light  of  its 
proper  standards,  rejecting  only  those  parts  of  it  that  mistqkenly  extended  to  the  story  of 
'how  metaphor  works  its  wonders'.  The  intended  lesson  of  the  phlogiston  example  was 
that  the  debate  regarding  the  existence  of  metaphorical  meaning  is  a  debate  which  is 
internal  to  semantics.  Theorists  like  Denham,  who  aim  to  give  a  'self-standing' 
minimalist  account  of  the  metaphor,  simply  fail  to  give  sufficient  regard  to  the  internal 
connections  between  superficially  'different'  discourses.  Such  a  mistake  is  unsurprising, 
and  tempting,  in  the  light  of  the  sketchy  and  intuitive  notion  of  'discourse'  that  Wright 
appeals  to  in  the  course  of  setting  out  his  framework  for  debates  about  realism.  But  it  is 
a  mistake  nevertheless.  Metaphorical  meaning,  if  it  lives  at  all,  lives  in  the  shadow  of 
meaning  proper,  and  inconsistency  with  key  commitments  of  that  grolinding  discourse 
spells  doom  for  realism  about  metaphorical  content.,  Mere  surface  discipline  in 
insufficient  in  this  kind  of  case.  200 
200  Similar  arguments  could  be  adduced  against  e.  g.  minimalism  about  the  analytic/synthetic  distinction.  If 
it  turns  out  that  the  notion  of  analyticity  is  thrown  into  confusion  by  central  facts  about  dicaning  in 
general,  then  adverting  to  the  surface  discipline  of  ascriptions  of  analyticity  could  not  -pace  minimalist 
descendants  of  Grice  and  Strawson  -  suffice  to  rehabilitate  it. 
153 The  foregoing  line  of  thought  no  doubt  requires  much  more  in  the  way  of  elaboration 
and  qualification.  Like  many  other  aspects  of  this  work,  it  marks  more  of  a  direction  of 
travel  than  a  route  map.  If  it  can  be  made  defensible,  however,  then  it  marks  one, 
admittedly  modest,  area  in  which  debates  about  the  nature  of  realism  can  be  clarified  by 
examination  of  the  case  of  metaphor.  It  is  easy  to  overlook  how  much  is  built  in  to 
Wright's  notion  of  a  discourse,  and  equally  easy  to  assume  that  change  of  focus  marks 
change  of  subject.  Do  moral  talk,  aesthetic  evaluation  and  epistemology  count  as  three 
different  forms  of  discourse,  or  as  three  sub-branches  of  a  more  general  language-game 
involving  the  making  andjustifying  of  non-native  ascriptions?  It's  difficult  to  tell,  but  a 
lot  hangs  on  the  answer.  If  it  turned  out,  for  example,  that  deep,  constitutive  epistemic 
commitments  undercut  a  certain  species  of  moral  or  aesthetic  judgement,  Wright's  plea 
for  charitable  construal  of  everyday  talk  would  carry  quite  different  weight,  depending 
on,  how  we  individuated  discourses.  201  1  do  not  pretend  that  Wright  is  unaware  of  this, 
nor  that  the  plea  for  charity  of  construal  might  not  be  reformulated  in  a  way  that  would 
help  address  it.  But  as  the  case  of  Denham  has  shown,  it  is  easy  for  even  sophisticated 
theorists,  familiar  with  the  details  of  Wright's  work,  to  overlook  the  possibility  of  appeal 
to  internal  clash  of  standards.  Even  if  the  dialectical  strategy  that  I  have  offered  to  the 
error  theorist  fails  in  a  given  case,  or  even  in  every  case,  it  at  least  ought  to  be  considered 
seriously  and  argued  against.  The  case  of  metaphorical  meaning,  I  believe,  brings  this 
simple  moral  out  quite  nicely.  202 
4.3  Metaphor  and  Evidence  Transcendence 
In  Section  2.5,1  outlined  what  I  took  to  be  the  best  'master-argument'  for  Davidson's 
key  theses  about  metaphor.  A  central  plank  of  that  argument  was  principle  (A2): 
(A2)  If  a  proposed  assignment  of  a  metaphorical  content  to  a  utterance 
201  Similarly,  transcendental  arguments  for  the  existence  of  epistemic  norms  would  bear  in  quite  a  different 
way  on  the  metaphysical  possibility  of  moral  norms. 
202  Moreover,  it  gives  further  support  to  the  broad  church,  holistic  methodology  that  I  defended  in  Chapter 
1.  If  we  aren't  sure  exactly  what  a  discourse  is,  it  can  hardly  be  wise  to  rely  on  such  a  semantic  notion  to 
the  exclusion  of  other  equally  well-founded  epistemic  and  metaphysical  commitments. 
154 results  solely  from  an  unacceptable  theory  of  metaphor,  then  the  utterance  does 
not  express  that  content. 
I  expressed  the  hope  there  that  (A2)  would  be  common  ground  between  realists  and  anti- 
realists  about  metaphor.  Such  an  expression  can  often  turn  out  to  be  overly  optimistic. 
In  Section  2.8,  in  a  slightly  different  context,  I  did  set  out  one  obvious  defence  of  (A2), 
were  one  to  be  demanded,  as  follows.  Grant  the  following  two  principles: 
(Warrant)  If  a  theory  is  crazy,  then  it  doesn't  give  warrant  to  beliefs  formed  on  the 
basis  of  it. 
(Epistemic  Access)  If  a  metaphor  m-means  that  P,  then  (in  somewhat  idealized 
conditions)  we  can  get  some  warrant  for  believing  that  it  m-means 
that  P. 
Now,  assume  that  the  only  putative  warrant  that  we  could  get  for  an  ascription  of  m- 
meaning  was  a  crazy  theory.  By  (Warrant),  no  warrant  for  believing  that  the  metaphor 
did  have  such  a  content  would  spring  from  that  theory.  So  we  would  have  no  warrant  at 
all  for  accepting  the  ascription.  Modus  tollens  on  (Episternic  Access)  gives  us  that  the 
metaphor  does  not  have  that  content,  and  conditional  proof  gives  us  the  plausible  version 
of  (A2). 
I  noted  above  that  the  latter  principle,  (Epistemic  Access),  seems,  if  good,  to  resolve  the 
first  of  Wright's  cruces: 
(Evidence  Transcendence)  Does  the  discourse  at  issue  include  sentences  with  regard 
to  which  a)  we  203  have  no  evidence  that  bears  on  their 
truth  value,  and  b)  we  lack  a  conception  of  any  way  in 
which  we  might  come  to  get  such  evidence?  204 
203  Or,  perhaps,  some  suitably  idealized  counterparts  of  us. 
204  1  will  abbreviate  these  principles  to  (EA)  and  (ET)  for  ease  of  reference  in  this  section. 
155 If  we  can  always  get  some  warrant  for  the  true  belief  that  a  metaphor  means  that  P,  then 
it  seems  harmless  to  think  of  some  moderately  idealized  counterpart  of  us  as  actually 
possessing  such  evidence.  Moreover,  our  grounds  for  accepting  something  like  (EA) 
presumably  depends  upon  our  having  some  conception  of  how  we  might  go  about 
getting  some  evidence  relating  to.  what  the  metaphor  means.  Either  way,  commitment  to 
(ET)  seems  assured. 
Most  extant  realists  are  likely  to  agree  with  such  a  position.  The  general  strategy 
embarked  on  by  a  realist  theory  of  metaphor  is  to  show  how  some  well-founded 
linguistic  theory  justifies  us  in  ascribing  meaning  to  metaphors.  Admittedly, 
presumption  of  global  knowability  is  rarely  explicitly  stated,  but  that  is  in  general  best 
explained  by  the  fact  that  it  is  widely  adhered  to.  205 
- 
Take,  for  example,  any  theory  of  metaphor  that  gives  a  special  determinative  role  to 
speaker's  intentions.  206  We  typically  assume  that  we  can  come  to  possess  warrant  for 
belýefs  about  what  people  intend,  and  that  such  an  assumption  is  not  merely  a  reflection 
of  wholly  contingent  epistemic  luck,  but  something  that  reflects  on  ivhat  it  is  to  form  an 
intention..  There  are,  of  course,  complications.  We  might  be  skeptical  about  whether 
intentions  are  always  really  warrantable  from  the  third  person  point  of  view,  or  might 
have  theoretical  or  dispositional  reasons  for  ascribing  widespread  self-deception 
regarding  our  actual  goals  and  purposes.  Nevertheless,  first  person  access  is  a  perfectly 
respectable  way  of  getting  access  about  one's  plans,  and  even  the  most  extreme  Freudian 
has  soine  idea  about  how  we  might  go  about  getting  some  evidence  regarding  what 
somebody  intends  to  do.  So  it  seems  that  adherents  of  the  'default',  speaker's  meaning 
position  ought  to  sign  up  to  an  anti-realist  reply  to  (ET). 
More  generally,  contextualists  like  Recanati,  Bezuidenhout  or  Stem  are  likely  to  include 
the  intentions  of  the  speaker  as  one  relevant  factor  determining  the  nature  of  the  context 
in  question.  207  Since  sensitivity  to  such  contextual  factors  is'generally  a  feature  of  such 
205  It  is  easy  to  see  why  this  might  be  so.  Wittgenstein's  insistence  that  meaning  be  manifested  in  use,  and 
Quine's  rejection  of  the  'myth  of  the  museum',  have  had  lasting  influence  in  the  philosophy  of  language. 
206  For  example,  Grice  (1975),  Searle  (1993),  Martinich  (1984),  etc. 
207  See  e.  g.  Stem's  account  of  presupposition,  that  plays  a  central  role  in  the  semantics  of  the  Mthat 
operator,  and  that  relies  on  recognition  of  what  a  speaker  is  'representing  themselves'  as  doing.  Stern 
156 contextualists'  accounts  of  linguistic  mastery,  commitment  to  the  epistemic  tractability 
of  intention  seems  secured.  A  similar  argument  can  be  given  for  sophisticated 
comparison  theorists  such  as  Fogelin,  who  make  essential  play  with  shifting  contextual 
standards  in  giving  their  non-reductive  account  of  figurative  likeness.  Similarly, 
theorists  who  make  essential  appeal  to  linguistic  convention,  like  Denham,  seem 
committed  to  our  knowing,  perhaps  tacitly,  what  such  conventions  demand  of  us. 
Nevertheless,  I  shall,  in  Chapter  5,  sketch  a  robustly  realist  account  of  limitlessness,  that 
entails  that  (ET)  fails.  As  far  as  I  know,  no  contemporary  realist  endorses  such  a 
position,  but  it  does  admit  of  some  independent  motivation.  Since  it  turns  on 
assimilating  the  open-endedness  of  metaphor  to  a  kind  of  vagueness,  however,  the  most 
interesting  construal  of  (ET)  is  not  threatened.  For  the  distinction  between  e.  g.  the 
domain  of  mathematical  truth,  which  we  can  conceive  of  as  containing  interestingly 
unknowable  elements,  and  judgements  of  the  relative  painfulness  of  our  experiential 
state,  is  surely  not  wholly  undermined  by  granting  that  it  is  conceivable  that  we  could 
(essentially)  lack  warrant  in  certain  borderline  cases  of  the  latter. 
I  provisionally  conclude,  then,  that  (ET)  ought  to  be  answered  in  an  anti-realist  spirit,  in 
the  case  of  metaphorical  meaning.  The  case  of  metaphor,  like  that  of  colour,  morals, 
beauty  and  phenomenology,  seems  fated  to  be  fought  within  a  more  closely 
episternically  demarcated  area  than  e.  g.  realist/anti-realist  disputes  about  mathematics, 
fundamental  physics,  or  the  past. 
4.4  Metaphor  and  Cognitive  Command  I 
The  case  of  (Cognitive  Command)  is  more  difficult  to  appraise,  even  putting  aside 
Wright's  broader  worries  about  that  supposed  test.  208  A  discourse  is  held  by  Wright  to 
accepts  that  his  account  of  presuppositions  relies  on  the  idea  that  they  are  'somehow  ...  manifest  in  the 
utterance'.  Stern  (2000)  p  122.  That  seems  enough  to  secure  the  suggested  answer  to  (ET). 
20'  For  ease  of  discussion,  I  will  assume  that  (Cognitive  Command)  has  somehow  been  improved  so  that 
it  can  test  for  questions  relating  to  the  sense  in  which  talk  about  metaphorical  meaning  is  robustly, 
cognitively  representational.  If  this  simplifying  assumption  turns  out  to  be  false,  the  Quandary  account  of 
the  difference  between  'disputes  of  inclination'  and  'matters  of  fact'  is  presumably  an  available  fallback 
157 be  robustly,  cognitively,  representational,  remember,  just  in  case  some  defensible 
version  of  the  following  holds; 
(CC)  It  is  a  priori  that  differences  of  opinion  arising  within  a  given  discourse  can  be 
satisfactorily  explained  only  in  tenns  of  'divergent  input'  (that  is,  the  disputants 
working  on  the  basis  of  different  information,  and  hence  guilty  of  ignorance  or 
error,  depending  on  the  status  of  that  information),  or  'unsuitable  conditions' 
(resulting  in  inattention  or  distraction,  and  so  -in  inferential  error,  or  oversight  of 
data,  etc.  ),  or  'malfunction'  (for  example,  prejudicial  assessment  of  data, 
upwards  or  downwards,  or  dogma,  or  failings  in  other  categories  already 
209 
listed). 
On  the  one  hand,  it  is  difficult  not  to  agree  with  the  letter  of  Davidson's  claim  when  he 
claims  that  'there  is  no  test  for  metaphor  that  does  not  call  for  taste'.  210  On  the  other,  it 
is  difficult  to  get  clear  on  what  precise  significance  this  is  supposed  to  have  for  the 
debate  about  cognitive  standing,  particularly  when  the  broader  context  of  his  remarks 
make  it  clear  that  his  primary  concern  is  to  reject  the  idea  that  metaphor  production, 
recognition  and  interpretation  is  rule-governed  in  any  'mechanical'  sense  of  that  term. 
Such  a  position  is  perfectly  compatible  with  a  certain  kind  ofparticularist,  intuitional 
epistemology  of  metaphor. 
Perhaps,  then  we  ought  to  apply  Wright's  'forced  march'  for  the  cognitivist  about 
metaphorical  meaning.  One  who  holds  that  metaphorical  meaning  accords  with  some 
suitable  revised  cousin  of  (CC)  must  make  the  case  by  identifying  a  'cognitive'  route  to 
the  relevant  facts.  Such  a  cognitive  route  will  be  either  inferential  or  direct.  If  direct, 
then  the  intuitional  epistemology  needs  to  be  defended.  If  inferential,  then  the  nature  of 
position.  If  that  also  fails  -and  I  suggest  later  that  it  can  be  put  under  pressure  -then  a  fallback  to  brute 
intuitions  regarding  cognitive  status  seems  inescapable. 
209  Wright  (1992)  pp  92-93.  See  also  Ch.  4,  passim,  where  he  defines  the  notion  as  follows  (p.  144):  a 
discourse  meets  Cognitive  Command  if  and  only  if  it  is  a  priori  that  differences  of  opinion  formulated 
within  the  discourse,  unless  excusable  as  a  result  of  vagueness  in  a  disputed  statement,  or  in  the  standards 
of  acceptability,  or  variation  in  personal  evidence  thresh6lds,  so  to  speak,  will.  involve  something  that  may 
properly  be  regarded  as  a  cognitive  shortcoming. 
21  0 
Davidson  (1984a)  p  245 
158 our  robust  warrant  for  the  conditionals  that  capture  such  inferences  must  be  explained. 
Pending  provision  of  such  a  substantive  epistemology,  we  are  entitled  to  construe  talk  of 
cognition  in  a  merely  minimal  manner,  a  mere  reflection  of  the  platitudes  requisite  for 
minimal  truth. 
I  cannot  examine  every  such  potential  epistemology  here,  (although  later  in  this  chapter  I 
will  examine  an  under-explored  acco 
, 
unt  which  is  amenable,  inter  alia,  to  the  speaker- 
meaning  theory).  Rather,  I  will  content  myself  with  brief  consideration  of  two  broader 
issues.  The  first  is,  that  in  the  light  of  my  earlier  methodological  scepticism  regarding 
burden  of  proof,  it  is  not  wholly  clear  that  Wright's  demand  is  a  fair  one.  Imagine  a 
theorist  who  thinks  that  metaphorical  meaning  is  determined  via  a  two  stage  process; 
We  display  a  sensitivity  to  a  rich  variety  of  relevant  features  of  context, 
somehow  integrating  them  into  our  unconscious  linguistic  processing 
In  the  case  of  many  metaphors,  such  pragmatic  knowledge  'intrudes'  into 
the  'derivation'  of  the  proposition  expressed  by  a  given  utterance.  This 
might  happen  e.  g.  (i)  because,  prior  to  availability  to  consciousness,  the 
semantically  determined  proposition  is  delivered  to  a  pragmatics  'module' 
which  applies  some  function  from  propositions  to  propositions  or  (ii) 
because,  prior  to  availability  to  consciousness,  the  semantic  derivation  of  the 
relevant  proposition  is  coeval  with  apragmatic  derivation,  so  that  the 
eventual  proposition  expressed  is  already  partially  pragmatically 
conditioned. 
Now,  imagine  that  it  proves  difficult  to  deliver  a  detailed  account  of  the  nature  of  such  a 
complex  contextual  sensitivity.  Ought  we  to  conclude  that  such  a  putative  realist 
explanation  is  thereby  disfavoured,  and  anti-realism  wins  by  default?  Such  a  verdict 
seems  to  me  to  be  excessively  harsh.  Perhaps  in  discourses  about  mathematics  or 
modality,  where  we  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  we  could  even  stand  in  the  right  kind  of 
relations  underwriting  such  a  sensitivity,  appeal  to  intuitional.  epistemology  carries  a 
heavy  burden  of  proof.  But  in  the  case  of  e.  g.  sensitivity  to  one's  context,  or  the 
intentions  of  others,  or  the  tacitly  recognized  demands  of  linguistic  convention,  or  the 
159 contents  of  one's  imaginings,  211  it  seems  an  unfairly  strong  constraint  on  the  realist  that 
a  full  epistemology  is  to  be  provided.  Surely,  we  might  think,  we  can  begin  to 
understand  how  a  causal  sensitivity  to  contextual  factors  might  exist,  even  if  we  are 
unable  to  give  a  theoretical  account  of  it.  If  that's  right,  then  the  lesson  of  theTailure  of 
Wright's  suggested  forced-march  is  unclear. 
Wright  does  give  us  more  general  guidance  on  when  appeal  to  intuitionism  is 
permissible; 
We  ought  not  to  associate  a  special  faculty  with  a  particular  region  of  discourse,  a 
faculty,  that  is,  apt  for  the  production  of  non-inferentially  justified  beliefs  essentially 
involving  its  distinctive  vocabulary,  unless  the  best  explanation  of  our  practice  of  the 
discourse,  and  especially  the  phenomenon  of  non-collusive  assent  about  opinions 
expressed  therein,  has  to  invoke  the  idea  that  such  a  faculty  is  at  work.  212 
The  problem  here,  as  so  often,  is  to  see  how  such  a  principle  can  properly  serve  to 
constrain  debates  about  realist  standing.  For  one  important  contributory  factor  to  an 
explanation's  good  standing  is  its  coherence  with  prior  probability  and  other  theoretical 
commitments.  Somebody  who,  like  Nogales,  Stern,  or  Yablo,  simply  finds  it 
overwhelming  pre-theoretically  plausible  that  metaphors  typically  express  propositions, 
is  unlikely  to  accept  any  theory  as  'best'  that  doesn't  deliver  that  result.  213  If  the  only 
way  to  secure  such  a  result  is  to  appeal  to  a  broadly  intuitional  epistemology,  based  on 
e.  g.  an  under-specified  causal  sensitivity  to  contextual  factors,  then  that  appeal  will  be 
211  1  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  the  kind  of  ersatz  account  of  metaphorical  meaning  sketched  in  the  last 
chapter  is  a  realist  account.  Být  it  is  an  interesting  question  whether  every  disagreement  about  the  ersatz 
meaning  of  a  metaphor  must  depend  on  some  cognitive  disagreement.  It  might,  if  e.  g.  the  only  apt  act  of 
imaginative  insight  is  that  originally  engaged  in,  or  intended,  by  the  maker  of  the  metaphor.  I  attempt  to 
make  such  an  account  slightly  less  implausible  than  it  would  otherwise  be  later  in  this  chapter.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  a  plurality  of  apt  such  construals  are  available,  some  sort  of  relativism  about  metaphorical 
meaning  might  be  defended.  I  cannot  pursue  these  matters  here,  except  to  note  that  decisions  relating  to 
the  logic  of  the  'according  to'  operator  will  play  a  large  role  in  this  case,  as  in  that  of  more  straightforward 
fictionalisms. 
212 
Wright  (1992)  p.  152 
213  Stern  (2000),  Yablo  (1998),  Nogales  (1999).  1  pick  these  theorists  merelY  for  illustrative  purposes; 
many  other  philosophers  and  linguists  share  their  intuitions. 
160 made.  Again,  if  we  had  it  written  into  our  methodology  that  the  anti-realist  position 
wins  by  default,  the  spectre  of  a  dialectical  stand-off  need  not  be  particularly  worrisome. 
But  I  have  distanced  myself  from  such  a  position  on  a  number  of  occasions  now. 
The  difficulty  of  establishing  a  neutral  framework  for  the  resolution  of  divergent 
intuitions  about  cognitive  standing,  then  is  the  first  of  the  broad  issues  that  I  wanted  to 
deal  with.  This  difficulty  might  lead  us  to  look  not  for  general  constraints,  but  on  local 
argumentation,  to  resolve  the  question.  The  second  issue  I  will  discuss  in  this  context 
concerns  the  potential  of  one  seemingly  promising  such  attempt. 
4.5  Metaphor  and  Cognitive  Command  2 
In  recent  work,  Robert  Hopkins  has  developed  and  defended  Kant's  claim  that  aesthetic 
judgements  are  autonomous,  in  a  sense  that  I  will  describe  below.  214  He  argues  that  a 
straightforward  line  of  argument  seems  to  show  that  a  discourse  that  mainly  comprises 
such  autonomous  judgements  cannot  display  Cognitive  Command.  Since  it  also  seems 
defensible  to  ascribe  autonomy  to  ascriptions  of  metaphorical  meaning,  it  might  seem 
that  Hopkins  argument  provides  a  more  direct  and  effective  route  to  settling  their 
cognitive  status  than  Wright's  'forced  march'  approach.  I  will  set  out  the  suggested 
argument  below,  and  go  on  to  argue  that  while  interesting,  it  does  not  provide  an 
obviously  new  route  to  determining  whether  discourse  about  m-meaning  is  cognitive  in 
the  relevant  sense. 
In  introducing  the  notion  of  autonomy,  Hopkins  compares  aesthetic  and  colour 
judgements.  Imagine  that  you  are  looking  at  a  surface  that  you  judge  is  blue,  on  the 
basis  that  it  looks  phenomenally  blue  to  you.  Now  imagine  that  some  larger  group  of 
people,  whom  you  have  no  reason  to  believe  are  in  any  worse  a  position  to  judge  the 
colour  of  an  object  on  the  basis  of  the  way  it  looks,  and  whom  are  apparently  careful  and 
sincere,  dissent  from  yourjudgement.  Let's  say  that  they  insist  that  the  surface  is  clearly 
red.  What  is  it  rational  for  you  to  do?  Intuitively,  you  ought  to  withdraw  your 
214  See  Hopkins  (2000)  and,  especially,  Hopkins  (2001) 
161 judgement.  Even  in  the  case  where  the  surface  genuinely  is  blue,  and  yourjudgement 
had  previously  amounted  to  knowledge,  it  seems  that  the  presence  of  so  much  apparently 
informed  disagreement  acts  as  an  epistemic  defeater. 
What  might  be  underwriting  such  an  epistemic  defeat?  Hopkins  suggests,  plausibly 
enough,  that  it  may  have  something  to  do  with  the  faU  that  colour  judgements  are 
cognitive  in  something  like  the  following  sense; 
Cognitive:  Cognitive  judgements  are  genuinely  representational  judgements.  In 
particular,  (i)  it  seems  a  priori  that  when  two  subjects  make  contradictory 
cognitive  judgements,  the  warrant  for  the  judgement  of  at  least  one  can  be 
rationally  criticised  and  (ii)  if  two  subjects  make  contradictory  cognitive 
judgements,  prescinding  from  vagueness,  etc,  exactly  one  of  them  must 
be  correct.  215 
Given  such  a  characteristic  feature  of  colour  discourse,  it  seems  that  the  following  line 
of  thought  -  thefault-allocating  argument  -  is  open  to  a  rational  subject  who  finds 
herself  in  the  above  situation: 
1)  1  and  my  opponents  disagree  about  whether  the  surface  is  blue. 
2)  One  of  us  is  at  fault 
3)  They  outnumber  me,  in  general  I  and  they  are  equally  competent  in  matters  of  this 
sort,  and  we've  all  tried  to  access  the  facts  in  the  same  way. 
4) So  it  is  likely  that  I  am  fault. 
5)  So  it  is  likely  that  the  surface  is  not  blue,  as  my  opponent  says. 
The  first  and  third  premises  simply  reflect  the  situation  as  described,  while  the  second 
reflects  the  apparently  cognitive  status  of  colour  judgements.  Hopkins  thus  holds  that 
commitment  to  Cognitive's  application  to  colour,  plus  the  supposition  that  the  two 
parties  are  of  equal  competence  but  different  size,  suffices  to  secure  the  transition  from 
2  15  Hopkins  explicitly  draws  on  Wright's  work  on  Cognitive  Command  in  his  discussion  here.  I  hope  the 
analogy  is  obvious. 
162 (1)-(5).  The  availability  of  such  a  pattern  of  reasoning  is  what  explains  the  fact  that  I 
ought,  rationally,  to  withdraw  my  intuitive  colour  judgement  in  such  circumstances. 
Hopkins  contrasts  that  example  with  the  case  of  beauty.  In  this  case,  he  argues,  it  is 
intuitively  not  always  rational  to  withdraw  one's  judgement  in  the  light  of  disagreement. 
If  you  find,  say,  a  piece  of  music  very  beautiful,  you  may  be  surprised  and  baffled  to 
find  that  those  who  you  had  previously  taken  to  reliably  agree  with  your  considered 
aesthetic  judgements  now  disagree.  You  may  return  to  the  music,  asking  them  for 
reasons  to  support  their  judgements.  But  if  your  disagreement  persists  through  these 
procedures,  it  is  far  less  clear  than  it  is  in  the  colour  example  that  you  are  rationally 
compelled  to  withdraw  your  judgement,  although  perhaps  you  should  place  less 
confidence  in  it.  Thus,  Hopkins  takes  judgements  of  beauty  to  be  autonomous  in  the 
following  sense; 
Autonomy:  When  one  party  finds  herself  disagreeing  with  (several)  others  who  share 
a  view  then; 
(a)  for  ordinary  empirical  matters  this  is  sometimes  reason  enough  for 
her  to  adopt  their  view,  but 
(i)  this  happens  much  more  rarely  in  the  case  of  beauty,  and 
(ii)  the  opposing  view  does  not  act  as  a  defeater  to  my  judgement  to  the  saine 
extent  as  it  does  in  the  empirical  case. 
Instead 
(b)  she  should  place  less  confidence  in  her  view;  and 
(c)  she  should,  if  possible,  test  the  issue  by  re-examining  the  disputed  item. 
Now,  imagine  that  judgements  of  beauty  were  cognitive.  In  that  case,  it  would  seem,  we 
ought  to  be  able  to  run  through  exactly  the  same  kind  offault-allocating  argument  as 
we  could  in  the  colour  case.  That  argument  would  move  from  the  stipulated  fact  of  my 
disagreeing  with  a  greater  number,  as  apparently  well-placed  as  1,  together  with 
observation  that,  by  Cognitive,  one  of  us  must  be  at  fault,  to  the  conclusion  that  it  is 
163 likely  that  I  am  that  the  one  in  the  wrong.  But  the  availability  of  that  transition  seems  to 
be  in  irrevocable  tension  with  Autonomy.  So  it  seems  that  we  are  forced  to  give  up 
either  the  idea  that  aesthetic  judgements  of  this  kind  are  cognitive,  or  that  they  are 
autonomous.  We  seem  to  have  some  kind  of  test  for  genuine  cognitive  character. 
What  about  the  case  of  metaphorical  meaning?  Consider  the  famous  conclusion  of 
Fitzgerald's  The  Gi-eat  Gatsby 
And  as  I  sat  there  brooding  on  the  old,  unknown  world,  I  thought  of  Gatsby's  wonder 
when  he  first  picked  out  the  green  light  at  the  end  of  Daisy's  dock.  He  had  come  a  long 
way  to  this  blue  lawn,  and  his  dream  must  have  seemed  so  close  that  lie  could  hardly  fail 
to  grasp  it.  He  did  not  know  that  it  was  already  behind  him,  somewhere  back  in  that  vast 
obscurity  beyond  the  city,  where  the  dark  fields  of  the  republic  rolled  on  under  the  night. 
Gatsby  believed  in  the  green  light,  the  orgiastic  future  that  year  by  year  recedes  before 
us.  It  eluded  us  then,  but  that's  no  matter  -  tomorrow  we  will  run  faster,  stretch  out  our 
arms  further 
... 
And  one  fine  morning  - 
So  we  beat  on,  boats  against  the  current,  carried  back  ceaselessly  into  the  past. 
Imagine  I  interpret  the  final  line  along  the  following  lines:  our  individual  projects  and 
concerns,  that  imbue  our  lives  with  meaning,  involve  a  constant,  pointless  struggle  to 
achie  ve  an  impossible  objective  that  is  both  determined  and  frustrated  by  the 
contingencies  of  our  past  histories,  personal  and  social.  And  imagine  that  friends  or 
critics  that  I  respect  agree  on  interpreting  the  line  rather  differently:  the  mention  of 
boats  alludes  back  to  the  'Dutch  sailors'  mentioned  a  few  paragraphs  earlier,  who  first 
gaze  on  the  "fresh,  green  breast  of  the  new  world",  that  had  "pandered  in  whispers  to  the 
last  and  greatest  of  all  human  dreams".  The  line  expresses,  according  to  them,  a 
fundamentally  American  theme;  the  inevitable  corruption  of  the  seemingly  new  world 
by  European  decadence,  symbolized  by  capitalism,  consumerism  and  elitism.  I  see  the 
line  as  making  a  universal  claim  about  what  it  is  to  be  human,  they  see  it  as  making  a 
claim  about  what  it  is  to  live  in  a  certain  kind  of  American  society. 
164 Surprised  by  their  disagreement,  I  re-draw  their  attention  to  the  phrase  'the  last  and 
greatest  of  all  human  dreams',  and  to  the  recalled  advice  of  Nick  Carraway's  father, 
which  opens  the  novel.  216  They  respond  by  reminding  me  in  turn  of  the  role  that  the 
contrast  between  the  cosmopolitan  East  and  the  moral  Midwest  plays  in  the  novel,  and 
point  to  the  thematic  significance  of  Oxford  education  and  World  War  I,  not  to  mention 
that  stock  Modernist  image  of  corrupt  European  capitalism,  the  cigar  smoking,  thick- 
tongued,  bulbous-fingered,  Jewish  gangster  Meyer  Wolfsheim,  of  'The  Swastika 
Holding  Company',  fixer  of  the  World  Series.  Imagine  that  things  go  on  like  this, 
without  an  obvious  resolution  of  the  issue.  217  Do  the  mere  facts  that  I  have  no  reason  to 
think  that  they  are  insincere  or  limited  in  capacity,  and  that  they  are  numerically 
superior,  give  me  good  grounds  to  think  it  is  I  who  am  in  the  wrong?  It  is  surely  at  least 
defensible  to  hold  that  they  do  not,  and  that  judgements  of  metaphorical  meaning  are 
autonomous.  It  is  quite  normal  for  us  to  feel  that  metaphors  are  precisely  open  to 
interpi-etation  in  a  way  that  literal  language  is  not.  218  It  is  in  any  case  interesting  to 
explore  the  question  of  whether  establishment  of  such  autonomy  would  provide  the  anti- 
realist  about  metaphor  with  a  telling  argument  against  treating  judgements  of  m-meaning 
as  subject  to  (Cognitive  Command). 
Given  the  worries  about  a  stand-off  I  raised  earlier,  in  the  context  of  Wright's  'forced- 
march'  argument,  it  would  be  reassuring  to  be  able  to  identify  some  such  focus  of 
discussion.  Nevertheless,  I  intend  to  argue  that  it  is  not  obvious  that  there  is  an 
inconsistency  in  holding  that  judgements  are  both  autonomous  and  cognitive.  The  fault- 
allocating  argument  niay  be  valid.  But  it  seems  that  there  are  enough  apparently 
cognitive  discourses  where  something  like  autonomy  seems  permissible,  for  us  to  be 
justifiably  concerned  about  whether  it  genuinely  can  be  relied  upon. 
216  "Whenever  you  feel  like  criticizing  anyone,  '  he  told  me,  'just  remember  that  all  the  people  in  this  world 
haven't  had  the  advantages  you've  had'. 
217  Assume  for  convenience  of  example  that  neither  of  us  is  convinced  by  the  other  party's  positive  case. 
Agreed  multiple  'meanings'  of  metaphors  raise  interesting  issues,  but  they  are  distinct  from  my  concerns 
here. 
21  8  Again,  any  fully  satisfactory  Davidsonian  semantics  for  "fictional'  metaphorical  meanings  would  have 
to  make  a  decision  about  how  to  account  for  these.  One  would  be  to  supervaluate  on  acceptable 
interpretations.  Another  would  be  to  use  a  non-standard  logic,  that  allowed  for  inconsistent  claims  to  be 
held  true  of  the  same  utterance.  Another  would  be  to  relativize  metaphorical  ly-means*  to  interpretations. 
165 To  see  why,  we  can  begin  by  noting  that  it  isn't  quite  right  to  suggest  that  granting 
premises  (1)-(3)  of  the  fault-locating  argument  immediately  secures  the  transition  to  (4). 
Imagine  that  aesthetic  judgements  are  robustly  true  or  false,  but  in  a  way  that  completely 
escapes  our  epistemic  powers.  Then  the  mere  fact  of  their  being  cognitive  in  the  above 
sense,  together  with  my  being  at  a  numerical  disadvantage,  in  no  way  warrants  the  move 
from  (3)  to  (4).  (If  an  unseen  ball  is  either  red  or  blue,  then  a  hundred  people  guessing 
blue  in  no  way  makes  it  more  likely  that  it  is  blue!  ).  We  can  see  that  when  a  certain  kind 
of  epistemic  drcnv  is  secured  -  in  this  case,  a  nil-nil  draw  -  Autonomy  is  not  threatened 
by  the  mere  fact  of  the  discourse  being  cognitive.  Endorsing  Autonomy  is  fine,  for  all 
Hopkins  has  shown,  as  long  as  the  move  from  (3)  to  (4)  can  be  resisted.  219 
Let's  say  we  attempt  to  remedy  this  by  appealing  to  an  earlier  commitment  to  epistemic 
transparency: 
(Epistemic  Access)  If  a  metaphor  m-means  that  P,  then  (in  somewhat  idealized 
conditions)  we  can  get  some  warrant  for  believing  that  it  m-means 
that  P. 
This  principle  is,  of  course,  independently  plausible,  at  least  on  standard  construals  of 
metaphorical  meaning,  so  a  defender  of  Hopkins'  line  ought  to  be  able  to  take  it  for 
granted.  However,  it's  not  clear  that  adding  this  as  a  premise  will  always  help. 
Consider  an  analogy.  Scientific  judgements  are  often  warranted  via  standard  scientific 
enquiry.  Now,  imagine  that  I  am  a  scientist  who  believes  that  there  is  intelligent 
humanoid  life  on  other  planets,  and  that  a  significant  number  of  my  friends  and 
colleagues,  on  the  basis  of  similar  evidence  and  methodology,  disagree  with  me.  Does 
such  disagreement  give  me  grounds  to  conclude  that  it  is  likely  that  I  am  at  fault,  and 
ought  to  adopt  their  view?  Not  at  all.  For  a  start,  I  may  have  a  different  subjective 
probability  set  than  they.  Since  the  shared  scientific  methodology  includes  the 
commitment  to  favour  theories  that  are  e.  g.  simple,  elegant  and  coherent  with  prior 
probabilities,  it  doesn't  seem  obvious  that  I  ought  simply  to  adopt  my  opponent's  view, 
219  Of  course,  in  the  case  where  the  facts  are  unknowable,  clauses  (b)  and  (c)  of  Autonomy  will  be 
independently  implausible.  But  that  hardly  distracts  from  the  point. 
166 or  even  to  become  agnostic.  In  this  case,  it  seems  perfectly  defensible  to  maintain  my 
existing  belief,  despite  the  paradigmatically  cognitive  nature  of  scientific  discourse.  220 
Mere  disagreement  does  not  warrant  me  in  revising  my  judgement. 
Perhaps  then,  we  ought  to  bracket  differences  that  merely  result  from  such  subjective, 
non-cognitive  differences: 
(Epistemic  Access*)  If  a  metaphor  m-means  that  P,  then  (in  somewhat  idealized 
conditions)  we  can  get  some  warrant  for  believing  that  it  m-means 
that  P,  and  such  warrant  does  not  rely  even  in  part  on  subjective, 
non-cognitive  differences. 
But  the  issue  is  delicate.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  not  clear  whether  the  capacity  to  undergo 
certain  kinds  of  creative  imaginings,  of  the  type  that  seems  important  for  thinking  of  one 
thing  as  another,  is  relevantly  non-cognitive.  Surely,  however,  no  account  of 
metaphorical  meaning  will  want  to  risk  cutting  it  off  from  some  fundamental  notion  of 
'thinking-as'.  In  the  second  place,  it  isn't  wholly  clear  that  it  is  irrational  for  me  to 
persist  in  my  judgement  in  the  scientific  case  even  if  e.  g.  our  prior  probabilities  are 
similar.  It  seems  at  least  conceivable  that  I  may  simply  come  to  a  different  view  to  you 
on  the  basis  of  similar  evidence,  and  yet  be  rationally  warranted  in  maintaining  it  in  the 
face  of  opposition,  simply  because  the  case  is  one  where  we  have  so  little  evidence 
either  way.  Such  a  position  certainly  seems  true  of  e.  g.  philosophical  practice.  Timothy 
Williamson  is  an  epistemicist  about  vagueness,  while  many  of  his  professional 
colleagues  are  not.  Neither  need  be  ignorant  of  any  relevant  a  priol-i  consideration,  and 
may  well  start  off  their  investigations  with  similar  degrees  of  intuitive  attachment  to 
certain  principles.  But  it's  extrem  ely  uncomfortable  to  think  that  the  merefact  ofsuch 
disagreement  acts  as  a  defeater  for  Williamson's  philosophical  beliefs.  And  it's  equally 
uncomfortable  to  think  that  e.  g.  philosophy  of  language,  or  metaphysics  is  not  cognitive 
220  Of  course,  one  might  respond  to  the  fact  that  subjective  probabilities  play  a  role  in  scientific 
methodology  by  becoming  an  anti-realist  about  science.  My  concern  with  this  move  is  that  it  tends  to 
impose  a  global  anti-realism,  whereas  the  most  interesting  forms  of  anti-realism  seem  contrastive  with 
6genuine  matters  of  fact'. 
167 in  the  above  sense,  or  depends  ultimately  on  non-cognitive  preferences  . 
22  1  So  it  seems 
that,  even  in  the  presence  of  (Epistemic  Access*),  the  transition  from  (1)-3)  to  (4)  is 
more  complicated  than  Hopkins  seems  to  suggest. 
Consider  one  final  example.  I  am  playing  poker,  and  have  been  lucky  enough  to 
improve  on  the  draw  to  the  highest  hand,  a  royal  flush.  Various  parties  are  observing  the 
game,  including  each  player's  hand,  and  making  side-bets  on  the  eventual  outcome.  To 
my  surprise,  they  don't  bet  heavily  on  me,  but  instead  start  backing  my  opponents.  I 
have  no  reason  to  believe  that  their  perceptual  equipment,  etc,  is  any  better  or  worse  than 
mine,  nor  that  they  are  engaged  in  any  great  conspiracy  or  subtle  strategy.  I  check  again 
with  my  co-players  what  the  rules  are,  and  have  my  prior  beliefs  apparently  confin-ned. 
Is  it  rational  for  me  to  fold?  After  all,  my  belief  that  I  have  the  best  hand  relies 
ultimately  on  causal  sensitivities  employed  in  perception,  memory  and  elementary 
computation,  just  as  in  the  colour  case.  But  somehow  I  don't  feel  that  I  would  fold  in 
such  a  situation,  nor  that  there  is  any  great  rational  pressure  on  me  to  do  so.  The  case 
would  seem  strange  to  me,  but  not  one  in  which  it  would  not  seem  obvious  to  me  that  I 
am  at  fault.  So  the  matter  seems  autonomous,  but  also,  surely  cognitive. 
The  issue  is  clearly  a  difficult  one,  but  I  suggest  that  the  valid  instances  of  the  fault- 
allocating  arguments  offered  by  Hopkins  are  really  enthymematic,  implicitly  relying  on 
like  the  following  premise; 
1)  1  and  my  opponents  disagree  about  whether  the  surface  is  blue. 
2)  One  of  us  is  at  fault 
3)  They  outnumber  me,  in  general  I  and  they  are  equally  competent  in  matters  of  this 
sort,  and  we've  all  tried  to  access  the  facts  in  the  same  way. 
4)  The  best  explanation  of  the  disagreement  in  this  scenario  is  that  I  am  at  fault. 
5)  So  it  is  likely  that-  I  am  fault. 
6)  So  it  is  likely  that  the  surface  is  not  blue,  as  my  opponent  says. 
22  1  Apart  from  anything  else,  such  a  view  threatens  the  kind  of  'globalizing'  argument  canvassed  in 
Section  1.10. 
168 Our  new  premise  is  made  probable  by  (1)-(3)  in  e.  g.  the  colour  case,  and  provides  a 
suitable  abductive  link  to  (5).  It  fails  in  e.  g.  the  case  where  no  evidence  at  all  is 
forthcoming,  and  the  scientific  case,  just  as  we  would  intuitively  predict.  (Similarly,  the 
fact  that  philosophy  is  very  difficult,  and  poker-type  cases  very  rare  and  weird,  seem  to 
provide  competing  explanations  of  divergence,  blocking  the  move  to  (4)  in  those  cases). 
But  its  inclusion  somewhat  diminishes  the  interest  of  Hopkins'  argument  for  the 
question  of  whether  discourse  about  m-meaning  is  cognitive.  For  the  original  promise  of 
the  argument  related  to  its  ability  to  circumvent  a  frustrating  realist/anti-realist  stand-off 
regarding  best  explanation.  It  is  now  far  less  clear  whether  a  genuinely  new  route  for. 
profitable  debate  has  really  been  identified. 
4.6  Metaphor  and  Intention 
So  far  this  chapter,  I  have  (i)  provisionally  concluded  that  even  the  realist  ought  to  grant 
that  talk  about  metaphorically  meanings  is  episternically  constrained,  and  (ii)  expressed 
some  methodological  worries  about  the  application  of  Cognitive  Command,  or  some 
improved  descendent  thereof,  for  settling  questions  of  the  cognitive  status  of  such 
judgements.  I  now  want  to  turn  to  the  last  of  Wright's  tests  for  realism  that  I  will 
discuss  here,  the  Order-of-Determination  test.  222  1  will  approach  this  issue  somewhat 
indirectly  in  this  section,  via  an  examination  of  the  relationship  that  intention  stands  to 
metaphorical  meaning.  I  will  then  conclude  my  discussion  of  Order-of-Determination 
in  Section  4.7. 
Intention  plainly  has  soniething  to  do  with  metaphor.  We  can  choose  to  make  a 
metaphor,  and  intend  our  utterance  to  be  taken  as  such.  We  have  a  certain  authority  with 
respect  to  our  utterances;  we  are  entitled  in  many  circumstances,  to  treat  lack  of  respect 
for  a  prior  intention  as  a  cognitive  failing.  You've  misunderstood  me,  we  might  say,  I 
wasn't  speaking  literally,  or  I  didn't  intend  that  aspect  of  the  metaphor  to  be  emphasised. 
Admittedly,  this  need  not  be,  and  in  all  probability  isn't  always  the  case.  When  speaking 
222  As  I  noted  in  Chapter  1,  Wright's  other  test,  Width  of  Cosmological  Role  seems  unlikely  to  be  passed 
by  metaphorical  contents.  However,  I  will  suggest  in  the  next  chapter  that  the  contents  of  some  metaphors 
may  play  a  role  which  isn't  always  mediated  by  the  attitudes  of  concept  users,  thus  defending  a  wider 
cosmological  role  for  them  than  might  have  been  expected. 
169 to  a  psychoanalyst,  or  writing  a  novel,  for  example,  one  might  implicitly  or  explicitly 
renounce  a  certain  degree  of  authority  over  the  interpretation  of  one's  metaphors,  along 
with  some  of  one's  literal  utterances.  Moreover,  there  might  be  many  other  types  of 
cases  where  speakers  happily  allow  their  metaphorical  utterance  to  be  extended  in  a  way 
that  is  new  or surprising  to  them.  We  should  not  let  consideration  of  these  cases  blur  an 
important  distinction,  however.  To  take  a  somewhat  analogous  case,  there  is  a  big 
difference  between  being  happy  with  a  way  a  witty  remark  is  picked  up  and  elaborated 
upon,  and  claiming  the  embellishments  as  one's  own..  We  need  an.  account  of  the  role  of 
intention  that  allows  us  to  make  just  this  kind  of  distinction  in  the  case  of  metaphorical 
utterance. 
This  is  important  both  for  the  type  of  Davidsonian  position  that  I  have  outlined  and 
defended  in  earlier  chapters,  and  for  the  most  plausible  realist  positions.  Everybody 
ought  to  grant  that  metaphor's  effects,  whether  or  not  they  are  taken  to  involve  the 
expression  of  propositional  contents,  are  highly  context  dependent.  But  our  best  models 
of  context  represent  them  as  highly  sensitive  to  conversational  purposes  and  goals,  local 
and  general.  223  Since  these  in  turn  are  likely  to  depend  on  the  aims  and  intentions  of 
conversational  participants,  a  satisfactory  account  of  the  metaphor  and  intention  is 
desirable  for  all  concerned.  For  the  Davidsonian,  such  a  theory  will  be  important  in  (a) 
the  cases  where  the  speaker-intention  model  is  appropriate  and  (b)  developing  the  kind 
of  pseudo-fictionalist  semantics  seemingly  necessary  for  avoiding  the  Frege-Geach 
problem.  For  realists  who  hold  the  default,  speaker-meaning  view,  the  need  for  a 
plausible  account  of  intention  and  metaphor  will  be  inescapable,  while  for  their  strongest 
rivals,  contextualists,  the  need  to  tell  a  story  about  what  a  context  is  should  provide 
suitable  motivation. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  might  seem  to  be  a  problem  in  reconciling  this  consideration 
with  the  peculiarly  open-ended  quality  of  metaphor.  Many  commentators,  for  example, 
have  felt  dissatisfied  with  a  straightforward  "speaker's  meaning"  account  of  metaphor, 
which  in  its  crudest  form  holds  that: 
223  1  say  more  about  the  nature  of  context  in  Chapter  5. 
170 (1)  S's  metaphorical  utterance  M  means  that  P  iff  S  intends  M  to  convey  that  p.  224 
Such  an  account  is  clearly  so  over-simplistic  as  to  allow  straightforward  disqualification 
as  a  serious  theory  of  metaphorical  meaning;  the  spiralling  complexities  of  speech  act 
theory  have  taught  us  that.  Yet  we  might  be  sceptical  of  the  prospects  for  any  such 
account,  however  hedged  and  qualified,  and  not  only  for  this  crude  precursor.  Surely, 
we  might  want  to  say,  this  whole  approach  to  metaphor  is  in  danger  ofjust 
misrepresenting  the  phenomenology  of  metaphorical  utterance.  We  don't  typically  have 
a  distinct  content  'in  mind',  as  it  were,  that  we  then  express  via  the  use  of  metaphor. 
Indeed,  if  we  did,  it  would  seem  to  render  the  motivation  behind  metaphorical  utterance 
a  little  mysterious.  If  you  intend  to  say  that  P,  then  why  not  just  say  it?  We  seem  to  be 
close  to  a  view  of  metaphor  that  characterises  it  merely  as  amusing  embellishment,  or 
useful  shorthand.  And  such  a  view  has  often  been  felt  to  be  philosophically  and 
phenomenologically  unsatisfying.  Of  course,  one  response  to  this  worry  would  be  to 
deny  that  we  have  any  privileged  access  to  the  content  of  our  own  intentions,  to  hold  that 
we  can  have  at  best  inductive  evidence,  resulting  from  a  process  of  self-interpretation, 
for  what  we  intend  and  mean,  even  in  the  most  everyday  cases.  But  this  move,  in  turn, 
makes  a  mystery  of  the  very  authority  we  grant  to  speakers,  which  originally  counted  in 
favour  of  the  speaker-intention  model.  We  need  a  theory  of  metaphor  that  allows  us  to 
be  faithful  to  the  phenomenology  of  metaphor  making,  while  also  delivering  a  satisfying 
account  of  how  we  interact  with  metaphor  makers.  It  may  seem,  however,  that  no 
speaker-meaning  theory  can  deliver  both  desiderata. 
David  Cooper  has  objected  to  the  speaker's  meaning  view  of  metaphor  along  related,  if 
not  strictly  analogous,  lines.  225  His  objection  contends  that  such  a  view  cannot  account 
for  the  indeterminacy  of  metaphorical  content.  A  metaphor  is  indeterminate  in  Cooper's 
sense  iff  it  admits  of  more  than  one  interpretation,  none  of  which  can  be  demonstrated  as 
uniquely  correct.  Cooper  holds  that  any  successful  account  of  metaphor  must  give  us  a 
story  about  metaphorical  indeterminacy. 
. 
224  See  Searle  (1993)  for  one  of  the  first  accounts  of  this  kind. 
225  Cooper  (1986)  pp.  71-77.  Cooper  characterises  the  speaker's  intention  model  of  metaphor  as  the 
'standard  view'. 
171 It  is  clear  that  Cooper's  characterisation  is  unsatisfactory  as  it  stands  -  it  lets  in  cases 
where  all  interpretations  are  clearly  incorrect,  for  example.  226  Rather  than  try  to  offer  an 
improved  version,  however,  I  intend  to  take  it  merely  as  gesturing  at  some  important 
aspects  of  our  normal  thought  about  metaphor:  namely,  that  metaphor  is  apt  for 
competing,  independently  satisfying  interpretations  of  which  there  is  seemingly  no  a 
priori  guarantee,  in  the  general  case,  that  we  wi  11  have  reason  to  adopt  one  rather  than 
another.  The  relation  between  this  thought  and  our  sense  that  attribution  of  meaning  to 
metaphor  is  apparently  autonoinous,  and  that  what  metaphor  leads  us  to  is  in  some  sense 
linfitless,  are,  I  hope,  fairly  obvious.  227 
Cooper  considers  three  possible  ways  in  which  the  speaker-intention  model  could  try  to 
account  for  such  indeterminacy.  Firstly,  the  indeterminacy  might  be  caused  by  our 
ignorance  of  what  exactly  it  is  that  the  speaker  intended.  Secondly,  the  speaker's 
intention  might  be  somehow  'open-ended'  or  indeterminate.  Cooper  characterises  this 
option,  following  Searle,  as  implying  that  when  S  utters  some  metaphor  of  the  form  'A 
is  B',  he  intends  to  mean  or  implicate  a  range  of  meanings;  A  is  C1  and/or  A  is  C2,  C3 
etc.  Finally,  we  might  take  the  indeterminacy  to  be  a  feature  related  to  the  fact  that 
different  possible  speakers  could  use  the  same  sentence  to  convey  different  contents. 
Cooper  rejects  all  three  of  these  proposed  accounts. 
Cooper  has  a  number  of  objections  to  the  first  proposal: 
226  There  are  lots  of  other  worries  that  could  be  raised  against  the  definition.  If  Quine  and  Davidson  are 
right  about  the  indeterminacy  of  translation,  then  all  metaphors  will  count  as  trivially  indeterminate,  for 
example. 
227  1  do  not  intend  to  suggest  that  relations  of  simple  entailment  are  involved  here.  Clearly,  a  metaphor 
could  be  indeterminate  in  Cooper's  sense,  and  yet  admit  of  a  competing  series  of  quite  determinate  and 
limited  paraphrases.  I  take  Cooper  to  be  guided  in  part  by  the  intuition  that  metaphor  is  limitless  both 
horizontally  and  vertically  as  it  were;  that  any  one  interpretation  is  'open-ended',  and  that  rival 
interpretations  can  be  equally  defensible.  His  definition  of  indeterminacy  makes  it  seem  as  if  it  is  the 
latter  that  is  at  issue,  but  the  second  of  his  suggested  replies  on  behalf  of  the  speaker-meaning  theorist 
suggests  that  he  is  just  as  concerned  with  the  former.  The  relevant  notion  of  open-endedness  is  multi- 
dimensional  and  plural.  I  say  some  more  to  help  disambiguate  it  slightly  in  Section  4.7,  and  in  the  next 
chapter. 
172 (MI)  A  metaphorical  content  M  is  indeterminate  iff  we  are  ignorant  of  what  an  actual 
speaker  S  intended  to  convey  by  his  corresponding  metaphorical  utterance  P. 
He  first  considers  the  case  were  we  have  no  knowledge  of  S  at  all,  and  concludes  that 
this  case  collapses  into  a  special  case  of  the  third  proposal  (M3,  see  below);  with  the 
indeterminacy  being  caused  by  the  speculation  about  what  different  possible  speakers 
might  have  meant.  He  then  argues  that  even  if  we  do  know  quite  a  lot  about  the  identity 
and  context  of  S,  a  limited  amount  of  ignorance  about  his  environment  can  still  leave  us 
completely  in  the  dark  about  S's  intention.  He  cites  solely  literary  cases 
In  learning  about  writers  such  as  Rimbaud,  Mallarm6,  Marinetti  and  Ezra  Pound,  one 
soon  learns  that  speculation  as  to  what  they  intended  to  communicate  by  individual 
metaphors  is  pointless  -  in  the  dual  sense  of  being  a  waste  of  time  and  beside  the  point. 
But  this  does  not  mean  that  it  is  pointless  to  try  and  interpret  the  metaphors,  nor  that  any 
old  interpretation  will  do.  228 
Having  argued  that  the  interpretation  of  metaphor  can  be  relatively  determinate  even 
"Aen  we  know  little  about  the  speaker's  intentions,  Cooper  goes  on  to  argue  the 
converse;  that  we  can  be  sure  of  what  the  speaker's  intentions  were  without  determining 
the  metaphorical  content. 
The  speaker,  poet  or  painter  does  not  have  exclusive  rights  to  interpretation  -  and  even  if 
he  did  his  interpretation  would  not  have  to  mimic  his  intention  at  the  time  of 
composition.  229 
So,  he  concludes,  ignorance  of  an  actual  speaker's  intention  is  neither  necessary  nor 
sufficient  for  a  metaphor  tq  have  an  indeterminate  content. 
If  the  point  here  is  solely  that  we  can  come  up  with  satisfying  interpretations  of 
apparently  metaphorical  utterances  that  mention  little  about  the  actual  speaker,  then  the 
point  is  well  taken.  But  that  is  surely  not  what  should  be  at  issue  here.  We  should  be 
careful  not  to  conftise  the  idea  that  we  can  interpret  what  a  person  knowingly  said  in 
228 
Cooper,  (1986)  p.  72 
229 
Cooper  (1986)  p.  73 
173 making  an  utterance  with  the  idea  that  we  can  interpret  the  sentence  he  uttered  in  a  way 
that  satisfies  us  in  some  respect.  The  whole  idea  of  something  being  an  unintentional 
double  entendre,  for  example,  relies  on  there  being  a  gap  between  what  a  speaker 
actually  said  and  the  possibility  of  construing  it  in  a  satisfying  way.  We  should  similarly 
admit  the  existence  of  non-intentional  metaphors  -  in  the  sense  of  sentences  or 
utterances  that  ive  can  intelligibly  or  usefully  treat  as  if  they  were  metaphors  -  which  we 
can  generate  and  interpret  for  particular  purposes.  Perhaps  Burroughs'  technique  of 
cutting  up  newspapers  and  randomly  assorting  often  suggestive  sentences  would  be  a 
clear-  example  of  how  we  can  intentionally  bring  about  such  non-intentional  metaphors. 
Nobody  should  claim  that  only  intentional  utterances  can  be  interpreted  as  if  they  were 
metaphors,  just  as  nobody  should  suggest  that  only  intentional  jokes  -  or  joke  shaped 
utterances  -  are  funny.  But  this  should  not  lead  us  to  play  down  the  role  of  intention  in 
the  practice  ofjoke  telling,  nor  in  metaphor. 
In  addition,  we  must  be  careftil  not  to  assume  that  we  can  give  a  unified  account  of  how 
we  should  best  interpret  metaphors,  no  matter  in  what  context  they  may  arise.  The  cases 
Cooper  cites,  involving  Modernist  literary  writers,  may  well  demand  a  different 
treatment  than  the  everyday  case,  but  this  is  not  to  say  that  we  haven't  identified  an 
important  feature  of  the  everyday  case  when  we  link  metaphor  to  an  intended  use  of  a 
sentence. 
Let  us  assume,  in  the  interests  of  charity,  that  Cooper's  target  is  only  the  'naYve'  intention 
theorist,  who  thinks  that  MI  says  all  that  needs  to  be  said  about  metaphoric 
indeterminacy.  His  arguments  against  naYve  intentionalism  then  seem  cogent; 
metaphoric  determinacy  and  actual  speaker  intention  can  come  apart.  What  about  the 
second  idea  then,  namely; 
(M2)  A  metaphorical  content  M  is  indeterminate  iff  the  speaker's  intention  is  open 
ended. 
Cooper  admits  that  a  speaker  can,  on  occasion,  intend  for  a  metaphor  to  be  taken  in 
'several  ways  at  the  same  time'.  230  Perhaps  when  I  say  "John  is  a  real  giant  among  men", 
"'  Cooper  (1986)  p.  74 
174 I  can  intend  that  his  mother  will  think  that  I  am  praising  him,  while  knowing  that  you 
will  really  know  that  I  am  drawing  attention  to  his  weight  problem.  But,  Cooper  argues, 
this  is  not  happily  characterised  as  intending  to  mean  CI  or  C2  by  P,  but  rather  CI  and 
C2.  Moreover,  it  cannot  suffice  for  a  metaphor  to  be  indeterminate  that  the  relevant 
intended  meaning  be  vague,  since  that  would  suggest  not  incommensurate 
interpretations  but  a  single  one  that  'matches  the  speaker's  intention  in  vagueness'.  231 
Nor  can  S  intend  merely  to  try  out  a  striking  sounding  sentence,  for  that  would  render 
the  relevant  speaker's  meaning  non-existent,  not  open-ended. 
Cooper  claims  that  there  is  only  one  kind  of  case  that 
might  happily  be  described  as  one  of'speaker's  open  ended  meaningý.  This  is  where  the 
proposition  meant  by  the  speaker  is  of  the  open-ended  form'P  or  Q  or  [But]  To  say 
that  a  speaker  might  have  meant  P  or  might  have  meant  Q,  is  not  equivalent  to  saying 
that  he  meant  a  disjunctive  proposition  P  or  Q  or  ... 
232 
Cooper  rightly  points  out  that  whereas  we  might  be  happy  to  say  of  a  notoriously  ironic 
friend  that  we  often  don't  know  whether  he  is  saying  P  or  saying  not-P,  we  never  take 
him  to  be  uttering  the  tautology  P  or  not-P. 
All  these  arguments,  I  would  suggest,  are  fine  as  far  as  they  go.  But  Cooper  is  wrong,  I 
think,  to  take  the  best  construal  of  M2  as  involving  vagueness  or  disjunction.  In  the 
latter  half  of  this  essay,  I  want  to  outline  what  I  take  to  be  a  better  picture  of  how 
intention  and  indetenninacy  are  related. 
We  can  deal  briefly  with 
(M3)  A  metaphorical  content  M  is  indeterminate  iff  different  possible  speakers  could 
mean  different  things  by  the  corresponding  utterance  P. 
This  is  untenable,  and  Cooper  rightly  demolishes  it.  Firstly,  there  are  just  too  many 
possible  speakers.  We  have  to  narrow  them  down  to  the'most  reasonable  ones',  and 
231  Cooper  (1986)  p.  75 
232  Cooper  (1986)  p.  75 
175 Cooper  argues,  we  can  do  so  precisely  because  we  have  a  prior  idea  of  what  counts  as  a 
reasonable  interpretation  of  the  metaphor.  Our  grasp  of  the  metaphoric  content 
determines  the  relevant  possible  speakers,  and  not  vice  versa.  I  am  slightly  sceptical 
about  the  general  effectiveness  of  this  response  to  more  plausible  modifications  of  (W), 
but  do  not  intend  to  take  issue  with  it  here. 
Instead,  let's  go  back  to  the  problem  that  we  started  out  with.  There  is  a  tension  between 
two  ways  we  might  want  to  think  about  metaphor.  On  the  one  hand,  we  are  pulled  in  the 
direction  of  saying  that  the  speaker's  intention  must  in  some  sense  constrain  acceptable 
interpretation  of  metaphor.  After  all,  how  else  are  we  to  explain  the  common  sense  idea 
that  the  speaker  has  often  selected  a  particular  metaphor,  that  she  has  reasons  for  using 
the  expression  that  she  does,  etc?  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  definite  substance  to  the 
intuition  that  lies  behind  Cooper's  objection.  The  idea  that  in  metaphorical  utterance  we 
have  a  definite  and  pre-existing  content  to  convey,  that  the  problem  of  selecting  a 
metaphor  is  one  of  how  best  to  dress  up  such  a  content  in  borrowed  clothes,  seems  to 
completely  misrepresent  the  phenomenology  of  what  we  do.  Typically  metaphors  spring 
to  mind  with  a  rather  vague  feeling  of  aptness.  We  can  often  struggle  to  express  or  even 
elucidate  in  literal  language  what  we  meant  by  a  metaphor.  Yet  typically  we  can 
recognise  interpretations  of  a  metaphor  as  being  in  or  out  of  accord  with  the  way  we 
meant  them  to  be  understood.  We  ought  not  to  envisage  ourselves  as  throwing 
metaphors  out  into  the  world,  semi-randomly  as  it  were,  to  fare  as  they  happen  to  be 
taken  up  and  elaborated  on,  whether  by  ourselves  or  others. 
But  similarly,  it  seems  difficult  to  see  how,  after  the  metaphor  has  been  correctly  and 
fully  interpreted,  taken  in  the  ivay  ive  ineant  it,  we  could  have  had  a  prior  intention  to 
mean  or  implicate  all  of  that.  Spelling  out  the  intended  effects  of  a  metaphor,  even  in 
the  case  where  one  has  produced  it  oneself,  can  be  a  long  and  tortuous  process. 
Plausible  interpretations  that  are  out  of  accord  with  one's  intent  need  to  be  set  aside; 
good  suggestions  about  how  to  convey  in  literal  terms  what  one  was  getting  at  need  to  be 
enthusiastically  adopted,  even  when  the  idea  of  putting  things  that  way  would  never 
have  sprung  to  one's  mind  in  a  million  years.  The  problem  -  or  at  least,  one  important 
problem  -  is  to  see  how  any  half-way  motivated  theory  of  speaker  intention  can  account 
for  first-person  authority  over  metaphor,  while  not  surrendering  the  datum  that  one 
rarely  has  some  clearly  delimited  proposition  in  mind  at  the  time  when  the  metaphor  is 
176 made.  And  if  my  earlier  discussion  is  correct,  that  seems  to  be  a  problem  for  realists  and 
error  theorists  alike. 
4.7  Metaphor  and  Order-of-Determination 
I  think  we  should  see  this  tension  as  an  instance  of  a  more  general  issue  about  intentional 
states,  discussed  by  Crispin  Wright  in  a  number  of  papers  233  and  usefully  summarised  by 
Jim  Edwards: 
The  problem  is  to  reconcile  the  first  person  epistemology  of  such  intentional  states,  the 
fact  that  we  normally  take  a  person's  sincere  avowals  of  his  own  intentional  states  to  be 
authoritative,  with  the  fact  that  an  intentional  state  may  also  'have  to  answer  to'  future 
behaviour,  behaviour  which  the  subject  need  not  'have  had  in  mind'  when  he  made  the 
avowal.  234 
In  the  case  of  metaphor,  the  intentional  state  in  question  is  what  the  speaker  intended  to 
mean  by  the  metaphor.  The  future  behaviour  is  the  responses  and  judgements  made  by 
the  speaker  concerning  which  interpretations  and  extensions  of  the  metaphor  are  in 
accord  with  his  original  intention.  Wright's  attempted  resolution  of  the  problem 
involves  taking  the  speaker's  considered  belief  about  what  he  intended  to  mean  to 
constitute  the  facts  about  what  he  meant,  rather  than  seeing  them  as  tracking  an 
independent  fact  of  the  matter.  What  I  intend  by  a  metaphor  can  be  open-ended 
precisely  because  for  any  given  interpretation,  extension  or  development  of  the 
metaphor,  there  is  not  an  independently  determined,  pre-existing  fact  about  whether  it 
accords  with  my  intention. 
Before  we  go  on  to  consider  the  particular  case  of  metaphor,  let's  remind  ourselves 
Wright's  general  account  is  structured,  since  we  have  covered  quite  a  lot  of  ground  since 
my  discussion  in  Chapter  1.  He  is  interested  in  different  ways  of  interpreting  what  he 
calls  'Provisional  Equations',  which  take  the  following  general  form 
233  See,  for  example,  Wright  (1987),  (1989a),  (1989b),  (1989c).  and  (1992). 
234  Edwards  (1992),  p.  21. 
177 (PE)  For  a  set  of  optimal  conditions  C,  a  state  of  affairs  P,  and  a  subject  S: 
If  C  holds,  then  (it  would  be  the  case  that  P  iffS  wouldjudge  that  P). 
There  are  two  contrasting  ways,  Wright  thinks,  that  we  could  understand  the  case  where 
a  given  provisional  equation  holds  for  a  particular  C,  P  and  S.  We  could  understand  the 
C-cond  itions  as  being  such  as  to  allow  S  to  successfully  track  an  independently 
obtaining  fact  that  P.  That  is,  we  could  understand  the  biconditional  as  indicating  that  S 
judges  that  P  because  P  is  the  case,  and  S  is  infallibly  good  at  tracking  that  fact  in  those 
conditions.  Call  this  the  extension-reflecting  sense.  . 
On  the  other  hand,  we  could  understand  the  biconditional  as  indicating  that  it  is  S's  best 
opinion  that  constitutes  the  fact  that  P.  In  this  case,  we  understand  it  as  telling  us  that  for 
P  to  be  the  case  consists  in  nothing  more  than  that  subjects  like  S  judge  that  P  in  C- 
conditions.  In  this  sense,  Macts  would  be  metaphysically  dependent  on  certain 
tendencies  of  human  response.  Call  this  the  extension-deterniining  sense.  235 
We  are  to  determine  which  way  the  Provisional  Equation  should  be  read  by  checking 
whether  (1)  the  C-conditions  have  been  specified  substantially,  not  by  means  of  a 
'whatever  it  takes'  ceterisparibus  clause  (2)  the  equation  holds  true  a  priori.  (3) 
whether  the  C-conditions  are  satisfied  must  be  logically  independent  of  facts  about  P  and 
(4)  that  there  is  no  better  explanation  of  why  the  first  three  conditions  are  satisfied  than 
the  claim  that  S's  best  judgements  constitute  the  fact  that  p.  236  If  the  result  of  all  four  of 
these  checks  is  positive,  then  the  relevant  instance  of  PE  is  to  be  read  in  the  extension 
determining  sense.  If  not,  it  is  to  be  taken  as  extension-reflecting. 
How  might  such  an  account  look  with  respect  to  first  person  self-ascriptions  of 
intention?  Consider  the  Provisional  Equation  for  Intention  (PEI)  for  any  subject  S  and 
content  P 
23'  As  I  noted  in  Chapter  1,  since  the  PE  only  tells  us  about  what  is  happening  in  optimal  conditions, 
Wright  normally  describes  our  optimal  judgement  of  whether  P  as  at  best  partially  determining  the  facts 
about  P.  I  continue  to  ignore  this  distinction  here. 
236  Wright's  motivation  for  these  constraints  is  explored  in  more  detail  in  Section  1.7 
178 (PEI)  If  conditions  C  hold  then  (S  believes  that  S  intends  that  P  iff  S  intends  that 
P).  237 
Wright  argues  that  in  suitable  conditions  a  subject's  judgements  about  his  own  intentions 
constitute  the  fact  that  he  has  such  and  such  intention.  It  is  not  at  best  a  contingent 
matter  whether  or  not  we  have  access  to  our  own  intentions,  he  thinks.  Rather,  it  is 
precisely  the  fact  that  our  best  opinion  determines  whether  or  not  we  have  a  particular 
intention  that  explains  why  we  are  'effortlessly,  non-inferentially  and  generally  reliable 
about  [our  own]  psychological  states.  '  238 
Of  course,  it  is  possible  for  us  to  be  self-deceived  about  our  own  states  of  mind. 
Moreover,  there  seems  to  be  no  straightforward  way  of  ruling  out  such  self-deception  in 
formulating  the  C-conditions  in  PEI  without  running  into  trouble  with  the  substantiality 
condition.  Nevertheless,  Wright  plausibly  argues,  the  'grammarof  intention  is  such  that 
we  are  a  priori  entitled  to  presume  that  we  are  not  deceived,  unless  we  have  actual 
evidence  to  the  contrary.  That  is,  although  we  cannot  include  a'no  self-deception'  clause 
in  the  optimality  conditions  and  still  fulfil  the  substantiality  condition,  we  can  still  be  a 
priori  justified  in  holding  that  any  given  instance  of  PEI  is  true.  239 
Such  justification  is  a  priori  but  defeasible,  since  evidence  that  S  was  in  fact  self- 
deceived  would  remove  it.  Wright's  claim,  therefore,  is  that  the  fact  that  PEI  is  apriori 
justified  is,  in  the  absence  of  a  better  explanation,  enough  to  show  that  our  best  opinions 
about  our  own  intentions  are  extension-determining  rather  than  extension  reflecting.  240 
Since  it  is  our  best  judgements  about  what  we  intend  or  intended  that  constitute  the  facts 
about  our  intentions,  we  can  reconcile  the  idea  that  we  have  a  definite  authority  with 
respect  to  our  own  intentions  with  the  fact  that  there  need  be  no  propositional  content 
237  Statistically  standard  health,  statistically  standard  external  conditions,  possession  of  relevant  concepts, 
judging  after  a  period  of  careful  reflection,  etc 
238  Wright  (1989b)  p.  289.1  have  drawn  here  on  the  useful  outline  of  Wright's  position  given  in  Edwards 
(1992) 
239  That  is,  we  are  not  a  priorijustified  in  holding  that  the  universal  closures  are  true,  but  we  are  in  holding 
that  any  given  instances  are. 
240  For  a  defence  of  the  move  from  apriori  truth  to  a  priori  justification  see  Divers  and  Miller  (1994) 
179 that  we  need  have  'in  mind,  in  the  sense  of  being  able  to  spontaneously  or  even 
reflectively  identify.  at  the  time  of  making  a  metaphor.  2-  41 
We  now  have  the  resources  to  make  the  case  that  in  making  a  metaphor,  the  speaker's 
intention  concerning  how  it  should  be  understood  can  be  essentially  'open-ended'.  The 
suggested  reply  is  that  intentions  concerning  the  communication  of  a  metaphorical 
content  are  merely  a  special  case  of  intending  in  general.  In  the  c  orrect  conditions,  my 
judgements  about  my  own  intentions  are,  as  Wright  has  plausibly  argued,  constitutively 
linked  to  the  facts  about  what  those  intentions  are.  It's  simply  difficult  to  make  sense  of 
a  genuine  intention  that  could  'float  free'  of  our  sincere,  undeceived  self-ascriptions.  242 
So  there  is  apparently  no  need  for  the  intention  theorist  to  have  to  make  the  case  that  in 
intending  to  authoritatively  convey  a  propositional  content  P  by  uttering  a  metaphor  M,  a 
speaker  S  must  somehow  have  had  the  resources  to  specify  or  delimit  P  available  to  him 
when  intending  to  utter  M  metaphorically.  It  may  be  a  perfectly  acceptable  picture  to 
conceive  our  access  to  the  facts  about  what  S  intended  by  a  particular  metaphor  as 
I primarily  relating  to  when,  under  optimal  conditions,  he  would  judge  that  a  particular 
interpretation  is  in  accord  with  what  he  intended. 
Cooper  originally  defined  a  metaphor  as  being  indeterminate  just  in  case  it  admitted  of 
more  than  one  interpretation,  none  of  which  can  be  demonstrated  as  uniquely  correct. 
We  have  seen  that  we  must  distinguish  the  idea  that  there  can  be  satisfying  and 
productive  interpretations  of  'non-intentional  metaphors'  from  the  notion  that  a  speaker's 
utterance  has  a  metaphorical  content  that  admits  of  more  than  one  interpretation.  So 
Cooper  requires  a  narrower  definition  of  what  indeterminacy  consists  in.  What  I  want  to 
argue  is  that  the  intuition  that  metaphors  are  in  some  sense  indeterminate  because  a 
241  1  have  concentrated  on  the  case  of  intention,  but  it  seems  highly  likely  that  a  similar  account  could  be 
devised  for  our  first  person  authority  over  the  nature  of  our  imaginings.  Experiential  imagination  is  a 
puzzling  case,  however.  In  the  case  of  intention,  we  generally  do  not  'check  back',  phenomenologically, 
with  the  content  of  our  thought.  In  the  case  of  imagination,  we  often  have  the  sense  that  we  do.  Imagine  a 
metal  fork  lying  in  clear  light  on  a  white  tablecloth.  Do  your  best  to  visualize  it.  Now,  are  the  prongs 
pointing  up  or  down?  There's  a  definite  sense  of  checking  back  against  a  prior  image,  in  the  way  that  we 
might  redirect  perceptual  attention  to  one  aspect  of  a  perceived  scene.  But  it  is  clear  our  epistemic 
relationship  to  the  merely  intensional  world  of  the  imagination  is  very  different  from  the  perceptual  world, 
that  we  causally  engage  with. 
242  See  Peacocke  (1999)  for  a  contrasting  account  of  this  phenomenon,  however. 
180 speaker  simply  couldn't  have  had  that  complicated  and  open-ended  andyet  determinate 
a  content  in  his  mind's  eye,  as  it  were,  may  be  simply  misplaced.  The  speaker  typically 
does  not  have  a  independently  determined  content  in  mental  view,  which  he  then 
conveys  with  a  greater  or  lesser  degree  of  success.  Nor  does  such  a  content  live,  wholly 
determinate  yet  inaccessible,  in  some  'intention  box'  in  the  lower  reaches  of  the 
speaker's  sub-personal  psychology.  243  Nor  is  he  merely  in  equal  hermeneutic  standing 
with  his  interlocutor,  forced  to  interpret  his  own  metaphors'  in  just  the  same  fashion  as  he 
interprets  those  of  others,  and  as  others  interpret  him.  Rather,  the  speaker  can  inhabit  an 
episternically  optimal  position  from  which  to  arbitrate  between  different  interpretations, 
making  constitutive  judgements  as  to  which  was  in  accord  with  his  earlier  intention.  But 
this  doesn't  entail  that  indeterminacy  in  Cooper's  sense  is  completely  removed,  that  one 
can  uniquely  demonstrate  that  one  interpretation  is  correct.  Such  a  demonstration  is  not 
possible  since  the  interpretation  at  hand  is  always  defeasible,  conditional  not  only  on  the 
possession  of  a  continuing  warrant  to  hold  that  the  relevant  epistemic  conditions  are 
ideal,  but  also  on  the  speaker's  ftiture  judgements  and  avowals  relating  to  alternative  or 
modified  interpretations. 
Of  course,  all  this  still  leaves  plenty  of  room  for  a  speaker  to  be  mistaken  about  what  he 
intended.  If  optimal  conditions  do  not  hold,  or  there  is  evidence  that  he  is  self-deceived, 
then  PEI  is  silent  about  whether  or  not  Ss  judgements  constitute  the  facts  about  what  he 
means.  We  might  favour  a  subjunctive  account,  appealing  to  what  the  speaker  would 
have  meant.  Alternatively,  in  many  cases  where  the  optimal  conditions  for  PEI  do  not 
hold,  the  optimal  conditions  for  radical  interpretation  still  might,  and  we  might  take  the 
facts  to  be  constituted  by  the  judgements  of  a  actual  or  hypothetical  radical  interpreter. 
In  other  cases,  including  perhaps  the  case  of  the  Modernist  novelist  and  the  psycho- 
analytic  patient,  I  might  be  taken  to  have  renounced  my  first  person  authoritative 
standpoint  with  respect  to  my  intentions,  even  when  I  actually  inhabit  best  conditions.  244 
24'  As  e.  g.  Sperber  and  Wilson  seem  to  suggest  at  times.  See  their  (I  986a)  passim,  and  (I  986b)  pp.  547- 
549 
244  We  might  characterise  what  is  happening  herein  different  xvýays.  Is  it  a  refusal  to  make  the  judgement 
about  my  intentions,  even  if  ideal  conditions  hold?  Or  a  second  order  intention  that  my  first  order 
intention  not  be  taken  as  authoritative?  (I  might  of  course  still  require  that  my  second  order  intention  be 
taken  as  such.  ) 
181 But  there  will  be  a  wide  area  of  cases  in  which  it  is  precisely  my  best  judgements  that 
are  authoritative.  245 
We  have  the  beginnings  of  a  potential  solution,  then,  to  the  problem  we  started  off  with. 
In  the  everyday  case,  there  is  a  firm  link  between  speaker  intention  and  metaphor.  But 
we  needn't  imagine  that  this  entails  having  the  whole  metaphorical  content  antecedently 
'in  mind'in  any  philosophically  problematic  way.  This  was  the  one  aspect  of  a 
problematic  picture  that  Cooper,  in  suggesting  that  metaphorical  content  is 
indeterminate,  was  no  doubt  reacting  against.  Instead,  it  is  open  to  us  to  replace  this 
picture  with  another  which  allows  the  nature  of  our  knowledge  of  intention  itself  to  be 
characteristically  'open'.  Wright's  theory  has  just  this  feature,  since  the  existence  of  facts 
about  what  I  intended  are  conditional  on  my  bestjudgements,  many  of  which,  at  any 
given  time,  I  shall  not  have  considered  or  made. 
Much  more  than  this  has  to  be  said,  of  course,  in  order  to  differentiate  metaphorical 
limitlessness  from  the  general  indeterminacy  highlighted  by  Wright's  account  of 
intention.  After  all,  that  account  applies  as  much  to  applying  the  rule  for  'Y'  as  to 
reflecting  on  what  Eliot  meant  by  "Midnight  shakes  the  memory/As  a  madman  shakes  a 
dead  geranium  ".  There  is  room  for  tinkering  with  this  proposal..  Perhaps  in  some  cases 
we  are  happier  to  admit  that,  at  the  time  of  utterance,  we  didn't  quite  know  exactly  what 
we  meant  to  convey,  while  in  the  literal  case  we  resist  this  much  more  strongly. 
Moreover,  there  will  no  doubt  be  many  cases  where  the  particular  propositional  content 
intended  to  be  conveyed  by  the  speaker  is  just  not  to  the  point:  we  like  the  metaphor 
because  of  its  non-propositional  effects  on  us,  say  the  way  the  words  sound  together. 
Nevertheless,  it  seems  clear  that  important  aspects  of  the  intuitive  open-endedness  or 
limitlessness  of  metaphor  have  been  omitted.  In  the  next  two  chapters,  I  turn  some  other 
ways  in  which  they  might  be  accommodated. 
245  Or  if  not,  the  case  has  to  be  made.  I  take  it  that  e.  g.  postmodernist  critics  aim  to  show  that  the 
optimality  conditions  are  never  fulfilled  -  the  lures  of  patriarchy,  ideology  or  the  unconscious  mean  I  am 
always  self-deceived.  I  leave  open  the  question  of  whether  this  is  a  coherent  thought. 
182 4.8  Conclusion 
I  began  this  chapter  by  examining  an  argument  of  Wright's  which,  if  good,  would  have 
served  to  undercut  much  of  the  primafacie  motivation  for  the  type  of  error  theory 
canvassed  in  Chapters  2  and  3.1  concluded  that  the  continuity  of  ascriptions  of 
metaphorical  meaning  with  semantic  ascriptions  generally  was  likely  to  provide  a 
convincing  answer  for  the  Davidsonian,  and  undercut  Denham's  attempt  to  provide  a 
minimalist  account  of  metaphorical  meaning.  I  then  broadened  my  focus  slightly, 
endeavouring  to  examine  the  objective  standing  of  metaphorical  discourse  in  the  light  of 
Wright's  test,  in  a  way  that  did  not  prejudge  more  detailed  issues  relating  to  the  good 
standing  of  particular  realist  theories.  I  concluded  that  most  contemporary  parties  to  the 
debate  were  likely  to  conclude  that  metaphorical  meaning  was  not  evidence 
transcendent,  and  had  an  at  best  limited  'Cosmological  Role'.  I  discussed  two  strategies 
for  settling  questions  of  the  cognitive  status  of  such  judgements,  due  to  Wright  and 
Hopkins,  but  concluded  that  neither  of  them  provided  a  promising  general  strategy  for 
settling  disputes  about  realism,  contrary  to  first  appearances.  I  then  noted  that  all 
parties,  including  the  Davidsonian,  were  likely  to  require  some  suitable  account  of  the 
relationship  between  metaphorical  meaning  and  speaker-intention.  Having  discussed 
and  evaluated  Cooper's  presentation  of  the  issues,  I  suggested  that  a  first-person, 
response-dependent  account  of  speaker-intention  might  provide  a  suitable  and  under- 
explored  model  of  that  relationship.  Such  an  account  would  clearly  impose  an  anti- 
realist  response  to  the  Order-of-Determination  test.  Nevertheless,  I  concluded,  such  an 
account  could  only  hope  to  provide  at  best  a  partial  explication  of  the  key  notion  of 
limitlessness,  appealed  to  by  Davidson  in  his  rejection  of  the  speaker-meaning  account. 
I  will  examine  two  further  treatments  of  that  notion  in  what  follows. 
183 5.  Metaphor  and  Non-Conceptual  Content 
5.1  Introduction 
Any  satisfactory  theory  of  metaphor  ought  to  have  an  answer  to  the  question:  why  do 
we  use  metaphors?  This  question  is  especially  pressing  for  the  realist  about 
metaphorical  meaning.  Given  that  you  want  to  communicate  some  proposition,  why  not 
just  say  it  outright?  There  are  of  course  straightforward  answers;  to  be  entertaining,  to 
enliven,  to  be  elegant  and  concise,  to  enhance  rhetorical  effect.  These  answers, 
however,  despite  their  classical  ancestry,  have  often  seemed  to  miss  something 
important  out.  Other  purposes  for  metaphorical  speech  have  been  suggested,  such  as  the 
'cultivation  of  intimacy'  between  speaker  and  interpreter,  and  there  is  no  doubt  much 
more  that  could  be  usefully  said  about  this  type  of  issue.  246  Moreover,  the  idea  that 
intending  to  express  some  proposition  means  having  it  there  in  mind,  ready  to  be 
suitably  adorned  in  metaphorical  garb,  is  clearly  mythology,  which  the  broadly 
Wittgensteinian  account  of  intention  offered  in  the  last  chapter  can  help  us  begin  to  see 
past.  Nevertheless,  these  solutions,  and  dissolutions  of  the  puzzle  are  apt  to  seem 
unsatisfying.  Something  seems  still  to  be  missing  -  the  sense  that,  when  one  employs  a 
metaphor,  one  is  often  doing  the  best  one  can  to  get  something  across.  247 
The  error  theorist  about  meaning  has  some  kind  of  answer  to  our  question:  one  uses 
metaphor  to  try  to  get  us  to  think  of  one  thing  as  another.  248  This  is  something  that  could 
246  See  Cohen  (1978).  Cohen's  suggestion  is  discussed,  elaborated  and  endorsed  in  Cooper  (1986)  pp. 
153-178. 
247  Yablo  (in  his  (1998))  says  that  the  cardinal  rule  of  metaphor  is:  make  the  most  of  it.  But  often  this  is 
clearly  not  what  we  want  at  all.  Interpretive  fireworks  are  not  at  all  to  the  point  in  many  cases;  we're 
trying  to  convey  something,  just  those  words  are  the  best  we  can  do  at  formulating  it,  and  we  want  our 
interlocutor  to  catch  on,  not  take  off  on  flights  of  associative  creativity. 
24  8  Thus  Lamarque  and  Olsen  (1994)  p.  360.  "The  constitutive  aim,  definitive  of  metaphorical  utterance 
per  se,  is  simply  this:  to  invite  or  encourage  a  hearer  to  think  of,  conceive  of,  reflect  on,  or  imagine  one 
184 be  done  in  other  ways;  by  use  of  simile,  mimicry  or  juxtaposition,  for  example.  But 
what  is  it  to  think  of  or  imagine  one  thing  as  another?  Why  invite  someone  to  do  such  a 
thing,  and  what  good  does  it  do?  These  are  no  doubt  bad  questions,  although  it  is  not 
always  easy  to  think  of  which  better  ones  should  replace  them.  In  any  case,  the  sheer 
generality  of  the  answer  involves  a  loss  as  well  as  a  gain.  A  real  question  seems  in 
danger  of  being  drowned  out  in  the  hubbub  of  a  general  theory  of  experiential  and 
propositional  imagining.  So  let  us  ask  it  again:  in  what  sense,  in  employing  metaphor, 
are  we  doing  the  best  we  can? 
In  this  chapter,  I  intend  to  argue  that  figurative  language  plays  an  important  and 
distinctive  role  in  helping  us  talk  about  aspects  of  the  world  that  would  otherwise  be 
resistant  to  linguistic  expression.  Moreover,  that  role  neatly  coheres  with  the  distinctive 
Davidsonian  'marks'  of  metaphor  outlined  in  section  2.9.  This  ought  to  be  good  news 
for  the  realist  about  metaphorical  meaning,  since  it  helps  provide  the  resources  for  a 
principled  rejection  of  (A6).  However,  if  I  was  right  to  suggest  previously  that 
everybody,  including  the  Davidsonian  error-theorist,  ought  to  sign  up  to  at  least  the 
possibility  of  pragmatic  communication  via  metaphor,  such  an  account  ought  to  be  of 
interest  to  both  sides  in  the  realism  debate. 
In  particular,  I  will  claim  that  we  use  metaphors  to  capture  aspects  of  representational 
states  which  have  a  content  that  the  attributing  subject  lacks  the  concepts  to  specify 
directly.  When  we  lack  the  concepts  to  specify  the  character  of  certain  states  in 
straightforwardly  literal  terms,  metaphor  helps  us  employ  the  concepts  we  have  to  do  so. 
In  that  sense,  what  metaphor  draws  our  attention  to  is  often  non-conceptual  and  non- 
propositional  in  character.  Moreover,  such  specifications  are  'limitlessness'  in  a  number 
of  relevant  senses.  We  naturally  feel  that  such  characterizations  are  often  irreducible  to 
literal  paraphrase,  that  the  process  of  interpretation  is  self-sustaining  and  constantly 
developing,  and  that  'the  idea  of  finishing  would  have  no  clear  application'  . 
249  in  each 
case,  the  non-conceptual  character  of  the  content  in  question  helps  us  to  provide  an 
account  of  why  this  should  be  so. 
thing  (state  of  affairs,  idea,  etc)  in  terms  associated  with  some  other  thing  (state  of  affairs,  etc)  often  of  a 
quite  different  logical  type.  " 
249 
Davidson  (1984a)  p.  263 
185 I  begin  by  outlining  the  model  with  attention  to  the  case  of  the  emotions.  I  argue  that 
there  are  elements  of  our  representations  of  our  own  emotional  states  which  are  non- 
conceptual  in  character,  and  suggest  that  metaphor  and  other  figurative  language  often 
best  captures  the  precise  phenomenology  of  such  states.  I  then  extend  the  model  to  the 
case  of  religious  metaphor,  demonstrating  in  detail  how  it  can  be  used  to  answer  a 
challenge  raised  by  William  Alston  to  the  coherence  of  'irreducible'  metaphors  in 
theology. 
5.2  Metaphor  and  Emotional  Content 
It  is  an  important  and  interesting  feature  of  our  normal  experience  of  our  emotions  that 
we  find  it  difficult  to  describe  in  literal  terms  the  exact  qualitative  and  experiential 
character  of  what  we  are  feeling.  In  communicating  with  each  other  about  our  emotions, 
we  often  use  metaphors  and  other  figurative  expressions  to  try  and  capture  the  fine- 
grained  phenomenology  of  our  emotional  states.  Proper  appreciation  of  such  metaphors 
can  often  be  an  essential  precursor  to  empathetic  and  imaginative  identification  with 
another  person's  emotional  states,  and  to  the  development  of  explicit  knowledge  of  the 
nature  of  our  own  emotions.  A  distinctive  and  valued  aspect  of  literary  skill  concerns 
the  ability  to  provide  depth  of  characterisation  -  making  the  character  'live'  -  precisely 
by  imaginatively  recreating  recognisable  emotional  states  via  such  figurative  use  of 
language. 
Take,  for  example,  Nick  Carraway's  description  of  his  distorted,  emotionally  charged 
dreams  of  West  Egg: 
I  see  it  as  a  night  scene  by  El  Greco:  a  hundred  houses,  at  once  conventional  and 
grotesque,  crouching  under  a  sullen,  overhanging  sky,  and  a  lustreless  moon.  In  the 
foreground  four  solemn  men  in  dress  suits  are  walking  along  the  sidewalk  with  a 
stretcher  on  which  lies  a  drunken  woman  in  a  white  evening  dress.  Her  hand,  which 
dangles  over  the  side,  sparkles  cold  withjewels.  Gravely  the  men  turn  in  at  a  house  - 
the  wrong  house.  But  no-one  knows  the  woman's  name,  and  no-one  cares. 
186 Or  James's  description  of  the  coldly  avaricious  nature  of  Osmond's  emotional 
attachment  to  Isabel  Archer 
Her  mind  was  to  be  his  -  attached  to  his  own  like  a  small  garden  plot  to  a  deer  park.  He 
would  rake  the  soil  gently  and  water  the  flowers;  he  would  weed  the  beds  and  gather  an 
occasional  nose-gay.  It  would  be  a  pretty  piece  of  property  for  a  proprietor  already  far- 
reaching.  250 
Such  metaphors  evoke  a  quite  precise  sense  of  the  specific  emotional  charge,  intensity 
and  hue  of  the  emotional  states  inhabited  by  the  characters,  a  sense  that  we  would  find 
difficult  to  capture  in  literal  terms.  I  have  chosen  fictional  examples  for  ease  of 
reference,  but  I  want  to  maintain  that  figurative  language  plays  an  exactly  analogous  role 
in  our  everyday  expressions  and  descriptions  of  emotion;  we  capture  best  how  we  feel  at 
times  by  sticking  resolutely  to  the  figurative.  It's  easy  to  recognize  this,  even  in  one's 
own  case;  we  grasp  for  pictures  and  analogies  to  convey  how  we  feel,  or  how  others 
seemed.  The  problem  is  not  to  recognize  the  phenomenon,  but  to  explain  it. 
I  have  noted  several  times  that  well-founded  worries  about  semantic  treatments  of 
metaphor  have  prompted  many  theorists  to  move  to  a  pragniatic  theory  of  metaphor, 
where  metaphor  is  accounted  for  at  the  level  of  speaker-meaning  rather  than  sentence 
meaning.  On  this  type  of  account,  the  producer  of  a  metaphor  utters  a  sentence  that 
literally  means  that  q  in  order  to  convey  or  implicate  some  other  proposition  r. 
Metaphor  is  thus  seen  as  structurally  analogous  to  irony  or  sarcasm,  where  my  utterance 
of  e.  g.  'that  was  really  clever'  can  serve,  in  the  right  circumstances,  to  implicate  my 
belief  in  the  negation  of  the  proposition  I  literally  expressed,  or  made  as  if  to  express. 
However,  I  have  also  noted  that  this  type  of  account  seems  to  run  into  difficulties  in 
accounting  for  the  marks  of  metaphor.  One  central  problem  relates  to  'paraphrasability'. 
In  the  typical  case  of  sarcasm,  I  could  have  said  literally  what  I  instead  implicated.  It  is 
this  kind  of  ability  that,  in  part,  makes  it  appropriate  to  identify  the  implicated 
proposition  as  what  I  was  really  trying  to  get  across.  In  the  case  of  metaphorical 
utterance,  on  the  other  hand,  it  often  feels  simply  inipossible  to  say  in  literal  terms  what 
250  Cited  in  Denham  (2000)  p.  327 
187 a  speaker  got  across  by  using  a  metaphor.  In  simple  cases,  with  practically  dead 
metaphors  or  near  idioms,  of  course,  this  isn't  difficult  at  all;  I  can  utter  'he  isn't  the 
sharpest  knife  in  the  drawer',  and  convey  my  belief  that  he  is  stupid.  With  even 
moderately  complex  metaphors,  however,  paraphrases  are  often  implausible  and  hard  to 
identify.  Since  the  type  of  pragmatic  theory  described  seems  to  rely  on  the  producer  of 
the  metaphor  having  some  proposition  'in  mind',  as  it  were,  which  she  intends  to 
communicate  obliquely  by  uttering  some  other  sentence  in  the  appropriate  context,  this 
constitutes  a  real  problem  for  proponents  of  the  theory.  A  natural  temptation  is  to  retreat 
to  a  generalized  error-theory  about  all  but  the  simplest  and  stalest  metaphors,  that  admit 
of  quite  straightforward  elucidation.  Again,  we  seem  to  tick-tock  between  two 
conflicting  inclinations;  on  the  one  hand  the  inclination  to  reject  the  wooden 
paraphrases,  and  the  pragmatic  theory  that  seems  to  demand  them,  and  on  the  other,  the 
sense  that  we  clearly  do  often  reach  for  quite  complex  metaphor  when  we  most  sincerely 
want  to  get  something  across  about  what  it's  like  to  feel  a  certain  way. 
I  want  to  resolve  the  felt  tension  between  these  compelling  lures  of  thought.  Perhaps  in 
purely  literary  cases,  what  a  metaphor-maker  means  by  his  words  is  less  important  than 
what  meanings  can  be  made  from  them.  In  the  everyday  case,  however,  the  use  of 
metaphor  is  rarely  a  symptom  of  the  fact  that  the  speaker  was  really  playing  around  with 
words;  instigating  a  game  where  each  participant's  aim  is  to  come  up  with  striking  and 
original  similarities  and  analogies  based  on  the  metaphor.  Rather,  using  metaphor  often 
involves  doing  the  best  ive  can  to  get  something  across  that  we  can't  convey  in  any  other 
way.  The  emotional  case  is  a  useful  illustration  precisely  because  it  is  so  clear  that  we 
may  well  be  trying  to  communicate  something  tremendously  significant  by  using 
metaphor.  We  needn't  be  trying  merely  to  politely  invite  certain  thoughts  or  attitudes  in 
our  interlocutor,  nor  to  let  her  come  up  with  her  own  inventive  readings  of  what  we  said, 
since  it  seems  difficult  to  see  why  should  we  care  about  them.  Rather,  we're  trying  to 
communicate  the  i,  vay  things  arefor  us,  something  that  (a)  genuinely  possesses  content, 
and  thus  can  stand  in  the  right  kind  of  normative  relations  to  our  attempt  at  putting  it  into 
metaphor,  and  yet  that  (b)  we  don't  seem  to  be  able  to  get  across  in  other,  more 
straightforward  ways.  A  natural  idea  is  to  hold  that  the  reason  that  these  two  conditions 
obtain  is  that  we're  dealing  with  non-conceptual  content. 
188 5.3  Metaphor,  Emotion  and  Non-conceptual  Content 
Let's  take  a  simple  case  where  I  turn  my  attention  inward  onto  my  own  emotions;  let's 
say  I  realise  that  I  am  feeling  more  resentful  and  competitive  towards  a  colleague  than  I 
had  first  realised.  Now,  it  -seems  primaJacie  non-controversial  that  I  am  representing  a 
particular  aspect  of  my  current  psychological  state.  Of  course,  there  have  been 
philosophers  who  have  denied  this  (thus  conforming  to  the  well  confirmed  universal 
generalisation  that  for  all  primaJacie  non-controversial  claims  C  there  exists  a 
philosopher  who  has  maintained  not-C.  )  In  particular,  error-theorists  about  the  emotions 
hold  that  most  folk  terms  for  emotion  almost  certainly  lack  an  objective  reference,  so 
that  there  is  nothing  for  such  terms  to  represent,  while  avoivalists  have  held  that  self 
ascriptions  of  mental  states  should  not  be  thought  of  in  representational  terms  at  all.  251 
Nevertheless,  there  are  well  known  problems  with  these  positions,  especially  relating  to 
the  motivation  for  adopting  them.  In  particular,  the  latter  seems  committed  to  providing 
a  plausible  theory  of  representation  which  entails  that  our  self-ascription  of  mental  states 
come  out  as  non-representational.  It  seems,  however,  that  the  opposite  is  true.  A  recent, 
and  convincing  set  of  necessary  criteria  for  a  given  state  to  count  as  representational  has 
the  consequence  -  unsurprising  no  doubt  -  that  my  second  order  thoughts  about  the 
emotional  states  I  am  in  are  genuinely  representational.  They  count  a  state  as 
representational  only  if 
1.  It  serves  to  explain  behaviour  in  situations  where  the  connections  between  sensory 
input  and  behavioural  output  cannot  be  plotted  in  a  law-like  manner  (Parshnony) 
2.  It  admits  of  cognitive  integration;  it  connects  uP  in  the  right  way  with  other 
psychological  states,  both  representational  and  motivational  (Integration). 
3.  It  is  compositionally  structured  in  such  a  way  that  their  elements  can  be  constituents 
of  other  representational  states  (Conipositionality) 
4.  It  admits  the  possibility  of  misrepresentation  (Error). 
25  1  Eliminativists  about  emotion  may  include  Churchland  (1981)  and  Griffiths  (1997).  Wittgenstein  is 
oflen  read  as  the  paradigmatic  avowalist. 
189 It  is  clear  that  these  criteria  (proposed  by  Jose  Bermudez)  are  met  in  the  case  of  my 
thought  about  my  emotional  states.  252  There  is  no  relevant  causal  story  to  be  told  about 
the  way  that  e.  g.  my  realisation  that  I  am  more  resentful  than  I  had  thought  affects  my 
behaviour,  and  how  it  does  so  will  be  in  part  a  function  of  psychological  interaction 
between  that  state  and  other  of  my  beliefs  and  desires.  I  can  think  other  self-involving 
thoughts,  and  thoughts  about  other  people's  emotional  states,  so  compositionality  is 
respected.  And  I  can  be  wrong  about  the  character  and  quality  of  my  emotional  states; 
mistaking  justified  resentment  for  envy,  or  a  short-lived  romantic  crush  for  genuine 
feelings  of  love,  for  example. 
The  interesting  thing  about  these  criteria,  however,  as  Bermudez  points  out,  is  that  while 
they  are  all  satisfied  paradigmatically  by  the  conceptual  contents  that  are  the  objects  of 
folk  psychological  propositional  attitudes  ... 
it  does  not  follow  that  conceptual 
253 
propositional  content  is  the  only  genuine  form  of  content  . 
In  particular,  there  is  theoretical  space  here  for  the  ascription  of  non-conceplual  content 
to  our  experiences  of  emotional  states,  where  a  non-conceptual  content  of  an  experience 
is  defined  as  follows 
(NQ  An  experiential  state  E  of  a  subject,  S  has  a  non-conceptual  content  iff  it  meets 
the  criteria  for  being  a  representational  state  outlined  above,  and  S  could  be  in 
the  state  E  even  if  S  lacked  the  concepts  requisite  to  specify  the  content  of  E. 
Notice  that  this  definition  does  not  rule  out  the  possibility  that  a  subject  might  indeed 
possess  the  concepts  necessary  to  specify  the  content  of  the  experiential  state  that  they 
are  in.  Indeed,  in  examples  like  the  one  above,  where  I  came  to  realise  that  I  was  angry, 
I  do  have  certain  of  the  relevant  concepts.  The  central  point  is,  of  course,  that  I  needn't 
have  the  concepts  to  be  in  the  state;  there  is  no  intrinsic  or  essential  connection  between 
my  being  able  to  represent  in  experience  e.  g.  my  emotional  state  as  being  thus  and  so, 
and  my  possessing  the  concepts  to  do  so. 
252  See  Bermudez  (1998)  Ch  3  and  4  for  extensive  discussion  of  these  criteria. 
253  Bermudez  (1998)  p.  94 
190 What  might  give  us  theoretical  reason  to  decide  that  my  experience  of  my  emotional 
states  possesses  non-conceptual  content?  There  are,  I  believe,  several  motivating 
factors,  familiar  from  discussions  of  non-conceptual  perceptual  experience 
1.  My  experience  of  my  own  emotions  is  more  fine-grained  than  my  conceptual 
repertoire.  I  can  internally  discriminate  states  that  fall  under  the  same  conceptual 
descriptions.  For  example,  I  can  distinguish  the  character  of  the  longing  boredom 
that  I  experience  waiting  for  a  bus,  from  that  I  undergo  while  awaiting  a  tiresome 
acquaintance's  punch-line.  Similarly,  I  can  distinguish  the  feelings  of  liking  or 
attachment  I  have  towards  a  range  of  new  workmates,  even  though  I  may  not  be  able 
to  verbalise  or  even  express  in  thought  precisely  what  the  relevant  difference  comes 
to.  254 
2.  Uncontroversially  limited  concept  users  such  as  young  children  or  higher  mammals 
can  nevertheless  seem  to  manifest  a  relatively  sophisticated  emotional  repertoire 
(boredom,  self-satisfaction).  Such  attributions  aren't  obviously  a  result  of  misguided 
anthropomorphism.  255 
3.  It  seems  primajacie  possible  that  I  might  recreate  exactly  in  memory  states  of 
emotion  that  I  underwent  before  acquiring  the  relevant  concepts,  such  as  a  moment 
of  resentment  or  euphoria  undergone  as  a  young  child.  Since  such  states  would  be 
by  hypothesis  phenomenologically  identical  before  and  after  acquisition  of  the 
relevant  concept,  and  would  seem  to  meet  the  constraints  on  being  genuinely 
representational  outlined  above,  the  most  natural  explanation  is  that  the  states 
possess  non-conceptual  content  on  both  occasions,  now  and  the  remembered  past.  256 
If  the  above  comprises  a  defensible  set  of  theses,  then  I  believe  that  we  have  the 
resources  to  explain  the  fact  that  we  often  seem  forced  to  resort  to  metaphorical 
constructions,  if  we  are  to  do  justice  to  our  experience  of  emotions.  Moreover,  we  can 
simultaneously  account,  at  least  in  part,  for  the  non-paraphrasability  of  an  important 
254  See  Peacocke  (1993)  Ch  3  and  Peacocke  (1994)  for  further  elaboration  of  this  line  of  thought  applied  in 
the  case  of  perception. 
255  There  is  a  sharply  increasing  body  of  research  on  the  contrasts  and  inter-relations  between  human  and 
animal  emotions.  For  an  illustrative  discussion,  see  McNaughton  (1989)  Ch  i  1. 
256  See  Martin  (1992)  for  an  analogous  argument  in  the  case  of  perception. 
191 class  of  metaphors,  without  resorting  to  the  abandonment  of  any  notion  of  metaphorical 
meaning.  The  story  we  should  tell  goes  roughly  as  follows.  In  experiencing  our 
emotional  states,  we  are  presented  with  states  which,  while  representational,  are  non- 
conceptual  in  character.  Unsurprisingly,  therefore,  given  the  fine-grainedness  noted 
above,  we  often  lack  the  necessary  concepts  to  communicate  such  states  to  others 
directly.  We  therefore  use  metaphor  to  tell  each  other  about  the  states  that  we  are  in, 
using  the  concepts  that  we  do  possess  to  get  across  the  way  things  are  with  us  that  we 
don't  have  concepts  for.  Nevertheless,  since  non-conceptual  states  are  genuinely 
representational,  they  provide  the  kind  of  normativeftiction  which  is  necessary  to 
account  for  our  practice  of  not  always  treating  metaphorical  utterances  as  just  invitations 
to  contemplate  salient  similarities,  or  useful  devices  for  the  promotion  of  lateral 
thinking,  but  rather  sometimes  as  genuine  attempts  to  get  something,  currently 
unspecifiable,  but  often  proposition-like,  across.  257 
If  that's  right,  then  a  realist  has  resources  with  which  to  take  some  of  the  sting  out  of 
Davidson's  (A6): 
(A6)  An  account  of  m-meaning  which  identifies  it  with  the  extra  propositional  content 
communicated  by  the  author  of  the  metaphor,  over  and  above  what  it  says,  as 
determined  by  a  linguistic  theory  of  pragmatics,  provides  an  unacceptably 
incomplete  and  misleading  account  of  our  practices  of  producing,  using  and 
reflecting  on  metaphors. 
257  The  content  communicated  by  such  a  metaphor  may  correspond  to  what  Peacocke  (1992)  p.  77  calls  a 
profo-proposition,  compQsed  of  individuals  and  properties.  See  Bermudez  (1998)  pp.  96-100  for  a  useful 
introduction  to  this  notion.  Having  such  'Russellian'  propositions  in  play  opens  up  the  possibility  that 
metaphorical  content  may  have  a  wider  'Cosmological  Role'  than  it  is  natural  to  expect.  In  a  sense,  the 
sensitivity  of  non-concept  users  to  such  representational  states  already  serves  to  establish  this.  It  is  clear, 
however,  that  while  non-concept  users  may  be  sensitive  to  the  content  expressible  by  metaphors,  they  are 
not  thereby  credited  with  such  sensitivity  via  metaphor.  The  sketchiness  of  Wright's  Wide  Cosmological 
Role  constraint  makes  it  difficult  to  settle  finally  on  ajudgement  as  to  the  correct  view  to  take  on  this 
matter.  See  Stem  (2000)  p.  188  for  a  related  distinction  between  referential  and  purely  conceptualized 
propositions.  My  conception  of  metaphor  as  apt  for  the  expression  of  non-conceptual  content  was 
developed  independently  of  Stern,  and  differs  in  detail  but  the  two  approaches  share  a  common  theme.  It 
is  of  course  a  very  old  and  intuitive  idea  to  hold  that  metaphor  helps  us  say  what  we  could  previously 
grasp,  but  not  put  into  words. 
192 That  principle,  remember,  was  supported  by  the  following  line  of  thought: 
a)  Anything  worth  regarding  as  a  tolerably  complete  and  infonnative  account  of 
our  practices  of  producing,  using  and  reflecting  on  metaphors  must  account 
for  all  of  the  distinctive  marks  of  metaphor. 
b)  An  account  of  metaphor  that,  like  Searle's,  characterizes  such  practices  as 
being  in  essence  a  special  case  of  saying  one  thing  and  meaning  another, 
cannot  account  for  all  of  the  distinctive  marks  of  metaphor.  In  particular,  it 
cannot  give  an  account  of  the  limitlessness  and  non-propositional  character 
of  what  -metaphor  draws  to  our  attention. 
c)  Therefore,  such  pragmatic  accounts  of  metaphor  provide  at  best  an 
incomplete  and  misleading  account  of  our  practices  of  producing,  using  and 
reflecting  on  metaphors. 
If  the  above  sketch  of  an  account  is  defensible,  then  the  pragmatic  theorist  has 
established  some  room  for  manoeuvre.  A  form  of  limitlessness  is  established,  since  no 
literal  paraphrase  is  likely  to  seem  satisfying.  Our  existing  vocabulary  will  be  far  too 
impoverished  and  clumsy  to  capture  the  complex  fine-grainedness  of  our  emotional 
lives,  as  tracked  from  the  inside.  Moreover,  there  is  scope  for  the  realist  to  argue  that  the 
relevant  form  of  non-propositionality  is  also  captured.  After  all,  trying  to  convey  to 
somebody  hoiv  one  isfeeling,  is  unnaturally  thought  of  as  trying  to  communicate  that 
such  and  such  is  the  case.  Davidson's  motivating  examples  of  non-propositionality  - 
perceptual  and  pictorial  content  -  share  many  relevant  features  with  our  experiences  of 
our  own  emotional  states.  Pictures,  perceptions  and  emotions  are  analogue  in  form, 
admitting  of  shading  and  degree.  They  are  multi-dimensional,  and  experientially 
integrated  in  a  hugely  complex  manner.  They  admit  of  gestalt  shifts,  as  when  one  is 
forced  to  see  one's  black  mood  as  suddenly  self-indulgent  and  ridiculous.  They  are 
resistant  to  judgement:  a  tromp  Voeil  picture  can  still  seem  strikingly  real  once  the 
illusion  has  been  unmasked,  and  anger  can  outlast  the  revelation  of  its  unmotivated 
character.  Such  observations,  however,  do  not  seem  to  undercut  the  idea  that  pictures.  or 
193 perceptions  can  be  genuinely  representational.  In  a  broad  sense  of  proposition,  they 
possess  propositional  content.  258 
5.4  Further  Thoughts  on  the  Limitlessness  of  Metaphor 
The  pragmatic  realist  can  do  even  better  in  accounting  for  our  intuitions  of  the 
limitlessness  of  metaphor.  I  have  already  distinguished  two  forms  of  this  intuitive 
notion;  one  relating  to  the  dependence  of  m-meaning  on  future  judgement,  and  the  latter 
on  the  unavailability  of  literal,  conceptualised  paraphrase.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  there 
are  other  strands  to  the  original  conception  that  might  be  profitably  teased  apart.  One 
involves  a  kind  of  open-endedness,  the  capacity  for  continual  elaboration  and 
development.  It  is  this  notion  which  is  often  taken  to  motivate  anti-realisms  about 
metaphor.  However,  given  the  gestalt-type  nature  of  our  representation  of  our  emotional 
state,  it  is  clear  that  the  realist  can  begin  to  account  for  why  we  might  feel  that 
metaphors  are  open-ended  in  this  sense  also. 
Let's  go  back  to  the  case  of  Nick  Carraway's  dream: 
I  see  it  as  a  night  scene  by  EI  Greco:  a  hundred  houses,  at  once  conventional  and 
grotesque,  crouching  under  a  sullen,  overhanging  sky,  and  a  lustreless  moon.  In  the 
foreground  four  solemn  men  in  dress  suits  are  walking  along  the  sidewalk  with  a 
stretcher  on  which  lies  a  drunken  woman  in  a  white  evening  dress.  Her  hand,  which 
dangles  over  the  side,  sparkles  cold  withjewels.  Gravely  the  men  turn  in  at  a  house  - 
the  wrong  house.  But  no-one  knows  the  woman's  name,  and  no-one  cares. 
It  is  clear  that  Nick  does  not  intend  us  to  take  much  of  this  literally;  he  does  not  literally 
see  the  dream  scenario  as  a  night  scene  by  El  Greco,  and  the  sky  is  not  literally  presented 
as  sullen.  Nevertheless,  the  metaphors  provide  an  effective,  almost  indispensable  means 
of  capturing  and  communicating  the  fine-grained  representational  content  of  the  dream, 
258  Moran  (1997)  p.  257-258  makes  a  similar  move,  noting  that  we  might  e.  g.  model  propositions  as  sets  of 
possible  worlds.  As  befits  my  attempt  to  remain  fairly  neutral  about  controversial  semantic  issues,  I  will 
not  critically  examine  this  possibility  here.  My  purpose  is  merýly  to  note  that  a  workable  model  of 
propositional  content  may  be  open  to  the  realist. 
194 including  the  emotional  charge  and  timbre  that  pervades  it.  So  much  was  argued  for 
above. 
We  needn't,  and  shouldn't,  rest  content  with  a  purely  reflective  account  of  emotional 
metaphor,  however,  metaphor  as  miffor  to  the  soul.  In  employing  the  metaphors  in 
reflecting  upon  his  emotional  states,  Nick  brings  those  states  into  a  light  that  illuminates 
but  also  colours  and  contours.  In  employing  the  El  Greco  metaphor,  Nick  at  once 
expresses  and  casts  neiv  light  upon  his  emotional  state.  Aspects  of  the  dream  that 
originally  provoked  the  figure  may  seem  afterwards  to  be  less  important  than  other 
elements  of  it  that  the  metaphor  fits;  the  strange  static  quality  of  the  movement  within 
the  dream-narrative,  for  example,  or  perhaps  a  quasi-religious  sense  of  sin,  abandonment 
and  foreboding.  The  metaphor  is  not  used  up  in  its  original  expression,  but  establishes  a 
new  gestalt  under  which  the  significance  of  the  dream  can  be  re-examined  and 
assimilated. 
Similarly,  consider  the  following  passage,  from  the  fourth  of  Abelard's  personal  letters 
to  Heloise: 
And  so  I  ask  you,  sister,  to  accept  patiently  what  mercifully  befell  us.  This  is  a  father's 
rod,  not  a  persecutor's  sword.  The  father  strikes  to  correct,  and  to  forestall  the  enemy 
who  strikes  to  kill.  By  a  wound  he  perceives  death,  he  does  not  deal  it;  lie  thrusts  in  tile 
steel  to  cut  out  disease.  He  wounds  the  body,  and  heals  the  soul;  he  makes  to  live  what 
he  should  have  destroyed,  cuts  out  impurity  to  leave  what  is  pure. 
Abelard  is  almost  certainly  consciously  punning  on  fatherly  punishment  as  symbol  of  the 
justice  of  God,  and  as  infamous  component  of  his  own  Historica  calainitatuln. 
Nevertheless,  we  can  easily  imagine  that  it  is  not  so;  that  the  original  metaphor,  drawing 
on  stock  Christian  imagery  in-the  service  of  theodicy  ,  comes  to  organize  Abelard's  sense 
of  his  situation  in  a  way  that  suddenly  reveals  to  him  the  tortuous  character  of  his 
relationship  with  his  own  sexual  nature.  Simply  stating  literally  that  God  only  inflicts 
evil  upon  us  for  our  own  good  is  clearly  far  less  likely  to  provide  such  a  moment  of 
insight  and  reorientation.  Metaphor,  motivated  by  one  set  of  insights,  can  come  to 
reconfigure  one's  sense  of  things  in  a  way  that  provides  smoothly  and  fittingly  for 
others.  In  this  sense,  the  earlier  picture  of  emotional  metaphors  can  also  seemingly  lay 
195 claim  to  a  satisfying  notion  of  open-endedness.  Of  course,  it  need  not  be  non-conceptual 
content  that  provokes  such  an  episodic  reflective  pattern.  Nevertheless,  it  seems  clear 
that  the  way  in  which  metaphor  serves  to  focus  and  elaborate  one's  sense  of  such 
emotional  episodes,  the  very  states  that  one  lacks  conceptual  resources  to  tackle 
reflectively,  entails  that  metaphor  has  a  special  role  to  play  here. 
5.5  Metaphor  and  Religious  Language  1 
I  now  want  to  turn  to  my  second  example  of  the  role  that  non-conceptual  content  can 
play  in  the  philosophy  of  metaphor,  namely,  religious  metaphor.  William  Alston  has 
presented  an  argument  which,  if  sound,  would  prove  the  impossibility  of  irreducibly 
metaphorical  talk  -  where  such  talk  is  irreducible  iff  it  says  something  which  cannot  be 
said,  even  in  part,  in  literal  ternis  -  about  God.  259  In  this  section  I  examine  two  answers 
to  Alston  that  might  be  given  by  a  theist.  The  first  develops  a  late  suggestion  of 
Alston's,  which  seems  to  undermine  his  main  argument.  I  conclude  that  this  reply, 
though  logically  consistent  and  independently  motivated,  is  weaker  than  a  second  reply, 
which  argues  that  Alston's  argument  has  little  force  against  a  theist  who  subscribes  to  the 
idea  described  above,  that  such  metaphors  can  express  non-conceptual  contents. 
Alston  argues  against  the  possibility  of  irreducibly  metaphorical  talk  about  God,  where  a 
metaphor  is  irreducible  in  the  relevant  sense  if  what  it  says  cannot  be  said,  even  in  part, 
in  literal  terms.  It  is  clear  that  the  denial  of  this  type  of  strong  irreducibility  (SI)  is 
perfectly  consistent  with  maintaining  that  metaphor  plays  an  important  or  even  essential 
role  in  our  theological  talk  and  thought,  and  that  such  iveak  irreducibility  might 
ultimately  turn  out  to  be  the  more  puzzling  and  interesting  variety.  Moreover,  there  may 
well  be  room  for  doubt  as  to  whether  there  are  any  good  grounds  for  endorsing  such 
strong  irreducibility  in  the  first  place;  Alston  notes  his  independent  disagreement  with 
claims  about  God's  transcendence  and  ineffability,  and  wit  h  the  non-vcrifiability  of 
religious  language,  each  of  which  might  potentially  be  employed  in  arguments  which 
motivate  an  appeal  to  the  strong  form  of  the  position.  Nevertheless,  since  I  take  it  that 
both  the  position  and  Alston's  argument  against  it  is  are  of  some  interest  in  their  own 
259  Alston  (1989) 
196 right,  I  propose  to  examine  the  merits  of  Alston's  case  against  the  possibility  of  strong 
irreducibility,  and  to  offer  two  replies  on  behalf  of  the  opposing  position.  Although  it  is 
not  strictly  implied  by  the  position  as  stated,  I  will  take  it  that  the  defender  of  SI  is  a 
theist,  and  moreover,  I  will  assume  that  there  is  no  special  burden  of  proof  placed  on  her 
by  Alston  simply  in  virtue  of  her  theism. 
It  is  as  well  to  be  clear  from  the  beginning  how  Alston  thinks  of  metaphorical  meaning. 
He  holds  to  a  pragmatic  realist  theory,  where,  as  ought  to  be  familiar  by  now,  speakers 
use  sentences  with  a  given  literal  meaning  to  convey  or  implicate  some  propositional 
content  distinct  from  that  expressed  by  the  sentence  taken  literally;  this  metaphorical 
content  is  equivalent  to  what  the  speaker  is  saying  via  his  use  of  the  metaphor.  It  is  of 
course  possible  for  speakers  to  use  metaphor  for  purposes  other  than  assertion  -  to  invite 
a  hearer  to  reflect  on  (or  play  with)  a  model  or  exemplar  of  a  given  situation,  in  order 
that  she  might  identify  striking  similarities  and  analogies  for  herself,  for  example  -  but  in 
many  cases,  the  speaker  will  have  some  fairly  definite  set  of  resemblances  'in  mind' 
which  he  wishes  to  convey.  Thus  Alston  writes 
[In]  the  typical  metaphorical  statement  is  "building  on"  the  relevant  meaning  of  his 
predicate  term  in  two  ways.  First,  he  is  presenting  the  kind  of  thing  to  which  the  term 
literally  applies  as  a  model  of  the  subject.  Secondly,  he  has  in  mind  one  or  more. 
resemblances  between  model  and  subject,  and  he  extracts  from  these  resemblances  what 
he  means  to  be  attributing  to  the  subject.  260 
For  the  purposes  of  this  section,  I  will  allow  Alston  that  this  is  a  convincing  theory  of 
metaphor,  although  there  are  clearly  many  issues  of  substance  and  detail  that  might 
reasonably  be  challenged.  How,  then,  given  such  a  theory,  does  his  argument  for  the 
impossibility  of  SI  proceed?  Let  us  concentrate  on  the  example  Alston  gives:  'God  is  my 
rock'.  Alston's  argument  can  then  be  represented  as  follows 
1)  Strong  irreducibility  is  true.  (Assumption,  for  reductio) 
2)  Alston's  model  of  metaphor  is  correct.  (Assumption) 
260  lbid  p.  23 
197 3)  'God  is  my  rock'  is  an  example  of  the  type  of  irreducible  metaphor  SI  is  concerned 
with,  and  can  be  used  to  say  something  about  God.  (Assumption) 
4)  'God  is  my  rock'  is  irreducible  (by  I  and  3) 
5)  'God  is  my  rock'  expresses  a  proposition  (by  2  and  3). 
6)  'God  is  my  rock'  must  attribute  some  property  to  God  which  isn't  literally 
expressible,  even  in  part  Call  this  property  P.  (by  4  and  5). 
7)  Since  the  speaker  is  attributing  the  property  P  to  God  by  means  of  the  metaphor,  the 
speaker  must  have  cognitive  access  to  P  (by  2  and  6)261 
8)  If  the  speaker  has  cognitive  access  to  P,  then  the  speaker  has  a  concept  of  the 
property  P. 
(Assumption) 
9)  If  it  is  possible  for  the  speaker  to  fonn  a  concept  of  the  property  P,  then  other 
members  of  the  language  community  can  form  a  concept  of  P.  (Assumption) 
10)  If  other  members  of  the  language  community  can  form  a  concept  of  P,  then  P  can 
become  the  literal  meaning  of  a  predicate  term  in  the  language.  (Assumption) 
11)  If  P  can  become  the  literal  meaning  of  a  predicate  term  in  the  language,  then  'God  is 
my  rock'  can  be  expressed  in  wholly  literal  terms.  (Assumption) 
12)'God  is  my  rock'  can  be  expressed  in  wholly  literal  terms,  contra  4.  (7,8,9,10,11) 
13)  Strong  irreducibility  is  false.  (By  reductio,  1,4,12) 
As  noted  above,  I  intend  to  grant  Alston  the  correctness  of  his  account  of  metaphor  and 
the  appropriateness  and  typicality  of  the  example  he  offers  (assumptions  2  and  3).  1  will 
also  accept  that  the  argument  as  presented  is  valid,  and  that  assumptions  10  and  11  are 
true.  It  is  thus  common  ground  between  myself  and  Alston  that  the  argument  against  SI 
is  sound  if  8  and  9  are  true.  For  convenience,  I  will  consider  the  question  of  their  truth 
by  examining  two  slightly  more  general  principles,  which  I  will  assume  provide  the  sole 
support  for  8  and  9. 
Conceptual  Access  If  a  subject  has  cognitive  access  to  a  property,  then  the  subject  has 
a  concept  of  that  property. 
261  This  step  in  the  argument  may  seem  less  than  obvious.  Remember,  however,  that  on  Alston's  account 
of  metaphor,  a  speaker  must'have  in  mind'the  respects  in  which  the  model  resembles  the  subject  of  the 
metaphor. 
198 Mutual  Access  If  it  is  possible  for  the  speaker  of  a  natural  language  to  form  a 
concept  of  the  property  P,  then  other  members  of  the  language 
community  can  form  a  concept  of  P. 
I  suggest  that  the  defender  of  Sl  can  best  resist  Alston's  argument  by  rejecting  either  one 
or  both  of  the  above  principles.  The  challenge,  of  course,  is  for  the  SI-theorist  to 
provide  principled  grounds  for  doing  so,  and  so  avoid  the  charge  of  a  mere  ad  hoc 
refusal  to  accept  Alston's  reductio.  I  will  begin  with  outlining  a  possible  strategy  for 
rejecting  mutual  access. 
Thepriinafacie  grounds  for  rejecting  the  Mutual  Access  principle  appear  bleak.  After 
all,  given  plausible  assumptions  about  the  shared  cognitive  and  conceptual  capacities  of 
natural  language  users  -  endorsed  byý  empirical  evidence  as  well  as  common  sense  -  it 
seems  to  follow  that,  in  the  vast  majority  of  cases,  a  species  of  conceptual  mastery 
attainable  by  an  arbitrary  member  of  a  natural  language  community  can  be  duplicated  by 
his  peers.  Of  course,  this  need  not  always  be  the  case,  at  least  in  practice.  The 
extemalist  tradition  in  epistemology  and  semantics  has  stressed  the  widespread 
phenomenon  of  epistemic  and  linguistic  div  ision  of  labour.  262  Given  finite  capacities 
and  ever  more  specific  fields  of  human  intellectual  enquiry,  it  may  well  be  practically 
impossible  to  acquire  conceptual  mastery  of  many  theoretical  concepts.  Moreover,  it  is  a 
familiar  truth  that  experts  can  develop  a  higher  degree  of  conceptual  sensitivity  than 
others  possess  with  regard  to  the  properties  of  wine,  humans  or  song;  and  perhaps  we 
can  imagine  certain  of  them  making  use  of  innate  sensitivities  simply  not  available  to  the 
rest  of  us.  Your  inborn  capacity  for  colour  discrimin  ation,  or  gift  for  mathematical 
physics  may,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  allow  you  to  conceptualise  elements  of  your  experience 
which  are  literally  unreachable  by  those  of  us  whose  sensitivities  are  naturally  less  apt 
for  honing.  Nevertheless,  this  can  hardly  be  the  kind  of  case  that  the  SI-theorist  would 
wish  to  rely  on.  Ineffable  experience  of  and  thought  about  God  seems  unlikely  to  be 
best  represented  as  the  unspeakable  privilege  of  a  genetically  blessed  few. 
262  See  e.  g.  Putnam  (1975);  Burge  (1979). 
199 A  better  tactic  is  for  the  defender  of  irreducibility  to  look  for  a  principled  way  to 
differentiate  between  certain  speakers  and  others,  in  a  way  that  lets  them  effectively 
undermine  mutuality.  Unusually,  Alston  identifies  precisely  such  a  route  in  a  footnote 
towards  the  end  of  his  paper.  In  a  footnote  to  his  discussion  of  I.  M.  Crombie's 
position  263  Alston  writes 
Although  I  am  reading  Crombie  as  a  parimetaphoricist,  he  is  susceptible  to  an 
interestingly  different  reading  according  to  which  theological  metaphors  can  be  literally 
paraphrased,  though  not  by  mere  mortals.  That  is,  we  might  think  of  Christ,  who, 
according  to  Crombie,  guarantees  that  the  models  he  provides  for  us  are  suitable  models, 
as  being  able  to  spell  out  the  crucial  similarities  in  literal  terms.  This,  then,  would  be  an 
extension  of  the  familiar  situation  in  which  a  poet  uses  a  metaphor  with  some  definite 
intention  in  mind  that  he  could  express  literally,  but  where  none  of  his  readers  could  do 
so,  though  some  of  them  are  "grasped"  by  the  metaphor.  264 
Alston  is  correct  to  note  that  this  is  an  "interestingly  different"  way  of  interpreting  or 
developing  Crombie's  position,  but  seems  not  to  fully  recognise  the  direct  relevance  of 
this  type  of  account  for  his  argument  against  strong  irreducibility.  It  seems  to  me  to 
speak  directly  against  the  mutual  access  principle,  in  cases  where  the  linguistic 
community  includes  members  who  are  more  than  "Mere  mortals". 
Let's  avoid  textual  issues  as  to  the  correctness  of  this  reading  of  Crombie,  and  simply 
take  the  defender  of  this  type  of  account  to  be  committed  to  the  following  claim: 
Asymmetrical  Access  In  cases  where  a  linguistic  community  has  members  who 
are  more  than  mere  mortals,  it  is  possible  for  certain 
speakers  to  form  concepts  of  certain  properties  which 
other  speakers  cannot. 
Asymmetrical  Access  entails  that  the  mutual  access  principle  doesn't  hold  in  cases 
where  the  linguistic  community  includes  those  who  are  more  than  mere  mortals,  and 
thus,  if  good,  would  block  Alston's  argument  against  SI.  Moreover,  it  has,  I  believe,  a 
263  As  outlined  in  Crombie  (1955)  and  (1957) 
264  Alston  (1989)  36  n.  23. 
200 certain  degree  of  independent  plausibility,  and  thus  provides  a  means  for  the  SI-theorist 
to  avoid  the  charge  of  ad  hoc  rejection  of  Alston's  premises.  After  all,  as  noted  above, 
we  are  familiar  with  the  idea  that  possession  of  certain  cognitive  capacities  can  be 
essential  for  concept  mastery,  at  least  for  basic  possession  of  such  concepts.  Normally 
sighted  people  have  psychologically  and  epistemically  basic  mastery  of  colour  concepts, 
for  example,  since  they  have  the  ability  to  grasp  colours  under  the  mode  of  presentation 
afforded  by  visual  perception.  Other  members  of  the  linguistic  community  (for  example, 
congenitally  blind,  or  colqur-blind  members),  if  they  count  as  possessing  the  concepts  at 
all,  do  so  in  virtue  of  the  existence  of  those  who  exercise  basic  mastery.  Perhaps  a 
person  who  couldn't  visually  distinguish  between  red  and  green  might  know  that  redness 
was  the  property  of  looking  red  to  normally  sighted  people  under  standard  conditions  in 
the  actual  world,  and  might  even  have  some  other,  reliable  way  of  telling  red  things.  from 
green.  (We  can  imagine  that  certain  light  wave  detectors  might  be  combined  in  such  a 
way  that  she  could  discriminate  objects  on  the  basis  of  their  colour).  Nevertheless,  if  she 
counts  as  possessing  colour  concepts  at  all,  it  is  partly  in  virtue  of  the  existence  of  those 
who  exercise  basic  mastery  of  such  concepts,  since  it  is  the  visually  basic  judgements  of 
these  members  which  determine  e.  g.  what  counts  as  being  co-extensive  with,  or  a 
reliable  detector  of,  red  things.  265  Moreover,  we  can  imagine  that  trying  to  get  across  to 
such  people  what  it  was  like  to  make  such  judgements  on  the  basis  of  visual  appearance 
alone  would  involve  appeal  to  metaphor,  analogy  and  image;  scarlet  being  like  the  sound 
of  trumpet,  for  example.  Nor  is  this  phenomenon  restricted  to  sensational  or  perceptual 
qualities.  We  might  offer  an  autistic  person  metaphors,  models  or  exemplars  to  help 
them  track  the  emotional  and  psychological  states  of  others,  for  example. 
I  claimed  above  that  the  existence  of  this  type  of  asymmetry  of  biological  capacity  didn't 
by  itsetfprovide  a  very  promising  model  for  directly  undermining  Mutual  Access  in  the 
theological  case.  However,  it  does  serve  to  provide  an  interesting  set  of  structural 
analogies  which  can  be  drawn  on  in  defending  Asymmetrical  Access.  Since  we  can 
reasonably  expect  that  more  than  mortal  members  of  natural  language  communities  have 
distinctive  cognitive  capacities  which  mere  mortals  lack,  we  can  expect  that  they  can 
form  concepts  of  certain  properties  -  have  ivays  of  thinking  about  certain  properties  - 
which  are  simply  not  open  to  their  cognitively  limited  peers.  It  is  open  to  the  Christian 
265  1  assume  here,  for  purposes  of  illustration,  a  response-dependent  account  of  colour. 
201 defender  of  SI  to  hold  that  only  Christ  can  form  basic  concepts  of  the  properties 
expressed  by  irreducible  metaphors,  and  that  any  mastery  of  them  that  we  might  come  to 
possess  is  bound  to  be  partial,  derivative  and  reliant  on  his  use  of  them  in  practice  and 
judgement.  A  natural  policy,  then,  as  we  have  seen  above,  is  for  Christ  to  make  appeal 
to  the  concepts  and  capacities  that  we  do  have  basic  mastery  of  in  order  to  elucidate 
those  which  we  do  not. 
Such  an  employment  of  Asymmetrical  Access  in  the  theological  case  has  the,  advantage 
of  blocking  a  potential  reply  that  Alston  might  make  against  the  claim  that 
considerations  concerning  experts  and  basicality  suffice  for  rejecting  Mutual  Access. 
Such  a  reply  would  hold  that  the  modal  claim  which  the  latter  claim  makes  -  that  other 
members  of  the  language  community  can  fonri  a  concept  of  P-  has  to  be  heard  as  'can  in 
principle  form  a  concept  of  F.  It  isn't  clear  that  such  a  reply  works  even  against  those 
considerations;  Kripkean  style  necessities  regarding  the  essentiality  of  species  and  origin 
might  mean  that  it  was  metaphysically  impossible  for  certain  members  of  linguistic 
community  to  acquire  certain  capacities  possessed  by  others,  in  cases  where  the 
linguistic  community  involved  several  distinct  kinds  of  creatures,  for  example.  But  in 
any  case,  it  seems  that  the  theistic  defender  of  SI  has  good  grounds  for  saying  that  even 
given  such  a  strengthened  reading  of  Mutual  Access,  there  might  be  good  grounds  for 
rejecting  it  when  the  linguistic  community  involves  both  cognitively  finite  and  non-finite 
members. 
The  final  position  of  the  SI-theorist  who  rejects  the  mutual  access  principle  by  endorsing 
Asymmetrical  Access,  then,  is  independently  motivated  to  the  extent  that  it  appeals  to 
other  cases  which  make  plausible  the  claim  that  concept  possession  should  be 
asymmetrically  and  externally  individuated.  Christ,  unlike  other  members  of  his 
linguistic  community,  can  form  basic  concepts  of  certain  properties  of  God;  the  best  way 
for  him  to  convey  the  nature  of  these  properties  to  creatures  who  lack  such  basic 
capacities  may  involve  metaphor,  myth  and  symbol,  given  to  us  in  the  form  of  parable. 
Nevertheless,  we  can  count  as  having  knowledge  of  God's  nature  to  the  extent  that  we 
stand  in  certain  communal  relationships  to  Christ.  Just  as  some  epistemological 
externalists  argue  that  we  can  count  as  possessing  theoretical  knowledge,  or  mastery  of 
the  meaning  of  the  terms  of  our  language,  in  virtue  of  standing  in  certain  deferential 
relationships  to  scientific  experts  and  to  the  linguistic  community  as  a  whole,  so  we  can 
202 count  as  having  knowledge  of  God  and  the  meaning  of  metaphors  that  describe  him  to 
the  extent  that  we  intend  to  be  accommodating  our  practice  to  Christ's. 
It  is  perhaps  worth  noting  that  this  defence  of  SI  is  not  dependent  on  Alston's  rather 
surprising  and  counter-intuitive  claim  that  this  account  "would  be  an  extension  of  the 
familiar  situation  in  which  a  poet  uses  a  metaphor  with  some  definite  intention  in  mind 
that  he  could  express  literally,  but  where  none  of  his  readers  could  do  s  o,  though  some  of 
them  are  "grasped"  by  the  metaphor".  I  find  it  difficult  to  see  why  Alston  takes  such  a 
case  to  be  familiar,  given  that  the  phenomenology  of  poetic  composition  seems  to  count 
fairly  drastically  against  it,  and  also  why,  on  his  account,  the  readers  fail  to  be  able  to 
identify  the  content  of  the  relevant  intention.  If  it  is  because  the  poem  concerns  some 
ineffable  subjective  experience,  then  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  it  can  comprise  such  a 
content,  given  Alstoifs  views  on  the  necessity  and  mutuality  of  concept  possession.  A 
natural  alternative  interpretation  is  that  the  readers  are  merely  contingently  ignorant;  that 
had  they  been  around  to  ask  the  poet  the  correct  questions,  he  could  have  identified  for 
them  the  proposition  that  he  had  decided  to  dress  up  in  borrowed  clothes.  Such  an 
account  seems  to  me  to  distort  the  nature  of  artistic  creation  and  interpretation,  but  more 
seriously,  to  drain  much  of  the  interest  from  his  suggestion  of  how  to  read  Crombie.  For 
if  it  is  only  the  fact  that  Christ  chose  to  speak  indirectly,  or  wasn't  asked  the  right 
questions,  which  differentiates  our  knowledge  of  God  from  his,  then,  apart  from  the 
radical  contingency  of  this  account  of  God's  ineffability,  there  seems  to  be  no  reason 
why  we  might  not  be  able  to  stumble  across  the  relevant  concepts  for  ourselves,  so  that 
the  moderate  strengthening  of  Mutual  Access  mentioned  above  would  suffice  to  rebut 
Crombie's  suggestion. 
5.6  Metaphor  and  Religio.  us  Language  2 
Such  a  strategy  seems  to  me  to  be  philosophically  defensible  and  logically  consistent;  it 
may  even  prove  promising  for  some  purposes.  Nevertheless,  I  think  there  is  some  cause 
for  concern  about  whether  it  alone  can  do  the  requisite  explanatory  work.  In  particular, 
the  defensive  strategy  as  outlined  so  far  might  be  taken  to  rely  overly  much  on  Christ's 
knowledge  of  God  as  providing  the  epistemic  link  between  us  and  God.  Christian  SI- 
theorists  might  want  to  hold  that,  for  example,  metaphor  s  employed  by  the  pre-Christian 
203 prophets  and  psalmists  can  express  or  serve  as  a  model  for  thought  about  God,  while 
non-Christian  theists  might  not  accept  that  natural  linguistic  communities  have  included 
members  with  qualitatively  different  cognitive  powers  and  capacities.  Alternatively, 
concern  may  be  felt  about  whether  a  purely  externalist  model  of  our  knowledge  about 
God  can  do  justice  to  the  reflective  component  of  much  of  our  theological  talk  and 
practice. 
For  these  reasons,  and  for  the  independent  interest  of  the  question,  it's  worth  examining 
whether  an  independent  rejection  of  Conceptual  Access  (the  claim,  remember,  that  if  a 
subject  has  cognitive  access  to  a  property,  then  the  subject  has  a  concept  of  that 
property)  might  be  motivated.  The  best  line  here,  I  believe,  is  for  the  defender  of  SI  to 
appeal  to  other  cases  where  philosophers  have  wanted  to  appeal  to  non-conceptual 
contents  of  our  propositional  attitudes.  For,  again,  drawing  analogies  with 
independently  motivated  philosophical  position  allows  the  SI-theorist  to  deflect  the  force 
of  Alston's  reductio,  while  avoiding  the  charge  of  mere  ad  hoe  rejection  of  another 
premise. 
It  seems  too  quick,  though,  just  to  saddle  Alston  with  the  general  claim  that  cognitive 
access  entails  conceptual  access  -  so  that  just  any  reason  to  posit  non-conceptual  content 
would  serve  to  rebut  his  argument.  Alston  might  justifiably  claim  that  strictly  he  needn't 
defend  the  general  claim,  (although  this  is  the  claim  that  he  would  most  naturally  be  read 
as  making)  but  only  the  weaker  thesis  that,  if  a  subject  has  access  to  a  theological 
property,  then  she  has  a  concept  of  that  property.  From  now  on,  then,  I  will  argue 
against  this  weaker  claim. 
The  defender  of  irreducibility  will  be  on  strongest  ground  if  he  can  make  the  case  that 
the  contents  of  thought  about  God,  according  to  him,  cohere  with  a  general  theory  of 
representation,  and  yet  are  available  to  creatures  who  lack  any  of  the  relevant  kinds  of 
concept.  This  latter  condition  seems  to  block  certain  of  the  arguments  presented  in  the 
literature  in  support  of  the  possibility  of  non-conceptual  contents  of  thought  -  for 
example,  the  claim  that  our  perceptual  experience  is  morefinely-grained  than  our 
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conceptual  mastery,  (visual  concepts,  for  example,  along  with  grasp  of  an  objective 
spatial  material  world)  but  argue  that  the  subtle  variations  of,  say,  shade,  tone  and 
shadow  that  our  visual  experience  presents  us  with  outrun  our  genuinely  conceptual 
discriminatory  capacities.  In  the  case  of  thought  about  God,  however,  certain  types  of  Sl 
theorist  may  well  want  to  hold  that  we  can't  form  any  concept  of  God's  nature,  (although 
of  course  this  isn't  the  only  conceivable  view,  and  certainly  isn't  entailed  by  the  basic 
position).  For  those  who  are  motivated  by  the  thought  of  the  complete  alterity  and 
transcendence  of  God,  though,  the  kind  of  conceptual  capacities  presupposed  by  the 
fine-grainedness  argument  simply  won't  be  present,  so  that  the  needed  analogy  won't 
genuinely  hold. 
A  better  approach  for  the  SI-theorist,  I  believe,  is  to  rely  on  Bermudez'  model,  that 
allows  for  ivholly  non-conceptual  contents.  It  has  been  a  while  since  I  introduced  his 
account,  so  let  me  briefly  summarize  it  here. 
Bermudez  outlines  a  plausible  set  of  necessary  conditions  which  a  psychological  state 
must  meet  if  we  are  to  count  it  as  genuinely  representational.  He  then  argues  that  this 
general  account  of  what  it  is  for  thought  to  have  a  content,  to  cognitively  map  aspects  of 
the  objective  world,  does  not  require  that  the  subject  of  the  thought  should  possess  the 
concepts  necessary  to  specify  that  content.  Rather,  the  conceptual  /  non-conceptual 
distinction  comprises  afurther  division  of  representational  states  into  those  whose 
contents  presuppose  conceptual  mastery  on  behalf  of  the  relevant  subject,  and  those 
which  might  be  undergone  by  creatures  who  lacked  those  concepts  completely. 
Bermudez  four  requirements  on  psychological  states  being  genuinely  representational 
are  as  follows 
1)  They  should  serve  to  explain  behaviour  in  situations  where  the  connections  between 
sensory  input  and  behavioural  output  cannot  be  plotted  in  a  law-like  manner. 
266  Again,  Peacocke  (1992)  and  particularly  his  (1994),  419-429,  provide  a  useful  overview  of  such 
arguments. 
205 2)  They  should  admit  of  cognitive  integration,  being  able  to  connect  up  with  other 
representational  and  motivational  states. 
3)  They  should  be  compositionally  structured  in  such  a  way  that  their  elements  can  be 
constituents  of  other  representational  states. 
4)  They  should  permit  the  possibility  of  misrepresentation. 
Given  such  a  conception  of  a  representational  state,  then,  Bennudez  offers  us  the 
following  definition  of  when  its  content  is  non-conceptual 
(NQ  The  content  of  a  psychological  state  T  of  a  subject  S  is  non-conceptual  if  the 
state  meets  the  criteria  for  being  genuinely  representational  outlined  above,  and  S 
could  be  in  the  state  T  even  if  S  lacked  the  concepts  requisite  to  specify  the 
content  of  T. 
Does  the  content  of  our  thoughts  about  God  meet  Bermudez'  four  criteria  for  being 
genuinely  representational?  I  believe  that  any  theist  is  going  to  be  committed  to 
defending  the  claim  that  it  does.  Our  thought  about  God,  is  going  to  be  relevant  to  what 
we  believe  and  how  we  act;  and  the  prospects  of  explaining  such  action  as  prayer, 
reflection  and  self-sacrifice  in  stimulus-response  terms  seems  wholly  impossible,  as  the 
first  condition  demands.  The  connection  with  belief  and  action  is  going  to  ensure  that 
such  thought  must  be  integrated  with  other  cognitive'states;  and  the  possibility  of 
speaking  and  thinking  falsely  about  God,  or  recognising  that  his  qualities  are.  not  shared 
by  human  beings,  is  going  to  ensure  that  any  such  thought  must  admit  of  the 
recombination  of  its  parts,  and  the  possibility  error  and  misrepresentation.  So  each  of 
Bermudez'  criteria  will  be  met. 
Given  that  a  theist  will  typically  be  committed  to  the  claim  that  thought  about  God  is 
representational  in  B  ermudez'  sense,  how  might  she  establish  that  we  could  be  in  such 
states  even  if  we  lacked  the  relevant  concepts?  Well,  she  might  hold  that  God's 
otherness,  transcendence  and  infinity  -  however  these  notions  are  fleshed  out  -  give  us 
priniafacie  reason  to  believe  that  we  couldn't  conceptualise  his  properties,  so  that  the 
burden  of  proof  is  rather  on  the  proponent  of  the  (modified)  Conceptual  Access  claim. 
How  does  holding  such  a  position  point  towards  a  positive  account  of  the  usefulness  of 
strongly  irreducible  metaphor?  Well,  defensively,  it  blocks  Alston's  argument,  so  that 
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argue  as  follows.  Attribution  of  non-conceptual  content  is  standardly  intended  to  help  us 
explain  apparently  cognitive  and  purposive  behaviour  in  creatures  that  arguably  haven't 
mastered  concepts  -  animals,  newborn  babies,  etc.  Attribution  of  such  content'piggy 
backs',  as  it  were,  on  the  conceptual  capacities  of  the  attributing  theorist:  it  is  because 
ive  have  the  concept  of  squirrels,  and  elm  trees,  and  spatial  locations,  that  we  can  specify 
the  dog's  mistaken  thought  as  one  that  the  squirrel  is  in  the  elm  tree.  In  this  way,  we  can 
get  the  explanatory  benefits  of  appeal  to  intentional  states,  while  avoiding  having  to 
attribute  an  implausibly  sophisticated  conceptual  range  to  beasts  and  babes,  or  to  play 
down  the  normative  and  holistic  character  of  concept  acquisition  and  mastery. 
It  is  open  to  the  defender  of  SI  to  hold  that  a  similar  relationship  holds  between 
ourselves  and  God  as  holds  between  the  dog  andthe  theorist.  We  entertain  genuinely 
representational,  non-conceptual  thoughts  about  God,  which  we  express  via  metaphors. 
Thoughts  with  which  contents?  Those  specified  by  God  -  since  only  ýsomething  as 
powerful  and  cognitively  unlimited  as  God  could  properly  conceptualise  his  properties. 
We,  not  the  dog,  can  specify  the  content  of  his  thoughts  about  the  elm  tree;  God,  not  us, 
can  specify  the  content  of  our  thought  about  God.  The  propositions  that  our  metaphors 
express  are  thus  cognitively  within  our  grasp,  and  yet  non-reducible,  even  in  part,  to 
literal language.  Moreover,  this  second  strategy,  if  good,  seems  to  avoid  the 
disadvantage  noted  with  the  first  approach,  since  it  is  consistent  with  the  claim  that 
subjects  from  many  different  traditions  and  historical  periods  can  think  about  God,  and 
express  that  thought,  no  doubt  with  widely  varying  efficacy,  in  metaphor,  model  and 
parable. 
This  type  of  reply,  as  with  the  first  account,  draws  strength  from  analogies  with 
independently  motivated  positions.  States  which  plausibly  involve  non-conceptual 
content  in  Bermudez'  sense  -  including  perceptual,  proprioceptive,  emotional  and 
aesthetic  states  -  are  ones  where  we  find  metaphors  centrally  important  in  describing  and 
understanding  our  thoughts.  In  these  cases,  metaphors,  analogies  and  models  may 
indeed  play  a  central  role  in  the  process  of  conceptualization  by  which  we  eventually 
come  to  be  able  to  specify  the  states  of  thought  that  we  are  in.  The  idea  that  this  need 
always  be  the  case  needs  arguing,  though,  and  there  doesn't  seem  to  me  to  be  any  reason 
why  the  SI-theorist  should  feel  obliged  to  hold  that  it  happens  in  the  theological  case. 
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evident  on  even  this  brief  outline.  I  want  to  briefly  consider  two  points  which  might  be 
raised  with  reference  to  the  rejection  of  Conceptual  Access,  however.  The  first  is  that, 
since  God  can  specify  the  literal  content  of  our  metaphors,  they  are  paraphrasable  after 
all,  and  Strong  Irreducibility  is  false.  The  defender  of  SI  should  concede  that,  in  this 
sense,  irreducible  metaphors  can  be  paraphrased,  but  hold  that  they  were  only  ever 
committed  to  the  weaker  modal  claim  that  they  could  not  be  paraphrased,  even  in  part, 
and  even  in  principle,  by  creatures  such  as  us.  Since  God  knows  everything  that  can  be 
known,  he  knows  what  our  metaphors  say,  if  they  say  anything,  but  this  rebuttal  of  SI 
seems  rather  too  quick  to  address  the  most  interesting  versions  of  the  claim  of 
irreducibility,  and  is  definitely  not  in  the  spirit  of  Alston's  argument  as  presented. 
The  second  objection  which  might  be  raised  is  that  I  have  appealed  to  many  non- 
metaphorical  qualities  of  God  in  setting  up  the  above  argument  -  for  example,  that  he 
would  assign  particular  contents  to  the  irreducible  metaphors  we  use  to  talk  about  him. 
Doesn't  such  appeal  to  our  knowledge  of  God's  nature  undercut  many  of  the  motivations 
which  might  be  given  for  endorsing  SI  in  the  first  place?  In  particular,  can  such  an 
account  be  squared  with  any  theory  which  holds  that  God's  nature  is  wholly  ineffable? 
I  would  want  to  make  two  replies  to  such  an  objection.  The  first  is  the  local  point  that, 
as  presented  in  this  paper,  Alston's  argument  is  presented  as  establishing  the 
impossibility  of  strongly  irreducible  theological  metaphors.  Even  if  my  argument 
doesn't  show  that  such  metaphors  can  play  the  role  that  the  supporter  of  ineffability 
required  of  them,  it  would  still  show  that  such  metaphors  ivere  possible  in  theological 
contexts,  for  all  Alston's  argument  shows,  given  either  certain  beliefs  about  externalism 
and  basicality,  or,  more  interestingly  for  my  purposes  here,  about  non-conceptual 
content. 
Secondly,  the  ineffability  theorist  might  make  a  certain  reflexive  move  in  response  to  the 
above  challenge,  and  claim  that  the  philosophical  claims  she  makes  about  God  in  the 
course  of  defending  SI  are,  ultimately  speaking  as  it  were,  as  metaphorical  as  talk  about 
shepherds,  kings  and  rock.  Of  course,  since  she  is  committed  to  such  metaphors 
expressing  non-conceptual  contents,  which  can  only  be  specified  by  God,  she  will  hold 
that  the  philosophical  remarks  about  God  and  metaphor  she  makes  themselves  are 
208 metaphors  whose  content  she  can  entertain,  although  only  God  can  specify.  But  it  isn't 
immediately  obvious  why  this  move  should  be  taken  to  be  viciously  circular,  or  self- 
defeating,  at  least  in  a  context  where  the  burden  of  proof  isn't  assumed  always  to  fall  on 
the  theist.  If  she  occupies  states  which  genuinely  represent  aspects  of  God,  and  which 
are  cognitively  integrated  with  her  other  psychological  states,  then  why  shouldn't  she 
employ  these  in  reasoning  about  God? 
Such  a  result,  even  if  consistent,  may  be  considerably  less  than  many  defenders  of 
ineffability  might  want  to  endorse;  perhaps  the  idea  that  we  can  occupy  any  states  which 
can  genuinely  represent  the  nature  of  God,  conceptual  or  otherwise,  simply  fails  to  meet 
a  certain  type  of  sense  of  God's  alterity.  Nevertheless,  such  an  account  would,  if  stable, 
at  least  provide  one  elucidation  of  God's  ineffability.  That  alone,  it  seems  to  me, 
provides  it  with  sufficient  interest  to  warrant  more  general  consideration. 
I  have  argued  that  the  defender  of  strong  irreducibility  has  room  to  counter  Alston's 
attempted  reductio,  and  sketched  two  possible  lines  of  thought  which  might  allow  her  to 
do  so.  Both  have  costs  in  terms  of  philosophical  commitments,  but  I  have  argued  that 
for  the  most  part,  they  are  not  particularly  steep,  and  have  struck  philosophers  as 
possessing  some  independent  plausibility.  I  conclude  that,  pending  further  investigation 
at  least,  and  for  all  Alston  has  shown  us,  theists  are  free  to  appeal  to  irreducible 
metaphors  in  theology. 
5.7  Metaphor  and  Vagueness 
I  want  to  briefly  discuss  one  final  disambiguation  of  limitlessness;  one  highlighted  by 
Davidson's  evocative  remark  that  any  attempted  paraphrase  of  metaphor  is  bound  to  fail 
because  there  is  'the  idea  of  finishing  would  have  no  clear  application'.  It  is  clear  that 
Davidson's  remark  may  be  taken  in  a  number  of  different  ways,  drawing  attention  to  a 
number  of  salient  features  of  the  limitlessness  of  metaphor,  including  some  discussed 
earlier.  I  want  to  draw  attention  to  one  way  in  which  the  realist  might  aim  to  explain 
why  the  idea  of  finishing  had  no  clear  application,  namely,  by  claiming  that 
'__jnetaphorically  means  that-'  is  a  vague  term. 
209 Take  a  standard  example  of  metaphor:  Romeo's  claim  that  Juliet  is  the  sun,  say.  It 
seems  clear  that  there  are  some  things  that  this  definitely  doesn't  mean;  that  Juliet  is 
gassy,  for  example.  Moreover,  there  may  be  some  features  that  no  satisfactory 
elucidation  of  the  metaphor  could  omit;  that  Juliet  is  important  to  Romeo,  for  example. 
But  between  these  to  categories,  it  is  clear  that  there  is  a  large  grey  area,  where  we  are 
unsure  whether  a  given  property  is  really  part  of  the  metaphorical  content  expressed. 
Thus  Stem  describes  the  metaphor  as  conveying  that  Juliet  is  "exemplary  and  peerless, 
worthy  of  worship  and  adoration,  one  without  whose  nourishing  attention  another  cannot 
live,  one  who  awakens  those  in  her  presence  from  their  slumbering,  who  brings  light  to 
darkness".  267  It  is  simply  not  clear  to  me  that  the  metaphor  genuinely  mandates  the 
claim  that  Juliet  e.  g.  'awakens  those  in  her  presence  from  their  slumbering'.  So  it  seems 
that,  in  general  terms,  we  can  often  identify  three  categories  of  metaphorical  assignment; 
those  properties  that  definitely  seem  part  of  the  metaphorical  meaning,  those  that 
definitely  do  not,  and  those  for  which  it  is  neither  definite  that  they  do  nor  definite  that 
they  do  not. 
Such  a  division  clearly  invites  a  treatment  in  terms  of  vagueness.  Such  an  account 
would  have  a  natural  account  of  why  there  was  no  clear  stopping  place  in  paraphrasing 
metaphor  -  we  simply  stray  onto  a  wide,  multi-dimensional  borderline,  where  it  is  often 
far  from  clearwhether  a  given  property  genuinely  counts  as  part  of  the  meaning  of  the 
metaphor.  Since  I  am  dealing  with  a  broadly  realist  account  of  metaphorical  meaning,  I 
will  examine  how  the  most  straightforwardly  realist  account  of  vague  terms  - 
epistemicism  -  might  account  for  this  phenomenon. 
. 
Epistemicists  about  vagueness  explain  the  linguistic  behaviour  of  vague  terms,  including 
their  capacity  to  g  ive  rise  to  the  famous  sorites  paradoxes,  in  terms  of  our  being  ignorant 
about  certain  facts  about  the  world.  For  an  epistemicist  about  redness,  there  is  a 
unknowable  fact  of  the  matter  regarding  which  precise  shade  on  the  colour  spectrum 
marks  the  transition  from  redness  to  non-redness.  For  the  episternicist  about 
metaphorical  meaning,  similarly,  there  are  complete  and  precise  facts  about  whether  a 
given  paraphrase  of  a  metaphor  is  correct  or  not,  but  we  simply  cannot  know  what  they 
are.  Since,  as  noted  above,  most  contemporary  philosophers  of  metaphor  endorse  an 
267 
Stern  (2000)  p.  9 
210 anti-realist  answer  to  the  Evidence  Transcendence  test,  episternicism  will  no  doubt 
seem  to  an  extremely  revisionary  proposal.  The  epistemicist  thus  has  some  important 
explanatory  debts  to  discharge.  They  ought  to  tell  us: 
(1)  why  we  should  believe  in  'sharp  cut-offs'  in  paraphrases  of  metaphor. 
(2)  why  we  are  unable  to  know  the  positions  of  such  cut-offs. 
(3)  how  the  answers  to  the  above  two  questions  can  be  integrated  with  our  pre- 
theoretic  conception  of  epistemology  and  semantics. 
I  do  not  have  space  here  for  a  satisfactory  treatment  of  these  issues.  I  can  however, 
sketch  the  beginnings  of  a  line  that  such  a  theorist  might  take.  Firstly,  the  epistemicist 
ought  to  motivate  his  position  by  noting  (a)  his  ability  to  give  a  straightforward 
resolution  of  a  number  of  versions  of  the  sorites  paradoxes  which  (b)  accords  well  with  a 
minimal  statement  of  the  phenomenon  of  vagueness  while  (c)  maintaining  classical 
logic,  an  intuitive  and  clearly  understood  system  and  (d)  avoiding  the  counter-intuitive 
results  that  seem  to  plague  its  rivals.  268  That  begins  to  address  (1).  Secondly,  the 
epistemicist  ought  to  tell  something  like  Williamson's  story  regarding  our  ignorance  of 
such  CUt_offs  . 
269  Arguably,  knowledge  demands  something  like  modal  safety:  it  is  a 
priori  that,  if  S  knows  that  P,  then  it  couldn't  easily  have  been  the  case  that  S  believed 
that  P  and  P  was  false.  The  problem  with  gaining  knowledge  of  exactly  where  a  given 
colour  cuts  off,  or  paraphrase  ends,  is  that  it  is  just  too  easy  to  form  false  beliefs  in  the 
area.  Even  if  one  happens  to  stumble  by  chance  on  the  correct  shade,  or  statement  of  the 
metaphor's  meaning,  one  does  not  count  as  knowing  that  one  has  done  so,  since  we  lack 
the  relevant  powers  of  discrimination  to  clearly  distinguish  such  choices  from  their 
incorrect,  closely  overlapping  neighbours.  So  one  is  typically  necessarily  ignorant  of 
where  redness  cuts  off,  and  what  the  uniquely  correct  paraphrase  of  a  metaphor  really  is. 
The  real  puzzle  for  the  episternicist  about  m-meaning  is  in  addressing  the  latter  half  of 
explanatory  debt  (3).  What  aspect  of  our  linguistic  thought  and  practice  could  possibly 
serve  to  determine  that  metaphor  meant  one  perfectly  precise  paraphrase  rather  than 
268  For  a  detailed  defence  of  (a),  (c)  and  (d),  see  Williamson  (1994)  and  (1997),  and  Sainsbury  and 
Williamson  (1997).  For  a  defence  of  the  claim  that  epistemicism  coheres  best  with  a  minim4l  description 
of  the  phenomenon  of  vaguness,  see  Greenough  (2003). 
269  See  Williamson  (1994)  Ch  7  and  (2000)  Chs.  5  and  7 
211 another,  closely  related  one,  in  a  way  that  transcended  all  possibility  ofsuccessful 
human  enquiry?  Surely,  one  might  feel,  this  is  wholly  to  surrender  the  Wittgensteinian 
insight  that  meaning  has  an  internal  connection  to  the  way  words  and  sentences  are 
used?  If  this  is  the  cost  of  finessing  limitlessness,  many  will  no  doubt  feel  that  it  is 
hardly  worth  the  candle. 
Nevertheless,  it  may  be  too  soon  to  hope  that  such  an  extreme  realist  about  metaphorical 
meaning  will  be  forced  into  capitulation.  The  following  answer  may  be  open  to  him. 
Call  each  potential  paraphrase  of  a  metaphor  a  candidate-meaning  of  the  metaphor. 
Think  of  such  meanings  as  conjunctions  of  claims  MI-Mn  relating  to  the  metaphor,  a 
little  like  Stem's  paraphrase  of  'Juliet  is  the  sun',  only  spelled  out  in  some  language 
which  is  infinitely  more  complicated  than  our  own,  suitable  for  expressing  literally  the 
fine-grained  non-conceptual  contents  that  English  can  only  gesture  at  figuratively. 
Acceptable  candidate-meanings  will  include  each  claim  Mk  that  definitely  belongs  to  the 
paraphrase  of  a  given  metaphor,  and  none  of  the  claims  that  definitely  do  not  belong  to 
such  a  paraphrase.  The  vagueness  of  metaphor  consists,  according  to  our  epistemicist,  in 
our  being  unable  to  tell  which  of  the  acceptable  candidate-meanings  of  the  metaphor  is 
the  correct  one.  Even  if  we  could  formulate  such  paraphrases  in  such  a  language,  and 
happened  to  pick  the  right  one  out  by  chance,  we  could  never  count  as  knowing  that  we 
had  done  so,  since  we  cannot,  we  are  supposing,  reliably  discriminate  the  correct 
candidate  meaning  from  its  incorrect,  partially  overlapping  neighbours.  So  we  can  never 
have  sufficient  warrant  for  thinking  that  we  have  correctly  paraphrased  a  metaphor,  and 
a  form  of  limitlessness  is  accounted  for. 
The  proposed  epistemicist  will  think  of  a  given  metaphor  as  being  ambiguous  between 
its  acceptable  candidate-meanings.  270  Our  linguistic  practice,  together  with  the  way  the 
world  is,  fails  to  determine  a  unique  satisfier  for  the  definite  description  'correct 
paraphrase  of  the  metaphor'.  Now,  arguably,  it  does  not  make  sense  to  ask  after  the 
unrelativized  truth  value  of  an  ambiguous  utterance.  Take  the  claim  that  many  bats  can 
fly.  Is  that  true?  Well,  it's  true  of  vampire  bats,  but  not  of  baseball  bats.  The  question 
270  1  owe  this  thought  to  Sider  and  Braun  (2004).  Those  authors  conclude  that  no  sentence  containing  a 
vague  term  has  a  truth  value,  and  no  argument  involving  one  is  valid.  My  epistemicist  concedes  that  may 
be  true  of  sentences,  but  denies  it  of  utterances. 
212 of  the  truth  value  of  the  sentence  is  only  properly  resoluble  once  the  ambiguity  in  the 
string  has  been  eliminated.  A  similar  feature  holds  true  of  arguments.  Is:  something  is 
aflying  bat,  so  something  is  a  bat  valid?  Yes,  on  some  resolutions  of  the  ambiguous 
terms;  no  on  others.  Since  sentences  involving  vague  terms  are  treated  as  if  they  were 
ambiguous  in  the  more  traditional  sense,  the  same  story  goes  for  them.  On  this  view, 
Frege  was  right  to  hold  that  vagueness  in  natural  language  must  be  eliminated  before 
evaluation  in  terms  of  truth,  validity,  etc,  can  take  place. 
Such  a  view  is  obviously  radically  revisionary.  We  normally  think  of  claims  like: 
(a)  Post-boxes  are  red 
(b)  Men  with  no  hair  are  bald 
as  being  straightforwardly  true.  Since,  on  the  mooted  view,  each  such  vague  sentence  is 
ambiguous  between  a  number  of  equally  acceptable  precisifications,  it  is  strictly 
speaking  incorrect  to  think  of  any  of  them  being  apt  for  truth  or  falsity.  Similarly, 
-  intuitively  valid  arguments  ("All  red  things  are  coloured,  this  thing  is  red,  so  this  thing  is 
coloured")  are  actually  not  apt  for  such  appraisal  after  all.  271 
My  epistemicist  attempts  to  sweeten  the  pill  with  the  following  fable.  Although  such 
sentences  are  non-truth  apt,  since  they  do  not  express  unambiguous  propositional 
contents,  utterances  of  such  sentences  in  context  do  express  such  unique  meanings. 
How  can  this  miracle  occur?  Think  of  a  linguistic  context  as  a  device  for  maximizing 
the  intelligibility  of  conversational  participants.  272  Now,  conversational  participants 
normally  aim  to  speak  truly,  and  reason  validly,  notjust  approximate  to  each.  Moreover, 
they  expect  the  same  of  other  interlocutors.  We  ought  to  predict  that  context  will  thus 
shift  in  a  way  that  allows  them  to  achieve  their  aims.  After  all,  that's  exactly  what 
happens  when  I  tell  you  to  put  all  the  beer  in  the  fridge,  or  describe  my  desk  as  flat. 
Contextual  standards  shift  appropriately  in  response  to  the  aims  of  conversational 
participants.  How  exactly  this  happens  is  no  doubt  a  puzzling  matter,  which  we  don't 
271  Sider  and  Braun  accept  this  conclusion,  but  argue  that  'approximate  truth'  is  all  we  need  and  should 
care  about. 
272  Compare  Lewis  (1979)  p  420.  "...  conversational  score  does  tend  to  evolve  in  such  a  way  as  is  required 
in  order  to  make  whatever  occurs  count  ascorrect  play". 
213 yet  understand  fully,  although  we  can  model  some  aspects  of  it.  Nevertheless,  poor 
grasp  of  a  phenomenon  is  not  a  reason  to  reject  it,  especially  when  we  rely  on  appeal  to 
it  to  do  important  explanatory  work. 
How  might  context  shift  to  let  us  achieve  our  aims?  Since,  by  hypothesis,  there  are  a 
selection  of  equally  good  candidate  meanings,  it  cannot  shift  so  as  to  pick  an 
independently  favoured  one.  In  a  sense,  context  is  in  the  position  of  Buridan's  Ass. 
Both  have  a  goal  -  to  eat  straw,  to  maximise  intelligibility  -  which  they  will  fail  to 
achieve  if  they  remain  static  in  the  face  of  equally  good  options.  The  obvious  solution 
for  the  Ass  in  this  case  is  not  to  think  about  things  too  hard;  to  pick  an  arbitrary  bundle 
at  random,  rather  than  settling  for  hunger  in  the  face  of  equally  tempting  alternatives. 
Similarly,  the  best  result  for  context  is  to  simply  assign  an  arbitrary  precisification  to 
every  vague  term  in  the  utterance.  That  way,  intelligibility  is  maximized.  If  context 
refuses  to  assign  a  value  in  the  case  of  a  draw,  then  our  utterances  end  up  failing  of  truth 
and  validity,  contrary  to  our  communicative  intentions.  And  that's  exactly  what  we 
think  context-shifts  tend  to  prevent. 
Now,  since,  by  hypothesis,  such  a  shift  by  context  assigns  an  arbitrary  precisification  to 
vague  terms,  we  cannot  hope  to  know  which  semantic  value  it  has  assigned.  Safety  is 
violated,  since  it  is  just  to  easy  for  us  to  form  false  beliefs  about  which  of  the  permissible 
sharpenings  of  e.  g.  'red'  or  'bald'  has  been  assigned  to  a  given  utterance.  So  the  basic 
epistemicist  story  about  vagueness  holds.  Nevertheless,  on  the  suggested  account,  the 
epistemicist  can  seem  to  circumvent  their  greatest  problem;  of  identifying  what  it  is 
about  our  pre-theoretic  linguistic  practice  that  could  possibly  determine  sharp  cut-offs. 
The  answer  turns  out  to  be  relatively  simple:  our  shared  expectation  that  the  correct 
interpretation  of  one's  thought  and  talk  is  the  one  that  maximizes  intelligibility.  Our 
epistemicist  simply  puts  a  characteristic  spin  on  this  plausible  thought,  by  denying  that 
we  can  always  in  principle  come  to  know  what  such  a  correct  interpretation  is. 
A  similar  story  goes  for  metaphor.  Metaphors,  according  to  our  hero,  are  ambiguous 
between  their  rival  candidate-meanings.  In  cases  where  we  want  to  get  something  fairly 
definite  across,  to  speak  the  truth,  in  an  extended  sense,  context  shifts  to  assign  an 
arbitrary  such  candidate-meaning  to  the  metaphor.  The  search  for  paraphrase  is  clearly 
doomed,  on  this  account,  since  we  would  never  be  able  to  know  that  we  had  lighted  on 
214 the  correct  restatement  even  if  we  had.  So  a  form  of  limitlessness  is  established.  We 
can  identify  some  propositions  that  lie  clearly  on  either  side  of  a  large,  grey  area,  but 
beyond  that  point,  we  are  out  of  our  epistemic  depth. 
5.8  Conclusion 
In  the  early  part  of  this  thesis,  I  outlined  and  offered  some  preliminary  defence  of  a 
broadly  Davidsonian  error-theory  about  metaphorical  meaning.  In  the  last  two  chapters, 
I  have  aimed  to  examine  some  key  issues  relating  to  realism  about  metaphorical 
meaning  in  a  broader,  and  more  neutral  manner.  In  Chapter  4,1  discussed  such  meaning 
in  the  light  of  Wright's  cruces,  and  began  to  examine  whether  they  might  help  highlight 
previously  unconsidered  resources  for  accounting  for  the  distinctive  marks  of  metaphor. 
In  this  chapter,  I  continued  that  project.  I  argued  that  thinking  of  metaphors  as  serving 
to  express  non-conceptual  contents  provided  some  resources  for  a  realist  account  of 
limitlessness  and  non-propositionality.  I  then  described  two  ways  in  which  such  a 
model  could  be  independently  insightful  and  significant,  in  the  philosophy  of  emotion 
and  the  philosophy  of  religion.  Finally,  I  sketched  a  novel,  robustly  realist  treatment  of 
non-paraphrasability,  in  terms  of  a  certain  kind  of  context-dependent  resolution  of 
vagueness. 
It  seems,  then,  that  Davidson  has  not  marshalled  conclusive  arguments,  based  on  the 
marks  of  metaphor,  that  would  serve  to  establish  that.  a  broadly  pragmatic  realist  model 
is  hopeless.  Since,  as  I  have  already  concluded,  Davidson  himself  should  agree  that 
metaphors  can  be  used  to  implicate  propositions,  this  is  not  wholly  bad  news  for  the 
error-theorist.  Nevertheless,  if  the  defence  of  Davidson's  (A6)  depends  maintaining  on 
the  vast  majority  of  metaphors  failing  to  convey  such  propositions,  at  the  supposed  cost 
of  surrendering  the  marks  of  metaphor,  then  such  a  defence  seems  to  fail.  Of  course,  my 
discussion  here  has  been  provisional,  sketchy  and  carried  out  at  an  intuitive  level. 
Nevertheless,  I  hope  to  have  established  several  strategies  by  which  the  realist  about 
metaphorical  meaning  might  hope  to  give  an  account  of  the  limitlessness  and  non- 
propositionality  of  metaphor,  without  surrendering  central  doctrines.  In  the  absence  of 
compelling  reason  for  thinking  that  such  strategies  must  fail,  the  pragmatic  realist 
account  of  metaphorical  content  seems  to  remain  as  an  important  and  viable  position. 
215 216  - Conclusion 
My  aim  in  this  thesis  has  been  to  examine  whether  the  philosophy  of  realism  can  cast 
light  upon  the  philosophy  of  metaphor.  The  issues  involved  are  large  ones,  and  my 
discussion  has  often  been  correspondingly  limited,  sketchy  and  provisional. 
Nevertheless,  I  hope  that  some  minor  progress  has  been  made.  I  began  by  endorsing 
some  key  aspects  of  Wright's  recommended  methodology  for  prosecuting  debates  about 
realism  -  in  particular  his  suggestion  that  we  should  aim  to  identify  and  apply  a  series  of 
diagnostic  'tests  for  objectivity'  -  while  rejecting  his  characterization  of  the  relative 
dialectical  positions  of  the  participants  in  such  investigations.  I  then  clarified  and 
defended  a  broadly  Davidsonian  position  on  metaphor,  signalling  its  kinship  with  error 
theoretic  positions  in  other  areas.  I  addressed  Wright's  worry  that  the  availability  of 
minimalism  undercut  the  motivation  for  such  a  such  a  position,  and  argued  that  the 
Davidsonian  was  best  understood  as  arguing  that  talk  of  metaphorical  meaning,  at  least 
in  the  semantic  sense  of  that  ambiguous  term,  failed  to  meet  even  the  most  basic  hurdle 
for  objectivity,  that  of  coherence  in  the  light  of  the  constitutive  standards  of  its  parent 
discourse. 
Though  there  is  still  much  more  work  to  be  done,  and  plenty  of  room  for  the  opposition 
to  manoeuvre,  I  provisionally  endorsed  this  aspect  of  the  anti-realist  challenge.  Key 
premises  of  Davidson's  master  argument  against  a  semantic  treatment  of  metaphorical 
meaning  had  proved  defensible,  and  the  overall  ontological  economy  of  the  position  had 
earned  it,  I  claimed,  a  right  to.  default  status  in  the  field.  In  an  effort  not  to  foreclose  too 
quickly  on  defensible  theories,  I  broadened  my  avenue  of  enquiry.  Wright's  tests 
provided  a  useful  structure  in  which  to  address  key  issues  in  the  philosophy  of  metaphor, 
and  I  endeavoured  to  apply  them  in  a  way.  that  was  maximally  neutral  between  live 
theories  in  the  field.  That  methodological  decision  turned  out  to  be  fruitful,  when 
attempting  to  apply  the  test  to  metaphor  tests  helped  bring  to  the  fore  several  under- 
explored  issues  -  relating,  for  example,  to  the  realist  standing  of  speaker-intention,  to  the 
autonomy  of  metaphorical  interpretation,  and  the  epistemic  transparency  of  context  - 
that  might  otherwise  have  remained  unexamined. 
217 In  the  closing  chapter,  I  set  out  a  more  positive  vision,  identifying  a  distinctive  cognitive 
and  linguistic  role  that  metaphor  characteristically  discharges.  I  related  Bermudez'  work 
on  non-conceptual  content  to  Davidsonian  worries  about  realist  neglect  of  the  marks  of 
metaphor,  and  tried  to  demonstrate  how  these  concerns  might  be  addressed  by  a 
pragmatic  realist  about  metaphorical  meaning.  I  briefly  treated  the  role  of  metaphor  in 
the  communication  and  examination  of  our  emotional  states,  and  suggested  some  ways 
in  which  the  position  might  serve  to  underwrite  the  possibility  of  irreducible  religious 
metaphor,  contra  Alston. 
Throughout  the  thesis,  I  have  tried  to  address  key  issues  in  contemporary  philosophy  of 
metaphor.  My  discussion  has  been  uneven;  painfully  underdeveloped  in  some  areas,  and 
painfully  detailed  in  others.  My  focus  of  attention  has  often  circled  round  two  or  three 
central  theories  and  concerns.  My  primary  stalking  horses  have  been  the  insightful  and 
original  approaches  of  Davidson,  Stem  and  Denham,  with  which  I  have  found  much  to 
disagree,  but  much  also  to  applaud.  I  have  often  returned  to  the  question  of  how  to 
pursue  profitable  discussion  about  realism,  to  the  proper  understanding  of  the  distinctive 
marks  of  metaphor,  and  the  connection  between  figurative  meaning  and  speaker 
intention.  Each  of  these  issues  seems  barely  to  have  been  broached,  and  yet  I  hope  that  I 
have  identified  some  potentially  rewarding  routes  for  further  enquiry. 
Philosophy  of  metaphor  -  like  the  philosophy  of  the  emotions,  like  the  philosophy  of  art 
-  often  seems  beset  with  a  single  overriding  tension.  .  On  the  one  hand,  there  is  a  strong 
tendency  to  try  to  bring  metaphor  within  the  compass  of  some  systematic  theory,  that 
assigns  it  a  suitably  cognitive  role,  a  place  at  the  foundations  of  our  epistemic  practice. 
On  the  other,  there  is  the  tendency  to  feel  that  this  approach,  no  matter  how  sensitively 
its  practitioners  try  to  account  for  the  distinctive  nature  of  the  phenomenon,  seems  to 
leave  everything  out  that  made  us  interested  in  the  topic  in  the  first  place.  It  is  difficult 
to  tell  whether  this  reveals  anything  important  about  the  nature  of  such  subject  matter, 
paradigmatically  close  as  it  is  to  the  expressive,  lived  life  of  human  beings,  or  whether  it 
is  merely  a  predictable  side-effect  of  the  usual  murdering  to  dissect.  In  any  case,  this 
thesis,  like  most  other  work  in  the  area,  has  made  at  best  limited  progress  in  resolving  or 
dissolving  that  ftindamental  tension.  Davidson  famously  described  metaphor  as  the 
dreamwork  of  language,  but  I  want  to  conclude  instead  with  Wittgenstein's  cautionary 
remarks  about  what  real  dreamwork  actually  achieves: 
218 In  Freudian  analysis,  the  dream  is  as  it  were  dismantled.  It  loses  its  original  sense 
completely.  You  might  think  of  it  as  performed  on  the  stage,  with  a  plot  that  is 
sometimes  fairly  incomprehensible  but  also  in  part  quite  comprehensible,  or  at  least 
apparently  so,  &  as  though  this  plot  were  then  tom  into  little  pieces  &  each  part  given  a 
completely  different  meaning.  You  could  also  think  of  it  like  this:  a  picture  is  drawn  on 
a  big  sheet  of  paper  &  the  sheet  is  then  folded  in  such  a  way  that  pieces  which  do  not 
belong  together  at  all  in  the  original  picture  collide  in  appearance  &a  new  picture, 
which  may  make  sense  or  may  not,  is  formed 
... 
Now  I  could  imagine  that  someone 
might  exclaim  "Yes,  that  is  the  solution,  that  is  what  I  dreamed,  without  gaps  or 
distortions.  "  It  would  then  be  this  acknowledgement  that  made  this  solution  tile 
solution  ...  In  this  case  it  might  really  be  said:  only  when  you  have  found  it,  do  you  know 
what  you  were  looking  for.  273 
It  seems  to  me  that  Wittgenstein's  construal  of  dreamwork  is  a  good  metaphor  for  the 
interpretation  of  metaphor  itself,  and  also,  aptly  enough,  for  the  completion  of  a  thesis. 
273  Wittgenstein  (1998)  p.  78.  '(  MS  136  137a:  22.1.1948.  ) 
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